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Foreword

The War

International

val

mote

Law Studies "Blue Book" series was inaugurated by the Na-

College in 1901 as a forum for essays, treatises and articles that pro-

a broader understanding of international law.

this historic series, International

scholarly papers

Law and Military

War

and maritime

tries

Operations,

is

volume of

a compilation of

College.

The purpose of the conference was
the 2006

eighty- fourth

and remarks derived from the proceedings of a June 2007 confer-

ence hosted by the Naval

sea

The

Lebanon

security, the

to address three areas of interest

—law of the

law of armed conflict and coalition operations, and

Conflict. Participants

and included government

officials,

came

Newport from twenty-five counmilitary commanders, representatives of
to

non-governmental organizations, esteemed international law scholars, and military

The conference was designed to encourage a constructive dialogue on these issues by examining US and international perspectives to ensure a
sensible development of the law, and to preserve both national and collective security
imperatives. Undoubtedly the ideas generated in this "Blue Book" volume will conand

civilian lawyers.

tribute substantially to the

ongoing examination of the major

companying maritime operations and armed

On behalf of the

legal challenges ac-

conflict in the twenty- first century.

Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations

and the

Commandant of the Marine Corps, I extend a warm thank-you to Major Michael D.
Carsten, US Marine Corps, under whose leadership this conference was organized,
and who served as the editor of this volume. I also wish to thank the authors for
their invaluable contributions to this

work and

for

engendering a greater under-

standing of operational law in the maritime context and of the law of armed conflict

generally.

Thanks

also to the Lieber Society of the

American Society of

International Law, cosponsor of this conference. And, finally, a very special note of
gratitude goes to the Naval

Law and

Israel

Yearbook on

War College Foundation, Roger Williams School of
Human Rights, whose tremendous support made this

conference, and, particularly, this International

JACOB

Law Studies volume,

L.

SHUFORD
US Navy
Naval War College

Rear Admiral,
President,

possible.

Introduction

Since its founding in

1884, the

US Naval War College has been committed to

the study and teaching of the law impacting military operations.

As part of its

commitment, from June 20-22, 2007 the Naval War College hosted a conference
entitled International Law and Military Operations. Initiated in 1990, with a conference addressing the targeting of enemy merchant shipping, the international law
conference series brings together international scholars and practitioners, experts
in military operations

and students

to

examine topical

legal issues.

Commencing

with that inaugural colloquium, the proceedings of and papers from each succeeding conference have been published as a
nationally acclaimed International

Book" continues

Law

volume of the Naval War

College's inter-

Studies ("Blue Book") series. This "Blue

that practice.

The conference speakers explored several diverse, yet timely, subjects relevant
to the planning and conduct of military operations. These include maritime strategy and the global legal order, the law of the sea and maritime security, the law of
armed conflict, maritime enforcement of United Nations Security Council resolutions, coalition operations, and the 2006 conflict in Lebanon. This volume of the

Law Studies series is a compilation of remarks made during the conand of articles that expand upon the thoughts articulated during the

International

ference

conference.

The conference was organized by Major Michael D. Carsten, US Marine Corps,
of the International Law Department, who also served as managing editor of this
volume. The conference was cosponsored by the Lieber Society on the Law of
Armed Conflict of the American Society of International Law, and was made possible through the support of the Naval

University School of

Law and

War

College Foundation, Roger Williams

the Israel Yearbook on

Human

Rights.

Without the

dedicated efforts, support and assistance of these individuals and organizations the

conference would not have taken place.
I

once again give thanks to Professor Emeritus Jack Grunawalt and Captain

Ralph Thomas, JAGC,

US Navy (Ret.), who undertook the lion's share of the edit-

ing process. Indeed, this edition marks the sixth consecutive "Blue Book"

they have shared editing responsibilities. Without their
tion to the Naval
lication

tireless efforts

on which

and devo-

War College and to the International Law Studies series, this pub-

would not have been

possible.

Special thanks go to Rear Admiral Jacob Shuford, President of the Naval

College,

and Professor Barney Rubel, Dean of the Center

Studies, for their leadership
ference,

and support

in the

for

War

Naval Warfare

planning and conduct of the con-

and the publication of this volume.

The International Law Studies series is published by the Naval War College and
distributed worldwide to US and international military organizations, academic
institutions and libraries. This "Blue Book" and its predecessors evidence the Naval
War College's long-standing dedication to the scholarly discourse and understanding of legal issues at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

MANDSAGER
Professor of Law & Chairman
DENNIS

L.

International

Law Department

Preface

Commander

following the conclusion of the conference,

Immediately
Hurt, JAGC,

Eric

US Naval Reserve, an officer assigned to the reserve unit support-

ing the International

Law Department,

expertly prepared a conference

summary

which captures the highlights of the presentation of each of the conference speak-

The remarks that follow are, with limited editing to conform to the "Blue
Book" style, that summary. My thanks are extended to Commander Hurt for this
outstanding work; it certainly eased my work as editor.
I also extend my thanks and appreciation to Susan Meyer of the Desktop Publishing Office here at the Naval War College. Ms. Meyer has been responsible for
ers.

preparation of the page proofs of eight volumes of the International
series.

The high

quality of this

and outstanding

Shannon

Cole,

expertise.

I

My thanks

Studies

again testimony to her professionalism

is

also

go to Mr. Albert Fassbender and Ms.

two superb proofreaders, who are Ms. Meyer's colleagues

Desktop Publishing
partment was a

volume

Law

Office.

The

"final" article that left the International

far superior article

when

encourage readers of this volume to

it

returned from that

first

in the

Law De-

office.

read the following summary.

It

will

whet your appetite for the individual articles prepared by the speakers and their insightful analyses of many of the challenging international

law issues facing military

forces today.

Keynote Address
In his address opening the conference, Professor Allen reflected that three decades

have elapsed since law of the sea scholar Daniel Patrick O'Connell challenged conventional thinking with his

book The

wrote that the law of the sea

is

erations planning staffs

used

this

ment of

power and

that future naval op-

must acquire an appreciation of the

law. Professor Allen

the stimulus to sea

groundbreaking book
the

Influence of Law on Sea Power. O'Connell

new maritime

as the

backdrop for a discussion of the develop-

strategy of the United States.

2006, the Chief of Naval Operations tasked the Naval
ideas that will guide the

new

team charged with

During the summer of

War College with developing

crafting the

new maritime strategy. The

strategy will be nested within the security strategies

National Security Strategy of the United States. This

is

which emanate from the
not the

first

time the

Navy has launched a grand strategy development project, but common to

all

US

of the

Preface

predecessor documents

is

and

a lack of express discussion of the role of law

legal in-

stitutions in naval operations.

This unanimous agreement on the need to reference international law arises

from the

law as an ordering force. Order

role of

is

necessary for successful trade,

transportation and the interaction of nations pursuing their national interests.
Professor Allen observed that the rule sets which bring about this order will not

ways be voluntarily complied with and
This enforcement requires

that, for that,

al-

enforcement must be added.

new ways of thinking. The historical "DIME"

construct

of diplomatic, information, military and economic methods of engagement must

be supplemented by law enforcement, judicial and cultural measures. To achieve
these goals within a maritime strategy, Professor Allen advanced the idea that law,
as a

proven promoter of order, security and prosperity, can be a powerful unifying

theme.

Law provides

for international

the language and logic of cooperation.

law and our recognition of such

clear that respect

It is

will allow the

United States to

shape the global and legal orders as a good-faith participant in the system.

Panel I - Law of the Sea and Maritime Security

JAGC, US Navy (Ret.), Judge Advocate
General of the United States Navy from 1974 to 1976, opened the panel by providing a historical background for the US position on the 1982 United Nations ConRear Admiral Horace B. Robertson

vention on the
as 1966,

Law of the

Sea (1982

Jr.,

LOS

Convention). The United

under President Johnson proclaimed that the

seas

States, as early

must not be the source

of a land grab. This position was reinforced by President Nixon's 1970

bed

US

opposition to the

LOS Convention, citing the machinery of implementation.

President Reagan

treaty. In 1982,

1982

call for a sea-

then-President Reagan announced the

detailed his specific objections to the treaty. In the time since these objections were
registered, they

have

all

been addressed. Despite these remedies, opposition to

US

accession to the Convention persists.

Rear Admiral Robertson outlined the continuing objections to the 1982

Convention. These objections

all

LOS

appear to be ideological and lack substance. Chief

among the opposition's arguments is that a ratification of the Convention is a surrender of US sovereignty to the United Nations. This is not supported by the text of
the

document or

the machinery used to administer the Convention.

also claim that the

United States need not

tional law provides

does

set forth a legal

all

ratify

UNCLOS,

as

Opponents

customary interna-

of the same benefits. While customary international law

framework,

it

does not provide the precision of UNCLOS or

the institutions by which to seek resolution of disputes.

xn
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The

Staff Judge

(Pete) Pedrozo,

Command, Captain Raul
are many challenges to free

Advocate for United States Pacific

JAGC, US Navy, observed

that there

navigation of the seas. These challenges include regimes adopted by the International

Maritime Organization (IMO), such as establishment of mandatory ship

porting systems and particularly sensitive sea areas (PSSA). These

have the practical

effect

IMO

measures

of impeding freedom of navigation in designated portions

of the ocean. Captain Pedrozo indicated that the National Oceanic and
spheric Administration

re-

(NOAA)

Atmo-

has requested the designation of over 140,000

square miles of ocean surrounding the Northwest Hawaiian Islands as a PSSA.

Such a designation,
for the

in his view,

is

not necessary and will pose significant challenges

US Coast Guard and NOAA to enforcement of the mandatory ship reportThe proliferation of IMO-adopted measures
adversely impact the operations of the US Navy worldwide.

ing system that will encircle the PSSA.

could also

The Judge Advocate General
William Baumgartner,

US

Coast Guard, spoke on the increasing importance of

on port entry as

conditions

United States Coast Guard, Rear Admiral

for the

a tool for ensuring maritime security

and the need

for

an analytical structure to evaluate proposed entry conditions. Given the impor-

Guard has developed a comprehensive strategy to
combat maritime terrorism called Maritime Sentinel which takes a three-pronged
approach: 1) achieving maritime domain awareness, 2) undertaking effective maritime security and response operations, and 3) creating and overseeing an effective
maritime security regime. Conditions on port entry, such as advanced notice of arrival for commercial vessels arriving from abroad, are and will continue to be an

tance of port security, the Coast

important part of executing

this strategy.

Rear Admiral Baumgartner noted that additional conditions

may be added

in

the future and suggested that the following questions should be asked in evaluating

those conditions:
•

Will the proposed condition be effective in addressing an issue of significant

importance?
•

Is

there a better, less expensive

and less objectionable way to accomplish the

same policy goal?
•

Will

the sea,
•

it

i.e.,

Does

be consistent with customary and conventional international law of
does

it

it

impinge on important navigational freedoms?

have a rational nexus in time, place and purpose to the actual entry

into port?

The

met by stopping threats
before they reach our shores. Conditions on port entry are one of the most effective
tools in accomplishing this but they must be prudent and well considered.
goal of enhancing national security

is

most

effectively

,

xiii
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Professor Guifang (Julia)

Xue of Ocean

University of China observed that

moving from being a State historically focused on coastal State interests to
becoming a maritime State. This move results from China's growth as a major
inrluencer of globalization. The importance of free navigation, as reflected in the
China

1982

is

LOS Convention, has caused a

reevaluation of China's laws and policies. This

reevaluation takes the form of modifying Chinese domestic law to
pliance with the Convention

and working

to settle

come

comtensions between China and
into

various States, such as Taiwan, Japan and Vietnam.

Luncheon Address
Rear Admiral Schachte began by outlining

how opponents

vention have dealt in misrepresentations to defeat

its

of the 1982

approval by the

LOS ConUS Senate.

These misrepresentations center mainly on the argument that the Convention
rob the United States of its sovereignty. In

fact,

there

is

will

nothing in the treaty which

away from the maritime power of the United States. Opponents also claim
the Convention will serve as a threat to US freedom of navigation on the high seas.
takes

With over one hundred illegal claims against navigation, the 1982 LOS Convention
stands as the mechanism which will allow for greater freedom of navigation and the
resolution of impediments to movement.
The Convention provides a stable legal environment which improves the US
ability to succeed in the Global War on Terror. Despite claims to the contrary, the
Convention does not give the United Nations the authority to tax the United
or to board

US

ships. Accession to the 1982

United States the

ability to

LOS Convention would

ators indicating support, Rear

soon provide

its

rect participation

tives

—

is

civilians

the

II

a part of US oceans policy.

- Law of Armed Conflict

Dinstein, Professor Emeritus, Tel Aviv University, spoke

of civilians in

cent decisions by the

between

number of sen-

advice and consent, but stressed that party or non-party, a robust

Panel

Yoram

a large

Admiral Schachte expressed hope that the Senate

freedom of navigation program must continue to be

Professor

give the

shape and influence world maritime policy and law.

With President Bush's endorsement of the Convention and
will

States

hostilities

and targeted

Supreme Court of

and combatants,

Israel.

The

killings in the context

as well as civilian objects

sor Dinstein noted that the definition of military objectives
is

very open ended, since every

xiv

di-

of re-

principle of distinction

and military objec-

most basic principle of the international law of armed

location, purpose or use)

on

conflict. Profes-

(grounded on nature,

civil

object

— including

a

Michael D. Carsten
be used by the enemy, thereby turning
—
the requirement of proportionHence, the key element
attacked—
meaning
—when

hospital or a church

is

into a mili-

liable to

in practice

tary objective.
ality,

a military objective

that

civilians

ticipated

is

incidental injuries to

is

must not be excessive in relation to the anmilitary advantage gained. Of course, what is considered excessive is of-

and damage to

civilian objects

ten a subjective assessment

made in the mind of the beholder, subject only to a test

of reasonableness.

On the subject of direct participation of civilians in hostilities, Professor Dinstein
observed that there
pation

is

is

a virtual consensus that, at those times

occurring, the individual

when the direct partici-

maybe targeted. But what is he in terms of clas-

sification? Professor Dinstein believes that the

person has become a combatant,

and indeed (more often than not) an unlawful combatant. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), on the other hand, adheres to the view that he remains a

(although agreeing that he

civilian

The

participating in hostilities).

only when the person

is

may be

attacked while directly

difference of opinion has a practical consequence

captured. Professor Dinstein takes the position that, as an

unlawful combatant, the person loses the general protection of the Geneva Con-

some minimal standards of protection, whereas
the ICRC maintains that the general protection of civilian detainees under Geneva

ventions and only benefits from

Convention IV remains

in effect.

Professor Dinstein also addressed the issue of human shields.
voluntarily attempting to shield a military objective
ticipating in hostilities.
jectives, the act is

As

it

mean

he

is

directly par-

Rome Statute of the International
what if involuntary human shields are used?

unlawful and even (under the

that the principle of proportionality remains intact, so that the op-

posing belligerent

may be barred from attacking the military objective?

position taken by Additional Protocol
his opinion,

attack,

for the involuntary use of civilians to shield military ob-

Criminal Court) a war crime. But

Does

from

When a civilian is

This

is

the

of 1977. Professor Dinstein disagrees. In

I

under customary international law, the principle of proportionality

must be stretched

in such

an instance and applied with greater

outcome is that a large number of civilians are killed,
the belligerent party that abused

them

as

human

their

blood

flexibility. If

is

the

on the hands of

shields.

Doctor Nils Melzer, of the International Committee of the Red Cross, stressed

no defined battlefield. This
distinguishing between civilians and combatants. Civilians

that in the current conflict against terrorism, there

leads to confusion in

is

enjoy protection under international law until such time as they participate in hostilities.

Unfortunately, there

is

no

clarity

on what it means to participate. An ICRC/

Asser Institute initiative on direct participation seeks to define the term "direct
participation" in the context of the concept of civilians, the nature of hostilities and

xv

Preface

the modalities of the suspension of hostilities.
hostilities as action
fect

on the

He

taken by an individual which

is

defined direct participation in

designed to have an adverse

military operations of a party.

Doctor Melzer indicated that the duration of this participation

is

quantify. Concrete steps toward the preparation of a hostile act,

commit

the act,

ered by the

commission of the

ICRC

to

act

be part of the hostile

act,

and cause

and are not lawfully subject

bat actions, proportionality

must

civilian

are

consid-

all

civilians to lose their pro-

to attack.

As with

civilians
all

com-

factor into the targeting decision involving the

engaged in the commission of a hostile

act.

Ultimately,

tion concerning the status of a civilian, the presumption
is

deployment to

and return from deployment

regain their protected status

ual

also difficult to

under international law. Once these actions are complete, the

tection

ef-

if there is

must be

any ques-

that the individ-

protected and not subject to lawful targeting.

Professor David Turns of the University of Liverpool detailed the recent

House

of Lords decision in the case ofAl-Skeini. This case involved the deaths of one Iraqi
civilian

while in British military custody, and five others during British military op-

erations

on the

streets

of Basra. The House of Lords held that an inquiry should be

held into the death of a prisoner in custody in Iraq in certain extraordinary circumstances.

Such an inquiry

of the United
specific

Kingdom

is

appropriate

when

the person

human

for purposes of British

is

within the jurisdiction

rights law. This

determination that centers upon whether the individual

tody. In this case, the death of the individual

is

is

a fact-

in British cus-

who was in British custody requires an

inquiry under the law. In situations where individuals are killed and not in British
custody, they are not within the jurisdiction of the United
rights law purposes,

and therefore there

Army deploys to

is

no requirement for an

when

the British

rights

law which must be applied to those under

a foreign country,
its

it

is

for

human

inquiry. In effect,

takes with

it

British

human

control and custody.

In closing, Professor Turns noted that the United
British presence in Iraq

Kingdom

Kingdom's

legal

view of the

similar to the position taken with regard to the presence

of British forces in Northern Ireland during the "Troubles." In both cases, the British military

was invited

to aid the existing

detainees are not prisoners of war under

government and

quell unrest; therefore

Geneva Convention

III,

because the con-

how

flict is

not a war. Professor Turns concluded by arguing that no matter

Global

War on Terror is classified, detainees should be treated either as prisoners of

war under Geneva Convention

III

or in accordance with

four 1949 Geneva Conventions and be given the

the

Common Article 3 of the

maximum

benefit of such

treatment.

Ashley Deeks from the Legal Adviser's Office

at the

US Department of State ex-

plained that the United States has engaged in a detailed, ongoing analysis of the

xvi
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rules pertaining to the treatment
cies

and classification of detainees. The rules and poli-

regarding detainees that the United States put in place in 2002 have evolved

considerably, due to input

from

all

three branches of the

US government. Under

Guantanamo Bay, the detention of inof constant and ongoing review. The United States has

the present regimes in Iraq, Afghanistan and
dividuals

the subject

is

taken concrete steps to ensure that detainees are treated appropriately and that
their statuses

and ongoing detention

are reviewed periodically.

Ms. Deeks noted that the situation in Afghanistan

is

complicated, given the

makeup of the coalition involved in operations. Different members of the coalition
have different domestic laws and policies concerning detainees. In addition,
ent countries are signatories to different law of war and

These

make

factors,

combined with the

difficult-to- classify

human

differ-

rights treaties.

nature of the operation,

detainee operations challenging. Despite these challenges, the United States

has achieved a sustainable detainee regime in Afghanistan.

Panel HI - New Developments in Maritime Enforcement
of UN Security Council Resolutions
Professor Alfred Soons, University of Utrecht, opened this panel
tion of who

by raising the ques-

may enforce UN Security Council resolutions (UNSCRs).

In short,

may

a non-flag State take action against a vessel outside the national waters of that State?

The answer depends on the nature of the Security Council resolution. These resolutions cover many areas, including economic sanctions, counterterrorism, counterproliferation and peacekeeping. The interpretation of these resolutions can be
undertaken by Security Council-established sanctions committees,
States,

lutions

domestic courts and international tribunals.
it is

important to note that the

UNSCRs

UN member

When interpreting these reso-

are not governed

Convention on the Law of Treaties because the resolutions are not

by the Vienna

The inlaw and the

treaties.

must be driven by looking to customary international
general principles of law on interpretation. Given the special nature of UNSCRs,

terpretation

is

also helpful to look at the statements of Security

resolution

and the prior resolutions and

Nevertheless, as
sovereignty,
tion. This

significant

it is

UNSCRs

Council members in passing the

practices of the Council.

often involve a potential for incursion into national

important to take a narrow approach to interpreting the resolu-

may lessen

the possibility of an incursion

doubt about the meaning or intent of a

particular circumstances, the proper action to take
rity

it

upon

sovereignty. If there

UNSCR and

would be

its

is

application to

to return to the Secu-

Council and ask for a determination as to whether a breach has occurred.

xvn
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when

Professor Soons closed by stating that
waters, the

action

UNSCR must state explicitly that force

is

is

taken in a State's territorial

allowed.

Professor Robin Churchill, University of Dundee, Scotland, focused on poten-

between

conflicts

tial

UNSCRs and

the 1982

LOS

Convention.

It

is

clear that

UNSCRs may routinely interfere with navigational rights reflected in the Convention. This interference may arise from activities occurring during the enforcement
of economic sanctions, prevention of trafficking in weapons of mass destruction

(WMD)

technology and the prevention of terrorism. These conflicts take place

when the Security Council, through
do upon the seas.

a resolution, places limits

on what

a State

may

Professor Churchill then turned to the question of resolving conflicts between

LOS Convention. He observed that pur103 of the UN Charter, UNSCRs will always prevail over provisions

Security Council resolutions and the 1982

suant to Article

of that or any other international agreement.
Churchill argued that they

ment
the

may be

bodies, previously chosen

When

conflicts

resolved by one of the various dispute settle-

by the

parties to the dispute

under Article 287 of

LOS Convention. Of course, these decisions bind only the parties to the dispute

and the rulings have no precedential value.

may

Finally, these dispute resolution bodies

decide the dispute but they have no authority to declare that a

Council resolution

is

taking domestic action to

and regimes. Force
1982

when

LOS Convention

principles of

must be

as

should be as limited as possible and

Keyuan noted

that the

has no provision authorizing the use of force and therefore

narrow a use

UN

Zou observed that China

explicitly authorized. Professor

humanity must be used

be argued that the

Security

comply with international non-proliferation standards

in support of these regimes

should be used only

UN

invalid.

University of Central Lancashire Professor Dr. Keyuan
is

do occur, Professor

to resolve conflicts. If force

as possible. In fact, before force

is

considered,

may be authorized,

it

it

can

UN Security Council resolution must specifically reference Arti-

The use of force in a maritime matter is a law enforcement action, the scope and nature of which must also be controlled by customary
international law, rules of engagement and an analysis as to proportionality and

cle

42 of the

necessity.
tity

Charter.

These considerations are

of human

life

and the need
Panel

all

secondary to the consideration of the sanc-

to preserve

IV-

it.

Coalition Operations

Ken Watkin, the Judge Advocate General of Canadian Forces,
began by noting that the Global War on Terror is referred to in Canada as the CamBrigadier General

paign Against Terrorism.

One

of the challenges for nations involved in coalition

xvin
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operations

is

reaching agreement as to the nature of the conflict. This includes the

question of whether you can have an international conflict against non-State actors. International

law was designed with the idea that two State actors would be in-

volved in a conflict; however, the majority of contemporary conflicts are internal to
a State.

At a minimum, there appears to be a consensus that

the 1949 Geneva Conventions
tionally, other treaties will

by the same

would apply to

conflicts

be applicable, but not

For example, Canada and

treaties.

all

Common Article 3

of

such as Afghanistan. Addi-

bound
are bound by

coalition partners are

many other nations

Geneva Conventions, while the United
States is not a party to that treaty. Although AP I does not apply as a matter of law to

Additional Protocol

most

conflicts,

it is

(AP

I

I)

to the 1949

integrated into the doctrine of Canadian Forces. This has not

presented any significant problems.

Unlike some nations, Canada recognizes the concept of "unlawful combatant."
In examining standards of treatment of unlawful combatants,

on both customary international and "black letter" law.
Different legal obligations and approaches sometimes cause

it is

important to

rely

alition operations. This

can occur in the area of targeting; however, those perceived

may not be that great. Canada and the United States have slightly differ-

differences

ent definitions as to what constitutes a military object.
uses

friction within co-

AP I wording and

The Canadian

definition

does not incorporate the "war sustaining capability" that

the United States brings within

its

definition. Generally, however, the difference

potentially quite small since Canada, like

many

other

AP

I

nations,

is

is

of the view

that in considering proportionality the military advantage to conducting an attack

must be considered

When

as a

whole and not be limited to individual

attacks.

disagreements arise within a coalition, they must be resolved or the ob-

jecting party will not be able to participate in the targeting mission.

such

sues,

This

is

other

is-

mine Ottawa Convention, problems rarely arise.
even though most NATO members are signatories and

as the anti-personnel

due to the

the United States

fact that
is

not, the nature of operations does not lend itself to consider-

ation of the use of the

by that

On

non-command-detonated anti-personnel mines governed

treaty.

Next, the Director General, Australian Defence Forces Legal Services,

Commo-

dore Vicki McConachie, underscored the importance of close coordination
coalition partners. This coordination results

may not

all

be signatories to the same

from the

among

fact that coalition partners

treaties regarding international

law and the

treatment of prisoners. In situations where the partners are signatories to the same

convention or
tions.

treaty,

they

may

still

have different interpretations of their obliga-

These differences must be quickly addressed. Accommodation of the various

partners' responsibilities

under both international law and

xix

their

own domestic

Preface

laws

is

necessary to maintain a coalition.

has created a

The nature of the current

number of uncertainties. Before

certainty as to

which parts of Additional Protocol

tions the United States did not accept. Post-9/1
calling for a greater

1

I

to the 1949

there

is

1,

was some

there

Geneva Conven-

less certainty

on

this issue,

need to coordinate on the proper application of the concepts

contained in Additional Protocol
Despite these uncertainties,
still

the attacks of 9/1

global conflict

able to reach accord

I.

Commodore McConachie feels the United States is

on important

issues such as targeting

and the applicable

rules of engagement. In the event a specific operation violates a coalition partner's
legal obligations there

must be an "opt out" provision. This provision allows

coali-

tion partners to continue their participation in the overall coalition, while not participating in operations

which violate

their legal obligations.

These obligations can

be either international or domestic, as Australian forces are subject to

all

Australian

domestic law while deployed in support of coalition operations.
Captain Neil Brown, of the Royal Navy Legal Services, observed that for coali-

work well there can be no barriers to communication, and that includes the
sharing of intelligence. The key approach of staff legal advisers in mission planning
is to identify, minimize and thereafter to manage different national legal positions.
In planning for the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and despite distinct national positions on
tions to

the jus ad bellum, this collaborative approach

all

but eliminated substantive

differ-

Kingdom on the application of international humanitarian law (IHL). The United Kingdom certainly found during
the prosecution of the campaign that IHL was entirely appropriate for modern
conventional warfare. The fact that US and UK forces operated throughout under
their own national targeting directives and rules of engagement was not important.
Of much greater significance was the fact that they were applying, in almost every
respect, the same law. Some issues were more difficult to resolve, such as the
ences between the United States and the United

United Kingdom's treaty obligations in relation to anti-personnel landmines used
in the "victim-initiated

mode," but

in the context of the high-intensity warfighting

phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom (March-May 2003) none were insurmountable.
In relation to prisoners of war, internees

Common Article 3 of the
sured

maximum

and

detainees, a

common

position

on

1949 Geneva Conventions and Geneva Convention IV en-

scope for a coalition approach to the prisoners of war, including

their transfer

between coalition partners. Although different national approaches

were

taken on the use of lethal force against escaping

initially

enemy

prisoners of

war, a coalition position was agreed which required guards to take into account

whether the
life.

scale

and character of any escape represented an imminent

Coalition positions in 2003 were developed to reflect

threat to

Common Article 3

Geneva Conventions and Geneva Convention IV requirements, such
xx

of the
as the

Michael D. Carsten

expedited screening process in advance of Article 5 procedures to determine status.

The

coalition position

was more

difficult to sustain

when, although United Nations

Security Council resolutions maintained the "imperative reasons of security" provision of Article 78 of Geneva Convention
for a wider

IV to

intern,

some commanders pressed

approach based on the requirement to gather

intelligence.

The Legal Counsel to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Colonel Ronald
Reed, USAF, concluded the panel with an approach to coordinating coalition
operations. This coordination
arises

is

designed to reduce the incidental friction that

between partners. Understanding that this

that as

friction

is

inevitable,

he indicated

much pre- contingency planning as possible should take place. The planning

must ensure

that operations are based

upon defined

international law.

To

the ex-

tent possible, rules of engagement should be developed that seek to reconcile part-

ner differences. Identifying pre-contingency coalition forces to react to and deal

with certain situations allows for a more efficient deployment of forces. The pre-

contingency planning is not a binding set of rules; rather,

it is

a

framework or start-

ing point for dealing with the specifics of certain contingencies.

Once

forces are deployed

that, if multiple rules

made aware of what

and the

coalition

is

actively engaged,

it is

imperative

of engagement are in use, adjacent forces are briefed on and

those contain. As the coalition begins operations, other inci-

dental friction will arise. This has occurred recently when a coalition partner's do-

mestic courts conducted investigations of battlefield incidents and then sought to
exercise jurisdiction over

US soldiers. The United States opposed this, thereby cre-

ating incidental friction.

While

must be taken

to

minimize

it,

friction will always

be present,

all

possible steps

since legal friction can adversely impact coalition

cohesion.

Panel
Professor Michael Schmitt,
the Naval

War

who

V- Lebanon Conflict
held the Stockton Chair of International

Law

at

College during academic year 2007-08, began the panel with a re-

view of the historical events leading up to the 2006 Lebanon

conflict.

These events

included elections in which Hezbollah gained positions in the Lebanese govern-

ment; the capture of Israeli
Israel.

The

soldiers;

and rocket

attacks launched against northern

actions of Hezbollah culminated with the Israeli

government sending

military forces into southern Lebanon.

Professor Schmitt then began the evaluation of Israel's actions in the context of
international law. Israel

announced

that

right of self-defense against Hezbollah

it

was commencing attacks pursuant

under Article 51 of the

precursor to the question of self-defense,

it is

xxi

UN

to a

Charter. As a

important to determine the status of

Preface

the attacks against Israel.

A UN

inquiry into the growing conflict found that

Hezbollah was part of the government of Lebanon and should be treated as a militia

ers

under Article 4 of the Geneva Convention Relative

to the

Treatment of Prison-

of War. Lebanon disclaimed affiliation with Hezbollah and stated that

Hezbollah was acting independently of the State of Lebanon.
Professor Schmitt noted that the current state of international law

by a group

stitutes State action

is

in flux.

on what con-

Under the Nicaragua decision of the Inter-

national Court of Justice (ICJ), for a group's actions to be attributed to a State, the
State

must control and sponsor the group. This decision has been much

and does not appear

to be consistent with current

present in the government of Lebanon;

ment organs and was
nese government

were significant

Assuming
Lebanon,

ties

was

Hezbollah was

some support from govern-

Lebanon. So, while the Leba-

between the State and Hezbollah.

clear

was not a

US

State actor for purposes of the attacks

from the Caroline case

attacks

on

that non-State actors are capable of

In fact, 9/11 illustrated that non-State actors are capa-

ble of devastating attacks. This

Israel

times had

reality.

may not have officially sponsored or controlled Hezbollah, there

armed attacks against States.
support of the

at

in control of much of southern

that Hezbollah

it is

it

world

criticized

was recognized by the world community through

on the Taliban following

justified in its attacks regardless

its

9/11.

of the classification of Hezbollah.

some ICJ precedent suggesting Israel could not invoke Article 5 1 absent an attack by a State actor, this position is weak. Article 5 1 makes no mention of

While there

is

State action as a prerequisite to self-defense and, as the

UN Security Council reso-

lutions following 9/11 demonstrate, attacks triggering Article 51 need not be

by

made

a State actor.

Professor Dinstein indicated Israel's action could be classified as extraterritorial

law enforcement.

Much

from within Lebanon,

like the facts

Israel

of the Caroline case, Hezbollah was acting

asked Lebanon to police

its

borders in order to pre-

vent Hezbollah's actions, and Lebanon either could not or would not stop

Hezbollah, the result being that Israel undertook the policing action

itself.

States

have an obligation to police their territory or risk having their sovereignty violated.
Evaluating
ity

Israel's self-defense in

shows that

immediate, as

Israel's
it

terms of necessity, immediacy and proportional-

response was appropriate.

was under

Israel's

action was necessary and

direct attack. Finally, as to proportionality, Israel's op-

erations were tied to defensive measures to protect itself

from rocket attacks by

Hezbollah.

Sarah Leah Whitson of

Watch had
conflict.

Human

Rights

sent teams of investigators to

Watch advised

that

Human

Rights

Lebanon both during and following the

These investigators conducted numerous interviews of members of the
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local population,

and of representatives of the Israel Defense Forces, Lebanese gov-

ernment, Hezbollah, humanitarian agencies, journalists, hospitals and local
cials.

The

examining

offi-

findings of this investigation will be set out in three pending reports
Israel's

and Hezbollah's conduct. The investigation revealed very few

instances of Hezbollah using the local population as shields for

In addition, very few of Hezbollah's rocket-launching

arms storage

facilities

were in close proximity to

few Hezbollah actions which resulted in

civilian objects.

attacks

Thus, there were

civilian deaths.

Colonel Pnina Sharvit-Baruh, Head, International
fense Forces, outlined the

sites

on Israel.
and munitions and
its

Law Department,

Lebanon conflict from the Israeli perspective.

Israel

It

De-

was clear

from intelligence obtained that Hezbollah was making every effort to blend in with
the civilian population. This blending ignored the distinction between civilians

and combatants, and resulted
civilians. Israel

were made so

in Hezbollah's shielding

its

military activities with

went to great lengths to limit civilian casualties. Targeting decisions

as to always

attempt to leave one road open for civilian evacuation.

Also, certain dual-use infrastructure

disproportionate impact

upon

was not targeted because

it

would have had

a

the civilian population.

Colonel Sharvit-Baruh noted that there were civilian casualties. These casualties

were not excessive given the expected military benefit of most of the
geting was taken very seriously and decisions were
ality review.

These decisions were

targets. Tar-

made based upon a proportion-

difficult given the

nature of the asymmetrical

warfare involved while fighting a non-State actor that does not comply with the law

of armed conflict.

Conclusion

In closing,
scholars

it is

our sincere desire that the works of the preeminent practitioners,

and leaders who contributed so graciously to this volume assist those seek-

ing answers to today's hard questions and propagate thoughts and action that

shape the course of the future.
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PARTI
LAW OF THE SEA AND MARITIME SECURITY

I

The Influence of Law on Sea Power Doctrines:

The New Maritime Strategy and the Future of
the Global Legal Order

Craig H. Allen*

elements of
For much of thean2006-07 academic
process designed
provide

the

year,

lege facilitated

elaborate

to

dations for the Chief of Naval Operations
drafting a

new maritime

strategy.

1

(CNO) and

conferences and listening sessions.

Chair of International
article

Law

It

was

draw upon
experts

in

from

foundation "war" games,

my privilege as the Charles H.

Stockton

to serve as legal advisor throughout the process. This

summarizes the contributions of the Naval

Department (ILD)

his staff to

strategic

Col-

the intellectual foun-

The process brought together

throughout the world to take part in workshops,
2

US Naval War

in the process to develop

War College

International

Law

and define the relationship between

maritime strategy and law, particularly international law, and provides the author's thoughts

on what course

that strategy should take.

now elapsed since Daniel Patrick O'Connell challenged our
thinking with his book The Influence of Law on Sea Power. 3 In it, the New Zealand
Three decades have

law of the sea expert and Chichele Professor of Public International Law argued,
shortly before his death in 1979, that because the law of the sea "has

stimulus to sea power, not
* Charles

its

restraint,"

4

become

the

future naval operations planning staffs

H. Stockton Professor of International Law,

US Naval War

College.

The Influence of Law on Sea Power Doctrines
must acquire

a

thorough appreciation of the law. 5 In contrast to Admiral Alfred

Thayer Mahan and the more recent naval historians who, while providing illuminating analyses of the influence of sea power on history, 6 mostly disregard the in-

on sea power, Professor O'Connell forcefully argued
power doctrines can no longer be considered in isolation from the relevant

fluence of international law
that sea

More importantly, O'Connell recognized that international law can be a powerful strategic enabler. The question I asked myself as I launched into my new task
last fall was, "Has the naval strategy community heeded Professor O'Connell's adlaw.

monition?" Let

me attempt to answer that question by taking the reader on a brief

tour of our maritime strategy development process and the role of law and legal advisors in that process.

The Maritime Strategy Project
At the June 2006 Current Strategy Forum, Admiral Mike Mullen, one year into
tenure as

CNO

his

(and one year before his nomination as Chairman of the Joint

new maritime strategy to guide the

Chiefs of Staff), called for the development of a

maritime services in the coming years.

7

It is

to be a strategy of this age

and

for this

The new strategy document, A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, 8
developed under the overall leadership of Vice Admiral John Morgan, Deputy
age.

Chief of Naval Operations for Plans and Strategy (N3/N5), joins several other naval
capstone planning documents, including Sea Power 21, 9 which, together with

Ma-

rine Corps Strategy 21, 10 provides the vision that establishes the strategic ends; the

Navy Strategic Plan, which lays out

the ways

and means

to achieve the vision; 11 the

CNO-CMC Naval Operations Concept, which addresses the operational principles
that will be used

by the

services; 12

and the US Coast Guard

Strategy for Maritime

and Stewardship. 13 At the June 12-13, 2007 Current Strategy Forum, the Commandants of the Marine Corps and the Coast Guard announced

Safety, Security,

CNO

when it is
completed, making it a true strategy of all three sea services. In the summer of
2006, the CNO tasked the Naval War College to act as broker for an ordered comtheir readiness to join the

in signing the

new maritime

strategy

14

petition of maritime strategy ideas
fully selected

country

ideas that

would inform and guide the

team charged with drafting the new

the start that there were
off limits.

—

no preconceived

The War College was

ideas

clear

from

no suggestions were

to be

strategy.

and

that

was made

care-

It

also asked to facilitate a conversation with the

— indeed with the world—

to describe

our process and

solicit

feedback. 15
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Security Strategies in the United States

We

were not asked to compose the new strategy on a blank canvas. Indeed, we

worked on one

was already suffused with an elaborate landscape. The new

that

maritime strategy will be nested in what has become a multifaceted web of security
strategies for the nation, all

the United States.

16

of which emanate from the National Security Strategy of

The National

Security Act of 1947, as

amended by

the

Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, requires the President annually to submit to the

Congress a National Security Strategy (NSS) report. 17 The President's NSS vision
in turn

is

implemented by the National Defense Strategy promulgated by the Secre-

tary of Defense

and the National Military

Joint Chiefs of Staff.

18

Strategy issued

by the Chairman of the

Closely related to those are the National Strategy for Mari-

time Security, the National Strategy for Homeland Security, the Maritime Strategy for

Homeland Security, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism and the National
Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. Not surprisingly, many of the
strategy documents have classified versions.
I should add that this was not the first time the US Navy has launched a grand
strategy development project. Indeed, research by the Center for Naval Analyses in
the fall of 2007 identified at least seventeen Navy capstone planning documents
since the 1 970s. 19 It is noteworthy for this observer that none of the earlier Navy capstone strategies, or Naval Doctrine Publication 1 on Naval Warfare20 which "introduces who we are, what we do, how we fight, and where we must go in the future"

—

expressly discusses the role of law

and

legal institutions in naval operations, other

than to make a passing reference to the fact that naval mobility would be better assured

if

the United States acceded to the 1982 United Nations Convention

Law of the

Sea (1982

LOS

Convention).

Strategy as a Critical

on the

21

Component of the

Geo-strategic Environment

Strategy is said to be "a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of

national

power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national,

and/or multinational objectives." 22 In setting out to achieve those national objectives, strategy
ate.

23

must be adapted

to the strategic

environment

in

which

it

will oper-

Accordingly, to provide the development team with the foundation they

needed to prepare maritime strategy options for the

CNO,

the Naval

War College

began by convening a Geo-strategic Environment Workshop. The workshop participants

drew heavily on the National

the Global Future."

24

Intelligence Council assessment

Later, a British perspective

was provided by the

"Mapping

UK Ministry

The Influence of Law on Sea Power Doctrines
of Defence Development and Concepts Doctrine Centre's "Strategic Trends 200725

2036.

The

experts' conclusions

were sobering. 26

The reader is likely familiar with much of the strategic environmental picture, so
will only summarize the most salient features. Geopolitical entropy, disorder and
uncertainty are on the rise. 27 The world is said to be suffering from a global security
I

deficit.

28

Unsustainable population growth

unemployment

are

most pronounced

in those regions lying in the so-called arc of

sovereignty and territorial integrity are on the decline. 29 State

instability. State

powers are increasingly diffused and devolved.
developed

"youth bulge" and chronic

rates, the

States, are besieged

money and migrants

Many States, even some of the most

by an unrelenting flow of

weapons, drugs,

illicit

same time, through what some
have described as the democratization of violence and of technology, 30 States have
lost their historical monopoly on the large-scale use of force and on access to weapacross their borders. At the

ons of mass destruction

(WMD)

technologies. 31 Indeed, the global picture looks

much the same as it did in 1921, when William Butler Yeats penned his apocalyptic
poem The Second Coming:
Things

fall

apart; the centre

cannot hold;

Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are

full

of passionate intensity.

Grim verses, indeed, whose dark and disturbing images still ring true.
Economic security is widely recognized as a vital interest of the State. 32 Yet, present efforts are not sufficient to meet basic security needs even within the borders of

many States,

let

dependent and

alone provide the kind of stability needed by the globalized, inter-

tightly

connected economy of the twenty-first century. Contempo-

rary security strategies

Those

must be designed

to

manage

threats to the public order.

come from States and non-State actors. We are painfully aware that
know no geographical boundaries, particularly as globalization in-

threats

the threats

creases the porosity of borders. Accordingly, the threats

managed

in the

commons,

at

boundaries between the

must be detected and

commons and

States,

and

along the borders of adjacent States.
In

an age

and the

when

seas over

States, global

the international supply chains that sustain the global

which those chains are carried are the

order

— including order on the —
sea

is

must be the goal of every maritime security policy and

common
new

economy

concern of

all

raison d'etat

and

strategy. Irresponsible

and

the
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incompetent

flag States; failing

tions; criminal syndicates

and

illegal,

and

failed States; transnational terrorist organiza-

engaged in trafficking in weapons, drugs and humans;

unreported and unregulated fishing

mons. Here

in the global

commons, where

all

undermine order

the pinch

from

in their responsibility to "effectively" exercise jurisdiction
vessels

is felt

most

acutely,

33

The

the security deficit

is

in the

com-

flag States falling short

and control over

their

most urgent.

Games

Strategic Foundations

Following the August 2006 Geo-strategic Environment Workshop, a series of executive

group meetings and war games were conducted in September and October of

2006 to develop

strategic

foundations for use in the Maritime Strategy Options De-

velopment Workshop in December. Those options were

later vetted

through the

Options Refinement Decision Support Event in February of 2007. The International

Law Department provided

legal advice to all

two of the executive groups. Early on

of the war game teams and to

in the process,

it

also provided a brief to the

Red Team Executive Group suggesting possible "lawfare" strategies and tactics that
might be used against the Blue Team. 34 During this same period, the Naval War
College hosted a conference on the maritime implications of China's energy strategy, 35 an Intercessional Conference on Maritime Strategy and a workshop entitled
Economics and Maritime Strategy: Implications for the 21st Century. 36 ILD attended
each of the events and an ILD member (the author) participated in the Economics
and Maritime Strategy Workshop, submitted a paper on legal interoperability challenges and made a presentation on international cooperation in securing the maritime commons. 37
The Future Global Legal Orders Workshop
Let

me now turn to

whom

something of greater

will likely appreciate that

international institutions 38

—

is

as

law

much

and therefore the planning "context,"
nizational culture

sovereign States,

—

interest to readers of this

that

is,

rule sets, legal processes

collectively

as geography, energy,

the

realists.

institutions

of

and

demographics, orga-

consists principally of

comprise a horizontal, non-hierarchical global

order that has historically been described as one of moderated anarchy,
39

all

a part of the geo-strategic environment,

and technology. The international system

who

volume,

at least

by

Conventional wisdom posits that within that system, international

and organizations ameliorate the anarchy, but with few exceptions

they do so without altering

its

horizontal structure.
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The experts who
hibited

little

Environment Workshop exinternational organizations and in international law.

participated in the Geo-strategic

faith in existing

Three sample findings demonstrate the depth of their skepticism.

First,

they con-

cluded that "some international organizations are looking long in the tooth and incapable of coping with emerging challenges." Next they concluded that "some of

managing

the institutions that are charged with

global problems

may

be over-

whelmed by them" and "the number of bilateral agreements will rise as international
organizations continue to

fall

short in their objectives." Given the experts' harsh

judgment of international organizations and regimes,

their prescription, "Interna-

tional Organizations: out with the old, in with the new," should not surprise you.

The Workshop
tional

law

interests

is

—

merely "epiphenomenal."

that

is,

added credence

experts' conclusions

the underlying

40

What

view that interna-

to the

really affects State

economic and political

factors.

41

behavior

is

State

Legal academics

have expressed related doubts about international law. International lawyers no

doubt

recall

John Austin's nineteenth-century conclusion that international law

was not positive law

at all,

but rather a body that partakes more of a moral obliga-

may provoke the hostility of other nations but not the kind
of sanctions that attend violation of laws promulgated by a sovereign. 42 And H.L.A.
tion, violation of which

Hart famously observed that because international law lacks the formal structure
of legislative courts with compulsory jurisdiction and

official

sanctions

it is

far

43

more primitive than the municipal law enacted by a sovereign.
The Workshop report left some of us wondering whether their views were shared
by international law
a vital

War

component

experts.

Mindful that the

in the geo-strategic

state

of the future global

legal

order

is

environment, the President of the Naval

College convened a two-day workshop that brought forty-two legal experts

together to examine the global legal order in 2020. 44 Those experts were asked to

provide the legal component that

With few exceptions,
shrift to international

traced back to Carl

is

too often neglected in strategy documents.

military strategists have a long history of giving short

law in their writings. 45 The origin of the problem can be

von Clausewitz, who dismissively

referred to those "certain

self-imposed, imperceptible limitations hardly worth mentioning,
ternational law
ica's

Cold

and custom." 46 George

F.

as

an excess of "legalism

as in-

Kennan, the leading architect of Amer-

War containment security strategy,

what he saw

known

remembered for his attack on
and moralism" in American foreign policy
is

also

during the Wilson presidency years. 47 Regrettably, international lawyers have not
always done their part to engage with strategy planners, to help them forge plans
that can achieve strategic goals while respecting
law.

The

experts

who came

to

and even advancing the

Newport were ready to do just

the strategists were ready to listen.

8

that, in the

rule of

hope

that
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And what a distinguished group they were. They came to Newport from Argenand Australia, from Canada and Chile, and from India, Indonesia and Italy. In
they represented eleven countries. They were law professors; international law

tina
all,

from the US Departments of State,

specialists

Justice

and Homeland Security and

the Center for Naval Analyses; a Chinese law of the sea scholar; senior legal advisors
to the Indian Coast

the

Guard and the

Italian

Navy General

Staff;

the legal counsel to

US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; senior judge advocates for the US Ma-

rine Corps, Coast Guard,

rector of the

and

several

commands; and the DiLaw of the Sea. They brought

combatant and

UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the

backgrounds in international security law, law of the
eration, the

law of armed

fleet

sea,

arms control and

prolif-

conflict, international transportation law, international

criminal law and international organizations.

The Workshop began with

a brief discussion of some assumptions proposed

the conference chair concerning the role and reach of law.

matic observation that the
gal order in

The

first

by

was the prag-

new maritime strategy must be adapted to the global le-

which it will function. The second was that a robust and respected legal

by providing predictability and preventing
and by providing effective and peaceful means to resolve conflicts that do

order has the potential to save
conflicts,

48

lives,

The third assumption was that, while the future state of the legal order is uncertain, it can, to some degree, be mapped and shaped, and
as Thomas Friedman
reminds us "the future belongs to the shapers and adapters." 49
To avoid what the influential British strategist Colin Gray labels the "sin of
presentism," 50 the legal experts attempted to widen their temporal lens by exploring several "alternative futures," using the scenario-planning method championed
by futurists like Peter Schwartz and Philip Bobbitt. 51 They initially discussed six
strawman scenarios that would collectively map the future global legal order, before adopting an approach that focused on twelve areas of potentially significant
changes in the legal order. For each of the twelve areas, the experts examined the
possible trends in the rule sets, legal processes and institutions, and in compliance
arise.

—

—

levels.

Next, they were asked to consider the consequences of those changes to the

maritime strategy mission inventory and for the means and methods for carrying
out those missions. Finally, they were asked what the

—and not say—about international

say

One would
find

little

new maritime strategy should

law.

expect that forty-two lawyers from eleven different nations would

on which

to agree.

To some

extent, that

was the case with

this

group.

There was, however, one question on which every expert agreed: the new maritime strategy should include an express reference to international law. As one expert put

it,

are there."

international law "is the foundation

on which we

operate;

it is

why we
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The Role of Law
As the

legal experts

concluded, there are a

brace the rule of law in the

The new

ing to do so.
strategies.

New Maritime Strategy

in the

new maritime

strategy

and no

reasons to

em-

sufficient reason for fail-

must be consistent with

strategy

The 2006 National

number of compelling

higher-level security

Security Strategy of the United States expressly cites

the importance of enforcing the rule of law. 52 Similarly, the presidential directive

on national maritime security made it clear that in developing the National Strategy

(NSMS) the United States will act consistently with international and US law. 53 The NSMS opens its chapter on "strategic objectives" by quot-

for Maritime Security

ing the presidential directive to "take
consistent with U.S. law, treaties,

United States

But even

if

is

party

all

necessary and appropriate actions,

and other international agreements

.

.

the higher-level strategy

a unifying

which the

.

documents were

silent

maritime strategy that acknowledges the importance of law

and

to

." 54

theme

on the
as

an ordering force

for the crucible of international relations

—

role of law, a

—

in short, the

more compelling and durable. Such a document would also be a source of pride and inspiration for the members of our armed
"centre" Yeats longed for

will

forces, a confidence-building

in

our

ability to

be

far

measure

for

our friends and

allies,

and

a key enabler

shape the future global order.

Law as an Ordering Force
The United

States has a long tradition of calling

serves the national interest.

55

upon

In the late eighteenth

and

international law

when

it

early nineteenth centuries,

the infant republic raised international law objections to Great Britain's boarding

of US vessels on the high seas and impressment of US sailors into the Royal Navy,

and against the Barbary
Mediterranean Sea and
States

and Great

Britain

States for piratical attacks
its

approaches.

—leading

known

to the readers of this

in the

other disputes between the United

respectively to the Caroline exchange of notes

and the Alabama arbitration award
well

Two

on US merchantmen

—produced enduring

international principles

volume. 56 More recently, the nation invoked

ternational law against Iran for breaching the inviolability of the

in-

US embassy

in

US diplomatic personnel and other citizens hostage, and against
Republic of China for its conduct when a US Navy EP-3 was forced to

Tehran and holding
the People's

land on Hainan Island following a midair collision with a Chinese fighter.

Although national
at the

same time

interest

is

surely the midwife of security policy

States have repeatedly

demonstrated

strategy, 57

their willingness to cooper-

ate with other States to achieve shared goals or resolve

10

and

common

problems.
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Globalization and

its

just-in-time

and just-enough

have fun-

logistics imperatives

damentally altered the strategic calculus, virtually mandating a cooperative ap-

proach to maritime

security. Accordingly, the

new maritime

mindful of national interests while remaining ever

alert to

strategy

must be

shared interests.

A strat-

egy that narrowly focuses on national interests will surely reinforce existing per-

away potential partners. By contrast, it takes
but little imagination to see that a new maritime strategy that defines and articulates in compelling terms a framework for achieving shared goals and joint solutions to common problems is much more likely to make other States want to flock
ceptions of the United States and drive

to the nascent 1,000-ship multinational navy. 58

Finding

common ground among national interests should not be

difficult.

For

some, the need to promote and protect the international trade and transportation
system on which the globalized and energy-hungry world depends
tional interest.
security."

59

It is

For other

also a shared interest. In the

words of some, "commerce craves

West Africa, South America and
from poachers is not merely a pursuit

other States consider threats to the envi-

of profit;

it is

ronment

as national "security" issues. Consider, for

a survival imperative.

States, for

whom

global

present an existential threat.
cess to

a vital na-

States, particularly those in

Southeast Asia, protecting offshore fisheries

oping

is

Still

warming and

its

example, small-island devel-

attendant

the sea level

rise in

A strategy that promotes sustainable and equitable ac-

marine living resources and protection of the marine environment is sure to

have broad appeal. At the same time, however, none of these interests can be obtained

if

the larger system

is

fraught with disorder and violence. In

Abraham

Maslow's hierarchy of human needs, the need for security is exceeded only by basic
needs,

e.g.,

food. 60

Professor Colin Gray asserts that "order
prerequisite for security, peace,
tion."

61

There

is,

in the

to be secured, extended

is

the prime virtue;

and possibly justice. Disorder

minds of many, no longer
and maintained, so

that

a "war" to be

is

it is

the essential

the worst condi-

won, only security

war can be prevented. The spread

of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction threatens chaos, as effective power
shifts

away from

States to non-State actors

and super-empowered

individuals.

To

on the control of violence, and the growing
such violence now casts a menacing shadow

the extent that civilization rests in part
capacity of non-State actors to inflict

over the planet, the role of law as the deep stratum undergirding international security

becomes more apparent and more urgent. Law has the

the indispensable binding force to check
tutional entropy. If the States' grip

prone to use military

force, the

potential to serve as

and perhaps reverse our

on law

lessens,

binding force so

weakened.

11

and

States

social

become

vital to civilization

and

insti-

increasingly

may be

fatally
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In a geo-strategic

environment everywhere characterized by growing uncer-

tainty, rapid

change and

and

At the same time, rule

stability.

instability, rule sets

can promote greater predictability

not legal pixie dust that miraculously

sets are

They must be given the level of respect
credibility or no State will be willing to rely on

brings order where there was once chaos.

and enforcement necessary
them. Rule
treaties

for

UN

sets like the

Charter, the 1982

LOS Convention,

anti-terrorism

and the non-proliferation regime can increase order, but only

if

they are

will voluntarily

comply

complied with.

We

recognize that not

with the rule

sets,

all

States

and non-State actors

whether the rules under consideration are those relating to non-

aggression and non-proliferation or to trafficking for profit. If voluntary compli-

ance

falls

we must of course redouble our efforts to rebuild it to the level
public order. That may come through education, inducement, de-

short,

necessary for

terrence, or capacity building of States, or of global or regional international organizations. 62

But make no mistake, while each of these approaches

long-term success, they

will likely

will

be

vital to

never be sufficient unto themselves to provide

the needed level of security in the

coming

For

years.

that,

we must add

enforcement.

Because law is not self-executing, no security strategy should be founded on unrealistic

expectations regarding the influence of law

State actors) in the

on

States (let alone

conduct of their foreign and military affairs

—

on non-

particularly when

survival or vital State interests, or "fundamental" religious beliefs, are at stake.

Nor

should we delude ourselves about the effectiveness of international organizations
in preserving or restoring

peace and security. Yet, even

if,

as

Thomas Hobbes

warned, "covenants, without the sword, are but words and of no strength to secure
a

man

63
at all,"

even the most committed contrarian would not counsel us to turn

our backs on covenants. International law and international organizations
United Nations

will

allow them to be. 64

like the

never be more effective or influential than the leading States

new US maritime strategy ignores the role of either, we di-

If the

minish the importance of both and undermine their effectiveness. The result
be a

less

ordered and

less

secure world. For that reason,

strategy provide a rule-based
In considering

enforcement approaches

construct.

The

vital that the

approach for enforcing the global

global rule sets will require a

"DIME"

it is

new way of

I

suggest that effective enforcement of

thinking that transcends the so-called

DIME approach, which looks to the State's diplomatic, in-

environment

in

which non-State actors pose

mic, risks to States. 65 This Cold
colleges,

maritime

legal order.

formation, military and economic "instruments of national power,"
for a global

will

assumes that only

a

War

narrow

artifact,

set

which

is

too narrow

even cataclys-

currently taught at

of instruments

12

significant,

is

is

available

and

US war

that they
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be used against

will

States. 66 In the

post-Cold War, post-9/1 1, post-Bali, Madrid,

London subway and Lebanon 2006-2007 world, it is clear that instruments of national power will increasingly be used against non-State actors, like Al Qaeda,
Hezbollah and transnational criminal syndicates, and that the

DIME

approach

is

not always well suited to them. The United States already reaches well beyond the

DIME framework, using a variety of leadership, managerial, institutional, cultural,
technological, law enforcement, judicial
assets.

"M"

67

Some of the

and

rule violations that threaten public order are

But

(military) issues.

many are "enhanced L"

ing for enhanced law enforcement measures.

work

will

be

vital to

financial measures, such as freezing

68

—

any maritime strategy

(law enforcement) issues,

will

must

also

Guard and
missions. The new

certainly for the Coast

acknowledge that without the Coast Guard,

US maritime forces

not have a seamless approach to maritime security, for without

will lack the

call-

This broader, "DIME-plus" frame-

other interagency players with maritime safety and security
strategy

and will remain

it

the strategy

only alternative "end game" to killing your adversaries or detaining

them on remote islands: arresting and prosecuting them. The Coast Guard puts the
"L" factor in what is otherwise a limited DIME tool kit for addressing many of our
maritime security problems. The next strategy must adapt itself accordingly.

Law as a

Unifying

Theme

Several of the outside experts engaged in the maritime strategy development process hosted

by the Naval War College highlighted the need

to include a "compelling narrative" that will ensure

How

mented.

do you

forces, unify the
alyst to

select a

theme

it is

for the

new document

read, studied

and imple-

that will counter the scores of centrifugal

elements of the strategy, and serve as the leadership spark and cat-

bring together the three maritime services with overlapping yet unique

identities, the

tional friends

other interagency players so essential to the mission, and interna-

and allies, while at the same time winning over or at least muting inter-

governmental and non-governmental organizations?

I

suggest that law and

its

proven, albeit imperfect, capability to promote order, security and prosperity can

be a powerful unifying theme and force in the new maritime strategy in the globalized,
media-sensitive world in which
tential to

we find ourselves.

In

fact,

the

new strategy has the po-

go a long way toward rehabilitating the reputation of the United States as an

overweening hegemon that has become tone deaf to the concerns of its

allies.

69

Global security requires global cooperation and, for many, law provides the
logic

and language of cooperation. Adherence to shared rule sets can be an effective

unifying force.
itan

DNA.

Some would go so far as to say it is now embedded in the cosmopol-

For that reason, an explicit embrace of the rule of law could prove to be

13
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one of the most

attractive features of the

new maritime

strategy for the Navy's in-

teragency and international partners. Promotion and implementation of rule sets

would

and broad external appeal. Any strategy

give the strategy internal coherence

that downplays, or

still

worse denigrates, international law and international orga-

nizations, as does the current National Defense Strategy of the

United

States,

ill

Much of the world still considers the United
the primary if not sole source of legitimacy for the use of force. A strategy

serves the nation's long-term interest.

Nations

that suggests that military force will be deployed in a

clude violates the

manner

that

some

will

con-

UN Charter, which prohibits the use of force or even the threat to

use force against the political independence or territorial integrity of a State, will
further isolate the nation.

The importance of common rule sets, based on international law as a unifying
force in combined operations, will not be lost on those who observed the evolution of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the recent UN Security
Council resolutions on proliferation threats to international peace and security.
Both make clear that most of the world will insist on an approach that respects international law.

Early positions taken by

2003 PSI-participating

then-Under Secretary of State John Bolton

States'

meeting

in Brisbane suggested that

legal justifications for PSI boardings, the

at the July

with respect to

United States was "taking nothing off the

table," including the Article 51 right

of self-defense. That was understood by some

on boarding

foreign flag vessels believed to be transporting

as advocating a position

weapons of mass destruction

that

might go beyond what current international law

permits. At their meeting in Paris three
States

months later,

several of the PSI-participating

US opening position with a call
common Statement of Interdiction

responded to the

to subscribe to a

statement eventually adopted at that meeting, and
participating States'

commitment that PSI

still

for

all

participating States

Principles.

The two-page

in force, twice expresses the

activities will

be carried out in a manner

consistent with international law. Similarly, Security Council Resolutions 1540,

condemning proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to or by non-State actors, and 1718, applying similar prohibitions to North Korea, both tie any enforcement measures to the applicable rules of international law.

Law and the Expectations of Our Partners
Admiral Harry Ulrich, Commander,

US

Naval Forces Europe, espouses

a relatively

simple formula for the global war on terrorism: have more partners than your ad-

The struggle against disorder knows no
team sport. Vice Admiral Morgan has been

versaries have. The reasons are elementary.
flag.

Waging

that struggle has

become a

14
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the leading voice for the 1,000-ship multinational navy/ Global Maritime Partner-

concept designed to attract the kind of partners Admiral Ulrich seeks. Does

ship, a

70
the Global Maritime Partnership (and the Global Fleet Station initiative ) need a

unifying global maritime strategy that promises to respect the rules of international law?

Many of the potential

1,000-ship-navy partners think so. 71

November 2005 "1,000 Ship Navy" article by Admirals
the naval commanders of France, Ghana, India, Portugal
the rule of law or legal considerations. 73 The French com-

In their response to the

Morgan and Martoglio,
and Spain

all

72

referred to

mander, for example, observed that any 1,000-ship-navy operations must be "in
full

compliance with the

UN Convention on the Law of the Sea

pressly referred to the "rule of law,"

."
.

.

.

Portugal ex-

and India asked whether the 1,000-ship con-

cept should be established under the aegis of the United Nations. Admiral Soto of

the Spanish

Navy observed

that "[tjogether

we must

find a legal solution to pre-

serving the natural flow of friendly maritime trade while denying freedom of action
to those criminals

seems

who

attempt to use the maritime space for

clear that respect for international

illegal activities." It

law has the potential to unite or fracture

the embryonic 1,000-ship navy.

One

year

later,

many

Admiral Mullen's plan for a new
tional law figured

the Brazilian

CNOs

of those same foreign

US

maritime

were asked to respond to

strategy. 74

prominently in several of the responses.

Navy urged

that the

new

Once again, internaThe Commandant of

strategy "be guided

by principles sanc-

tioned by international law," a viewed shared by the Secretary General of the Peruvian

Navy and

the Portuguese

Colombia emphasized the need
ation." Uruguay's reply

was

for

Navy Chief of

Staff.

Their counterpart in

an "international

legal

mechanism of cooper-

also directly

on

point: "Multilateral cooperation

when it is based on the law." The Commander
of the Lebanese Navy cited the 1982 LOS Convention and cautioned against the
United States acting alone, while the new Chief of Staff for the Spanish Navy
highlighted the need for the US Navy "to operate alongside its allies in accordance

among navies

is

legitimate activity

with international law." The Australian Maritime Doctrine elegantly and forcefully captures the central

most respected

importance of law and legitimacy for one of America's

partners:

armed force must be subject to the test of legitimacy, in that the
Government must have the capacity to demonstrate to the Parliament and the
electorate that there is adequate moral and legal justification for its actions
[T]his
adherence to legitimacy and the democratic nature of the Australian nation state is a
particular strength. It is a historical fact that liberal democracies have been more
successful in the development and operation of maritime forces than other forms of
government, principally because the intensity and complexity of the sustained effort

Australia's use of

15
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demands upon a nation's systems of state
and its educated population.
other words, depend directly upon the support of the

required for these capabilities places heavy
credit, its technological

combat

Sophisticated

and

industrial infrastructure,

forces, in

people for their continued existence. 75

Finally, a bit closer to
Safety, Security,
will recall will

in the

and Stewardship, the

US Coast Guard Strategy for Maritime
Commandant of the Coast Guard, who you
2007

be asked to join in the coming maritime strategy, has clearly identi-

need to update and strengthen maritime regimes to address emergent

fied the

threats

home,

and challenges and to support US ocean policy. More specifically, the Com-

mandant has concluded that the "nation needs a set of coordinated and interlocking domestic and international regimes that
balance competing uses within the
maritime domain" and that "[strengthened rules, authorities, and agreements
enable consistent, coordinated action on threats and provide an acceptable framework of standards that facilitate commerce and maritime use." 76 The lessons seem
.

.

.

.

.

Navy-led maritime strategy that similarly acknowledges the important

plain: a

contributions of rule sets to promoting public order

support of international and interagency partners.

is

far

more likely to

attract the

77

Law and Our Opportunity to Shape and Influence
Serious students of international law and relations understand that the law

complete, nor

is

it

perfect.

We

also

know

adapted, developed, clarified and explained
ing years.

—

it

rule of law, while

sullenly turn their backs

can and will be influenced,

in other words,

shaped

on the

working to remedy

—

in the

com-

enterprise?

its

shortfalls, or

those

who

78

2006 Current Strategy Forum remarks, Admiral Mullen cited as two of the

nation's three enduring naval strengths the capacity to "influence"
friends

not

Who will be most influential in the law development enterprise? Those

who embrace the
In his

that

is

and partners." The

legal experts

had something

and "to build

to say about both.

There

seemed to be widespread agreement among the experts that it is not enough to sim-

know and

ply

shape those
flight

—

follow the rules of international law; there

rules.

79

for warships

also

an urgent need to

For example, leadership on freedom of navigation and over-

and military

aircraft

on which the global economy depends
experts' assessments reveal the

national maritime law
•

is

—

and the commercial

will

vessels

aircraft

be crucial in the coming years.

magnitude of the coming challenge

on navigation

and

Some

to shape inter-

issues:

38 percent of the experts believe that the regime for innocent passage in the

12-mile territorial sea will not remain stable between
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now and

2020.

When

they
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were asked the same question about

transit passage

through international

and archipelagic sea lanes passage, the numbers went up
percent respectively.

straits

and 51

to 41 percent

80

95 percent of the experts believe that in the coming years more States will

•

claim the right to exercise jurisdiction and control over military activities in their

200-mile exclusive economic zones. 81

To

lead

on freedom of navigation and

crucial that the

overflight, or

any other law of the sea

United States become a party to the 1982

is-

LOS Convention

sue,

it is

and

participate in the United Nations' annual law of the sea processes. Moreover,

to encourage others to respect those parts of the rule set about

concerned

—

the navigation rights of warships and military aircraft and the non-

proliferation regime, for
set,

82

as

which we are most

example

consented to by each

important or even "quaint" to

—we must be

State,
us.

clear that

we respect the entire rule

including the provisions that might seem

less

We cannot hope to "shape" the global or regional

why
would any State acquiesce in letting us help define a rule set if they know that we inlegal

order unless

we

are a good-faith participant in the system. After

tend to later exempt ourselves from

At the same time, there

is

all,

it?

growing concern that law

is

increasingly used

by less

powerful States and by non- State actors as an asymmetric instrument to discredit or

more powerful States, even proclaiming that less powerful
States are not bound by the same rules. 83 It has been observed that less powerful
States respond to sea control strategies by more powerful adversaries by employing
sea denial strategies and tactics. Naval mines commonly come to mind, 84 but lately
otherwise balance against

"lawfare" strategies seek to restrict the navigation rights and freedom of action of

new legal remore powerful

powerful States by exerting pressure on them to bind themselves to
gimes, 85 or by employing existing legal regimes to discredit the
State.

As Professor Davida Kellogg at the University of Maine has argued forcefully,

the response to such tactics
decisive

must not be

and well-reasoned rejoinder

a reflexive denigration of law, but rather a

that

unmasks

this

abuse of the law. 86

The new maritime strategy will almost certainly have an effect on the law by what
it says
or does not say about the role of law in modern maritime security operations. 87 In a system where international law is made in part by State practice, navies
make international law every day by what they say and what they do. At the same
time, and for the same reason, the strategy's treatment of law will affect the ability
of the United States to influence the future direction of international regimes and
organizations. The Navy can create or ease friction by what it says or does not say
about the law in the new strategy and enhance or erode its credibility and therefore

—

its

—

effectiveness as a shaping influence. 88
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Law's Role
At an early Naval

in Preserving

War

and Enhancing

the Service Ethos

College session involving veterans of prior

strategy drafting teams, Professor

Navy maritime

Roger Barnett spoke of the importance of under-

standing the Navy's culture in crafting any capstone strategy document. That culture,

it

seems to me, plainly includes a deep appreciation for international law. In

describing the most desirable qualifications for a naval officer, Captain John Paul

more than two hundred years ago that the "naval officer should be familiar with the principles of International Law
because such knowledge may often, when cruising at a distance from home, be necessary to protect his flag from
insult or his crew from imposition or injury in foreign ports." 89 US Navy Regulations have long codified the requirement for its members to comply with internaJones wrote

.

tional law. 90

Compliance

.

.

facilitated

by a proactive training and education

among the first

subjects taught in the opening days of the

is

program.
International law was

Naval War College in 1 884 and the Naval War College
the United States to have a dedicated International
vilian to join the

Naval

War

is still

the only war college in

Law Department. The

first ci-

College faculty was James R. Soley, appointed in the

foundation year of the College to teach international law. In 1901, the well-known
publicist

John Bassett Moore joined the faculty

and

later initiated the College's International

The

first

academic chair

at the

Naval

Law, established on July 11,1951, and

as a professor of international

Law

law

Studies ("Blue Book") series.

War

College was the Chair in International

filled

by Harvard's Bemis Professor of Inter-

Law and Permanent Court of International Justice Judge Manley O. Hud1967 the chair was named in honor of Rear Admiral Charles H. Stockton,

national
son. In

an international law scholar and former president of the Naval

War College.

Our personnel have a right to expect that their capstone strategy will honor the rule
of law. We have a new generation of men and women who are drawn to the all- volunteer
forces

by a combination of pride, patriotism and the need

are at their best

when they believe in

for self-affirmation.

They

themselves, their service and their nation.

Our

The
support and defend the Con-

accession programs and ceremonies emphasize respect for law and principle.

oath of office for military officers includes a pledge to
stitution of the

warship
that

in

United States

commission

same hallowed

Coast Guard

all

is

— not

a

monarch, but rather

a

body of law. Our oldest

named not after a president or a famous battle, but rather

legal text.

The core

principles of the Navy,

Marine Corps and

highlight the importance of honor, which for Marines expressly in-

cludes the obligation to respect

human dignity. Those creeds also recognize the im-

portance of courage, one version of which expressly includes "moral courage,"
describing

it

as the inner strength to

do what
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is

right

and

to adhere to a higher
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standard of conduct. 91 The service

members who

moved
know more than

take these oaths

and

are

by these creeds represent our nation's finest, and they deserve to
merely how and where they will fight; they deserve to know why they fight
is,

—

that

The Navy lieutenant

the principles they are being asked to support and defend.

junior grade leading her boarding team onto a freighter in the Arabian Gulf to

conduct a Proliferation Security Initiative boarding and the battalion landing team
sergeant major ordering his Marines into the

LCACs and CH-46s to execute a non-

combatant evacuation operation should both be able to
flected in the

see their core values re-

maritime strategy that sent them on their missions.
Conclusion

The decision by the Naval War College to integrate faculty from the College's International Law Department and outside legal experts into the strategy develop-

ment process wisely ensured that the core strategy development team had access to
a thoughtful

and informed assessment of the future global legal order. Legal partic-

ipation in the process
strategy,

by no means

assures that the law will play a role in the

but there's every reason to believe that

it

will.

Respect for the rule of law is a signal strength for those who practice
atious, corrosive
clearly

and embarrassing source of friction

its

and a vex-

who fail to do so. By
rule of law in the new

opportunity to enhance its legitimacy and

members and position itThe Coast Guard has shown the way

ability to attract coalition partners, instill pride in its

self more effectively to

forward with
let

seize the

it

for those

embracing a position that promises respect for the

maritime strategy, the Navy can

new

there be

obligation

its

shape the global order.

new Strategy for Maritime Safety,

no mistake: "respect"
for

the

asymmetricians. 93

It

Security,

for the rule of law entails

and Stewardship. 92 But

more than

United States to obey the relevant laws advocated by
also

means

that

we will expect

comply with the

others to

including those provisions that, in the words of John Paul Jones
centuries ago, "protect" the nation,
rights

its

vessels

and

aircraft,

and

all

the buildup

it

has been given, the

new

strategy

more than two

their navigational

must not

providing a fresh and proactive approach to a demonstrably

tem.

law,

and freedoms.

With

ment

a one-sided

that has shaken a lot of people's confidence in the

It

US

new

fall

short in

threat environ-

national security sys-

should be a strategy of hope and action, rather than one born of despair and

cynicism.

Whether you

are an idealist aspiring to establish a shining city

means

to ends,

forcefully advocated

hill

own sake, or a calculating utilitarian methodically
there is much to value in a more robust rule of law,

that reveres the rule of law for
calibrating

on the

its

by the three maritime
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Ramadi and Kandahar whether the threat environment was better or worse after images of the disgraceful and lawless acts at the
Abu Ghraib prison flashed across the Internet and Al Jazeera. While you're at it, ask
them how it affected their pride as American service members. We cannot always
control the behavior of our members, but our service chiefs can be firm and unequivocal about the fundamental principles for which we stand.
It must seem to many that the world has not changed much since the interwar
the Marines and soldiers in Fallujah,

years that drove Yeats to lament the loss of conviction

sionate intensity

by the

best, the rise

by the worst, and the collapse of the "centre."

94

What he

of pasleft

un-

named is the source and nature of that center and how we might fortify it. For
many in Yeats' age, the ordering force to provide that center was to be found in the
hopeful vision of a new League of Nations. Their modern counterparts look to the
and implemented by forward-thinking

rule of law developed

gether in respected and competent international organizations.
I

will close

with a report on the informal surveys

I

States

coming

to-

95

conduct each year

at

my law

week of classes back in Seattle I ask my students for their views
on the "rule of law." They have so far been unanimous in their approval of the principle, though some are skeptical of its empirical record. But when I then ask them
school. In the

first

to define the rule of law, their

shouldn't be too hard on them.
rule of law or postulate

learn that the
to

its

brows furrow and they grow

Few law school casebooks attempt

force or trajectory.

We

to describe the

And you will not be too surprised to

Department of Defense dictionary does not define

it.

We must work

remedy that oversight. The legal profession has a well-earned reputation for per-

suasive communication.
legal profession

cumbent upon us
this

And I believe, as did Alexis de Tocqueville, 96 that we in the

have a special province and duty.

global cooperation,

all

to

embrace the

Postscript on

it

and

it is

US Accession

to the

first

LOS Convention
met

is

to obtain

presidential action for the United States to accede to the

maritime services and

Senate to approve the

1982

toward that elusive finish line.

challenge that must be

LOS Convention. Nothing less than an

ficient. If the three

time for us to take up the baton from

steadily forward

experts widely agreed that the

the necessary Senate

1982

the logic and language of

rule of law as our lodestar, as the "center" for

tumultuous new century. 97 In short,

The legal

If law is

we are its most proficient expositors. As such, it is, I believe, in-

Professor O'Connell and advance

a

silently pensive.

all-agency full-court press will be suf-

their allied agencies

fail

to persuade the

LOS Convention during the One Hundred Tenth

Congress,

maritime strategy that purports to affirm the importance of law to global security
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will

have no

Words without consistent action will soon be ignored and

credibility.

forgotten.

The

call for

Senate action was renewed when, during his January 30, 2007 con-

firmation hearing before the Foreign Relations Committee to serve as Deputy Secretary of State, former Director of National Intelligence John D.

One week later,

affirmed the administration's strong support for the Convention.
the

Negroponte

Department of Defense once again included the LOS Convention on

priority

list.

98

The next

new Chairman of the

Senate Foreign

Relations Committee, citing the "historic bipartisan support for the

Convention" and requesting Senate action "as early
Congress."

On May

treaty

day, the President's National Security Advisor, Stephen

Hadley, wrote to Senator Joseph Biden, the

99

its

15,

urging the Senate to give

as possible

Law of the Sea

during the 110th

2007, President Bush formally announced that he was
its

advice and consent to accession to the Convention

during the current session of the Congress. 100

On June

13, 2007,

Deputy Secretary

Gordon England joined in
The Navy and Coast Guard have long worked to

of State Negroponte and Deputy Secretary of Defense

an op-ed supporting accession. 101

gain Senate approval for the Convention.
States accede to the

Convention was the

A

first

recommendation
resolution to

that the United

come Out of

the

US

Commission on Ocean Policy chaired by former CNO Admiral James Watkins. In
testimony before the Congress on March 1, 2007, Secretary of the Navy Donald
Winter, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Mike Mullen and Commandant of the
Marine Corps James Conway unequivocally affirmed the Navy Department's support for US accession. 102 Admiral Thad Allen, Commandant of the Coast Guard,
similarly reaffirmed his service's support for accession on May 17, 2007. 103
Thus, there is every reason to be optimistic about the fate of the 1982 LOS Con-

we have been this close
when Senator Lugar pro-

vention within the Senate this time. Painfully, however,

once before.

It

seemed

like success

was

at

hand

in 2004,

vided the needed leadership on the Foreign Relations Committee to achieve a

unanimous recommendation out of that Committee that the US Senate should provide its assent. Somehow, however, a small but vocal opposition was able to persuade
the Senate leadership not to bring the treaty to a floor vote. 104 If the Senate cannot

now be

persuaded to approve the

LOS

Convention, other parties to the Conven-

tion will continue to shape developments in the
Limits, International Seabed Authority

the Sea and, perhaps,

add

Commission on Continental Shelf

and International Tribunal

a gloss to the Convention's text

process of agreed-upon interpretations.

105
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one of several positive theories of international relations that seek to (1) describe the world of international affairs, (2) predict how it might change in the coming years and
(3) prescribe a response to that world. Such positive analysis must be distinguished from the norRealism

39.

is

mative approaches in political philosophy.
40.

See Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes

and Regime Consequences: Regimes

as Inter-

vening Variables, 36 International Organizations 185, 190 (1982).
41. Id. at 189. In reviewing Anthony Arend's book Legal Rules and International Society,
David Bederman surveys views on international law held by the various schools of interna-

tional relations:

But

[international relations (IR)] theory could not divine a categorical conclusion as

if

to the ultimate nature of the international order,

could agree on some things.

both

realists

and

institutionalists

One of them was that international law was irrelevant. The

championed by such

Hans Morgenthau and
George Kennan, is that international law is "epiphenomenal" ([that is,] stupid). The
classical realists' intellectual successors, the structural realists (or neorealists), are no
less hostile to international law. Such writers as Kenneth Waltz, John Mearsheimer, and
classical realist position,

epic figures as

Joseph Grieco were emphatic in their dismissal of international legal rules as an

independent force influencing the behavior of nations. All that matters, according to
the realists (whether classical or structural),

And

is

power. In their view,

legalities

can never

Hobbesian way, the rational
institutionalists of IR theory are really no better. As Professor Arend notes at the outset
of his book, institutionalists were quick to "sell-out" international law in their rush to
constrain power.

defend themselves

if

this

against

institutionalist scholarship

seems dreary

onslaught

the

in

of

a

Much

attack.

realist

instead, to resort to a bewildering array of jargon for such

phenomena

norms, and values. International law, in the minds of such writers
Stephen Krasner, and Oran Young,
instutitionalists

is just,

well, too legal.

as

And even though the rational

allow "repeat-playing" and cooperation in international

and permit decentralized enforcement of norms, none of these
into

the

recognition

institutionalists, international

that

is

not

as regimes,

Robert Keohane,

espouse the view that institutions and regimes reduce transaction

stabilize expectations,

translates

of rational

does not mention international law by name, preferring,

at the

of definitively

legal

rules.

law might impact "low-politics"

—

costs,

affairs,

virtues necessarily

According

to

the

that realm of policy

core of central state interests. For the rational institutionalists, where

rules really matter, there really
rational, at least in the

is

no

law. This

is

view of their archenemies, the

what makes the

institutionalists

realists.

Bederman, Constructivism, Positivism, and Empiricism in International Law, Review
of Anthony Clark Arend, Legal Rules and International Society (1999), 89 GEORGETOWN LAW
JOURNAL 469 (2001) (footnotes omitted). Others respond that whatever its status as positive law,
mere epiphenomenal character, or its comparatively primitive state of development, there is no
denying that international law exerts a normative force on State behavior.
42. JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 208 (1832). Lord AusSee David

J.

tin is said to

have once likened the

blocking one's path,

it

effect

of international law to that of a hedgerow: while not

certainly redirects one's trajectory.

Hart, The Concept of Law 209, 226 (1961).
For a forceful argument that the rules, principles and institutions of international law are essentially complete, see Vaughan Lowe, The Politics of Law-Making: Are the Method and Character of
Norm Creation Changing?, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 207-12 (Michael
43.

Herbert Lionel Adolphus

(H.L.A.)

Byers ed., 2000).
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The

44.

of the Naval

final report

War College

Legal Experts'

Workshop

is

available at http://

wuw.nwc.navv.mil /enws maistiat/docs/research/Legal_Experts_Final_Report.pdf
Feb.

(last visited

2008).

8,

Cg.,COLINS. GRAY, THE SHERIFF: AMERICA'S DEFENSE OF THE NEW WORLD ORDER
NATO intervention in Kosovo, without UN Security Council autho3
rization, he argues that "[bjecause world politics comprises a distinctly immature political system, we have to be somewhat relaxed about some of the legal niceties").
45.

(

See,

2004

)

1

in referring to the

4b.

Carl VON Clalsew

4:.

George

f.

ITZ,

On War

75 (Michael

Howard &

Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950,

Peter Paret eds. and trans.,

at

95 (expanded

ed.,

1984)

(1951).

The assumptions were generally drawn from several reports on the experts' list of recommended materials, which included the Center for Strategic and International Studies' multime48.

dia presentation. Seven Revolutions, http://7revs.csis.org/sevenrevs_content.html (last visited

The Princeton Project on National Security, G. JOHN IKEXBERRY & ANNE-Marie
Slaughter, Forging a world of Liberty Under Law, U.S. National Security In The
21ST CENTURY (2006), available at http://www. princeton.edu/~ppns/report. html; and UN
Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World:
Our Shared Responsibility (2004), available at http://www.un.org/secureworld.
49. Thomas Friedman, Lexus and the Olive Tree 239 (2000).
50. Colin S. Gray, Stability Operations in Strategic Perspective: A Skeptical View, PARAMEFeb.

1,

1

2008);

Summer

TERS,

2006, at

4.

51
Philip Bobbitt, The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History
314-16 (2002); Peter Schwartz, The Art of the Long View: Planning for the Future in

an Uncertain World

(1991).

National Security Strategy, supra note 16,

52.

at 4-5.

The White House, National Security Presidential Directive 41 /Homeland Security Presidential Directive 13, at 2 (Dec. 21, 2004). See generally Department of Homeland Security, National Security Presidential Directive 41/Homeland Security Presidential Directive 13, available
53.

<?r

http://www. dhs.gov/xprevprot/programs/editorial_0597.shtm.

The White House, National Strategy

54.

for

Maritime Security

7 (Sept. 2005), available at

http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/maritime-security.html.
National interests include survival, defense of the homeland, economic well-being,

55.

vorable world order and promotion of values. States are

more willing to

fa-

place their trust in inter-

and organizations for the protection and promotion of the latter three interests, less
do so with defense of the homeland, and would almost never do so when the State's sur-

national law
likely to

vival

at stake.

is

The Caroline (exchange of diplomatic notes between Great Britain and the United
1842), 2 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL Law 409, 412 (1906); AlaSee

56.
States,

bama Claims
57.
a thin

I

Arbitration (U.S.

v.

U.K.),

record in strategic history and,

SUpra note 45,

TIONA1

1

Int.

Arb. 495, 656 (John Bassett

Moore

ed., 1872).

avoid arguments based on altruism, noting Colin Gray's observation that "altruism has

Law

at 8.

See also JACK

we must assume, an unpromising

L GOLDSMITH &

ERIC A. POSNER,

future."

THE

THE

SHERIFF,

LIMITS OF INTERNA-

21 1-15 (20(

A useful starting point for a common goal is secure, accessible and environmentally
sound seas. lor a discussion of the "thousand-ship navy" concept, see Christopher P. Caval, The
Thousand-Ship Saw, ARMED FORCES JOURNAL, Dec. 2006, at 26, available at http://www
.armedforcesjournal.com/2006/12 2336959.
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59.

Smaller, regional navies often embrace Professor Till's concept of

good order

at sea.

Some remark

that there are no longer any wars to be won, only order to be secured. See
Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-First Century (2004). See also Richard Hill, Maritime Strategy for Medium Powers (1986).
60. Abraham Maslow, A Theory of Human Motivation, 50 PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW 370

(1943), available at http://psychclassics.yorku.ca/Maslow/motivation.htm.

THE SHERIFF, supra note 45, at 3.
62. But we should not fall prey to what some call the "perfect" regime paradigm, by which we
assume that the present regime is complete and perfect and that new threats, challenges and op61.

be addressed by merely reinterpreting the existing regime. See Harry P.
Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 353 ( 1 98 1 ). To do
portunities can

so

stifles

all

rulemaking, substituting judges and academics for legislators.

sider the merits of one

cation where

no

critic

who

suggested that the

State does anything.

UN Charter system

it is

asking too

much

is

only clear in

its

to expect clarity

appli-

from

members of the

Security Council. But the lack of clarity gives

the temptation for clever interpretations of

UN Security Council resolutions or of Article

resolutions vetted through fifteen
rise to

Perhaps

We would do well to con-

51 of the Charter.

Thomas Hobbes, THE LEVIATHAN (1651), republished as THE LEVIATHAN: WITH SELECTED Variants from the LATIN EDITION OF 1668 ch. 17, para. 2 (Edwin Curley ed., 1994).
64. Future US security strategies will almost surely say a good deal more than the past ones
63.

about the tension between State sovereignty and international law and organizations.

Many see

the relationship between the two as a zero-sum game: every gain in international law or in an in-

power necessarily means there must be an offsetting loss of State sovereignty. See, e.g., JEREMY A. RABKIN, LAW WITHOUT NATIONS? WHY CONSTITUTIONAL
Government Requires Sovereign States (2005). Others see synergistic possibilities. See, e.g.,
Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy (1999). A bold maritime strategy
ternational organization's

might

start this

conversation

now in the

expectation that

it

will

bear fruit in 2009 with the

new

administration, perhaps even leading the way.

The diplomatic-ideological-military-economic force formulation by Professors
McDougal and Feliciano in 1961 was plainly focused on State actors. See MYRES S. McDOUGAL
& Florentino P. Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order 28-33 (1961).
66. The Commander's Handbook includes "judicial" powers in its consideration of nonmilitary measures. US Navy, US Marine Corps & US Coast Guard, NWP 1-14M/MCWP 5-12.1/
COMDTPUB P5800.7A, The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations para.
65.

4.2.3 (2007).
67.
is

The

(May

on "national

President's recent executive order

likely to stimulate

and expand those

efforts.

security professional development"

See Exec. Order No. 13,434, 72 Fed. Reg. 28583

17, 2007).

68. Will the

US maritime

security forces operate with local law enforcement authorities? If

and Posse Comitatus Act/DoD Directive 5525.5 issues must be considSome thought the DoD and the US Navy might want to revisit their role in law enforcement

so, legal interoperability

ered.

operations outside the United States. See Mark E. Rosen, Center for Naval Analyses,
Integration,

CNA Rep. CIM D0015579.A4/1

ent authority of "public vessels" (including

US Code

USN-USCG

Rev. (Feb. 2007). For example, should the pres-

US Navy vessels)

to enforce laws against piracy

381-82) be expanded to include enforcement of the Convention for the
(33
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Mar. 10, 1988,
1678 U.N.T.S. 201 and the Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Oct. 14, 2005, IMO Doc. LEG/CONF., 15/21,
sec.
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available at http://www.austlii.edu.aU//cgi-bin/disp.pl/au/other/dfat/treaties/notinforce/2005/

30.html?query=suppression%20of%20unlawful%20acts (which

now extends

to additional acts

of maritime terrorism and transport of WMD)? The author has been informed that the

Navy re-

jected the idea.

Who

69.

could imagine that Russian President and former

KGB

officer

Vladimir Putin,

Munich in 2007, could (in the minds of some) credibly denounce the United States for its "disdain for basic principles of international law" or argue that
now "nobody can take safety behind the stone wall of international law"? See Charles Krauthammer, The Putin Doctrine, WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 1 6, 2007, at A23, available at http://www
.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/ 1 5/AR200702 1 50 1 282.html; Thomas L.
speaking to an international forum in

Friedman, Putin Pushes Back,

NEW YORK TIMES,

Feb. 14, 2007, at A27, available at http://select

.nytimes.com/2007/02/ 14/opinion/14friedman.html?_r=l&oref=sloginvailable.

As Admiral Mullen described the Global

70.

deploy, where invited,

... a fleet

Fleet Station concept,

"The idea

of shallow-draft ships and support vessels

... in

is

to forward

green and brown

water." Mullen, supra note 7 (emphasis added).

Twenty-five chiefs of navies from around the world offer their views on the 1,000-ship

71.

concept in The Commanders Respond,

US NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, Mar.

2006, at 34.

Admiral Mullen has called the 1,000-ship navy "a network of international navies, coast guards,
maritime forces, port operators, commercial shippers and local law enforcement, all working together."

Mike Mullen, Remarks

Studies, Future

at the

Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security

Maritime Warfare Conference, London, England (Dec.

13,

2005), http://

Compare

this

approach with

www.navy.mil/navydata/cno/mullen/speeches/mullen051213.txt.

James Cable, Gunboat Diplomacy: Political Applications of Limited Naval Force,
1919-1991 (1994) and KEN BOOTH, LAW, FORCE AND DIPLOMACY AT SEA (1985).
72. John G. Morgan Jr. & Charles W. Martoglio, The 1,000-Ship Navy: Global Maritime Network, US Naval Institute Proceedings, Nov. 2005, at 14.
73. The Commanders Respond, supra note 71, at 34.
74. The Commanders Respond, US NAVAL INSTITUTE PROCEEDINGS, Mar. 2007, at 14.
75. AUSTRALIAN MARITIME DOCTRINE - RAN DOCTRINE 1 - 2000 ch. 4 (D.J. Shackleton
ed.,

2000), available at http://www.navy.gov.au/spc/amd/amdintro.html.
76.

Supra note

13, at 6.

77. The new Joint Publication on Multinational Operations recognizes that " [c] ommanders
must ensure that MNTF forces comply with applicable national and international laws during
the conduct of all military operations." Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-16,

Multinational Operations,

at III-6 (2007). Joint

Publication 3- 16

lists

law not as an "operational"

consideration in planning and execution, but rather as one of several "general considerations,"

which include,

inter alia, rules

of engagement, language, culture and sovereignty.

on the International Law Commission (ILC), arguably the world's most important international law codification and progressive development forum, when its candidate was, for the first time since the ILC's founding, not voted a seat on the
Commission. Those who observed the international and non-governmental organization politics behind the United States being voted off the UN Human Rights Commission on May 3, 200
78.

In 2006, the

United States

lost its seat

should not have been surprised.
79. See Daniel Moran, The International Law of the Sea in a Globalized World, in GLOBALIZATION AND MARITIME POWER 22 236-37 (Sam J. Tangredi ed., 2002). After noting Britain's difficulties in eradicating slave trading by sea, the author argues that
1

,

more

in

matters of international law, practice trumps theory. Or,

it,

both logically and for the most part historically, as the developments surveyed
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precedes
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essay illustrate clearly enough. This deference of theory to practice
international law.

is

not a defect of

On the contrary, it is testimony to its underlying realism and utility.

does suggest that international law is probably not the place to look for leadership
in solving the problems of the emergent global economy or in addressing the strategic

Yet

it

challenges that have followed in
80.

its

wake.

For example, the 2006 Green Paper on Maritime Strategy for the European Union con-

cludes that
[t]he legal system relating to oceans

to face

and seas based on

UNCLOS needs to be developed

new challenges. The UNCLOS regime for EEZ and international straits makes it

harder for coastal states to exercise jurisdiction over transiting ships, despite the fact

any pollution incident in these zones presents an imminent risk for them. This
makes it difficult to comply with the general obligations (themselves set up by

that

UNCLOS)

of coastal

states, to

protect their marine environment against pollution.

European Commission, Towards a Future Maritime Policy for the Union: A European Vision
for the Oceans and Seas 41-42 (2006), available at http://ec.europa.eu/maritimeaffairs/pdf/
com_2006_0275_en_part2.pdf. See also Justin Stares, UN Right to Free Passage under Fire,
LLOYD'S LIST, June 5, 2007, available at http://www.lloydslist.com/ll/news/articleSearch.htm;
then search "Justin Stares UN Right to Free Passage under Fire" (subscription required)
(reporting on European Union discussions to extend coastal State jurisdiction in the exclusive
economic zone to include the transport of illegal migrants).
8 1 See George V. Galdorisi & Alan G. Kaufman, Military Activities in the Exclusive Economic
Zone: Preventing Uncertainty and Defusing Conflict, 32 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL
LAW JOURNAL 253 (2002). When the law of the sea was largely a matter of customary law, Judge
Jessup argued that States could assert jurisdiction beyond their territorial seas in self-defense or
self-preservation. PHILIP C. JESSUP, THE LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDICTION 96-101 (1927).
82. My use of the term "rule set" begs the important and controversial question "which rule
set?" It is important to keep in mind that, as the Department of State's Legal Advisor John Bellinger highlighted in his address to the 2006 Naval War College International Law Department
Conference, a number of States and non-governmental organizations criticize the United States
for

disregard for "international law"

its

when often the

"laws" they are referring to are not bind-

on the United States (e.g., the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court,
the Kyoto Protocol, the Ottawa Anti-personnel Landmines Convention and the Additional Protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions). The critics rhetorically conflate a policy choice by the
United States not to become party to a treaty with violations of a treaty to which the United States
is a party. This can present a problem for the strategy drafter who might need to choose his/her
words carefully, to make it clear that the United States will adhere to international law to which it
ing

has consented to be bound. See John B. Bellinger

III,

International Legal Public Diplomacy, in

Global Legal Challenges: Command of the Commons, Strategic Communications
AND NATURAL DISASTERS 205 (Michael D. Carsten ed., 2007) (Vol. 83, US Naval War College
International Law Studies). See also Policy Coordinating Committee, US National Strategy for
Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communication (2007), available at http://www .state.gov/documents/organization/87427.pdf.
83.

See, e.g.,

POST, Aug.
rules,

9,

John Pompret, China Ponders New Rules of Unrestricted Warfare, WASHINGTON
1, quoting Colonel Wang Xiangsui, of the Chinese Air Force: "War has

1999, at

but those rules were

have no chance

made by the West

[I]f you

follow those rules, then

weak countries

We are a weak country, so do we need to fight according to your rules? No."
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84. The classical approach was the "fleet
Maritime Stra teg y pt III, ch. Ill (1911).

SOME PRINCIPLES OF

Command of the Commons Boasts: An Invitation to Lawfare?,
-l.OBAL LEGAL CHALLENGES, supra note 82, at 21. Examples might include the Rome Statute
See generally Craig H. Allen,

85.
in

in being." See Julian Corbett,

(

establishing the International Criminal Court, Additional Protocol

I

to the 1949

Geneva Con-

ventions and the Convention on Anti-personnel Landmines. In the words of Vattel, in interna-

weakness
counts for nothing. A dwarf is as much a man as a giant is; a
no less a sovereign state than the most powerful Kingdom." EMERICH DE
Vattel, Droit des gens (1758), quoted in Adam Watson, The Evolution of International Society 203 (1992).
tional law "strength or

small Republic

.

.

.

is

Kellogg, supra note 34, at 50.

86.

The "New Haven School" policy-oriented jurisprudence developed by Yale Professors
Myres McDougal and Harold Lasswell depicts international law as a process, in which "uses"
produce "effects," some of which are undesired, resulting in "responses," which may include
new rules. MYRES S. MCDOUGAL & HAROLD D. LASSWELL, JURISPRUDENCE FOR A FREE SOCIETY:
Studies in Law, Science and Policy (1992).
87.

Some have argued that only the United States has an independent global security strategy. See, e.g., ROBERT COOPER, THE BREAKING OF NATIONS: ORDER AND CHAOS IN THE
Twenty-First Century 45 (2004); LEHMAN, supra note 16, at 135-36 (noting that any US
88.

maritime strategy must be global

in concept).

89. John Paul Jones, quoted in BURDICK H. BRITTIN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR SEAGOING
OFFICERS 7-8 (5th ed. 1986). The relevant law was collected, reported, analyzed and, in my opin-

books on international law; by Cap1 956
and 1 986; and by the 1 987 Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operation and the later
Annotated Supplement, which many believe sprang fully footnoted from the cranium of one
Captain Jack Grunawalt (US Navy, retired). The current iteration of the Commander's Handion,

shaped by the pioneer Charles H. Stockton

tain

Burdick Brittin in the

book

is

90.

five editions

cited in note 66.

See Department of the Navy,

Army's commitment to

a

conform

cates.

to the law into practice

Some now

US Navy

0705 (1990). Arguably, the
robust operational law program, begun in the 1980s under the leader-

ship of visionaries like Colonel David
to

in his early

of his Naval Institute Press books published between

Regulations

Graham, went one

art.

step further

by putting the requirement

through training and wider use of the

service's

judge advo-

urge that operational law should be included in the Joint Professional Military

Education requirements.
91.

For the sake of argument,

I

will

concede that protecting

widely viewed as a "vital interest" of the United States; however,

trenched

must

this issue

is

in

our national

identity. Strategy

also be consistent with the national identity. See

Policy,

FOREIGN SERVICES JOURNAL (May

human

rights

abroad

is

not

we must not overlook how en-

must serve the national

interests;

but

it

William C. Adams, Opinion and Foreign

1984), available at http://www.gwu.edu/~pad/202/

readings/foreign. html. For the United States, that identity begins with a reminder that

we are the

world's oldest constitutional democracy.
92.

Supra note

93.

See

ITARY

13.

ROGER W. BARNETT, ASYMMETRICAL WARFARE: TODAY'S CHALLENGE TO

POWER

ch

3.

U.S. MIL-

(2003) (discussing exploitation of legal constraints by asymmetric oppo-

nents).
94.

William Butler Yeats, The Second Coming (1920).

95. Paul Kennedy, The Parliament of Man: The Past, present, and Future of
the United nations (2006); annf-Makii si aughtfr, The new world order (2004).
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book with Alfred Lord Tennyson's 1837 poem Locksley Hall,
which accurately reflects the modern/postmodern view.
96. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America (1835).
97. The author is indebted to the late Judge William L. Dwyer (US District Court for the
Western District of Washington) for the allusion to Yeats and the suggestion that the law can
Professor

Kennedy opens

his

serve as our "centre."
98.
rity

Deputy Secretary of Defense, Memorandum

for the Executive Secretary, National Secu-

7, 2007) (copy of letter and FOUO attachment on file with
Department of Defense, National Security and the Convention on the Law

Council, Treaty Priority List (Feb.

the author). See also

oftheSea(2ded. 1996).
99.

Letter of Stephen

J.

Hadley, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, to

Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Joseph Biden (Feb.

8,

2007) (copy on

file

with

the author).
100.

Oceans

The White House, President's Statement on Advancing U.S. Interests in the World's
(May 15, 2007), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2007/05/

See

20070515-2.html.
101.

John D. Negroponte

& Gordon England, Reap

the Bounty,

WASHINGTON

TIMES, June

16, 2007, at 17.

102.

See, e.g.,

Testimony of Hon. Donald C. Winter, Secretary of the Navy; Admiral Michael

G. Mullen, Chief of Naval Operations; and General James T. Conway,

Commandant of the Ma-

House Armed Services Committee on the Fiscal Year 2008 National Defense
Budget Request from the Department of the Navy (Mar. 1, 2007), http://armedservices
rine Corps, to the

.house.gov/hearing_information.shtml.
1 03
Statement by Admiral Thad Allen, Commandant of the Coast Guard, on the Convention
on the Law of the Sea (May 17, 2007), https://www.piersystem.com/go/doc/786/156912/.
104. See JOHN F. MURPHY, THE UNITED STATES AND THE RULE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL
AFFAIRS 240-45 (2004) (analyzing the arguments for and against US accession and the prospects
for success); Congressional Research Service, The Law of the Sea Convention and U.S. Policy

CRS No. IB95010.
105. See A.V. Lowe, The Commander Handbook on the Law ofNaval Operations and the Contemporary Law of the Sea, in THE LAW OF NAVAL OPERATIONS 109, 1 1 1 (Horace B. Robertson Jr.
ed., 1991) (Vol. 64, US Naval War College International Law Studies). In discussing evolution of
(updated Jan. 27, 2006),

's

the law governing maritime baselines, Professor Lowe was likely thinking of Article 31(3) of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1 155 U.N.T.S. 331.
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Conditions on Entry of Foreign-Flag Vessels
into

US Ports to Promote Maritime Security

William D. Baumgartner and John T. Oliver*
Executive

One

Summary

of the most important engines driving global economic development

and progress

in recent years

is

the freedom to engage in seaborne trade

throughout the world. Relatively unhindered access to the world's ports

is

a vitally

important component of the recent story of global economic success. At the same
time, the grave threats that international terrorists

order give

rise to

and rogue

overriding maritime security concerns

which argue strongly against a maritime open-door
illegal

and other

threats to the

laws, are also

Other

vital

concerns,

oil tankers, illegal fishing

marine environment, and violation of customs and trade

prompting port

States to take actions that

impose conditions on port

and even

to restrict traditional free-

entry, to exercise greater jurisdiction in port

doms

among port States, factors

policy.

immigration, drug trafficking, unsafe

including

States pose to global

of navigation in coastal waters.

As a general rule, international law presumes that the ports of every State should
be open to all commercial vessels. However, if a State considers that one or more
important interests require closure, necessitate imposing conditions on entry or
exit,

*

or dictate the exercise of greater jurisdiction over foreign vessels in port,

Rear Admiral William D. Baumgartner,

United States Navy

(Ret.).

US

Coast Guard and Captain John T. Oliver, JAGC,

Conditions on Entry of Foreign-Flag Vessels into

international law generally permits the port State to

the port entry of

all

do

so.

US Ports

A port State may restrict

foreign vessels, subject only to any rights of entry clearly

granted under an applicable treaty and those vessels in distress due to force majeure.

At the same time, international law presumes that the port State
to foreign

commercial

vessels or

will restrict access

impose sanctions upon those that enter

port, even

those designed to promote important maritime goals, which are reasonably related
to ensuring the safe, secure

and appropriate entry or departure of the

vessel

on the

occasion in question.

As

ment

fundamental policy

a

efficient

and

goal,

all

States

effective conditions

must cooperate

on port entry

to develop

and imple-

to ensure the security of the

port State and the international commercial system. Unreasonably restrictive conditions

would have

a deleterious effect

Ineffective conditions

on

on global trade and the world's economy.

entry, such as faulty procedures to screen ships

cargoes, could result in a security breakdown

port

city.

Such

a disaster

and

their

and a devastating terrorist attack on

a

would render virtually inconsequential the debate over re-

on port entry to achieve political, environmental, navigational safety, law
enforcement or other worthwhile goals. Even so, international lawyers and policystrictions

makers

in the

United States and elsewhere must seek to ensure that access to the

ports of the world

fundamentally free, and restricted only on conditions

and reasonably

effectively

the world

is

community at

directly,

related to the significant interests of the port State

and

large.

This article discusses general principles of international and domestic law governing the condition of port entry as a basis for regulating foreign vessels entering
ports, with

an emphasis on maritime

quences of imposing
have the practical

which would lead
sult in

security.

It

also considers the policy conse-

legally permissible restrictions or

effect

requirements that could

of infringing unreasonably on maritime commerce, or

community and which might reobjections. The goal of the article is to de-

to concerns in the international

diplomatic protests and political

velop an analytical structure that would encourage a rational review of any

proposed conditions on entry to ports to help ensure that any such requirements
are legal, acceptable, reasonable

and

wise. In a post-9/11

world that remains de-

pendent on international trade for economic prosperity, achieving an
balanced, legal and workable port-entry regime

/.

As

Introduction

to

all

commercial

and Burke observed

a vitally

important goal.

and Competing Policy Interests

a general rule, international law

open

is

effective,

presumes that the ports of every State should be

vessels seeking to call

forty-five years ago:

on them. As Professors McDougal

"The chief function of ports
34

for the coastal

William D. Baumgartner and John

state is in provision

of cheap and easy access to the oceans and to the

[T]he availability of good harbors

world

T. Oliver

.

.

rest

remains a priceless national

.

of the

asset." 1

Every modern State has a general obligation to engage in commercial intercourse
with other States and, absent an important reason, none should deny foreign commercial vessels reciprocal access to

its

ports. 2

In a much-quoted (yet often- criticized) statement, an arbitral tribunal observed
in the

Aramco

case in 1958, "According to a great principle of public international

law, the ports of every State

be closed when the

must be open to foreign merchant vessels and can only

vital interests

of the State so require." 3 In his widely respected

Colombos wrote that "in time of peace, commercial ports must be
left open to international traffic," and that the "liberty of access to ports granted to
foreign vessels implies their right to load and unload their cargoes; embark and disembark their passengers." 4 The Third Restatement of the Foreign Relations Law of
treatise,

Dr. C.J.

the United States

ports are

summarizes the

legal principle as follows: "In general,

open to foreign ships on condition of reciprocity,

.

.

.

maritime

but the coastal State
"5

may temporarily suspend access in exceptional cases for imperative reasons
At the same time, each port

State has the sovereign right to

tablish reasonable conditions related to access to

its

deny entry and to

internal waters, harbors,

6

roadsteads and ports. Indeed, apart from certain pronouncements, there
actual support for the

broad statement that ports can only be closed for

ests" or "imperative reasons" as a

es-

is little

"vital inter-

fundamental principle of customary interna-

The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982 LOS
Convention) 8 "contains no restriction on the right of a state to establish port entry

tional law.

7

requirements

." 9
.

.

.

Article 25, entitled "Rights of protection of the coastal State,"

provides: "In the case of ships proceeding to internal waters or a call at a port facility

outside internal waters, the coastal State

steps to prevent

.

.

.

has the right to take the necessary

any breach of the conditions to which admission of those ships to

internal waters or such a call

is

subject." 10 While the

Agreement," which incorporates almost

all

United States signed the "Part XI

of the 1982

LOS Conventions

the United States Senate has not yet ratified or acceded to

it.

Even

in 1994,

so, the

United

States has long considered the navigation- related principles contained in the 1982

LOS Convention to

reflect

customary international law, binding on

all

States.

1

]

After carefully examining the relevant authorities cited in support of such a
right-of-port-entry principle in the

Aramco

case, Professor A.V.

Lowe concluded

that international law does not so severely restrict the authority of a port State to
close a port or

tween a
State

impose conditions on

right of entry

and

a.

which are designated

provisions to the contrary

entry. 12

He

convincingly distinguished be-

presumption of entry, concluding that "the ports of a
for international trade are, in the absence of express

made by

a port State,

35

presumed

to be

open

to the
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merchant ships of all

States .... [S]uch ports should not be closed to foreign

chant ships except

when

cessitates closure."

13

a

presumption that

vessels,
it is

but this

is

the peace,

good order, or

ports used for international trade are

all

practice only, based

[their sovereignty

that the internal waters

the complete sovereignty of the nation, as

and the

to

all

merchant
interest;

over their internal wa-

... to

and

territorial sea are "subject to

much as if they were a part of its land ter-

coastal nation has the privilege even to exclude foreign vessels alto-

gether." 15 In another case, the

power

open

is

have absolute control over access to their ports." 14 The United States

Supreme Court observed
ritory,

"There

further:

upon convenience and commercial

Pursuant to

mer-

security of the coastal State ne-

Another knowledgeable observer went even

not a legal obligation

ters], states

US Ports

Supreme Court concluded

that Congress

condition access to our ports by foreign-owned vessels

sion to any liabilities

it

may consider good American

had "the

upon submis-

policy to exact." 16

Whether States view port entry as an international obligation or one granted
based on international comity and domestic self-interest, they typically do not undertake to deny entry to their ports without good cause. Before restricting entry to
ports, a State

must have good policy reasons

may "necessitat[e]

reasons" or what factors

do

to

so. "Vital interests,"

its

"imperative

closure" or constitute "good policy" in-

clude such obvious ones as national security or public health. However, acceptable
State practice includes closing a port to enforce

an embargo, to sanction hostile be-

havior by another State, to impose a political reprisal 17 or to promote other significant interests as the port State

There

is

a

may determine

good deal of foreign

to be appropriate

and necessary. 18

State practice supporting the imposition of a

broad spectrum of conditions governing port entry and the exercise of jurisdiction
in port. 19

Today, there

is

over access to ports and

by foreign

vessels."

20

general agreement "that the coastal state has

is

competent to exercise

it,

full

authority

virtually at will, to exclude entry

Among appropriate entry conditions are complying with pi-

lotage requirements, obeying traffic separation

schemes and paying customs

duties.

Port States have even greater rights to limit or control entry with respect to certain
categories of vessels, such as warships, nuclear-powered vessels, fishing boats

and

recreational craft. Absent agreement between the States concerned, foreign war-

ships have

no general expectation of being permitted entry 21 and must request per-

mission to

make a port call

to

deny or condition entry

recreational craft.

24

in

each case. 22 International law also permits port States

as they see

fit

to foreign-flag fishing boats 23

and private

Some port States may consider that the domestic political costs

of approving nuclear-powered or -armed vessels entry to their waters are too
high, 25 while granting port entry to warships, fishing vessels
ational craft does not

promote the overriding

tional trade that foreign-flag

commercial

recre-

interests of the port State in interna-

vessels directly serve.

36

and private
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Just as there

is

a

presumption that a port State

commercial vessel from entry into
fected flag State

its

T.

Oliver

may not

properly bar a foreign

ports absent adequate justification, the af-

and the international community would view with concern the

imposition of unreasonable, arbitrary or discriminatory requirements for access. 26
"It is

.

.

.

possible that closures or conditions of entry which are patently unreason-

might be held to amount

able or discriminatory

to

an abus de

droit, for

which the

coastal State

might be internationally responsible even if there was no right of entry

to the port."

27

However, both conventional and customary international law per-

mit a State to impose reasonable restrictions on port entry. 28 The possible condi-

on entry run from those historically designed
free from infectious diseases, and that customs

and crew

tions

to ensure that vessel

are

duties have or will be paid, to

provisions ensuring that promises to use the services of a pilot when entering or exiting
port,

and to moor or anchor

related concerns so

ger

as directed, are kept.

important in a post-9/1 1 world, such

and crew lists and cargo manifests, and

of the

territorial sea until

as

submission of passen-

a willingness to wait

an inspection of the

equipment can be completed.

Of

These also include those security-

beyond the

limits

monitoring

vessel with radiation

29

course, under the fundamental international legal principle of pacta sunt

servanda, nation-States

must comply with international agreements

to

which they

Hundreds of bilateral friendship, commerce and navigation (FCN) treaties govern the circumstances under which those party to the agreements permit
port entry to the other. 30 Such FCN treaties confirm the general presumption that
ports will be open and unrestricted by unreasonable conditions. Whether these bilateral FCN or "most-favored-nation" treaties concerning commerce and navigaare party.

tion reflect customary international law or

customary law, there

is

may have

a general expectancy that,

vessels of either party will

helped established a rule of

when

entered into, commercial

be able to trade with any foreign port, and

will

need to

comply only with standard and necessary port entry conditions and expectations. 31
Here

again, international practice

the general presumption of entry.

sovereign

immune

is

32

to exclude warships

Whether

and

at sea or in port,

vessels are subject only to the

fishing vessels

from

warships and other

enforcement jurisdiction of the

immune vessel engages in an activity in violation of the
local authorities may direct that the vessel leave immediately

flag State. 33 If a sovereign

law of the port

State,

and may seek damages through diplomatic channels
foreign sovereign

immune vessels.

resulting

from the actions of

34

Although a port State has a right to condition entry to
spectrum of concerns, any such restrictions

entail costs.

rectly involved in administering the conditions,

conducting any ship inspections that

may be
37

its

ports based

on

a

broad

The costs include those di-

from processing the paperwork

necessary.

Such

direct costs

to

may be
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fully or partially offset

age
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with appropriate port-entry, pilotage, mooring or anchor-

But the most significant burden entails the economic,

fees.

political

and other

smooth
and efficient flow of international trade. Whether a nation's port-entry scheme requires a merchant vessel to wait outside port until it receives clearance, embarks a
costs involved in slowing, complicating or otherwise interfering with the

pilot or agrees to

submit to a search, or imposes such an extensive planning,

spection or reporting system

on shipping companies or ship masters

that

in-

it is

no

longer attractive to do business with a certain nation or port, any such conditions

on port entry make international trade more time-consuming,

and costly.

difficult

The 1965 Convention on Facilitation of International Maritime Traffic, modeled
on earlier international efforts to improve international air traffic, emphasizes the
importance of simplifying and reducing to a minimum the administrative burdens
imposed on international shipping "to facilitate and expedite international maritime

" 35

traffic

International legal principles also expect that port States will ex-

tend "equality of treatment" to prohibit discrimination in

all

rules governing port

entry and conditions and procedures applied to foreign commercial vessels. 36

Given the crucial importance of international trade in today's global economy,
the cumulative impact of incremental costs, short delays or

have a profoundly adverse impact. In

this regard,

minor disruptions can

harmonizing and coordinating

conditions on port entry throughout the world community, with similar expectations, requirements,

imposing

as

forms and procedures, can achieve the desired goals without

much of an administrative burden. Wisely balancing the benefits to be

achieved from imposing conditions on port entry, such as intelligently devised security requirements, against the costs

and burdens associated with each

As one commentator observed, with respect

is

to the broader efforts to protect the

nation's security against potential terrorist attacks, "Ultimately, getting
security right

is

essential.

not about constructing barricades to fend off

homeland

terrorists. It

is,

or

should be, about identifying and taking the steps necessary to allow the United
States to

moting

nomic

remain an open, prosperous,

relatively unrestricted
vitality

Security

is

planet."
perts

who

at the

the single greatest engine in

The

globally engaged society." 37 Prois

continued eco-

essential to the

of the world. As Dr. James Carafano, senior fellow for National

important thing that
38

and

oceangoing trade

and Homeland Security

commerce

free,

raises the

them must be

economic growth and

standard of living for every

goal of policymakers

advise

Heritage Foundation, observed: "Global
it's

the single

human

most

being on the

and the attorneys and other subject-matter ex-

to find an appropriate balance that fosters effective

and workable limitations on port entry directly

related to

goals to be achieved, while avoiding unnecessarily

promoting the important

burdensome

restrictions

procedures thai merely hamper free international navigation and trade.
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Contemporary Context and Analytical Structure

A. Historical Background

Seaborne commerce has been a vitally important part of the world's economy ever
since

mankind began to engage in

substantial trade with his neighbor. Portuguese,

Chinese, Arabian, Indian, Italian, Dutch, Spanish and English ships competed with

each other over the centuries to dominate key trade routes and control the supply
of commodities and other valuable goods. Global maritime trade has been a

component

vital

and economic growth. Indevelopment in the history of world

in stimulating international relationships

deed, perhaps the

most impressive

structural

growth and development has been oceangoing trade. Particularly for goods carried
in quantity or bulk, water transportation has long

and

—

until the advent of railways,

good deal

usually a

faster

been cheaper and more

modern highways and

and airplanes

trucks,

than the alternative transportation modalities.

At the same time, history has demonstrated the
activities.

efficient

risks associated

with maritime

Too often, the crews of seagoing vessels were engaged in activities less be-

nign than mutually beneficial, arm's-length trading. Pirates and privateers

wreaked havoc on ships engaged in peaceful trade. Coastal
tites in

the twelfth century BC,

shipping, ports

raiders,

such as the Hit-

and Vikings around the tenth century AD, ravaged

and peoples. Vicious oceangoing criminals have preyed on those

weaker than themselves along the coasts of Africa and Southeast Asia for thousands
of years. Powerful maritime States engaged in the conquest of foreign lands and

monopolization of vital shipping lanes and key trading ports and nations. From
seaborne attacks against ports in the Mediterranean to the surprise attack on Pearl

Harbor, States have sought to exploit coastal waters to wage aggressive warfare.
History has demonstrated that the tremendous benefits of international ocean

commerce must be balanced

against the potential risks.

Even

so,

while the history

of international ocean trade no doubt has demonstrated the potential for adverse
activities

and consequences, including imperialism, colonization,

and maritime terrorism, seaborne commerce has long been

a vital

conflict, piracy

component

promoting global economic growth and improving living conditions worldwide.
B.

in
39

Contemporary Context

on which the world community trades by sea today. Moreover, world trade has been growing at 6-10 percent each year. 40 Ocean
commerce will no doubt become increasingly vital in years to come. Some 95 per-

Nothing

in history rivals the scale

cent of the world's trade today
for

is

dependent on maritime commerce.

ocean transport of key commodities, such

such

as

wheat and

rice,

and construction
39

and natural

as oil

materials,

many

If it

were not

gas, cereal grains,

of the world's peoples
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would not have power for their transportation and electrical systems, food for their
tables or

homes

for their families. Increasingly, international trade has focused

on

high-value items, such as automobiles, televisions, furniture and expensive enter-

tainment systems. Specially constructed roll-on, roll-off vehicle carriers and container ships carrying thousands of interchangeable sealed containers transport

cargoes worth hundreds of millions of dollars. Often, the value of the cargo far exceeds the value of the ship.

The nations of Asia,

Thailand, Singapore, India and, increasingly, China (via

Hong Kong
trade.

41

modern

These States use a good portion of the profits from

parts of western Africa. Supertankers transport

(LNG)

natural gas

port

facilities in

and, increasingly, on the mainland), dominate high-value ocean

and natural gas from the energy-rich Middle

oil

South Korea,

in particular Japan,

East,

this trade to

purchase

Indonesian archipelago, and

huge amounts of oil and liquefied

tankers carry tremendous volumes of natural gas through re-

stricted waters of southeastern Asia to the vibrant,

but energy-dependent, econo-

mies of North and South America, Europe, and South and East Asia.
Despite the tremendous worldwide economic growth exemplified by China, India, Brazil

and

several other developing States, the

American economy remains, by

would be difficult to exaggerate
the importance of the maritime transportation component to this nation's economy. When measured by volume, more than 95 percent of international trade that
enters or leaves this country does so through the nation's ports and inland waterfar,

the largest

and most dynamic

ways. 42 In 2004,
containers.

43

US

in the world. It

ports handled almost twenty million multimodal shipping

Container ships, which account for only eleven percent of the annual

tonnage of waterborne overseas trade, account for two-thirds of the value of that
trade. Several of the

326 or so seagoing ports in the United

Angeles/Long Beach,

among the busiest

New

in the

States, including

Los

York, Houston, San Francisco and Baltimore, are

world in one or more categories. 44 In excess of two

billion

commerce now are carried on the water, creatmillion jobs and contributing more than $742 billion to the

tons of domestic and international
ing

more than

thirteen

gross national product. 45 Multimodal freight transportation accounts for nearly 15

percent of services the United States trades internationally. Each year,
vessels flying foreign flags

make 51,000

calls in

US

ports.

Energy is also a critical and growing import into the United
can owned and/or operated tankers carry

and

refineries

on the West Coast. But

a

oil

much

States.

from Valdez, Alaska

larger

some 7,500

46

volume of oil

is

Large Amerito terminals

imported into

on the Gulf Coast from Mexico, Venezuela, Nigeria and the Middle East. 47
Increasingly, huge liquefied natural gas tankers call on US terminals to meet the

ports

tremendous and increasing American appetite
are only six

LNG

for natural gas. 48 Presently, there

terminals in the United States, but there are plans under

40

way

to
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build dozens more. 49 Because the volume of international trade

by 2020, and because the maritime transportation system

is

is

expected to double

the nation's best

means

of accommodating that growth, experts expect that the importance of seaports in the

US economy will continue to grow dramatically over the coming years. 50
While trade has grown dramatically, the potential national security risks are also
far greater
trate, in

and more complex today than they have ever been

December, 1941, the Empire of Japan assembled a

To

in the past.

fleet

illus-

consisting of six

thousands of men, hundreds of aircraft and scores of supporting

aircraft carriers,

vessels (including

submarines and mini-subs) to attack the

US Navy and Army in-

frastructure at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. This surprise attack killed

some 2,403

service

members and sixty-eight civilians, seriously damaged or destroyed twelve warships
and 188
ture,

aircraft,

caused hundreds of millions of dollars in damages to infrastruc-

and plunged the United

years later, a

mere

fifteen

States into the

Al-Qaeda

Second World War. 51 Nearly

sixty

terrorists hijacked four civilian airliners

and

caused the death of nearly three thousand innocent civilians and wreaked incalculable financial costs

by intentionally crashing three of the

aircraft into the

Trade Center towers and Pentagon. As a result, the United States
a "global

now engaged in

war on terrorism" (GWOT), with hundreds of thousands of casualties

and hundreds of billions of dollars
Even

is

World

this level

in costs. 52

of death and destruction would pale compared to the potential

numbers of casualties, and the hundreds of billions of dollars in potential destruction and disruption of global trade, were a nuclear device, "dirty bomb" or other
weapon of mass destruction to explode in a major port city, such as Long Beach or

many

Baltimore. 53 Experts fear that terrorists could hide such a device in one of the

thousands of ubiquitous shipping containers imported into the United States every
day. 54 Other scenarios, such as the possibility that terrorists
carrier

and detonate the cargo

devastating destruction.
restrictions

55

would

hijack an

LNG

in a populated or industrial area, could also result in

Assuming

on port entry and

a rational

efforts to prevent

and

effective

such a

connection between

disaster, a port State

could

condition port entry on compliance with virtually any set of maritime security

measures consistent with international law. Likewise, port States could exert jurisdiction over foreign-flag vessels voluntarily in port, other than sovereign
vessels, to carry

On

out virtually any rational and effective security measure.

the other hand, policy experts

trade with irrational, excessive

ductive

—enormously

Moreover,

if the

immune

and

would argue

that handcuffing international

ineffective restrictions

disruptive, hugely expensive

would be counterpro-

and fundamentally unwise. 56

United States were to adopt a policy to conduct wide-ranging,

trusive security raids

such heavy-handed

on board

tactics

foreign-flag vessels voluntarily present in

US

would likely prompt international censure and,
41

to

in-

ports,

some
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extent, discourage trade. For national concerns of
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somewhat

lesser

magnitude,

such as to prevent customs violations or the importation of illegal drugs, the imposition of intrusive pre-entry requirements, while legal,

should also be directly and

reasonably related to the goals to be accomplished.

C. Analytical Structure
In evaluating the legal principles governing the right of port States to
tions

on port entry

factors.

It

to

promote maritime

will analyze the

impose condi-

security, this article will consider various

nature of the underlying

activity,

long-standing ones that are directly related to the vessel's

beginning with the most

visit to

the particular port,

and proceeding through those which have only recently been considered

as condi-

tions for restricting port entry, such as requiring other flag States to cooperate in the

global

war on terrorism. The more

condition on port entry, the

and

also the

more

likely

it

more

will

traditional,

commonly required and obvious

likely

meet standards of international

it

will

the

law,

be widely regarded as prudent and necessary.

After analyzing the question of jurisdiction and the various types of underlying

we

activities,

something
rival, to a

gers

as

will next consider the

nature of the conditions to be imposed, from

unobtrusive as requiring the vessel to notify port authorities of its ar-

requirement to provide a

list

of the names and nationalities of all passen-

and crew members, to submitting to an offshore inspection, to outright denial of

The conditions may extend beyond the immediate visit of the vessel
to the port State and include activities of the vessel on other occasions, of other ships
of that shipping company or even of other vessels of that flag State.
Finally, we will consider a list of relevant questions that a port State and the international community should ask with respect to any proposed condition regulating entry into a port to ensure that it is reasonable and necessary. The questions
deal with a variety of factors, ranging from the importance of the goal the regulatory scheme is designed to achieve, to the geographical and temporal nexus beentry to the port.

tween the vessel and the port

State, to the effectiveness

of the proposed regulation,

to the

impact of the regulation on freedom of navigation and existing treaty obliga-

tions.

The

goal of this article

ate the legality

///.

is

to develop

and consider objective

and wisdom of conditions on port

criteria to evalu-

entry.

Conditions on Entry Directly Related to the Vessel's Port Visit

A. Port Security
1

1

istorically, as well as presently, the

most

vital single

concern that a port State has

had with respect to one or more foreign vessels entering
ters involves

its

own

security.

As the United

42

States

its

ports and internal wa-

Supreme Court has expressed

it,

William D. Baumgartner and John
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'obvious and unarguable' that no governmental interest

is

more compelling

than the security of the Nation." 57 As the English, Irish and French lookouts and
private citizens stared awestruck out to sea in the years

around the turn of the

millennium, they did not wonder whether the dozen or so longboats

first

manned by

Viking warriors they observed rowing into their ports or up their rivers were coming to engage in peaceful and productive trade. Instead, they were convinced, based

on dreadful experience,

that these Vikings

lages, pillaging their riches,

the security of their

were hell-bent on raiding

and abusing and murdering the

homeland was

their port vil-

inhabitants. In short,

in peril.

For what good it might do, a port or nation obviously has always had the right to
prohibit the entry of any vessel determined to inflict death and destruction

In like manner, the port State could

mandate

a requirement that the pirate ship or

foreign-flag raider disarm itself before entering, or sign a promise that

of the crew would engage in any violent or

lem was

that,

when

upon it.

illegal activities

no member

while in port. The prob-

faced with marauding Chinese pirates, Phoenician raiders or

Vikings, the denizens of the beleaguered coastal port usually did not have the re-

sources to insist on anything of the sort. Instead, the security forces and inhabitants

could only run deep into the

forest,

row or

sail

nearest mountainside, hoping that the raiders
in the well or overtake

and murder them

further

up the

would not

river,

or climb the

find the treasure hidden

as they fled.

Of course, pirates and other maritime raiders no longer represent a direct threat
to Los Angeles, Lisbon or Sydney. Nonetheless, in the
rity

wake of 9/1 1, national secu-

concerns remain paramount throughout the world. Experts conclude that the

greatest single security risk to

attack on, or

America and its allies today is a surreptitious terrorist

byway of, port cities using nuclear weapons. 58 To prevent the massive

number of innocent deaths,
would entail, 59

a port State

physical destruction

and financial disruption

that this

may legally do almost anything reasonably necessary to

protect against such a threat. This article will discuss in detail the various possibilities

of how

far a

port State

may go to ensure port security during times of war or to

protect against actual or potential threats to national security, such as
ble terrorist attacks.

60

Before doing so, however,

from

possi-

we will first analyze the traditional

requirements for port entry properly demanded of bona fide commercial vessels to

comply with domestic laws
terests

to ensure

good order and

to protect the legitimate in-

of the port State.

and Customs Laws and Regulations
ensure the security of the port State, the most long-standing,

B. Fiscal, Immigration, Sanitation

Beyond seeking

to

traditional requirements attendant to a
facility are

commercial

vessel entering a foreign port

those that pertain to compliance with port State laws involving

43

fiscal,
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immigration, sanitation and customs (FISC) matters.
fathers of Venice

From

US Ports

the time that the city

imposed import taxes on the foreign merchants seeking entry to

trade their spices or other exotic wares, or the authorities of Tokyo required foreign
ships to

comply with domestic laws

related to sanitation, health

coastal States have exacted financial requirements

and immigration,

and imposed requirements

to

ensure that their citizens benefited from seaborne trade, rather than suffered adverse consequences.
All States

today agree with the basic principle that a port State

foreign ship's entry to port

upon compliance with laws and

"the conduct of the business of the port

.

.

.

States,

a

regulations governing

provided that these measures comply

with the principle of equality of treatment"

United

may condition

among

foreign-flag vessels. 61 In the

Congress has provided for a regulatory scheme related to each FISC-

related requirement, including port clearance

and entry procedures, 62 payment of

tonnage and customs duties, 63 restrictions on immigration, 64 and sanitation and
health regulations. 65

No one doubts the legal authority for, indeed the necessity of,

denying entry of a foreign ship to a port

board carry a serious infectious
wise, a port State

passengers or

members of the crew on

such as tuberculosis or the plague. 66 Like-

may take necessary and effective steps, such as requiring that a local

public health official
are

disease,

if

first visit

the vessel to confirm that the crew and passengers

free of infectious disease, before granting port entry. 67 International

all

grants to port States the right to take necessary

and appropriate actions

to prevent

the entry into the port of stowaways, absconders, deserters or other illegal
grants.

68

Among those is the right to

passport or other identifying

inquire as to nationality,

demand

law

immi-

to see each

document and determine the status and intentions of

crew members and passengers.
For

many years,

each port State established

its

own paperwork and

procedural

requirements for foreign vessels to complete and submit. As international trade be-

came more

universal

and

essential, the

hundreds of different procedural require-

ments and forms became burdensome, particularly where the

failure to

complete a

way caused the responsible bureaucrat to deny
or delay port entry, or to delay departure. In some ports, a customs official would
"overlook" a missing document or "assist" a master in filling out the required
particular

document

forms properly

in

in a particular

exchange for an under-the-table payment. Even where no bribes

or other chicanery was involved, the cost, confusion and delay inherent in complying with varying local laws

and completing a plethora of different documents were

considerable.

To

help ameliorate the problem of burdensome forms and differing port-entry

requirements, the 1965

London Convention on

the Facilitation of International

Maritime Traffic (FAL) established standard practices with respect to documents
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may require a foreign vessel to submit prior to or
upon port entrance. Because it makes so much practical sense, the international
community has embraced the Convention. 70 In implementing the FAL Convenand procedures

that a port State
69

tion to

promote maritime

efficiency, the International

Maritime Organization

(IMO) has developed recommended practices and prepared several standardized
documents for port States to use. 71 Near universal agreement with what a port State
could impose with respect to fiscal, immigration, sanitation and customs requirements, and standard forms and procedures, has greatly improved compliance and
promoted international trade. While a port State not party to the FAL Convention
could legally deviate from the IMO FISC-related standards as a condition for port
entry, to do so would be self-defeating. No State wants to discourage international
seaborne trade or, without good reason, increase the costs and delays associated
with it. As a result, virtually all port States, whether or not party to the FAL Convention, use the standardized forms and follow the prescribed procedures.

and Mooring and Anchorage Requirements
traditionally imposed on visiting vessels the obligation

C. Navigation, Pilotage

Port States have also

comply with requirements designed to ensure

safe navigation within their internal

waters and the operational efficiency of their ports. As Professors Myres

and William Burke observed:
Once

and

are within state territory, states claim sole

activities relating to

the use of the waters. In the port, for

example, coastal states claim authority to regulate the myriad

berths,

activities

movement and anchorage of vessels

port operation such as the

and numerous other events

.

.

.

,

connected with
assignments of

directly affecting the use of the area.

Applicable requirements range from rules mandating use of a pilot

pending on the

size

of the vessel,

—

McDougal

72

vessels enter internal waters

competence to prescribe for

to

its

cargo, horsepower of its plant,

—often

de-

and conditions

manning and equipment expectations, to requirements as
to where the vessel must anchor or moor. To have access to ports, all merchant vessels must follow the rules.
of weather or tide

As

to

a foreign vessel, particularly

any

large

and unwieldy

vessel,

approaches the

busy and restricted internal waters of a port, authorities of the port State usually require that a pilot boat meet

it

several miles

from

restricted waters.

From

the pilot

boat emerges an expert mariner, with an intimate knowledge and familiarity about
the waters, currents, shoals, winds and other peculiarities of the port, and

who

is

comfortable in handling a wide range of merchant vessels in any kind of weather,
tide, traffic,

current and light conditions.
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one of many port

Conditions on Entry of Foreign-Flag Vessels into

States that condition a foreign vessel's right of entry to

its

with non-discriminatory pilotage laws and regulations.
traces

its

origins to 1789, pilots

US Ports

ports

73

upon compliance

In a federal law that

and the laws concerning the use of pilots

to enter

ports are generally governed by applicable state laws, rather than any federally

US

man-

74

The purpose of pilotage laws is to better ensure that a vessel
can enter and operate within a port safely. The practice of requiring pilots in the
world's major ports and restricted waterways to ensure the safe entry and depardated requirements.

common worldwide. For example,
among other requirements, the People's Republic of China now requires the use of
ture of larger commercial vessels

licensed pilots for

all

is

increasingly

foreign commercial vessels calling

on any of its

ports. 75

Proper port management also requires that port State authorities designate

how and under what circumstances a vessel can navigate in inland
ports and waterways. 76 Anyone who has passed through the Panama Canal can at-

when, where,

the scores of merchant ships "waiting their turn" anchored at either the At-

test to

lantic or Pacific side until

ready to take them.

ton Ship Channel

77

is

such time as the local authorities and a qualified pilot are

Managing vessel
nearly as hectic.

traffic in

78

the busy, fifty-six-mile-long

Hous-

Without some degree of coordination and

control over vessel operations, the complicated ballet of ships navigating the channel,

anchoring or mooring

at the

appropriate places, and on-loading and off-loading

cargoes could not be done safely or efficiently.

on port entry

is

An

a vessel's willingness to use (and

obvious permissible condition

pay

for) a qualified pilot

and

to

follow the rules of the port and directions from the harbor master and other authorities as to

when, where and

how to

proceed. Failure to comply with these re-

quirements means that the vessel would not be permitted to enter port
there,

would be subject

to

or,

once

enforcement jurisdiction.

D. Ability of the Vessel to Operate Safely

Another

significant goal of the port State

vessels entering a port will

and the

to ensure, as a condition of entry, that

be able to navigate and operate

and poorly trained crews present
facility

is

a

safely.

79

Unsafe vessels

major threat to the proper operation of a port

coastal waters nearby.

Those include

vessels that are

unseaworthy

because they were not designed or constructed correctly or do not have proper

equipment; are inadequately maintained; or have an improperly trained, manned
or certified crew.
port State
terials,

The Transportation

may impose

such as

a

Safety Act includes special precautions that a

with respect to vessels carrying particularly hazardous ma-

cargo of explosives, radioactive materials or liquefied natural gas. 80

Unless the port authorities are convinced that a vessel transporting

hazardous materials has the
the area safely, they are

ability to enter port,

under no obligation
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or ports. 81 Moreover, a port State has a right to
the vessel and

its

T. Oliver

insist, as a

condition of entry, that

crew have demonstrated that they are capable of operating

and have no track record of maritime accidents. 82 The 1982 LOS Convenimposes a "duty to detain" on port States which have determined that a foreign-

safely

tion

within one of their ports

flag vessel

and standards

in violation of applicable international rules

relating to seaworthiness of vessels

the marine environment.
try, that

is

the vessel

is

83

Finally, a port State

equipped with the

avoid collisions and groundings.

latest

and thereby threatens damage to

may require,

as a condition of en-

IMO-approved

safety technology to

84

commerce would come to a virtual halt if the authorities in each
port took it upon themselves to impose unique requirements as to how a ship
should be constructed, equipped, manned, trained and operated. As a result, the
international community has established detailed rules for most aspects of the
construction, equipping, operations, manning and training of merchant vessels
International

above a certain
important

(SOLAS),

is

as

size.

Of all the conventions

the 1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea

amended. 85 The

original version

the sinking of the luxury passenger liner

more than

dealing with maritime safety, the most

fifteen

hundred

lives.

86

The

was adopted

RMS

latest

Titanic,

in 1914 in response to

and the

version of

resulting loss of

SOLAS was adopted

in

1974 and has been amended periodically since then. Under SOLAS, classification
societies carefully survey (inspect) vessels

during and immediately after construc-

tion to ensure compliance with international standards for strength, stability,

damage
torily

control, safety

and equipment. Defects must be corrected prior

completing the survey. Only then does the classification society issue a cer-

documenting the conditions under which the

tificate

Although
flag are

flag States

properly documented, port States party to the

any unsafe conditions.

Another

multilateral

Training, Certification

may

safely operate.

SOLAS Convention have

sailing until the

a

owners and crew cor-

87

treaty,

the

International

and Watchkeeping

seeks to ensure that the vessel's crew
sel's

vessel

have the primary responsibility to ensure ships flying their

duty to "intervene" to prevent a vessel from
rect

to satisfac-

Convention on Standards of

for Seafarers, 1978

members,

(STCW Convention), 88

particularly the master

and the ves-

other officers, complete rigorous training on engineering, watch standing,

ship handling, maintenance, rules of the nautical road, firefighting
control,
pletes

and other emergency procedures. Only after he or she

all

aspects of training

dence under instruction
revision of the

even greater

STCW

level

is

and damage

satisfactorily

and demonstrates adequate experience and

a crew

member

certified as qualified to serve.

Convention that the

IMO

completed

confi-

A major

in 1995 provides

of precision and standardization. The 1995

47

com-

Amendments

an

also
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State control, providing a specific right of intervention

and deten-

tion in the case of a collision, grounding or other casualty, or evidence of erratic

ship handling. 89

STCW

These

requirements provide qualification standards and expectations

for seafarers. Ideally, a

French master

in charge of a

Persian Gulf to Europe and back will have the

same high

South Korean master on a massive container ship

and Southern

California.

Each should be able to

many

rest

level

of qualifications as a

sailing to

and from Singapore

safely navigate

charge through any weather or casualty that might
covers

supertanker sailing from the

arise.

The

any

vessel in his

STCW Convention

other matters related to maritime safety, including mandatory crew

and periodic

recertification.

Under US

law,

no

vessel

may enter

or operate in

the navigable waters of the United States unless such vessel complies with
cable laws

and regulations designed

to

promote maritime

all

appli-

safety. 90

From the perspective of the port State, the local authorities have the right to inquire whether the vessel's SOLAS certification and documentation are in order,
and

the crew have their required

if all

and up-to-date

STCW certificates,

allowing the vessel to enter port. 91 Ensuring that a port
safely

it

be completed

an essential port State function, and any requirement reasonably related to

is

this goal

sider

visit will

prior to

is

on port

permissible as a condition

entry. 92 If port State authorities con-

to be essential or helpful to accomplish this purpose, they

may direct

that

the visiting vessel submit to a boarding to verify the accuracy of the information

provided and, in cases of doubt, to physically check the seaworthiness of the vessel

and

qualifications of

its

crew.

Where

a pilot

is

required to be on board, he or she

may not proceed into port unless the appropriate authorities are confident that the
vessel

is

shipshape in every respect.

The United

States

Congress recently imposed a

which the Coast Guard has begun
sels

operating in

tification

to

safety- related requirement,

implement, that virtually all commercial ves-

US navigable waters carry a properly functioning Automatic Iden-

System

(AIS). 93

"AlS-equipped vessels

will

transmit

and

receive

navigation information such as vessel identification, position, dimensions, type,
course, speed, navigational status, draft, cargo type,

time."

94

AIS can prove

traffic flow,

essential to avoid collisions

and destination

in near real

and groundings, monitor vessel

and, as discussed below, help identify and track vessels of interest for

security purposes as part of
tential threat

Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA). 95 "Once

a

po-

has been identified, a port or coastal State must have the capability to

detect, intercept

and

interdict

it

using patrol boats or maritime patrol aircraft.

Such action could disrupt planned criminal
catastrophe before

it

threatens the port."

96

acts

and prevent the eventuality of a

Other safety-related technology that the

United States requires of most commercial and certain other vessels calling on
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IMO-approved electronic position- fixing devices, 97 automatic radar
aids 98 and emergency communications systems. 99

ports includes
plotting

E.

Voyage Information

Another area of inquiry that port
ports
is

is

States usually

to the date
tions,

One common

that relating to voyage information.

(NO A),

providing a vessel's Notice of Arrival

make of vessels

calling

on

their

condition of port entry

including advance information as

and time it expects to reach port. Under current US Coast Guard regula-

NO A inforThe information required in an NOA

modified following 9/11, visiting ships must generally provide

mation ninety-six hours prior to
extensive, including the

charterer

and

name

arrival.

100

is

of the vessel, flag State, registered owner, operator,

classification society. 101

Other voyage information required

is

the

names of the last five ports or places visited, dates of arrival and departure, ports
and places in the United States to be visited, the current location of the vessel, telephone contact information, detailed information on the crew and others on board,
operational condition of the essential equipment, cargo declaration and the additional information required under the International Ship and Port Facility Code
(ISPS Code). 102

The vessel must make an additional notice whenever there is a hazardous condition, either on board the vessel or caused by the vessel. 103 Failure to do so means
that the vessel will be denied entry and will have to wait outside of the port until
the Coast Guard and other port authorities are satisfied that they can safely clear
the ship. 104

Many of the

NOA requirements are related to port security concerns.

The ninety-six-hour reporting requirement permits Coast Guard and other authorities

time to run the vessel through the appropriate automated databases to

try to identify terrorist threats, suspected

involvement in drug trafficking or

trafficking in illegal immigrants, suspicious or hazardous cargo,
special vulnerabilities.

By

identifying the current flag State, port State authorities

can determine whether the

duce the

flag State is party to international

risk of a terrorist attack,

prescreened at

its

ment permitting

and any other

previous port of

procedures to

re-

whether the vessel in question has been

call

and whether there

is

an applicable agree-

The NOA regime also provides adequate time to
and tug escorts and plan for the optimal use of limited port

at-sea searches.

arrange for pilotage

resources. International law clearly permits port States to require foreign mer-

chant vessels to provide such information directly related to the voyage as a condition

of entry, particularly where the

mandatory

for

all vessels.

105
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IV. Conditions

on Entry Related

to

US

Ports

National Defense, Homeland Security,

Counter terror ism and Law Enforcement Concerns
A. Vessels

from Enemy,

A port State has an

Hostile, Unfriendly or

absolute right to deny entry to

certain other categories of ships
status gives warships special
is

within

cause at

its

it

ports to foreign warships and

immunities from enforcement jurisdiction, a port State

rights to require prior authorization,

any one time, or requiring that the

daylight hours. 107

its

States

considers threatening. 106 Although their sovereign

or condition access, such as limiting the

all,

in port at

Rogue

Even where there is an

deny entry

for

any cause or no

number of warships that may be

vessel enter

and leave port only during

FCN treaty granting to each party reciprocal

rights to enter each other's ports, the provisions usually exclude routine entry rights

for "vessels of war." 108 Article 13 of the Statute

time Ports specifically excludes

its

on the International Regime of Mari-

application to warships. 109

The recognition

that

international law gives to port State discretion with respect to providing entry to

warships
tial

due

is

to the special sovereign

immune character of warships,

threat that they might represent to the security of the port State

the poten-

and the lack of

when a merchant vessel engages in
As a general rule, therefore, warships must make special arrangements and

reciprocal benefits that accrue to the port State
10

trade.

obtain prior permission before entering a foreign port. 111

The power to deny entry to enemy or potentially hostile vessels is an obvious
curity precaution that States have followed for centuries.

not the only vessels to which a port State

may deny

se-

However, warships are

entry for security reasons. In

October 2006, the Japanese government barred all ships from North Korea, including commercial vessels
ports

due

and scheduled passenger

to the "gravest danger" represented

test in that

rogue

from entering

State.

112

Threat Response Plan, which

time Security, the

on the

is

list

are Cuba, Iran, Libya,

security

closed

is

its

is

The United

States has taken

most recent Maritime Operational

deny port entry

North Korea, Sudan and

charged with denying entry to

and ports of the United

of the United States."

right to

North Korean ships

US government listed six States as non-entrant countries. The six

the internal waters

The

States. In its

all

published as part of the National Strategy for Mari-

Secretary of Homeland Security

ritorial seas

its

by the underground nuclear-weapons

ports except in dire emergencies. 113

its

from entering any of

Australia followed suit, banning

even broader action against rogue

presently

ferries,

States and,

when

all

Syria. 114

The

such vessels "to

appropriate, to the ter-

115

in times

of actual or perceived threats to national

well established in international law. In the early 1900s,

company during a period of
The steamship company filed suit before an

ports to the vessels of a single

revolutionary activity in that nation.

US

Venezuela
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international arbitral tribunal complaining that the denial of access to Venezuelan

ports was arbitrary

and discriminatory,

same ports

particularly since those

re-

116

mained open to vessels from other companies. Venezuela claimed that it had denied port entry to that company's vessels to prevent rebel forces from receiving
support and supplies, and that the steamship company in question was the only
one friendly to the rebels. The umpire found that the prohibition was permissible,
opining that "the right to open and close, as a sovereign on

its

own territory, certain

harbors, ports or rivers in order to prevent the trespassing of fiscal laws

could not be denied to the Venezuelan Government,
nied

when used

... in defense

At the same time,

is

not and

much less this right can be de-

of the existence of the Government." 117

US government

officials

may

not act arbitrarily in denying

when based on security concerns. In 1950, President Truman, actauthority of the Magnuson Act, 50 US Code sec. 191, issued Execu-

port entry, even
ing under the
tive

Order 10,173, granting to cognizant

officials

US

of the

Coast Guard the

US ports of foreign -flag vessels, or direct their anchorage
and movement in US waters, as may be "necessary ... to prevent damage or injury
authority to deny entry to

to

any vessel or waterfront

dian Transport Co.

v.

the United States for

facility

or waters of the United States

." 118
.

.

.

In Cana-

United States, a Canadian corporation brought action against

damages

vessel having a Polish master

merchant

for the Coast Guard's refusal to permit a

and

officers entry to

harbor in Norfolk, Virginia, on

the basis that the presence of Communist bloc officers in that sensitive port might

pose a risk to national security. 119 The District Court had entered

ment

against plaintiff for failure to state a claim. 120

Circuit held that "if the Coast

Guard

On appeal,

officers acted arbitrarily

summary judg-

however, the D.C.

and

in violation of

regulations in diverting [the foreign merchant vessel], the United States

mune from
Court for a

damage action
factual hearing on
a

.

B. Denial of or Restrictions

." 121
.

.

The Court returned

that single issue.

on Entry Related to Terrorism Concerns

War and revolution-

ary zeal as the focus of greatest global security concern. Three trends

—economic

globalization, diffusion of nuclear weapons technology and well-funded

terrorism

—present an unprecedented

they can to keep foreign merchant ships out of their coastal waters
risk;

and fanat-

security threat to the United States,

trading partners and the whole world. 122 Given these trends, port States

any kind of security

not im-

the case to the District

In recent years, international terrorism has replaced the Cold

ical

is

the stakes are simply too high.

123

must do

if they

its

all

represent

According to Dr.

Ste-

phen Flynn, the current Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow in National Security
Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and an expert on the risk terrorists
pose to international trade, the essence of the terrorist strategy is global economic
51
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havoc: "There

is

a public safety imperative

vancing international trade security."

124

and

a powerful

US Ports

economic case

Terrorism experts, and the

for ad-

terrorist orga-

nizations themselves, consider seaports to be particularly susceptible to attack. 125

Moreover, the proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass de-

and the means

struction,

bin Laden

Qaeda

is

to deliver them, dramatically increase the threat.

reported to have described the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Al-

as a "religious duty." 126

An

improvised nuclear weapon or "dirty

hidden in a shipping container, secreted into a port
or after

Osama

city

bomb"

and then detonated there

has been loaded on a train or truck and in the transportation network

it

could cause hundreds of thousands of deaths, hundreds of billions of dollars in destruction

system.

and incalculable damage

to the world's confidence in the global trading

To prevent a terrorist attack by means of a weapon of mass destruction is a

top priority, within both the United States and the international community. 127

Moreover, traditional containment and deterrence
the Cold

War

are

no longer

likely to

strategies that

worked during

succeed against fanatical terrorist groups. 128

Appropriate measures to reduce the risk of such an attack include any conditions

on port
ists;

entry, or outright denial of such entry, designed to detect

and deter terror-

nuclear weapons and other instrumentalities of mass destruction; and other

weapons, supplies and materials used by

terrorists

from entering

a port State.

While an attack with a nuclear weapon secreted on a container ship or otherwise
introduced into the transportation system poses the gravest danger to a port State,
a terrorist

to

it,

group could cause catastrophic damage using weapons widely available

such as conventional explosives and rockets. Before 9/11, for example, few

would have guessed that a small group of committed, suicidal terrorists could have
caused so much death and destruction by commandeering civilian jetliners and

World Trade Center and Pentagon. 129 Various terrorist cells
are no doubt speculating even now on vulnerabilities in existing port security plans
crashing

them

into the

and developing strategems

to try to exploit

them.

A port State has the right to deny entry or impose conditions on entry to its ports
when

it

determines such action to be necessary to protect the port or coastal State

and the security of the population against

terrorist or other attacks. Indeed,

the "vital interests" analysis discussed above, this fundamental principle
dent.

Nothing could be more

sive terrorist attack.

"vital"

is

under

self-evi-

than defending the homeland against a mas-

Following the terrorist attacks on 9/11, the

appropriated funds and passed laws, the Department of
other cognizant agencies implemented

new

policies

Homeland

US Congress
Security

and procedures, and

and

airport,

border, coastal, and port security has been strengthened considerably. Even so, experts agree that

much more work

needs to be done to make our nation's ports and

borders truly secure and prepared. 130
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There

is

an additional international

tial terrorist

attacks

T. Oliver

legal basis for taking action against

—the fundamental

right of self-defense. Article 51 of the

United Nations Charter provides: "Nothing in the present Charter
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense
against a

Member of the United Nations

"

if

nation-States, such as Nazi

shall

impair the

an armed attack occurs

While the United Nations

visualized this provision as applying to defending against

by other

poten-

armed

originally

attacks initiated

Germany's attack on Poland on September

1939 or the invasion of South Korea by

Communist North Korea in

June, 1950,

1,
it

seems perfectly appropriate to extend the right of self-defense to deter attacks by
subnational terrorist groups, such as Al-Qaeda, in the
today, the emphasis has changed
to anticipating

State

may do

GWOT. In the United States

from enforcing the law and responding to attacks,

and preventing such

attacks. 131 International

to protect itself against

law limits what a nation-

an armed attack by shooting

preemptive military measures beyond its

own territory.

133

first

132

or taking

However, that paradigm

maybe changing with respect to preemptive action in anticipation of a terrorist attack.

As the White House has argued:

We

must adapt the concept of imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives of
rely on acts of terror and, potentially,
Rogue states and terrorists
To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by
the use of weapons of mass destruction
today's adversaries.

.

our adversaries, the United States

.

.

will, if necessary, act

preemptively. 134

homeland against a terrorist attack, individual
States and the international community must have adequate means to identify
and track weapons, vessels, cargo, passengers and crew, and to take appropriate
In order to better protect the

action against those that represent a threat.
to

Some

of the

improve coastal and port security against potential

(1) Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), (2)

Automated

(3)

initiatives to identify

United States and
tect

its

and deter them.

One key

(5) International

designed

terrorist attacks include the

Container Security

Identification System (AIS), (4)

Tracking (LRIT) of Ships,

new programs

Long-Range

Initiative (CSI),

Identification

and

Port Security Program, and (6) other

personnel and vessels that pose a security threat to the

trading partners and to devise and improve processes to de-

135

reason for advancing the requirement of foreign vessels to provide a

Notice of Arrival

at least ninety-six

hours before they plan to enter a

US

port

is

to

ensure adequate time to check the accuracy and veracity of the details the vessel has
provided. 136 In the United States, watch standers at the National Vessel

Center

Movement

(NVMC) monitor the data and evaluate and promulgate possible threats. 137

However, the decision

to

approve or disapprove port entry

53

is left

to the discretion
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of the Coast Guard Captain of the Port (COTP). 138 Implementing and improving
processes to identify and track vessels and their cargoes, and to ensure the reliabil-

of their crews, will continue to be a key factor in ensuring the security of the

ity

network

global transportation

now briefly consider

article will

United States and around the world. 139 This

in the

and programs.

several of these initiatives

(1) Proliferation Security Initiative

For

many years, the United States and its allies were justifiably concerned about the

prospect of certain categories of weapons and delivery systems falling into the

hands of

and rogue

terrorists

Various

States.

including the Nuclear

initiatives,

Non-Proliferation Treaty, specifically addressed the concern of proliferation of
nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.

The concern that outlaw States or interhands on weapons of mass destruction intensi-

national terrorists could get their

fied following the 9/11 terrorist attacks

on the World Trade Center and the Penta-

gon. President Bush announced the PSI on

May 31,

2003, as a

proliferation" through international agreements "to search

pect cargo to seize
to help

fill

in the

illegal

weapons or

missile technologies."

.

140

.

"new
.

effort to fight

ships carrying sus-

The PSI was designed

gap in international law to ban the secretive and dangerous trade in

nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems,

and component

The impetus

materials. 141

to develop the PSI concept

was

due

largely

to the circumstances

surrounding the interdiction of the North Korean freighter So San some

six

hun-

dred miles off the Yemeni coast, which demonstrated the lack of international
tools then available.

following

its

142

American

satellites

and Navy ships had tracked the So San

departure from North Korea in

was not flying a

flag

mid-November 2002.

and there was intelligence information

rying ballistic missile

components

to

legal

Aden, Spanish naval

Since the vessel

available that
vessels, in

it

was

car-

coordination
143

The

with the United States, stopped and boarded the So San on the high

seas.

crew of the So San contended that the vessel was carrying a

of concrete

to

Yemen and showed

papers demonstrating that

it

was

legal cargo

validly registered in

Korea. Nonetheless, the search proceeded and uncovered Scud

components and chemicals necessary
crete. After

dard

sales

Yemen demonstrated

to fuel the missiles

that the cargo

North

ballistic missile

hidden beneath the con-

was perfectly

legal

under

a stan-

and shipping contract, Spanish and American authorities eventually had

to acquiesce in the vessel continuing

There was

a general

on

to

its

destination. 144

consensus within the Bush Administration, particularly

within the Department of Defense, that this was an unacceptable result and that

something had

to be

done

to

change existing law and operational procedures to

permit the interdiction of such shipments. 145 In consultation with other concerned
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Bush developed and announced the Statement of Interdiction
146
Among
Principles that States participating in PSI are "committed" to undertake.
those steps the Statement lists as appropriate is that the States will stop and search
States, President

suspected vessels, and "enforce conditions on vessels entering or leaving their
ports, internal waters, or territorial seas that are reasonably suspected of carrying

[prohibited] cargoes, such as requiring that such vessels be subject to boarding,

and seizure of such cargoes prior to entry." 147 Although the Statement specifically provides that any actions taken under the PSI will be "consistent with nasearch,

tional legal authorities

and relevant international law and frameworks, including

some governments and observers are conPSI interdiction efforts beyond the limits of national ju-

the United Nations Security Council,"

cerned that aspects of the
risdiction

may violate international law. 148 However,

if

done with the cooperation

of the flag State and in compliance with the Statement, interdiction activities

should not raise any legal problems. Moreover, the United States and
could use failure of the

flag State to

its allies

cooperate in the PSI as the basis for denying or

restricting port entry to vessels registered in that State.

(2)

Container Security Initiative

Another recent initiative to combat the
ports

is

the CSI.

149

risk of international terrorist attacks

The CSI allows US customs agents,

in coordination with foreign

governments, to prescreen high-risk cargo containers

Today

the CSI process results in the preclearance of

tainers that enter

on US

at the

port of departure. 150

some 90 percent of the con-

US seaports and is in place in at least fifty major international sea-

ports around the world. 151

automated information to

The CSI process consists of four key elements: (1) using
identify and target high-risk containers; (2) prescreening

those containers identified as high risk before they leave foreign ports; (3) using

up-to-date detection technology to quickly and efficiently prescreen high-risk
containers;

and

(4)

developing and using "smarter," more secure tamper-proof

containers. 152

American

citizens

and

allied nations expect that the

United States

will

adopt

port entry requirements that are reasonably related to the real threat, effectively designed to respond properly to

it,

and no more

costly or intrusive than reasonably

necessary. For example, a requirement that every vessel bringing containers into a

US port must wait at a point 200 nautical miles from our shores until the US
Guard boards the

vessel

Coast

and opens and inspects every container on board would

not violate international law. 153 However, given the millions of containers in tran-

them while on board a vessel under way,
and the costs and delays that any such effort would entail, this would be an unworkable and unwise policy. 154 The CSI, on the other hand, focuses on a relatively
sit,

the practical impossibility of searching
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number of containers that security experts have determined to be "high risk."

small

Trained

personnel,

screening

using

the

high-technology equipment,

latest

prescreen these "high risk" containers while they are readily accessible, before they
are loaded

on the

vessel

en route to the next port of call.

recently enacted Security
fies

the

and Accountability

for Every Port Act

the

(SAFE Act) codi-

Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, a public-private sector ini-

tiative that offers international

US

clearance through
rity

Among other things,

measures.

155

ports in exchange for improvements in their internal secu-

Giving preferential access to vessels from CSI ports

and

effective, legal

shipping companies benefits such as expedited

way

relatively inexpensive

is

an

efficient,

to lower the threat of international

terrorism.

The fourth key element of the CSI process is to use technology to develop and
employ more secure containers. Perhaps the most promising option is to use the
latest sensor and computer technology to continually monitor the location, status
and cargo of each container.
United States carry a

A

requirement that every container entering the

fully functional, self-contained tamper-resistant

controller

(TREC) would

if industry

were to agree to participate voluntarily or if it were part of an

TREC

security initiative. 156

widely available.

157

also

embedded

be a reasonable condition of port entry, particularly

technology

IMO vessel

rapidly being refined and

is

Various companies are developing and deploying

becoming

TRECs

that

use sophisticated operating systems and act as intelligent, real-time tracking de-

These devices are capable of detecting radiation, reporting tampering of the

vices.

container and,

when coordinated with shipping

identifying voyage routing

A pilot program

is

and other anomalies. 158

under way to permanently

number of containers. Each
vices

install

such controllers on a large

unit uses the latest generation of satellite tracking de-

and an advanced technology network

gistics providers, carriers

plans entered into a computer,

for use

and governments

by manufacturers,

to share real-time cargo information.

In addition to detecting unauthorized access to the container
stant information stream as to location

potential to constantly

radioactive materials

and

and providing a con-

TREC controllers have the

status, the

monitor each container's contents

and chemical and

retailers, lo-

to detect the presence of

biological weapons.

Any anomaly could

lead to a denial of port entry until such time as appropriate authorities could test

the container offshore or at a safe location.

Moreover, by enabling them to
world

at all times,

tainers

would

exactly

where each container

is

in the

those depending on the shipments and efficient use of the con-

benefit enormously. For example, imagine that the

bile plant located in

necessary

know

component

Spartanburg, South Carolina
parts

from Germany
56

to arrive

is

BMW automo-

expecting a shipment of

on August

1.

Because of a
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severe Atlantic hurricane, however, the container ship
eral days. In a just-in-time

in the assembly line.
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must delay its arrival by sev-

supply chain, such a delay could cause an expensive halt

Knowing of the disruption and to avoid that production delay,

the factory might order an interim shipment of essential parts to be shipped
All of this could be

lay

by air.

done automatically, saving millions of dollars in production de-

and unnecessary warehousing. Another key business advantage,

particularly to

company that owns the shipping container, is that, as soon as the cargo is offloaded, it would become immediately available to pick up another shipment. Except for the most efficient companies, no one currently keeps track of millions of
such containers throughout the world. Detecting a weapon of mass destruction
the

thousands of miles from the United
benefit,

States, while

an absolutely

priceless security

would be "frosting on the cake" to the everyday value of a far more efficient

global supply system.

A similar tamper-resistant device could be developed to be permanently affixed
no matter how small. Ideally, such devices could detect
the presence of dangerous materials on board or keep track of, and report on, routto each vessel in the world,

ing anomalies. If US policymakers were to determine that such devices
ers or vessels

would contribute meaningfully to our maritime

require that every vessel entering a
as a condition

on contain-

security, they

could

US port be equipped with fully functional units

of port entry. Global cooperation to develop the best possible tech-

nology, and an international agreement to require the use of such technology on
vessels,

would be the

all

best approach to the effective implementation of such re-

quirements worldwide.

Even though the total cost to

install a

TREC on every container would be signifi-

would no doubt come down as mass production of the device was
begun and makers competed for their portion of the market to equip millions of
containers. Although the international community must expect growing pains as
the CSI becomes fully operational, initiatives to prevent the "bomb in a box" or
"bomb on board" scenario are important tools to protect homeland security and
the international transportation network against the threat of paralyzing and excant, unit costs

pensive terrorist attacks.

(3)

Automated Identification System

Modern

and communications technologies provide the
accomplish much of what needs to be done to enhance the

detection, information

potential capability to

security of the global maritime transportation system.
as a collision avoidance

and maritime

AIS "as a mandatory prescription

safety tool, the

Although

initially

introduced

IMO has recently promoted

to the shipping industry's fear of terrorism." 159

Although there were growing pains

as the

57

technology was developed, AIS has
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proven to be very helpful, both to mariners and

flag

and port

State authorities.

Even before the emphasis shifted to combating terrorism, maritime experts had
identified satellite-based vessel

monitoring systems

as

an invaluable tool for man-

The Department of Homeland Security has statutory authority to implement regulations to fully implement
AIS in the United States. 161 The Coast Guard also recognizes the need for such AIS
aging fisheries and for promoting maritime safety.

information to improve Maritime

160

Domain Awareness by monitoring

vessels ap-

US coastline and, ultimately, to develop the intelligence necessary to
terrorist attacks on US ports. 162

proaching the
help deter

The Maritime Transportation
Maritime Safety Act of 2004

ment

164

Security Act of 2002 163

and the Coast Guard and

required the Coast Guard to develop and imple-

comprehensive vessel identification system. This system

a

will

enhance the

Coast Guard's capabilities to monitor vessels that could pose a threat to the United
States.

165

AIS

is

IMO's marine

a relatively

mature technology, having been

a

key component of

safety system for years. All vessels using the Vessel Traffic Service

while entering or leaving major ports in the United States must

now employ AIS.

Consistent with internationally agreed vessel equipment standards, AIS
sory on

all

large

require that
States

and

satellite

it

its

commercial

vessels worldwide.

US law and regulations
US waters. 166 The United

may further exploit AIS to keep track of vessels, with

AIS tracking on the near-term horizon. 167

and Tracking of Ships
The Long Range Identification and Tracking of Ships system
Long-Range

(4)

tive

compul-

Moreover,

be operational on larger vessels entering

trading partners

is

Identification

under SOLAS.

168

is

another

IMO initia-

When it becomes fully operational in January 2009, LRIT will

require ships to which the requirement applies (passenger ships, cargo ships over 300
gross tons, including high-speed craft,

and mobile offshore drilling units on interna-

tional voyages) to transmit their identities, locations,
sitions.

169

That information

and dates and times of their po-

maybe accessed upon payment of the costs

port States for those ships that intend to enter ports of that State.
cantly, coastal States

thereof by

Most

signifi-

may obtain access to the information when the ship is a desig-

nated distance off that State's coast, not to exceed one thousand nautical miles. 170

As

it is

no

presently planned, there will be

interface

between LRIT and AIS. One

of the more important distinctions between LRIT and AIS, apart from the obvi-

ous one of range,

is

that,

whereas AIS

range, data derived through

government

recipients

who

is

LRIT will be

a

broadcast system available to

available only to the

SOLAS

all

within

contracting-

are entitled to receive such information. As a result,

LRIT regulatory provisions have built-in safeguards to ensure the confidentiality of the data and prevent unauthorized disclosure or access. LRIT will be another

the
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might represent a security threat. Traditional free-

of navigation principles prevent a coastal State from requiring AIS or LRIT

information on foreign-flag vessels merely navigating on the high seas or within

economic zone, or engaged in innocent or transit passage through the

the exclusive

territorial sea.

However, by adopting the AIS and LRIT amendments to SOLAS,

contracting governments

may

obtain available AIS and

LRIT information from

other contracting States. Vessels from States that choose not to participate

may be

subject to extra scrutiny and delay, additional port access screening or reporting re-

quirements, or even outright denial of entry to ports.

(5) International

In

Port Security Program

December 2002, the

IMO adopted a new set of rules for all States and interna-

tional shipping companies. 171

These rules included changes to the Safety of Life

at

Sea Convention through adoption of the ISPS Code. These came into effect on July

The ISPS Code requires States to assess the security risks at all port facilities
and to ensure that port operators prepare and implement security plans. Shipping
companies have to evaluate risks to their vessels and develop prevention and re1,

2004.

sponse plans. Moreover, ISPS requires that ships
alert systems, create a

install

AIS, develop ship security

permanent display of their vessel identification numbers and

carry a valid International Ship Security Certificate.

with the ISPS requirements, port States

may not

Assuming

that vessels

comply

take enforcement action against

the vessel, including denial of port entry, unless there are "clear grounds" for con-

cluding that a vessel represents a security threat to the port State. Even then, international procedures encourage the port State to provide an opportunity for the

non-compliance.

vessel to rectify the

Under US

law, the Coast

Guard

is

responsible for determining whether foreign

ports are maintaining effective anti- terrorism measures. 172

Guard created the

International Port Security Program.

implementation of the ISPS Code
anti-terrorism measures in place.

eign port

is

on

this,

the Coast

generally uses a State's

key indicator as to whether

it

has effective

When the Coast Guard determines that a for-

not maintaining effective anti- terrorism measures (normally by

failure to fully

entry

as the

173

It

To do

its

implement the ISPS Code), the Coast Guard imposes conditions of

vessels arriving in the

United States from a port of that

State.

These con-

ditions of entry usually require that the vessel take additional security measures,

both while in the foreign port and in the United
non-compliance. In addition, the Coast Guard

States, to rectify the

apparent

will issue a port security advisory

concerning that port and publishes a notice in the Federal Register to provide
public notice of

its

determination. Should a vessel not meet those conditions or
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should there be additional "clear grounds" for concern, the vessel

may be denied

entry into the United States.

Before allowing

it

to enter

and inspect each high-interest
ing

on

I'S port

its first

vessel before

it

of call, the Coast Guard must board
enters the territorial sea or, depend-

loeal conditions, shortly thereafter. Before the

mit the vessel to enter the

US

port, the inspection

Captain of the Port

team must

first

will per-

determine that

the vessel has complied with special security conditions in the foreign port(s), con-

duct an inspection using radiation-monitoring equipment and impose certain additional security requirements.'^ If the vessel

these conditions or the inspection

fails to

unwilling to subject

itself to

any of

resolve any security concerns, the

COTP

is

has the authority to impose various "control and compliance measures," including
"

denial of entry to the port.
vessels

list

1

5

Guard requires that foreign-flag
ports on which they have called. 1_t> Since any

Presently, the Coast

the five previous foreign

such measures would be designed to effectively reduce the

on

a

US

port,

risk

of a terrorist attack

imposing such non-discriminatorv conditions on port entry com-

ports with international law. Vessels that meet the requirements of the ISPS

and have

called

upon

ports that are in compliance with the ISPS

Code

Code generally will

not be considered to be of "high interest" and will not typically be required to un-

dergo inspections beyond the l*S

The

effect

of the ISPS

territorial sea.

Code and

efforts to

implement

that today the

[MO,

the United States

munity has

much

better handle than ever before

are at any
ist

a

how

best to

respond

Otlur Programs Designed

At the

rest

[MO, within

on where

to

to various other

engaged

threat,

all

commercial

how

emergency

com-

vessels

to avoid a terror-

situations.

Improve Vessel ami Port Security

the I'S government,

sible policy experts are

grams designed

to

around the world means

of the international shipping

one time, the nature of the potential security

incident and

o

and the

it

in

and

in various international fora,

an ongoing

effort to review

enhance the security of commercial

vessels

respon-

and improve pro-

and

ports.

Time and

space does not permit a comprehensive review of all the various proposals. Suffice
it

to note here that

whatever international agreements the international community

develops to improve security against potential terrorist attacks must include appropriate legal

and policy bases on which

C. Denial of or Restrictions

to

impose conditions on entry into

on Entry Related

port.

to Suspected Criminal Activity

States have a right to require that vessels seeking to call

on

their ports will

comply

with relevant criminal laws and regulations designed to protect the peace and security

of the port State. Port State authorities

60
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to,

or impose extensive
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controls on, commercial vessels seeking access to their ports as they may deem necessary to ensure that any such vessels are not

There

is

promoting criminal

activities.

a vast array of potential criminal activities that can be

through port entry, ranging from the importation of

illegal

promoted

drugs, trafficking in

women and children for various criminal purposes, maritime terrorism, illegal immigration, and other violations of customs and immigration laws and regulations.

To combat such

may require vessels

illegal activities, States

visiting their ports to

submit to law enforcement boardings and investigatory screenings. Moreover,
flag States, particularly

"open registry" or

"flags

if

of convenience" States, are unwill-

ing to take appropriate action to ensure that vessels that they have registered are

not engaged in criminal enterprises, a port State could appropriately deny entry to
vessels

from such

States.

177

All States naturally see effective crime prevention as a

appropriate investigation and exercise of the sover-

vital State interest that justifies

eign right to close or protect access to their ports.
If a State is

aware that a particular vessel, the vessels of a particular company, or

the vessels operating under the flag of a particular State are engaged or likely to be

engaged in criminal
vessel or that
vessels

may deny entry to that
Likewise, these authorities may require that those

activity, that State's

group of vessels.

178

port authorities

submit to a records review, a thorough search, and/or other personnel or

cargo screening as a precondition for entry.

US

tion industry, the
vessels calling at

To

increase security in the transporta-

Congress established a requirement that

United States ports

tion that the Secretary decides

is

.

.

.

carry

necessary."

all

"crewmembers on

and present on demand any identifica-

179

This has evolved into the Department

of Homeland Security's initiative to establish a transportation workers identifica-

(TWIC)

tion credential

for workers in the

maritime industry. 180 In the SAFE Port

Act of 2006, Congress directed that persons convicted of certain crimes could not
obtain a

TWIC, and that the TWIC

US ports by July 1
ports

by July

1,

,

process be in place at the ten most vulnerable

2007, and that the process be in place for the forty most vulnerable

2008. 181

The benefits of requiring and screening lists of crew and pas-

NOA include the opportunity to detect those with criminal records. All

sengers in an

of these conditions on entry are well established in traditional State practice. 182

D. Balancing the Right of Port Entry in Emergency Cases of Force Majeure or
Distress with the Protection of the Vital Interest of the Port

There

is

one

set

of circumstances where customary international law generally rec-

ognizes a vessel's right to enter any port
majeure.

ous sea

1

—where

the ship

is

in distress

due to force

^ Historically, a vessel in distress due to bad weather conditions, danger-

state,

involvement in a

collision, fire or other

ening the loss of the vessel and the

lives

emergency condition

threat-

of those on board enjoyed a right to seek
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refuge in a foreign port, bay or other protected internal waters of a foreign coastal

The 1982 LOS Convention recognizes the principles of force majeure and
distress as permitting a ship to stop and anchor when in innocent or transit pas183
Moreover, both coastal States and individual mariners have an obligation
sage.
to take affirmative action to render assistance to vessels and persons "in danger of
State.

184

being

As

lost at sea."

186

a general rule, vessels in distress

of a port State to seek shelter without
pecially
lives

when

there

is

have a right of entry into the internal waters

first

obtaining permission from that State, es-

the real risk that the vessel might be

of those on board at genuine

risk.

187

lost,

thus putting the

Moreover, the sovereign authority of the

port State does not generally apply to vessels forced to seek refuge in a port by force

may be

majeure or other necessity, except as
cient operation of the port.

national law, therefore,

harbor, the port State

188

when

necessary to ensure the safe and

Under long-standing
a vessel

is

in extremis

principles of customary inter-

and must take

may not exclude the vessel from

its

"not take advantage of the ship's necessity" in anyway.

On

effi-

shelter in a safe

internal waters

and may

189

the other hand, port States have a right to protect themselves and their

citi-

zens under the principle of self-preservation. This basic principle gives such States
the right, indeed the fundamental responsibility, to keep dangerous instrumentalities

and conditions away. 190 As Professors McDougal and Burke expressed

it:

"[I]f

would threaten the health and safety
of the port
191
The Netherlands Judicial
and its populace, exclusion may still be permissible."
Division of the Council of State recently considered the conditions under which a

the entry of the vessel in distress

.

.

.

badly damaged Chinese vessel had a right to enter Dutch waters for the purpose of
effecting repairs in a shipyard: 192

[U]nder international law
distress

and requires

[a State]

repairs

may

not go so

from entering

far as to

territorial

and

prevent a ship which
coastal waters

is

in

and seeking

safety in a port or elsewhere along the coast. In such case, the seriousness of the

situation in

which the ship finds

itself

should be weighed against the threat which the

ship poses to the coastal State.

Thus, the right to seek refuge does not extend to situations in which greater damage or loss of

life

the emergency

may

result

were the vessel to

on the vessel with the

threat to

enter.

its

national security sensitivities in the world today,
distress
it

ies

today can

may

entry into

it

on

all

State

must balance

people and nation. Given the

seems unlikely that any vessel

demand entry to any port at any time.

well conclude, based
its

own

The port

in

Instead, port State author-

the relevant factors, that permitting a vessel

port or internal waters represents an unacceptable threat to vital port
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necessary action to bar entry. However, the doctrine of

all

force majeure continues to represent a viable basis for requesting such access and, in

most

cases, fully expecting to find safe refuge.

deny or condition
ing so. Finally,
ters

if

entry, they should

Moreover,

if

port State authorities

be able to articulate a defensible basis for do-

the port State denies entry, that State's authorities, and the mas-

of any vessels in a position to

assist,

must provide appropriate

aid to preserve

the lives of any mariners or other persons in distress. 193

V.

Even

Domestic Authority and Practical Procedures for Denying Port Entry

if

a port State has the international legal right to

deny entry

to

its

ports to a

particular vessel in the interests of maritime security, the cognizant officials

must

do so. While a country's head of State or

usually have explicit domestic authority to

body could formally advise another State that vessels flying its flag are
not welcome within its ports (such as Japan and Australia have recently done with
respect to vessels flying the North Korean flag and the international community is
doing to enforce UN sanctions against Iran), most decisions are made by lowerlevel functionaries seeking to apply domestic law designed to promote the interests
of the State. Since there is a general presumption of entry for foreign-flag commerlegislative

cial vessels,

an official who determines that a vessel may not enter under certain cir-

cumstances must generally have the domestic
that official

do

legal authority to

so.

Otherwise,

and his agency may experience legal and political complications for en-

gaging in an ultra vires act or failing to follow mandated procedures. This might

even result in a lawsuit and/or
official

political or

has taken unauthorized or

shipping

company and

illegal

diplomatic pressures

if

the responsible

action to the detriment of the foreign-flag

the domestic interests using that vessel to engage in inter-

national trade. In other words, even

if

a State has the international legal right to

prevent entry, the exercise of that right must be carried out in accordance with domestic legal authority and following established procedures.
In the handful of reported decisions that have focused
try in the

United

the officials

States, the aggrieved party

who have made

on the denial of port en-

has generally taken the position that

the decision to do so have acted contrary to domestic

law and policy. In Canadian Transport Co.

v.

United States, for example, a Canadian

corporation brought an action for damages for the Coast Guard's refusal to permit
a vessel

employing a Polish master and several Polish

Norfolk, Virginia. 194

The

officers entry to the

appellate court observed that "if the Coast

harbor in

Guard

officers

acted arbitrarily and in violation of regulations in diverting [the foreign merchant
vessel], the

United States

is

not

immune from

63

a

damage

action

." 195
.

.

.
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In a

more recent case, Humane Society of the United States v.

Clinton, 196 plaintiffs

and the Secretary of Commerce because of the

successfully sued President Clinton

federal government's failure to take timely action to sanction Italian driftnet fish-

when

ing vessels

these

government

officials

had, or should have had, reasonable

cause to believe that such vessels persisted in employing excessively long driftnets

of an international treaty and the implementing statute. 197 The

in violation

US

Court of International Trade concluded that "nine confirmed sightings [of illegal
driftnet fishing

by

Italian vessels]

combined with the numerous

allegations

make

the Secretary's refusal to identify Italy a second time arbitrary, capricious and not
in accordance with the Driftnet Act." 198

Existing federal statutes
to

vessels

found

is

cifically

give the Coast

Guard

rather broad

deny port entry and control operations within US waters of foreign -flag

power
States

and regulations

to be in violation of laws, regulations or treaties to

a party.

The Ports and Waterways

Safety Act of 1972, as

which the United

amended, 199 spe-

authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security (delegated to the cognizant

Commander and COTP) to deny port entry to any US port or

Coast Guard District
navigable waters

if "he

has reasonable cause to believe such vessel does not comply

with any regulation issued under this chapter or any other applicable law or
treaty." 200

Implementing regulations provide that "[e]ach

Captain of the Port
States ... to

.

.

.

may deny

COTP

is

201

Commander or

entry into the navigable waters of the United

any vessel not in compliance with the provisions of the

ulations issued thereunder."

or

District

[Act] or the reg-

Later in that regulation, the District

Commander

given authority to order a vessel to operate in a particular

whenever he "has reasonable cause to believe that the
with any regulation, law or treaty

vessel

is

manner

not in compliance

." 202
.

.

.

When a port State has good cause to deny port entry to a foreign-flag vessel and
decides to do so,
its

it

has an obligation to notify the vessel's master,

owner(s) in as timely a manner as

official

flag State

and

reasonable under the circumstances. The

is

President, Secretary of State, appropriate

Department

its

US ambassador or other authorized State

could communicate to the appropriate

flag State that a partic-

may not call upon ports in the United States because of its violation of an
international convention or domestic law. However, under existing US proce-

ular vessel

dures, appropriate Coast

Guard

officials

normally carry out the process of denying

US laws and regulations require or authorize it. The cognizant District Commander or COTP normally issues an order to
the vessel denying port entry. Such an order should include a summary of the facport entry to a foreign-flag vessel where

tual situation, the basis for

action, the circumstances

denying port entry, the

legal authority for taking

such

under which the order would be rescinded, the potential

penalties for violating the order, the process for appealing the order

64

and the

office

William D. Baumgartner and John

which the recipient of the order could

call for

T. Oliver

any questions. Such an order should

be communicated not only to the vessel in question, but also to

and

its

owners, agents

flag State.

Anytime

that the United States seeks to

deny port entry to

a foreign-flag vessel,

even to a foreign warship, fishing vessel or merchant vessel that
of a law, regulation or treaty obligation,

is

in clear violation

must find the authority for denying such

it

entry and comply with basic due process requirements of notice and an opportu-

homeland

nity to be heard. Particularly involving issues related to

security, the

Coast Guard and other cognizant agencies employ the Maritime Operational
Threat Response

(MOTR)

coordination process to effectively align and integrate

"responses to real or potential terrorist incidents across
eral

government.

203

If Congress

all

stakeholders" in the fed-

and cognizant agencies consider that denial of port

entry to certain foreign-flag vessels under particular circumstances promotes key
interests of the

United

States, there

should be laws, regulations and procedures in

place to carry out such a policy. Otherwise there are likely to be legal, political

and

practical consequences for the denial.

VI.

Evaluation and Development of an Analytical Matrix

One of the key purposes of this paper is to

develop a methodology to evaluate pro-

posed and actual conditions that the United States and other port States seek to impose on foreign-flag vessels to promote maritime security. This section
evaluate both the legal
tions

and policy factors

and then propose an

analytical

will

that affect the imposition of such condi-

methodology

in determining

whether a par-

on port entry is an appropriate way to promote a particular policy
goal. The final part of this section will emphasize the need and importance of harmonizing port State regulations with international expectations and procedures.

ticular condition

A. Evaluating Legality and Policy for Imposing Port Entry Conditions

As discussed

in detail above, international

law permits port States to impose rea-

sonable conditions on the entry of foreign vessels into ports. Promoting mari-

time security
international

is

clearly a reasonable, if not essential, policy goal.

community presumes

that, as a general rule,

However, the

commercial

vessels will

have access to the ports into which they need to enter to engage in global trade. To
be consistent with international law, any conditions on port entry must be based

on important national goals, must be directly and effectively related to accomplishing one or more of these goals and must be objectively prudent and necessary under all the circumstances. Any effort to impose conditions on port entry of a
foreign-flag vessel involves a claim of jurisdiction over the vessel for certain
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A port State may not deny entry or exercise jurisdiction with respect to a

foreign-flag vessel or

its

activity

when the exercise of such jurisdiction would be arbi-

discriminatory, unreasonable, in violation of treaty obligations or otherwise

trary,

improper. 204

B.

Determination of "Reasonableness"

Although individual
often differ as to

States, the international

when

community and legal commentators may

the imposition of conditions or the exercise of jurisdiction

reasonable under various circumstances,

whether the imposition of such

it is

important to make an

would be

restrictions

whether the exercise of jurisdiction over a vessel or its
try

is

effort to

is

determine

reasonable. In determining

activity as a condition

of port en-

number of relevant factors. Quescommunity might appropriately ask in

appropriate or not involves consideration of a

tions that a port State

and the international

determining the reasonableness of a law or regulation conditioning port entry or imposing jurisdiction upon a vessel's arrival in port include:

(1) Is the policy interest(s) that the

one of significant importance
(2)

Does the harm(s)

law or regulation

is

designed to address

to the port State?

to be avoided, or the benefit(s) to be achieved, have a

direct connection to the foreign vessel's presence while operating in the

coastal waters of the port State?

(3)

Does the regulated

activity

have a close geographical and temporal nexus

to the entry of the vessel into the waters of the port State?

(4) Will the

for

(5)

law or regulation be effective in accomplishing the policy goal(s)

which

Would

it

was implemented?

the exercise of jurisdiction under the circumstances violate an

applicable bilateral or multilateral convention or the relevant provisions

of customary international law?
(6) Will

the law or regulation have the practical effect of denying or

impeding freedom of navigation

in international waters, or the exercise

of the rights of innocent passage, transit passage and archipelagic sea
lanes passage, as provided in the 1982

(7) Is there

domestic

legal authority for

LOS Convention?
denying port entry, and have the

appropriate authorities complied with the procedural requirements to

66
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notify the vessel of the denial
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and included an opportunity to be heard on

the matter?

there

(8) Is

a

objectionable

disruptive,

intrusive,

less

way to accomplish

Each of these questions

is

the

expensive,

same policy

complicated

or

goal(s)?

relevant in determining the reasonableness of the law or

regulation under consideration. States considering whether or not to enact such

laws or impose such regulations should evaluate

them

to ensure they are objec-

tively reasonable.

C.

Harmonizing Regulations with International Law and Expectations

Even where the port
tant

and

that,

State can demonstrate that the

under the

factors discussed above,

proposed regulation

it is

is

impor-

objectively reasonable,

it is

important to harmonize the proposed regulation with relevant international standards and expectations. The best way to accomplish this

is

to obtain the approval of

the "competent international organization" charged with regulating the particular
activity. If a

port State wanted to establish a traffic separation scheme for vessels en-

gaged in innocent passage through
ters,

international law requires that

its territorial
it

sea

on

the

way

into internal

wa-

take into account "the recommendations of

the competent international organization." 205 Before establishing such schemes

within international

straits

used for international navigation, the 1982

vention requires that the "States bordering the

straits shall refer

LOS Con-

proposals to the

competent international organization with a view to their adoption." 206 Within the
exclusive

economic zone,

may "adopt

a coastal State

laws and regulations for the

prevention, reduction and control of pollution from vessels conforming to and
giving effect to generally accepted international rules

on comity and

efficiency, all States

tations, standards

and standards

." 207
.

.

.

Based

should seek to harmonize their national expec-

and procedures with those of the international community.

The 1982 LOS Convention provides for coordinating proposals that affect international shipping, particularly with respect to navigational safety and the protection of the marine environment, within the IMO process. The IMO has proven
particularly adept at reaching consensus, and then harmonizing national and international standards
vessel construction

tion

on

and expectations

wide variety of

issues ranging

from

through bilge-water-discharge standards. The 1965 Conven-

Facilitation of International

regularly,

for a

Maritime

Traffic,

which the

IMO has updated

emphasizes the importance of simplifying and reducing to a

the administrative burdens imposed

on international shipping

expedite international maritime traffic

." 208
.

.

.
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minimum

"to facilitate

and
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Any measures

designed to protect port State interest must also be instituted in

such a way so as to avoid the practical
navigation as provided in the 1982
the sea

vessels

effect

of denying or impeding freedom of

LOS Convention. Those

must be concerned about the

might have on

try
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interested in the law of

potential impact that restrictions

merely engaged

in transit passage,

innocent passage or

Some

high seas navigation in the exclusive economic zone of another State.
restrictions
lia's

on port entry under consideration by some port

recent decision to require pilots

on most

on port en-

States,

such as Austra-

vessels transiting the Torres Strait,

threaten traditional navigational freedoms and

undermine long-standing

ples of the law of the sea. 209 Others are less objectionable, because they

State parties.

of the

princi-

bind only

These include a provision of the recently adopted Wreck Removal

Convention, which imposes a requirement that each State party

shall

ensure that

any ship entering or leaving a port or offshore terminal provide evidence of financial security.

210

Another trend

in multilateral treaties

is

to require that States party

bar entry to their ports for fishing vessels determined to have been engaged in
gal,

unregulated and unreported fishing

sideration

Since

is

activities.

the possible impact of conditions

World War

II,

ille-

Another issue that requires con-

on entry with trade agreements.

multilateral efforts have sought to reduce barriers to interna-

tional trade, while ensuring a level playing field.

These

efforts first resulted in the

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). During the 1990s, negotiations

World Trade Organization (WTO), which took over
functions of GATT. Although the WTO/GATT process is silent on the

led to the establishment of the

most of the

specific issue of vessel access to ports, the denial of a right of port entry

could well

be seen as a trade barrier inconsistent with a nation's responsibility under
sions.

Moreover,

ferently, the

if

a port State

were to

is little

WTO/GATT rules may apply to
real

homeland

prevent discrimination or favorable

member

States. 211

However,

danger of a successful challenge when the port State

promote legitimate concerns, such
security.

as

provi-

treat vessels flying various foreign flags dif-

treatment being given to vessels from
there

its

in practice,
is

seeking to

environmental protection, vessel safety and

As Professor Ted Dorman put

it,

While the international trade agreements administered by the W.T.O. may affect the
ability of a port state to deny access to foreign vessels or to impose burdensome
conditions on foreign vessels entering port, the effect

where the port state
carried by the vessel

is

using port access as a
212

68

means

to

is

limited to those situations

deny entry of the goods being

William D. Baumgartner and John

T. Oliver

any regulations designed to restrict entry to US
ports must also be consistent with our international obligations under any bilateral

As discussed

earlier in this article,

FCN treaties to which the US is party.
VII.

Recommendations and Conclusion

For the good of the entire world community, policymakers must seek to ensure
that ocean trade continues to flourish

and grow. This requires promoting access to

key ports with minimal restrictions and conditions. Toward this end, international
law presumes that the ports of every port State should be open to
mercial vessels, and a port

when important

may be

all

foreign

com-

closed or a vessel denied entry to the port only

interests of the port State justify the closure.

At the same time, the world community must be

sensitive to the legitimate con-

cerns of port States to protect important national interests, particularly maritime
safety

and

security.

To promote and

protect these and other important interests,

port States have a right to close their ports or to impose conditions on port entry

and

exit

with respect to a broad range of important interests directly related to the

A port State may restrict entry to all foreign vessels, subject only to any

vessel's visit.

rights of entry clearly granted
tress

due

under an applicable treaty and those

vessels in dis-

to force majeure.

To avoid

using international trade as a heavy-handed and ineffective diplomatic

tool designed to reward or punish foreign States, however, a port State should not

impose port entry or exit requirements on foreign merchant vessels
risdiction

on

—even those designed

foreign-flag vessels in port

to

—or

exercise ju-

promote impor-

tant goals, that are not reasonably related to the visit of the vessel in question
specific occasion.

Toward

this end,

absent specific, identifiable concerns with re-

spect to the vessel or State in question, a port State should treat
sels equally,

and not discriminate

on the

in the prescription

all

foreign-flag ves-

and enforcement of its

laws.

The application of the law of the port State should not have the practical effect of
denying or impairing the traditional rights of the

sea,

including freedom of naviga-

tion in international waters, or the exercise of the rights of innocent passage, transit

passage and archipelagic sea lanes passage, in coastal waters. Moreover, denial of
port entry, or imposing unreasonable conditions on port entry, has an adverse impact

on the port

State's ability to

engage in international trade. As a

harm the economy of both
world community at large.
strictions

result,

such

re-

the port State and, to a less direct extent, the

Given the crucial importance of international trade

in today's global

economy,

incremental costs, short delays or minor disruptions can have a profoundly adverse
impact. In this regard, harmonizing and coordinating conditions on port entry
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throughout the world community, with similar expectations, requirements, forms

and procedures, can achieve the goals without imposing as much of an administraburden. Wisely balancing the benefits to be achieved from imposing condi-

tive

tions

on port

costs

and burdens associated with each,

entry, such as intelligently devised security requirements, against the
is

essential. International lawyers

icymakers must strive to ensure that access to the world's ports
ably possible, and that conditions

on entry and

The

goal of all States should be to

and

effectively

and the world community

promote and ensure

and environmentally sound international ocean

as free as reason-

exit are directly

related to the important interests of the port State
large.

is

and pol-

at

safe, secure, efficient

trade.
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Encroachment on Navigational Freedoms

Raul (Pete) Pedrozo*
Introduction

i

was asked

to address the following four questions:

Will there be increasing environmentally oriented measures adopted at the

•

International Maritime Organization

(IMO)

that will encroach

on navigational

freedoms?
Will there be increasing coastal State efforts to regulate military- related

•

economic zone (EEZ),

activities in the exclusive

citing

environmental concerns?

Will excessive coastal State claims continue to proliferate driven primarily

•

by resource needs?
Will continental shelf disputes proliferate as nations attempt to

•

make broad

margin claims beyond 200 nautical miles (nm)?
I

believe the unfortunate answer to

"yes,"

and will

cite a

all

four of these questions

is

most

definitely

number of examples supporting my concerns.

IMO Environmental Measures

My criticism
work

the

* Captain,

of the

IMO

IMO

1

in this article

is

not intended to disparage

all

the great

has done over the past five decades to improve safety at sea and

JAGC, US Navy. The views expressed in

this

paper are those of the author and do not

represent the official views of the United States government, the Department of Defense or

United States Pacific

Command.

Encroachment on Navigational Freedoms

protect the marine environment. 2 Conventions, such as the International
tion for the Safety of Life at Sea

(SOLAS), 3 the International Convention

Prevention of Pollution from Ships and

its

Protocol

Dumping Convention) and
5

(MARPOL 73/78),

Dumping

vention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by

Matter (London

Conven-

4

for the

the

Con-

of Wastes and Other

the International Convention

on

6

Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers have greatly

enhanced

safe,

secure and efficient shipping, while at the same time protecting the

marine environment from pollution from

ships.

However, since the 1990s a grow-

ing concern over marine pollution has put greater pressure

on

IMO

the

to adopt

environmentally based routing measures that encroach on traditional freedoms of
navigation guaranteed to

all

States

by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the

Law of the Sea (1982 LOS Convention). 7 That pressure, coupled with the IMO's focus on getting to "yes"

—

the

IMO "spirit of cooperation" —has resulted in the un-

member States to adequately scrutinize other States' proposals for
their own proposals may not be supported at a later date. In other words,

willingness of
fear that

"you scratch

my

back and

adopted even though they

I'll

fail

scratch yours."

As

a result, proposals have been

to adequately demonstrate that international ship-

ping poses a serious threat of damage to the area or that additional protective measures are truly necessary.

In 1995,

SOLAS Chapter V was amended to add a new Regulation

coastal States to

the

1 1

that allows

implement compulsory ship reporting systems that are adopted by

IMO. The new
8

regulation entered into force

on January

1,

1996. Since 1996,

there has been a proliferation of mandatory ship reporting systems adopted

IMO

—

a total of sixteen. All of the systems

State citing the
clearly a

were

justified, in part,

by the

by the

coastal

need to protect the marine environment. Although there was

demonstrated need for some of these systems, others were adopted with

only minimal scrutiny by the relevant

IMO

subcommittees and committees that

reviewed the proposals.
In effect,

mandatory ship reporting systems are nothing more than prior notice

and consent regimes
spite long-standing

for ships transiting coastal State territorial seas

US policy regarding the invalidity of such regimes, the US dele-

gation did not oppose the establishment of any of these systems. In
States

had

its

and EEZs. De-

fact,

the United

own mandatory ship reporting system adopted by the IMO in

protect the northern right whale

from the danger of collision with ships

1998 to

off the

US

The reporting system, which was vehemently opposed by the US Department of Defense (DoD) in the interagency process, became operational in
East Coast.

1999.

There has similarly been a proliferation of IMO-approved particularly sensitive
sea areas (PSSA).

A PSSA

is

an area that needs special protection through action by

86

Raul

the

(Pete)

Pedrozo

IMO because of its significance for recognized ecological

(unique or rare eco-

system, diversity of the ecosystem, or vulnerability to degradation by natural events

or

human

activities)

or socioeconomic (significance of the area for recreation or

tourism) or scientific (biological research or historical value) reasons, and which

may be

vulnerable to

damage by

international maritime activities. Guidelines for

designating PSSAs are contained in

an area
trol

is

approved

maritime

as a

IMO Assembly Resolution A.982(24). 9 When

PSSA, associated protective measures are adopted to con-

activities in the area.

Such measures can include areas

to be avoided

(ATBA), mandatory ship reporting or mandatory ship routing systems, no anchorage areas, establishment of vessel traffic services and other

IMO-approved routing

measures.

—

—

The first PSSA the Australian Great Barrier Reef was designated in 1990.
The Great Barrier Reef was clearly an area that warranted designation as a PSSA.
However, since 1990 there has been a proliferation of PSSA designations. The ten
additional PSSAs that have been designated since 1990 are Sabana-Camagiiey Archipelago, Cuba (1997); Malpelo Island, Colombia (2002); Florida Keys, United
States (2002); Wadden Sea, Denmark, Germany and the Netherlands (2002);
Paracas National Reserve, Peru (2003); Western European Waters (2004); extension

of the Great Barrier Reef PSSA to include the Torres

Strait (2005);

Canary

Islands,

Spain (2005); Galapagos archipelago, Ecuador (2005); and Baltic Sea Area, Den-

mark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Sweden (2005).

The Malpelo Island PSSA is a perfect example of how the IMO "spirit of cooperation" can lead to bad results. The Colombian proposal was initially justified on the
need to curtail illegal fishing in and around Malpelo Island clearly not an adequate basis for a PSSA designation under A.982(24). Although the proposal was
initially rejected, "interested States" assisted Colombia in revising its proposal to
meet the requirements of A.982(24). The proposal was resubmitted and approved
by the IMO the next year.
I would be remiss if I did not take the opportunity at this juncture to say that
the United States is its own worst enemy in this area. The United States has re-

—

cently submitted a proposal to the
Islands

uous
will

IMO to designate the Northwestern Hawaiian

Marine National Monument

as a

PSSA. Again,

DoD objection in the interagency review process.

become

the largest

PSSA

in history,

of ocean space. Even though the

were adopted by the

IMO

this
If

was done over

stren-

adopted by the IMO,

it

encompassing over 140,000 square miles

monument is already protected by six ATBAs that

in 1980, the

United States

ATBAs and adding a ship reporting system around
opinion, the US proposal fails to demonstrate that

is

proposing expanding the

the entire

monument. 10

In

my

international shipping poses a

threat of damage to the area, demonstrate that additional protective measures are
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necessary, establish that the size of the area

address the identified need and address
enforced.

Previous efforts

a

that necessary to

how these measures will be monitored and

is

at the

the issue of compulsory pilotage in international

IMO to adopt such measures in straits used for inter-

national navigation have failed. However,

mented

commensurate with

11

Another area of concern
straits.

is

compulsory pilotage scheme

on October

6,

in the Torres Strait.

2006, Australia imple-

Although the scheme

is

purportedly being implemented as a condition of port entry, failure to comply with
the

mandatory pilotage requirement can be enforced against ships

strait

12

the next time the ship enters an Australian port.

and Singapore, have

the United States

regime

is

filed

through the

maintain that the scheme

strait.

Several States, including

diplomatic protests indicating that the

inconsistent with international law because

transit passage

transiting the

The United

it

States,

interferes with the right of

Singapore and other States

also inconsistent with the decision of the

is

time Environment Protection Committee

MEPC resolution clearly states that

it

(MEPC)

IMO

Mari-

The

that adopted the measure.

"recommends

that

Governments

.

.

.

inform

ships flying their flag that they should act in accordance with Australia's system of
pilotage

." 13
.

.

.

Additionally, the intervention of the

Third Session of the

MEPC

stated that the

"international legal basis for

other

strait

MEPC

mandatory pilotage

used for international navigation."

several other delegations.

14

US

delegation at the Fifty-

resolution did not provide an

for ships in transit in this or

any

This statement was supported by

15

Perhaps the following quote from a Danish delegate sums up

how the IMO will

balance environmental protection and navigational freedoms in the future: "The
failure

of the

IMO to shift focus in order to adapt to international opinion and curbeyond freedom of the oceans and embrace

rent international priorities that go
coastal state environmental interests

not an isolated position. There are a
within the

US government,

is

regrettable." 16

number of nations,

that think the

is

a creature of the 1982

would suggest
as well as

that this

is

some individuals

same way.

Environmental Encroachment

The EEZ

I

in the

EEZ

LOS Convention and was

created for the pur-

pose of giving coastal States greater control over the resources adjacent to their
coasts out to 200
cial islands

ronment

and

in the

nm. 17 Coastal

structures,

States

marine

were also granted jurisdiction over

scientific research

artifi-

and protection of the envi-

EEZ. 18 Unfortunately, over the years, some coastal States have

attempted to expand their influence
over non-resource-related

EEZ by attempting to
including many military

in the

activities,
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encompasses a large area of the ocean that a
sidered to be high seas. This

is

little

over twenty years ago was con-

particularly true in the Asia-Pacific region,

number of overlapping 200 nm zones. 19
The fact that some coastal States have attempted to impinge on

where

there are a

of the

EEZ

of particular concern to the Department of Defense.

is

examples of interference with
alia,

traditional uses

resource-related

US

military activities in the

Some

EEZ based

recent

on, inter

and environmental concerns include Chinese challenges to

a

US military survey vessel in the Chinese- claimed EEZ, Indian challenge to a US military survey vessel in the Indian-claimed

EEZ, Malaysian and Indonesian opposi-

tion at the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Regional

Forum meeting

in

Manila to a proposal by Singapore to conduct a maritime security exercise in the
Indonesian EEZ, Indonesian challenge to a
sian

US

warship operating in the Indone-

EEZ, and Burmese and Indian interference with a

US military aircraft in their

respective flight information regions.

There are also regional
tivities in

the

efforts

under way to

establish guidelines for military ac-

EEZ that are clearly inconsistent with international law. The most re-

cent example

is

the

Nippon Foundation/Ocean

Guidelines, which were developed between 2002
als

acting in their personal capacities.

voluntary principles

is

20

Policy Research Foundation

and 2005 by a group of individu-

The purported need

for these

non-binding

that naval activities at sea are expanding at the

same time

that coastal States are attempting to exercise increasing control over their EEZs.

These opposing trends,

it is

argued, will result in a higher frequency and intensity

of incidents and guidelines are therefore necessary to de-conflict maritime and
coastal State interests in the

EEZ. Some of the principles outlined

in the

Nippon

Foundation guidelines that have absolutely no basis in international law include:
•

Military activities in the

EEZ should

not

•

stimulate or excite the defensive systems of a coastal State;

•

collect

•

involve deployment of systems that prejudice the defense or security

information to support the use of force against a coastal State;

or

of a coastal State, or interfere with or endanger the right of the coastal State
to protect
•

and manage

its

resources and environment.

Major military exercises in the EEZ should be prenotified to the coastal State

and the

coastal State should be invited to observe the exercise.

•

Military exercises should be limited to the adjacent high seas.

•

Military activities should not cause pollution or negatively affect the marine

environment or marine

living resources, including
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•

There should be no

of sound waves that
•

areas.

live fire

of weapons, underwater explosions or creation

may harm marine

life

There should be no military activities

or cause marine pollution.
in

marine parks and marine protected

21

Although the Nippon Foundation guidelines are non-binding
should be of great concern to

all

in nature, they

maritime nations.

Excessive Claims Driven by Resource Needs

There are a number of island disputes and excessive maritime claims in the AsiaPacific region that are driven, in part,

Japan are involved in
nizes that

China

is

many

by resource needs. The

of these disputes

is

fact that

understandable

the world's second-largest energy

China and

when one

recog-

consumer and Japan

is

the

fourth (and the world's second-largest energy importer).

Some
•

of the more prominent island disputes include 22

(Takeshima/Dokdo) Rocks (Japan and Republic of Korea

Liancourt

(ROK)),
•

Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (Japan, China and Taiwan),

•

Spratly Islands (China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and

Brunei),
•

Paracel Islands (China,

•

Kuril Islands (Russia

•

Natuna

Taiwan and Vietnam),

and Japan) and

Islands (Indonesia

and China).

Liancourt Rocks (Takeshima/Dokdo) are claimed by both Japan and the Republic of Korea.

The

ROK

has occupied the rocks, located 87.4 kilometers (km)

from Ulleungdo Island (ROK) and 157.5

km

from the Oki Islands (Japan), since

1954 and maintains a police station, lighthouse and helicopter pad. The rocks are

surrounded by

rich fishing

maintains that the

grounds and potential mineral resources. The

EEZ median

line

lands. Japan maintains that the

Rocks and Ulleungdo

should be between Ulleungdo and the Oki

median

Island. Talks

ROK

line

Is-

should be between the Liancourt

between the two governments have been ongo-

ing since 1996, with four rounds between 1996

and 2000, and two rounds

To date, no

ROK has refused third-party inter-

vention

resolution has been reached

(e.g.,

and the

in 2006.

International Court of Justice, International Tribunal for the

Law of

the Sea, etc.).

The Senkaku (Japan)/Diaoyu (China) Islands are claimed by China, Japan and
Taiwan. The islands, located about 120 nm northeast of Taiwan, lie astride key
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oil

Currently, the issue

is

reserves

(Pete)

Pedrozo

and have been the source of a century-old dispute.

linked to the ongoing

EEZ and continental shelf dispute be-

tween China and Japan. The continental shelf dispute

is

over delimitation princi-

China claims natural prolongation, while Japan claims equidistance and has
proposed a median line as the demarcation line for the respective EEZs and contiples;

The Shirakaba oil field straddles Japan's proposed median line.
China began oil and gas development west of the proposed median line in the

nental shelves.

However, with China's development of the Shirakaba

1980s.

EEZ and continental shelf in

the

sions

by Chinese

Japan's claimed

oil

EEZ around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands increased.
off- again since

resumed

lution. In the short term, Japan

wants China to stop

The

it is

its

law

exploration vessels, warships and ocean research vessels into

successful rounds in 2005. Talks

ing that

EEZ dis-

1996 to include the Senkakus/Diaoyus, incur-

between the two countries have been on-again,

in 2006,

China has rejected Japan's demands

joint project.

the

when Japan promulgated

pute has become more prominent. Additionally,

on

oil field,

developing resources in an area that

Spratly Islands consist of well over

the center of the South China Sea.

23

to
is

drilling

and has proposed a

suspend exploration, indicat-

not in dispute.
islands, cays, reefs

and

hundred thousand square miles in

Although most of the

Spratlys are uninhabitable, they lie astride

2004, with three un-

but again failed to reach a reso-

one hundred

shoals scattered over an ocean area of nearly five

Bilateral talks

islets

that

make up

the

some of the most important and busiest

maritime routes in the world. The waters surrounding the Spratlys are also potentially rich in

hydrocarbon and mineral deposits, and contain some of the region's

most abundant
the world's

most productive offshore

and natural gas
States.

fishing grounds. Since 1950, the

fields

South China Sea has been one of

and gas-producing

oil-

areas.

Over

thirty oil

have been developed in the region by the various

littoral

24

The Spratlys are claimed in their entirety by China, Taiwan and Vietnam and in
part by Brunei, Malaysia and the Philippines. 25 At least forty- three of the fifty-one
major islets in the Spratlys are occupied by five of the six claimants. 26 Each claimant
has offered separate justifications for

its

claim, including historic

title,

discovery,

occupation, maritime law, and proximity and indispensable need. 27 The historical
claims of China and Taiwan are the most substantive in terms of abundance and
time.

However, neither claimant has exercised

effective,

continuous and undis-

puted peaceful control over the entire region. Only Japan has
temporarily, occupied the disputed islands, from 1939 until

However, following World
Spratlys

and the Paracels

War

in the

nately, a successor sovereign

II,

effectively, albeit

its

Japan was forced to renounce

defeat in 1945.
its

claims to the

San Francisco Treaty of Peace (1951). Unfortu-

was not designated

91

in the treaty. 28
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Similarly, the Paracel Islands

lie

astride rich fishing

grounds and potential

oil

The islands are claimed by China, Taiwan and Vietnam, and have
been occupied by China since 1974 when Chinese military forces expelled the
South Vietnamese garrison from the islands. Vietnam, however, has not abandoned its claim, reaffirming its position on April 11, 2007. 29
The Kuril Islands have been the source of a dispute between Russia and Japan
since the end of World War II. Prior to the war, Japan occupied the southern porand gas

deposits.

and

tion of Sakhalin Island

all

of the Kuril Islands from Hokkaido to the

Kamchatka Peninsula. Following Japan's defeat in 1945, Russia occupied all of
Sakhalin Island and all of the Kurils down to Hokkaido. Japanese fishermen, however,

have continued to

fish in

Russian-claimed waters around the islands. In Au-

gust 2006, a Japanese fisherman was killed after a Russian border patrol boat fired

on

The boat was

a Japanese fishing vessel in disputed waters north of Hokkaido.

seized

and

its

three surviving crew

members were taken

to

Kunashir Island, one of

by Russia. 30

the Northern Territory islands controlled

Global warming and the world's insatiable appetite for more resources have

brought a renewed focus on the Arctic. The thawing of the polar
Arctic, creating access to

new shipping

ice

is

opening the

new fishing grounds, proexploitation of new oil and gas

routes, creating

viding

new tourism

opportunities,

fields.

A

Geological Survey report concluded that 25 percent of the

recent

US

world's energy reserves

lie

and allowing

north of the Arctic Circle. 31 Record energy prices, cou-

pled with the melting ice cap, are therefore creating renewed interests in projects
that

had not been considered

cost-effective.

This increased attention on Arctic resources has brought several territorial disputes to the forefront, including a disagreement between Russia and
the Barents Sea, a disagreement between Russia
ring Sea, a disagreement

and the United

Norway over

States over the Be-

between Canada and Denmark over Hans Island, and

a

disagreement between Canada and the United States over the Beaufort Sea. As Arctic oil

and gas become more

readily available,

it is

likely that the territorial claims

and tension between the various claimants

will increase.

The Bering Sea is home to the
salmon, halibut and crab. It yields

Navarin Basin and

oil-rich

nearly 50 percent of the

US

is

rich in pollock,

seafood catch and

nearly one-third of Russia's seafood catch. Fishing opportunities will increase as
sea ice cover begins later

and ends sooner

in the year as a result of global

warming.

There have been ongoing discussions between the United States and Russia since
1981 in an effort to agree on a maritime boundary.

The

issue

was apparently

re-

on June 1, 1990 when the United States and Russia signed a maritime
boundary agreement. The agreement was submitted to the US Senate for advice
solved

and consent and

to the Russian

Duma

for ratification.
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Duma

Raul

could

act,

the Soviet

Union

boundary agreement

cle

path

is

Pedrozo

United States too

to use the

rhumb

opposed to the great

line (as

difference in area using the

over twenty- thousand square miles.

The Beaufort Sea

now say that the proposed
much of the Bering Sea's fish

collapsed. Russian officials

gives the

The Russians want
path) as the boundary. The
stocks.

(Pete)

rhumb line or the great cir-

32

also contains significant energy resources.

Although

rently frozen year-round, increasing temperatures are expected to
fort Sea to oil

Beaufort Sea

is

circle

it is

cur-

open the Beau-

and gas exploration (and increased fishing) in the
claimed by both the United States and Canada.

future.

The

Continental Shelf Disputes

As discussed above, the Arctic contains an estimated 25 percent of the world's energy reserves. Competing continental shelf claims exist

United

States,

among Denmark, Canada,

Russia and Norway. The Russian submission to the Continental

Shelf Commission, for example, claimed nearly half of the Arctic Ocean.

The Rus-

sian claim clearly overlaps portions of the Arctic that the United States could claim.

In August 2006, the Canadian Prime Minister announced a series of measures to
secure Canada's sovereignly claims in the Arctic, including plans to construct a

deepwater port for submarines on Baffin Island near

Iqaluit; build three military

icebreakers; install underwater sensors in Arctic waters to detect foreign
rines;

and

station

unmanned

aerial vehicles

and more

carry out regular surveillance of the northern region.

aircraft in

subma-

Yellowknife to

33

The Arctic is not the only place where we see continental shelf disputes brewing.
For example, encroachment by India and Burma (i.e., surveys and overlapping gas
blocks in the Bay of Bengal) on the Bangladeshi continental shelf has created great
concern in the Bangladesh Ministry of Defense. The Foreign Minister has been
quoted as saying that no one will be allowed to explore hydrocarbon within Bangladesh's

EEZ without permission. 34
Conclusion

Military organizations need to

do

a better job

both domestically and

at the

IMO to

ensure proposed measures are really necessary to address the stated environmental

and

safety of navigation threats

military equities

and concerns. The focus must be on protecting

by ensuring that proposals are consistent with the 1982 LOS Con-

vention and that the balance between coastal State and user State interests
erly maintained.
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prop-
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In order to preserve operational

and training

EEZs without

flexibility, militaries

must con-

Conducting lawful military activities in foreign EEZs avoids adverse precedents and
preserves navigational rights and freedoms for all ships and aircraft.
tinue to operate in foreign

coastal State notice or consent.

inevitable that resource needs will result in excessive coastal State claims

It is

and increasing confrontations at sea. The same is true for continental shelf disputes

among the broad-margin States in the Arctic and elsewhere. Although the underlying territorial or maritime boundary disputes may not be resolvable in the near
term, joint development may provide a short-term solution that defuses tensions
and allows

for peaceful exploitation of resources.
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China and the Law of the

Sea:

An Update

Guifang Xue*
Introduction

This

article

examines the practice of the People's Republic of China with

re-

on the Law of the Sea (1982
LOS Convention). Two principal areas will be assessed: China's efforts to accommodate the challenges of the Convention to its ocean domain as a coastal State and
its major maritime legislation to implement the Convention regime. The analysis
begins with a brief introduction of China's maritime features and a review of its
spect to the 1982 United Nations Convention
1

basic stance toward the Convention. This

is

followed by a discussion of the major

challenges China encountered while establishing

Convention regime. China's

efforts in

its

ocean domain based on the

implementing the 1982 LOS Convention

through national legislation are examined to assess the consistency of that statutory framework with Convention requirements. Finally, conclusions are

from China's law of the

sea practice.

It is

shown

that China, for

accelerating domestic procedures with a view to enabling

it

to

its

drawn

part, has

been

comply with Con-

vention requirements. However, China's maritime practice has not been wholly
consistent with Convention provisions. At the

adjustments indicate a
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maritime

State to that of a

prove

its

State.

management

overall

To

that end,

China needs

capacity and to bring

its

to set priorities to im-

maritime practice into

LOS Convention.

alignment with the requirements of the 1982

LOS Convention

China's Maritime Features and Basic Stance on the 1982

China

is

situated in the eastern part of the Asian continent with a land territory of

9.6 million square kilometers,

which ranks

it

as the third-largest State in the world.

As a developing country with a population of 1.3
task to feed

billion,

faces

more than one quarter of the world's population on

world's arable land. China's overriding national policies
sion to meet the basic
cades,

China

call for

an enormous

7 percent of the

economic expan-

and growing needs of its huge population. In the last two de-

China has experienced tremendous economic growth, but the limited
hinder

terrestrial resources

further development.

its

With

a soaring increase in

population and gradual reduction of land resources, China has turned to the ocean
for

marine resources to ease the pressure on

From north to

insufficient land-based resources.

south, China borders an internal sea

semi-enclosed seas

—the Yellow

(hereinafter called the

China

Sea, the East

Seas). 2

China

China has

—the Bohai Sea—and

Sea,

three

and the South China Sea

a coastline of

more than

eighteen

thousand kilometers, more than 6,500 offshore islands and an island coastline of
over fourteen thousand kilometers. In the early 1990s, China embarked on a "Blue

Revolution" to develop the "Blue Economy," and this practice has continued into
this century.

China has eleven

coastal provinces

and municipalities

that cover an

area of 1.3 million square kilometers, account for 14 percent of the country's land-

mass

in total,

but support 44.7 percent of its population and generate 60 percent of

the nation's gross domestic product.

As

a land power,

China did not focus

sea or sea power. In

mostly from the

its

sea.

Those

major concern.

Law of the

(UNCLOS

Sea

bitter experiences

as

made maritime

III)

and the maritime

UNCLOS

new

III,

practices of

China made

international convention

its

new

its

on the

neighbors kindled

its first

contribution to

10, 1982, the

was opened for signature, and was eager to enjoy the maritime

rights

very day

and

it

interests

regime. 3 However, as a coastal State bordering three semi-

enclosed seas, China found
der the Convention.

security issues

—the 1982 LOS Convention.

China signed the 1982 LOS Convention on December
attached to the

should have on the

it

participation in the Third United Nations Conference

China's interest in the seas. 4 In
the creation of a

much attention

long history, the foreign invasions China suffered came

3

Its

as

It

opposite or adjacent to

itself

had
its

disadvantaged in embracing the

full

entitlement un-

to deal with overlapping boundaries with

own

coast

its

neighbors

and within four hundred nautical miles (nm).
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In contrast to the worldwide acceptance of the Convention's exclusive economic

zone (EEZ) regime, China hesitated to implement
conclusion of the 1982
of a

LOS Convention

it.

6

Overall,

a concrete step

China considers the

toward the establishment

new international legal order for the oceans, and is interested in both the legal

and economic aspects of the Convention,
Convention is bringing about.
articles

7

as well as the political implications the

On the other hand, China is not satisfied with those

of the Convention pertaining to innocent passage, the definition of the

continental shelf, boundary delimitation of the

EEZ and continental shelf, and the

international deep seabed regime.

After years of debating the advantages

Convention in

makes

China to claim

its

sovereign rights and jurisdiction over three

million square kilometers of maritime space to which

LOS Convention.
its

it is

entitled

under the 1982

provides China with a vital opportunity to develop

It

Economy," the best way to secure
date

ratified the

May 1996 and established its EEZ at the same time. The ratification

possible for

it

and disadvantages, China

its

its

"Blue

national interests and the impetus to consoli-

The Convention also enabled China to take part in
and, more importantly, to pursue a sustainable development

links with the world.

global marine affairs

strategy consistent with that universal instrument.

However, while implementing

the Convention regime, China has encountered a series of challenges.

1982 LOS Convention Challenges Encountered by China
982

LOS Convention was signed, the EEZ concept has been firmly estab-

Since the

1

lished in

customary international law. By the time the Convention

into force in 1994,

more and more

States

had

maritime zones and had started negotiations to
with their neighbors. This

is

States bordering those seas

tensive areas of offshore waters,

where

in the

came

started to define the limits of their
settle

also the case with the

have

finally

maritime boundary disputes

China

Seas,

where

all

the coastal

made unilateral assertions of jurisdiction over exincluding full 200-nm EEZ claims. 8 However, no-

Yellow Sea does the distance between opposing coastlines reach 400

nm. Most of the East China Sea is less than 400 nm in width. Any unilateral claim of
a full EEZ or continental shelf would create substantial overlaps.
China

is

China Seas

adjacent or opposite to eight neighboring countries surrounding the
(the

two Koreas, Japan, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei

Darussalam and Indonesia). 9 These States vary greatly in
uration, social

and

cultural structures,

size,

and economic and

geographical config-

political systems,

but

many of them have contested sovereignty claims or sovereign rights to different
parts of the seas, particularly

some

islands of the

South China

Sea. 10

The semi-

enclosed seas surrounding these States provide not only distinctive ecosystems and
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abundant resources, but also a unique social and political environment. The geographical

proximity and the confluence of myriad social and

torical legacy, different social

political factors, including his-

systems and ideology, and international

politics,

have

made the relationships among the China Seas' States complex over the last century. 11
The situation is further complicated by disputes over the ownership of some uninhabited islands and the boundary delimitation of the continental shelf. 12 Of the
disputed island claims concerning China, the status of the Xisha (Paracel) Islands

and the Nansha

(Spratly) Islands have

been the most serious and have resulted in

several clashes involving military action

between China and Vietnam. 13 China

also

has maritime disputes regarding the ownership of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands

with Japan; these show no sign of settlement in the near future. These disputes concern sovereignty over offshore islands that are valuable to the owners because of
their locations, rather than their physical usefulness.

tablishes

The

State that successfully es-

ownership of the islands gains enormous jurisdictional rights over the

surrounding seas by establishing an EEZ.

Prompted by the problems of boundary delimitation with its maritime neighbors, China has shown a keen interest in continental shelf issues, as they involve
China's

vital interests.

China's fundamental position

is

that the continental shelf is

the natural prolongation of the coastal State, which defines, according to
cific

its

spe-

geographical conditions, the limits of that portion of the continental shelf ex-

tending beyond

maximum

its

EEZ that is under its exclusive jurisdiction. The
continental shelf may be determined among States

territorial sea or

such a

limits of

through consultations. The progress, however, has been extremely slow due to the
different principles the

concerned parties employ for the delimitation,

the geophysical nature of the seabed at issue.
line in the

14

as well as

South Korea argues for the median

Yellow Sea and part of the East China Sea, but

relies

on the doctrine of

natural prolongation in the northeastern part of the East China Sea because in that
area the continental shelf extends 200

nm beyond the baseline of its territorial sea.

Carrying on with the doctrine of natural prolongation, China maintains that the

Okinawa Trough

is

a natural

boundary between

itself

and Japan. Understandably,

Japan has denied this characteristic and insisted on the application of the equidistance principle.
In addition to the dispute over the

ownership of islands and overlapping claims

over maritime zones, China also has to deal with the competing interests over natural resources, living
larly Japan,

and non-living, with some of its neighboring

States, particu-

Korea and Vietnam. Prospects for resolution of these issues are limited

profound impact and

due

to their

ship

among these

States.

dress disputes with

its

critical

consequence, plus the

Over the years China has made

a

political relation-

number of efforts

to ad-

maritime neighbors, but these overtures have led to the
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conclusion of only a few bilateral agreements (mainly pertaining to the settlement
of fisheries conflicts),

e.g.,

those with Japan, South Korea and Vietnam. However,

the situation in the South China Sea has not changed

much. The

petition for fisheries resources has even resulted in clashes

intensified

com-

between fishermen

themselves, and between fishermen of one State and maritime forces of another. 15

These clashes have often resulted in the

loss

quence, the South China Sea has become a
This has

made

of property and

site

life.

16

As a conse-

of tension and potential conflict.

somewhat dangerous and problematic.

access to those waters

Besides a host of maritime challenges, the South China Sea has also been an im-

portant consideration for China's defense and security. 17 The South China Sea
strategic

tion

importance to China, not only owing to

resources, but also for

its

of

loca-

and value for transportation. In addition to a distinct ecosystem and rich natu-

ral resources,

such as

and

oil

international sea lanes.

It

gas, the

is

relying

is

one of the world's busiest

superhighway with more than half of

and over half of the world's merchant

through those waters every year.

China

South China Sea

serves as a maritime

the world's supertanker traffic

Sea,

its

is

18

As the

more and more

largest State bordering the

heavily

supply and international trade. China

is

on

this

passing

fleet

South China

superhighway for

its

energy

playing an increasingly important role in

the evolution of maritime behavior in the South China Sea. Examples include

China's participation in the Regional

adopted by the

China
gional

member

Code of Conduct

in the

South China Sea

States of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations

and

19

November 1999. The driving force for China's proactive attitude in reaffairs is, on one hand, to resolve its long-standing disputes with its mari-

in

time neighbors, and to secure

its

interests in the

South China Sea on the other.

It

may also be expected that China's positive attitude will bring its management practices

in

line

with

and contribute

requirements

international

regional

to

cooperation.

Compared with its maritime neighbors, China is disadvantaged in the use of the
China

Seas.

Although China claims three million square kilometers of "blue

tory" under the 1982

LOS

Convention, the ratio of land to ocean space

is

smaller

than those of its maritime neighbors. China has engaged in negotiations to

maritime boundary disputes with
issues,

China has shown

little

its

neighboring

States.

terri-

settle

When dealing with these

interest in using international adjudication

and ap-

pears to favor consultation, thereby minimizing the necessity of multilateral in-

volvement. Predictably, China will eventually

means. However, in situations where there

is

settle these

a dispute

interpretation or application of the

LOS Convention,

tlement mechanism

XV is available.

set

out in Part

101

disputes by

between two States

its

own

as to the

the compulsory dispute set-
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China's Implementation of the 1982
Ratification of the 1982

LOS Convention

LOS Convention has had a strong impact on China's mari-

time legislation and practice. China's commitment to the Convention's obligations

evidenced by national legislation on maritime zones.

is

Among the maritime

zones under national jurisdiction provided for in the Convention, China has de-

12-nm territorial sea (with straight baselines), a 24-nm contiguous zone, a
200-nm EEZ and a continental shelf. China formally promulgated the Law of the
PRC [People's Republic of China] on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone
in 1992 (1992 TS/CZ Law), and the Law of the PRC on the Exclusive Economic
Zone and the Continental Shelf in 1998 (1998 EEZ/CS Law). 20 As the most important pieces of national maritime legislation, the two laws are fundamental and decisive in their legal status and direct impact on China's LOS Convention practice,
and merit a discussion.
clared a

China's

Law and Policy on the Territorial Seas

Much of China's early law of the sea practice was found in specific laws and regulations concerning control
a

and jurisdiction over foreign vessels

number of treaties on commerce and
sea

Chinese waters, in

navigation, or in bilateral agreements con-

cluded with neighboring States. China's
rial

in

first

national action regarding the territo-

was the Declaration of the Government of the People's Republic of China

on China's

Territorial Sea (1958 Declaration), 21

tember 1958,

five

months

Law of the

ence on the

after the

Sea

which was promulgated

conclusion of the

(UNCLOS

I).

As

first

in Sep-

United Nations Confer-

reflective of China's early practice

of

the law of the sea, the 1958 Declaration corresponded generally with the principles

of

UNCLOS

Sea.

22

I

as represented in the

1958 Geneva Conventions on the

Law of the

The Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone did not

specify the extent of the territorial sea, but the
nautical miles.

practice then

and declared

sea

ing

Taiwan and

its

may be

that this breadth applied to

all

and the

surrounding

islands,

related to the

two most

islands in the South

fisheries

China

Sea.

significant physical features of China's
shelf. It

have been necessitated by the desire to control foreign fishing

and

territo-

the Chinese territories, includ-

geography: the length of its coastline and the size of its continental

coastal waters

was three

However, the 1958 Chinese Declaration established a 12-nm

rial

This action

common

to protect fisheries resources therein.

23

This

is

may also

activities in its

evidenced by the

agreements signed between China and Japan dating back to 1955. Most

importantly, the bitter Chinese history certainly served as one of the impetuses for

China

to define a

wider

territorial sea

and

to

coastal State jurisdiction.
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The 1958 Declaration
for delimiting the

Qiongzhou

Strait

also established, inter alia, the straight-baseline

Chinese

(Hainan

territorial sea limit

Strait) as

method

and declared the Bohai Sea and

Chinese internal waters.

It

also prohibited the

entry of foreign military vessels or aircraft into China's territorial sea and the national airspace

by

tested

without prior permission. These declarations were pro-

waters and that the straight-baseline system was invalid under interna-

would be fair to say that the Chinese claim to a 12-nm
reflection of what was to become an irreversible trend.

tional law.

was a

it

few States on grounds they constituted a unilateral extension of

a

territorial

above

It

territorial sea

Following the promulgation of the 1958 Declaration, China enacted Regulations

Concerning the Passage of Foreign Non-military Vessels through Qiongzhou
1964 (1964 Regulation). According to

Strait in

vessels

were allowed to pass through the

might pass through the

strait

this regulation,

strait,

no foreign

military

but foreign commercial vessels

with permission requested forty-eight hours in ad-

vance and only during daylight hours.

The 1958 Declaration and the 1964 Regulation were the basic legal documents
that established China's territorial sea regime. During the past decades, this regime
has not been changed, except that foreign commercial vessels are

Qiongzhou

pass the
these

Strait in

documents were

now allowed

to

both daytime and nighttime. The general positions of

effectively carried

out on matters concerning China's

terri-

torial seas.

China's action in adjusting

CZ

Law.

24

its territorial

In general, the 1992

Declaration,

25

was made by the 1992 TS/

sea regime

TS/CZ Law maintained

but improved the

territorial sea

the principles of the 1958

regime in a number of aspects,

cluding control over foreign scientific research and other

in-

clarification

and the establishment of a contiguous zone. 28 Some
of the 1992 TS/CZ Law are, however, inconsistent with the LOS Conven-

of enforcement authorities,
articles

activities,

26

27

tion regime regarding innocent passage of warships
security in the contiguous zone.

China's consistent navigation policy that there
for warships

the 1982

and

jurisdictional control of

29
is

no

right of innocent passage

through the territorial sea posed a constraint on China's

LOS Convention. China

insists that foreign

regulated by requiring prior authorization

of,

ratification of

warship transits should be

or notification

to,

the coastal State

before passing through the territorial seas. This policy was reiterated in the Mari-

time Traffic Safety
that

"no military

Law

of the People's Republic of China (1983), which provides

vessels of foreign nationality

may

enter China's territorial seas

without being authorized by the Government thereof." 30 Although China
only nation to have such a requirement

—

there are

world that have made similar pronouncements on
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more than
this issue

is

not the

thirty nations in the

—

it is

suggested that
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China amend

its

legislation

on

the issue of innocent passage. China

modifying the requirement for prior authorization
foreign warships wishing to pass through

its

to

mav begin by

one of prior notification

territorial seas.

for

Such a policy mav be

a

workable compromise between Chinese navigation polio* and the innocent pas_e provisions
S

-

LOS Convention.

been the issue of most concern to China. This

juritv has

13 of the 1992

of the

TS CZ Law, which provides

that

is

reflected in Article

China exercises control

in the

con-

tiguous zone to prevent and impose penalties for activities violating Chinese laws

and regulations on

customs,

st

and

territory, internal waters

to be

on the basis

fiscal,

sanitarv or entry-exit control within

The addition of security control is said
and China's special circumstances, but it

territorial sea.

ate practice

has been criticized for not beins consistent with the 1982

EEZ

China's

its

LOS Convention.

and Enforcement

Legislation

China proclaimed

its

EEZ upon

ratification of the 1982

LOS Convention

in 1996.

This enabled China to declare sovereign rights over a significant ocean domain,

guaranteed
tus for

its

growing

interests in ocean-related activities

China to focus increased attention on the

finalized

its

Law.- With

its

diction over

its

It

EEZ and

laws on the

EEZ and

EEZ/CS

and

juris-

provides a legal framework to manage China's marine resources pursuant

for such waters

is

LOS Convention.
historic title or historic waters in articles 10(6),

law

shall

has been observed that the Convention re-

EEZ CS Law provides in

customary interna-

Article 14 that the provisions of

not affect the historic rights that China enjoys."34 This provision

confusing in that

and

It

to be determined in accordance with

tional law. 33 China's 1998

rights,

landmass. China

continental shelf, and safeguards China's national inter-

and 46(b) without defining them.

"this

its

continental shelf by adopting the 1998

The LOS Convention recognizes
gime

sea bordering

sixteen articles, this law ensures China's sovereign rights

to the requirements of the 1982

15

and provided an impe-

it is

it

does not specify what provisions might

affect

is

China's historical

not clear what "historical rights" are being referenced.

5

Arguably

these rights refer to traditional fishing rights in the South China Sea, as China

claims historic

title

to these waters. 3 "

disputes between China and

ies

its

Given the overlapping EEZ claims and

maritime neighbors,

measures could be worked out among them to resolve

it

fisher-

remains to be seen what

this non-specific

claim to

historic rights.

EEZ enforcement
Convention

in

which

is

a

key component for coastal State parties to the 1982

coastal States' jurisdictional rights are provided to ensure the

compliance of management measures
the

EEZ

is

LOS

in their

EEZ. According to the Convention,

an area of shared rights and responsibilities between coastal States and
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foreign States. 37 In regard to State practice

on EEZ enforcement,

there

is

great vari-

ation in the national regimes that coastal States have put in place. 38 China favors

and exclusive

extensive

jurisdiction over sea areas for the coastal State,

the view that a coastal State

vided by the

is

entitled to

LOS Convention.

Regarding the

legal status

overflight

territorial sea. Further,

fense.

41

it

seas. It

This position

argued that

if

EEZ

EEZ was to be con-

the

EEZ are concerned, China stated that nor-

would not be

affected since neither

China considers that

was

it

part of the

EEZ serves as a buffer zone for de2002 amendment of the Surveying

its

demonstrated by the

is

that pro-

would make no sense to establish such a zone. 40

of other States in the

mal navigation and

EEZ than

its

of the EEZ, China opposed the position that the

sidered part of the high seas, then
far as the rights

control over

39

should be regarded as part of the high

As

more

and holds

and Mapping Law of the People's Republic of China ( 1992). 42 According to China,
the EEZ is a new zone with specific legal status, 43 and coastal States have the right to
protect, use, explore

essary measures

and regulations

in the zone; to

adopt nec-

from being damaged or

to prevent the resources

and to exercise overall control and regulation of the marine environment

polluted;

and

and exploit all the natural resources

within the zone.

scientific research

Along with the development of EEZ

activities in the seas,

China's maritime law

and policy have been enhanced to deal with enforcement issues, including the basic
principles of

management. Although lacking

throughout

risdiction

trol the activities

its

EEZ, China has adopted

44

cedures for

EEZ enforcement. This leaves its

EEZ

domestic measures to con-

Indeed, China does not have laws to specify operational pro-

legality.

for

strict

of other States in those waters; these have resulted in some debate

about their

ficult to

sufficient capabilities to enforce ju-

1998 EEZ/CS

Law incomplete and dif-

implement. 45 With no other law in place to

fill

enforcement, China needs to accelerate

legislation

EEZ enforcement.

pacity for

its

precise nature

and improve

its

ca-

EEZ is a relatively new

China's practice shows that the

regime in international law, and that
tion of coastal States'

its

and an urgent need

the gap

and the

full

conceptualiza-

and other States' rights and responsibilities in the EEZ are still

evolving. 46

As

a coastal State with increasing interests in the seas

moved away from
pacity

and

ing the

its

previous practice. China has taken action to build up

institutional

number one

enforcement

one of the

fleet.

and oceans, China has

framework with long-term
issue,

strategies.

China has made an

The Chinese navy, though mainly

largest in the world. In addition,

effort to participation in international

effort

47

to

With

ca-

security be-

develop

its

EEZ

a coastal defensive force,

is

China has devoted more attention and

and regional marine

affairs.

These

have contributed to the image of China as an emerging maritime power.
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Conclusion

As the most authoritative international instrument with the widest acceptance, the

LOS Convention

1982

has changed access

oceans and ocean-related

activities. It

and the regulation

to,

of,

the world

provides basic principles for the develop-

ment of national law and policy and guidelines for State practice, and has remained
a dynamic instrument and a point of reference for legal norms at the global, regional and national levels in dealing with the countless marine issues. 48
As the nation with the greatest population in the world, China is playing an increasingly more active role in international affairs and is undergoing a rapid transformation into the world's most influential force in globalization. In the realm of
the law of the sea, the years that have followed China's ratification of the 1982

Convention have witnessed major changes

in China's attitude

LOS

toward the Conven-

Through the implementation of the LOS
Convention framework, China has made a distinctive enhancement in the development of Chinese national law and policy.
This analysis of China's implementation practices has shown that China has
embraced opportunities to develop its legal and policy framework to safeguard its
rights and interests related to the oceans and seas. In reviewing the actions taken, it
tion

and international marine

affairs.

can be concluded that China, as a contracting party, has

plement the 1982

LOS Convention

regime. China, for

ing domestic procedures with a view to enabling
obligations,

and has made progress

ment. Notwithstanding

its

in legislative

noticeable effort, the

it

made

its

to

a solid effort to

part, has

been accelerat-

comply with Convention

harmonization and policy adjust-

LOS Convention practice of China

has not, as a whole, been totally consistent with Convention provisions
lation

is

incomplete and enforcement remains weak. China's position

secure an opportunity for

commitments

at the

its

national interests

come to

and

to accept the

—

its legis-

is

clear: to

accompanying

same time.

China once focused almost exclusively on
has

im-

realize that

its

status as a coastal State.

Now China

freedom of navigation throughout the world's oceans and

through and over international

straits

is

indispensable not only for

its

booming in-

ternational trade but also for ensuring the steady stream of imported oil necessary
to fuel

its

remarkably growing economy. Facing considerable structural, man-

power and
needs to
cles,

and

financial constraints within the ocean administrative system,

set priorities to

to

improve

its

overcome
overall

political,

management

economic,

legal

capacity.

China

China

and technical obstaalso needs to

adopt

operational regulations regarding maritime enforcement issues to comport with
the requirements of the 1982

LOS Convention.
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V
The 1982 United Nations Convention on the

Law of the Sea:

An Historical Perspective on Prospects for
US Accession

Horace

B.

Robertson Jr.*

Early Background

Contrary to popular belief, the initiative for the Third United Nations Conference on the

Law of the Sea did not originate with Ambassador Pardo's famous

speech before the General Assembly in 1967. Although this speech dramatized ocean

seabed issues to the international community and gave us the now-famous phrase of

"common heritage of mankind," the idea for a third conference germinated from several different sources, one of the principal of which was the US government.
More than a year prior to Ambassador Pardo's speech, the US House of Representatives

touched off the process in a letter to the Department of State suggesting a

study of the international implications of developing resources of the seabed. The
reply

from the Assistant Secretary

State

Department "was unaware of any need for a study of international law or for-

for Congressional Relations indicated that the

eign policy relating to the development of the natural resources of the oceans."

1

The attention of the State Department was pricked again in 1966 when the Soviet
Union sent a letter to some sixty States about the possibility of convening a third
Rear Admiral, Judge Advocate General's Corps, United States Navy (Ret.)

Historical Perspective on Prospects for

law of the sea conference. 2 The
breadth of the

territorial sea,

the Territorial Sea

letter dealt explicitly

which was

left

Conference on the Law of the Sea. This

ceived,

it

on

to the

LOS Convention

only with the issue of the

unresolved by the 1958 Convention on

and Contiguous Zone and the
3

Soviet position

US Accession

letter

the 12 mile territorial sea.

failed

was
4

1960 Second United Nations

basically

When

an appeal to affirm the

the Soviet proposal was re-

touched off a six-month study by the Departments of State and Defense

and the Bureau of Commercial
partment of Defense could

companied by

Fisheries. 5 This study

live

with a 12 mile

a right of free passage

group concluded that the Deprovided

territorial sea,

through international

recognized that this solution was not attainable without

tween coastal and maritime States with respect to

straits,

was

it

but

it

acalso

some accommodation be-

fisheries.

There was also appre-

hension by the Department of Defense that the process might get out of control

and urged that any international negotiation should be conducted
packages."

in

"manageable

6

Concurrently with

this effort, the Office

of International Organizations of the

Department of State, apparently without extensive vetting by other departments,
launched
to the

its

own initiative in the United Nations. James Roosevelt, the US delegate

United Nations, sent a

letter to

Secretary-General

U Thant suggesting that

the Secretariat conduct a study "of the state of knowledge concerning undersea
resources and exploitation technology." 7

nomic and

As an immediate consequence, the

UN Eco-

Social Council adopted a resolution requesting the Secretary-General

"make a survey of the present state of knowledge of [the non-fish resources of the
sea beyond the continental shelf], and of the techniques for exploiting these resources," particularly those capable of exploitation for the benefit of developing
countries. 8

Echoing

this

theme, President Johnson, in his remarks

at the

commissioning of

the ocean research ship Oceanographer in 1966, stated:

[U]nder no circumstances, we

must we ever allow the prospects of rich
to create a new form of colonial
competition among the maritime nations. We must be careful to avoid a race to grab
and to hold the lands under the high seas. We must ensure that the deep seas and the
ocean bottoms are the legacy of all human beings. 9
harvests

With

and mineral wealth

this as

background,

it

believe,

[of the oceans]

was not

really a giant step for

Ambassador Pardo,

representing the State of Malta, to propose in 1967 that the mineral resources of the

"common heritage of manHe went on to predict that the

seabed beyond national jurisdiction be declared the

kind" to be developed for the benefit of all nations.

volume of these resources was so

vast

and so
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easily

mined

that in a few years the
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ores

would yield

at least

$5 billion profit annually to be distributed for the benefit

of the poorer countries of the Third World. 11 The

US Ambassador

to the

United

Nations, Arthur Goldberg, heartily endorsed including the item on the agenda of
the First Committee. 12

Enticed by the "mirage" of the wealth of the deep seabed predicted by Ambassa-

dor Pardo, the UN General Assembly rapidly formed an ad hoc committee to study

—the Committee on

seabed issues

the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed

Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction.

13

and the Ocean

This committee, in turn, was

made a permanent committee and morphed into the Preparatory Committee for a
Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.
Congress quickly took notice of the Malta proposal, and almost immediately
several bills

were introduced in the House and Senate, mostly unfavorable to the

idea of an international regime for the seabed. In testimony before several
tees that held hearings

on the

issue,

commit-

Johnson administration witnesses displayed

some uncertainty and confusion about
given the present state of knowledge,

it

control over the resources of the seabed.

the

US

position but generally stated that

was premature
14

The

to consider international

UN resolution and the uncertainty

indicated by the congressional hearings did, however, stimulate action within the

US policy
responsibility for which previously had been divided among

Executive Branch to take action to coordinate the formation of a unified

on the law of the

sea,

many departments. The result was the creation of the Committee on International
Policy in the Marine Environment (CIPME), under the chairmanship of the

Dep-

uty Under Secretary of State. Day-to-day leadership was under the International
Organizations Office of the State Department, but eventually was assumed by the

By the time of the second session of the Ad Hoc Seabed Committee
in June 1968, as a result of the work of the CIPME, the United States was able to
submit to the Seabed Committee a draft declaration of seven principles, two of
Legal Adviser. 15

which were
no state might claim or exercise sovereignty or sovereign rights over any part of
the deep ocean floor; and (2) that international arrangements to govern exploitation of
(1) that

deep-sea resources should be established as soon as practicable, with provisions for the
orderly development of resources and for the dedication of a part of the value of the
resources to "international

By 1970

community purposes." 16

the principle of the deep seabed as the

apparently so firmly established within the
the sea that
1970, in

it

was included

which he

US

in President Nixon's

stated, in part:

113

common

heritage of mankind

was

government's policy on the law of

ocean policy statement of May 23,

Historical Perspective on Prospects for

I

am

today proposing that

they would renounce

all

all

seas reach a depth of 200 meters

common heritage of mankind.

went on

.

.

.

and would agree

17

to say that the treaty should establish an inter-

national regime for the exploitation of seabed resources

vide for agreed international machinery to authorize

beyond

United States submitted to the

UN

this limit

and pro-

and regulate exploration and

use of seabed resources beyond the continental margin. 18
year, the

LOS Convention

nations adopt as soon as possible a treaty under which

to regard these resources as the

President's statement

to the

national claims over the natural resources of the seabed

beyond the point where the high

The

US Accession

On August 3 of the same

Seabed Committee a draft

UN Con-

vention on the International Seabed as "a working paper for discussion purposes"
that spelled out the details of machinery for the exploration

and exploitation of the

seabed beyond national jurisdiction, and provided that developing countries

would share
a

in the revenues. 19 It also included a provision for the establishment of

law of the sea tribunal for settlement of disputes. 20

The Opposition Emerges
It

can be seen then

that,

from the

outset, the principle of the

"common heritage of

mankind" and the creation of an international body to orchestrate the exploration
and exploitation of its mineral resources was not something invented by Third

World

States to use against the

United

States,

but was a principle accepted and ad-

US government at all levels. What, then, changed bemake that principle, as now codified in Part XI of the Law

vanced from the outset by the
tween 1970 and 1982 to

of the Sea Convention 21 unacceptable to the United States at that time? The stated
cause, as expressed

by President Reagan

nouncements that the United
cific

States

in his

January and July 1982 an-

would not adhere to the Convention, was the spe-

terms of the machinery adopted to implement the common-heritage principle in

the deep seabed. In his statements, the President identified six provisions in Part XI of

the Convention that could not be accepted by the United States.
that

if

these objectionable provisions were corrected, he

The

President's statement

He

would support

L.

Malone,

ratification.

was reinforced and amplified a month

statement of the President's then-Special Representative for the

Ambassador James

added, however,

in his

later

22

by the

Law of the

Sea,

statement to the House Merchant Marine and

Committee in which he testified that the United States has "a strong interest in an effective Law of the Sea Treaty" 23 and six months later when he testified
before the House Foreign Affairs Committee that the United States was "not seekFisheries

ing to change the basic structure of the treaty" or "to destroy the system" but rather
to

"make

it

work." 24
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With the defects in the machinery identified by President Reagan having been
25
fixed by the 1994 Agreement superseding the objectionable elements of Part XI;
with President Clinton having forwarded the Convention and the 1994 Agreement to the Senate strongly recommending adherence; 26 with his successor,
George W. Bush, having strongly renewed that recommendation; 27 and with the SenRepublican-chaired Foreign Relations Committee having unanimously rec-

ate

ommended that the Senate give its advice and consent to the Convention in
2004, 28 why is there still controversy even in getting it to a vote by the full Senate?
The result may be partly the result of higher-priority items displacing it on the
Senate agenda

—

after

all,

be functioning without

the argument goes, the American stakeholders appear to
difficulty in a

bugaboo, in my view and that of others

non- treaty environment. But the major

as well, in 1982, as well as today,

is

ideologi-

The most vocal opposition advocates view with suspicion any action by the
United States that accepts any arrangement for decision making by an internacal.

tional institution. In their

view

this is a

"surrender of sovereignty." 29

This ideology was stated early on in a surprising statement by Ambassador

Malone

at the Sixth

Annual Conference of the University of Virginia Center

Oceans Law and Policy held in Montego Bay in January 1983
ter the

opening of the Convention for signature

for

—only one month

at the identical location

af-

and only

months after the President's announcement of his decision not to sign the Convention. The statement was "surprising" in that it directly contradicted the President's statement and Ambassador Malone's contemporaneous testimony before
the two House committees that the US objective was not to scuttle the Convention
but to make it work. At the University of Virginia Conference, Mr. Malone stated:
six

The Treaty

document which, hiding behind the mask of superficially appealing
"new international economic order" and the "common heritage of

... is a

slogans like the

mankind," promotes a thinly disguised world

collectivism.

It

instrument for the redistribution of the world's wealth from those
their prosperity

by

risk, sacrifice,

and hard work

to those

who

is

intended as an

who

have acquired

seek to promote their

prosperity through organizational means. 30

Replying to those

"PREPCOM, and
possibility

who

suggested that the flaws could be corrected through

other means," he added, "The plain fact

is

that there exists

nor instrument for making the important changes that would

President Reagan's objections."

satisfy

31

Ambassador Malone continued:
The

potential impact

latent danger.

on the

U.S.,

its

friends

and

allies is

without

parallel.

Think of the

We are discussing an institution that would exert supreme control over
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to the

their mineral wealth representing over

LOS Convention

60%

of the resource

potential of planet Earth.

how many informed and well-meaning Americans can be willing
compromise principals [sic] and values which support America's national greatness
and mortgage our future economic health and security interests for a treaty that is little
better than an international entitlement program
a give away. 32
I

sometimes wonder

to

Opposition Arguments against the Convention

The arguments put

forth

by Ambassador Malone's remarks

at the University

of

Virginia conference form the core of current arguments against adherence to the

Convention
a giveaway.

—

33

that

is,

the Convention

Opponents

is

bolster their

a surrender of sovereignly

and amounts to

arguments by pointing out what they per-

ceive as specific flaws in the substantive provisions of the Convention.

phrased somewhat differently in the
tion,

but in essence they boil

1.

The seabed provisions

(ISA) jurisdiction over
face (ocean, seabed

down

are

many statements originating with the opposi-

to the following:

(Part XI) give the International Seabed Authority

all activities

occurring in over 70 percent of the earth's sur-

and airspace above);

The 1994 Agreement did not

2.

They

XI of the

really correct the flaws in Part

Convention;
3.

Adherence

to the

telligence operations
4.

and the Proliferation Security

in-

Initiative (PSI);

Since most of the provisions of the Convention reflect customary interna-

tional law,
5.

Convention would impede the conduct of US maritime

we

don't need the Convention to protect our maritime interests;

The Convention's provisions

in bringing the

for

compulsory dispute settlement could

result

United States within the jurisdiction of an international tribunal

against our will;
6.

The Convention

taxes"

(some

gives the International

critics conflate

into the United Nations);
7.

Seabed Authority power to "levy

the Convention's seabed-governing

body

(the ISA)

and

Pressure to accede to the Convention

is

a "rush to judgment."

Counterarguments
All

of the foregoing criticisms have been effectively answered in detail by govern-

ment

officials

and independent experts numerous times and

including congressional hearings,
will

official reports

in detail in

many fora,

and other public discussions.

I

not attempt to answer them in detail in this article but will briefly summarize
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the gist of the responses and, where appropriate, provide in the endnotes

erence to where the interested reader

may find amplification.

some ref-

34

Jurisdiction of the International Seabed Authority

The

jurisdiction of the

ISA

is

limited to the "solid, liquid or gaseous mineral re-

sources in situ in the Area at or beneath the sea-bed." 35
as "the sea-bed

jurisdiction."

36

and ocean

floor

and subsoil

thereof,

The Area, in turn, is defined
beyond the limits of national

Article 135 explicitly provides, "Neither this Part [Part XI]

rights granted or exercised
ters superjacent to the

pursuant thereto

Area or that of the

air

shall affect the legal status

nor any

of the wa-

space above those waters."

The 1994 Agreement
The changes adopted in this "Agreement relating to the Implementation of Part XI
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982" supersede any conflicting terms in the 1982
jections raised

by President Reagan

LOS Convention and meet all of the ob-

in his

1982 statement. The Agreement

substantially overhauls the Authority's decision-making procedure, including

provisions guaranteeing the United States a permanent seat
cil

and Finance Committee.

and

financial decisions

States veto power.

It

on the powerful Coun-

requires that in these bodies important decisions

be made by consensus, thus, in essence, giving the United

The development

principles incorporated in the

market-based and require the operating arm (the Enterprise),

compete on the same basis

as other

dies inconsistent with the General

commercial enterprises.

It

Agreement

when

are

activated, to

eliminates

all

subsi-

Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. The site claims

of mining companies already licensed under US laws are grandfathered, and the re-

quirement for mandatory transfer of technology

is

eliminated. 37 In a letter to the

Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, all living former Legal Advisers of the Department of State, who constitute a continuum of service from 1977
to 2000, authoritatively refuted the argument that the 1994 Agreement had not
cured the provisions of the 1982 Convention to which President Reagan objected. 38

Proliferation Security Initiative

and US Maritime Intelligence Surveillance

The US-developed PSI is directed toward preventing the illicit transportation by
ships of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and related materials.
Under the Law of the Sea Convention and customary international law, a number
of jurisdictional bases exist for stopping and searching ships suspected of being engaged in some sort of illicit activity. These include jurisdiction exercised by a State
with respect to ships flying

its

flag or

within
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zone, and stateless vessels.

also permissible to stop

It is

vessel with the permission of the flag State.

risdiction with a series of bilateral

treaty partners agree in

nothing

US

the

in the

set

under the Proliferation Security

US

which the United

of juits

in

is

any respect with respect to

Initiative. 39

Law of the Sea Convention

naval surveillance and intelligence operations not

already included in the 1958 Convention
to

this latter basis

of orderly procedures for the reciprocal

Likewise, with respect to intelligence operations, the

Zone

on

a foreign-flag

and search of suspected ships and cargoes. There

visits

contains no restrictions on

and search

builds

Convention that would change the law

practices

LOS Convention

agreements by which the United States and

advance on a

granting of permission for

The PSI

to the

States

is

on

the Territorial Sea

already a party.

and Contiguous

40

Customary Law of the Sea as an Acceptable Alternative to the Convention
There is at least a germ of truth in this argument. The United States and its maritime

activities are

law of the

sea.

functioning reasonably well under the customary regime of the

Most of the Convention

is

indeed a codification of customary inter-

national law. President Reagan's 1982 statements acknowledged this and pledged

would abide by its rules. 41 But customary law does not provide the precision and detail of a written document. It may establish a principle,
but its content may remain imprecise, subject to a range of interpretations. With
that the United States

respect to the exclusive

economic zone (EEZ),

for example,

it is

generally conceded

today that the principle of the zone has become a part of customary international

The details are contained in a set of articles codifying a series of compromises worked out in meticulous detail in the negotiations
leading up to the signing of the Convention. The rules for determining the allowlaw.

But what about

its

content?

able catch of the living resources of the EEZ, the determination of the coastal State's

capacity to harvest them, the determination of the allowable catch by other States

and the

rules governing the coastal State's establishing of terms

foreign fishermen in their

EEZs

are laid out in detail.

and conditions

for

42

Customary rules are fuzzy around the edges and may not be recognized as binding by an opposing State.

and 1960
futility

First

The

and Second

"jurisdiction creep,"

which continued

UN Conferences on the Law of the Sea,

of relying on customary law to protect our

after the

1958

illustrated the

vital security interests.

Only

a

document can provide the certainty and stability required by our governmental agencies and private maritime enterprises. And in any dispute with a for-

written

eign State to secure

arguments based on

its

compliance with the rules

a written

set forth in the

Convention,

agreement rather than an asserted principle of

customary international law would be much more
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Also, international institutions cannot be created

agreements can
tial

to

its

this occur.

by custom. Only through

The institutions incorporated in the Convention are essen-

proper functioning

—the Seabed Authority,

the

Commission on the Limits of

Law of the Sea Tribunal and the other dispute settlement

the Continental Shelf, the

mechanisms provided for in Part XV and Annexes V to VIII of the Convention. The
marine

of the Convention also provide for im-

scientific research articles (Part XIII)

plied consent to research requests in foreign waters if there

time

is

no reply within

not accorded to the United States as a non-party.

limits, a right

fixed

43

Some States also argue that some of the rights of navigation set forth in the Convention are the contractual products of the negotiations and are available only to
parties to the Convention.

international straits

These rights include the right of transit passage through

and archipelagic

tance to the United States.

sea lanes passage, both of the

utmost impor-

44

Compulsory Dispute Settlement
From the outset the United States has insisted that a system of compulsory dispute
settlement be a part of any comprehensive convention on the law of the sea. 45 The

US delegation, in the person of the late Louis Sohn, took the lead in the negotiating
group that developed the

and

its

related Annexes.

final

It is

package, which became Part

incongruous that the

XV of the Convention

flexible provisions

of Part XV,

worked out under the leadership of the United States, should now be the basis of
objection to the Convention. The objectors suggest, without basis in fact, that the
United States might be dragged against

its

will into the jurisdiction

the Sea Tribunal, particularly with respect to our military activities.

of the

46

Law of

They ignore

the terms of the Convention that provide, with respect to compulsory procedures
entailing binding decisions, an opportunity for States,

upon

signing, ratifying or

acceding to the Convention, "or at any time thereafter," to choose the binding pro-

cedure

it

will accept

has indicated that
cession.

48

it

from
will

a

menu

of settlement mechanisms. 47 The United States

choose arbitration under Annexes VII and VIII upon ac-

Further, the criticism ignores the provisions of Article 298 that provide

that State parties

may

exclude from the applicability of "any" of the compulsory

procedures providing for binding decisions, inter
tary activities."

One

alia,

"disputes concerning mili-

of the declarations that will accompany any

the Convention will state that

its

accession

"is

US

accession to

conditioned upon the understand-

ing that, under article 298(1 )(b), each State Party has the exclusive right to deter-

mine whether

its

activities

are

or were 'military activities' and that such

determinations are not subject to review." 49
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The Power to Levy Taxes
This argument

is

a distortion of the requirements of the

Convention

for funding

Under these provisions, during the period unISA can become self-supporting, funding its operations depends on assess-

the International Seabed Authority.
til

the

ments against

States party to the

Convention. In 2004 the Legal Adviser of the

Department of State estimated that had the United
vention,

its

assessments for 2004 would have been a

Authority and

The
that
lose

States

less

been a party to the Con-

little

over $1 million for the

than $2 million for the Seabed Tribunal. 50

made by opponents

taxation objection

often coupled with an argument

is

US companies that had invested millions of dollars in exploration costs would
their existing claims under US law. This argument ignores the fact that the

1994 Agreement grandfathers these holders into the treaty regime based on ar-

rangements no

less

favorable than those granted to holders of claims already regis-

tered with the Authority

upon

certification

by the US government and the

payment of a $250,000 application fee (a fee that is half of the fee established in the
1982 Convention). 51 As Ambassador Colson pointed out in the 1994 hearings, "If
the U.S. does not

become Party to the Convention,

rights of the U.S. licensed consortia could

international recognition of the

be jeopardized." 52

A "Rush to Judgment"
Rather than a "rush to judgment,"

it is

hard to find any aspect of the Convention that

has not been discussed and debated ad infinitum

—

in the public media, in

academic

conferences and symposia, in legal and ocean policy literature, and in congressional
hearings.

has been studied and restudied by each successive administration, and

It

every government department and agency with a concern in the oceans supports
accession. In
Wildlife,

in

testimony before the Subcommittee on Fisheries,

and Oceans of the Natural Resources Committee of the House of Repre-

sentatives,

Joint

March 2007,

Admiral James D. Watkins and Leon

Ocean Commission

vention, saying,
a party to the

Initiative,

E. Panetta,

Co-chairmen of the

renewed their strong endorsement of the Con-

among other things, that the failure of the United States to become

Convention

is

"one of the most serious international ocean policy is-

sues that remain unresolved for our nation." 53

On May

15,

2007, President George

W. Bush

issued a formal statement urging

the Senate

to act favorably

on

U.S. accession to the United Nations

Convention on the Law of the

Sea during this session of Congress. Joining will serve the national security interests of
the United States, including the maritime mobility of our
will

armed

forces worldwide.

It

secure U.S. sovereign rights over extensive marine areas, including the valuable
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natural

resources they contain.

Accession will promote U.S.

when

With

the rights that are vital to our interests are debated

this

the

in

interests

And it will give the United States a seat at the table

environmental health of the oceans.

overwhelming support from

all

and

interpreted. 54

US economic and

segments of the

gov-

ernmental structure, one would think that Senate advice and consent to accession

would be a "slam dunk." The immediate effect, however, was a flurry of media articles in opposition to the Convention, most of them from familiar names previously
identified with the opposition. 55 Their
lessly

arguments were the same

as

have been end-

repeated since the Convention was adopted in 1982, with but one

ment I had not heard before. That

is

that the United States

is

giving

new argu-

up sovereignty

under the terms of Article 2, which provides, "The sovereignty over the territorial sea
is

exercised subject to this Convention

argument conveniently ignores the
identical text in the 1958

and to other rules of international law." 56 This

fact that the

Convention on the

United

States

Territorial Sea

is

already

bound by

and Contiguous

Sea. 57

The Costs of Non-adherence
There are tangible costs for the United States in not being a party to the Law of the
Sea Convention. Until 1998, the United States was entitled to provisional

member-

ship in the meetings of the States party to the Convention, but since then

present only as an observer.
costs. It is ineligible to

forfeited (as of

Its

it

can be

non-accession has had and continues to have real

nominate members to the Law of the Sea Tribunal;

March 2007)

the opportunity to nominate

members

to the

it

has

Com-

mission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf until the next election in 20 12, 58 and
it

cannot occupy

its

guaranteed seat on the Council of the Seabed Authority and

the powerful Finance Committee.

tinue to suffer

from long delays

which would be

alleviated

the United States a party.

The marine

scientific research institutions

con-

in gaining approval for research in foreign EEZs,

by the Convention's implied consent provisions were

59

Perhaps as damaging as the concrete benefits of the Convention previously
cussed

is

failing to

the

harm

dis-

to the credibility of the United States in international relations

accede to the Convention. After

all,

by

we laid out before the world in President

Reagan's 1982 statements our objections to the Convention and what would be required for the United States to

become

a party.

By adopting

the 1994 Agreement, the

community gave us what we demanded as conditions for our accession,
and now, thirteen years later, the United States has still not become a party.
international
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Current Prospects for Accession

As of the date of preparation of this paper
there are indications that the Senate

is

for publication (early

September 2007),

prepared to take action toward granting

advice and consent to accession to the

Law of the

its

Sea Convention. Both Senator

Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Senator Lugar,
the senior minority member, are strong supporters of the Convention. It is anticipated that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee will hold further hearings toward the end of September. Both the Department of State and the Department of
Defense appear to have mounted a "full-court press" to obtain Senate approval. 60
Biden,

The Commandant of the Coast Guard has weighed in with a strong endorsement. 61
Four former Commandants of the Coast Guard have written Senator Biden urging
the Senate to approve the Convention this session of Congress. 62 But the opposition's efforts to scuttle the

Convention remain

Internet with arguments built

active, flooding the press

and the

on destroying the straw men they have created by

misrepresentations and distortions of the terms of the Convention. As one of their

spokesmen has

said,

"The Senate won't

and I'm doing everything

I

ratify the

Convention

can to make a controversy."

The window of opportunity

for the Senate to grant

if it is

its

the Convention in the current 110th session of Congress

consent to accession to
is

small,

Foreign Relations Committee and the Senate at large both have
Iran,

North Korea, Afghanistan and immigration

controversial,

63

issues.

and the Senate

full plates

—

Iraq,

Complicating the land-

Committee Chairman, Senator Biden, is a presidential
candidate with the first state primaries only a few months away. If the Convention
cannot be brought up for a vote in this session, it is unlikely that the Senate would
scape

is

the fact that the

be inclined to address the issue in the second session of this Congress with a presi-

November 2008. Those who favor US accession
may have to keep their hopes alive until a new Congress convenes in January 2009.

dential election

looming ahead

in
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The Unvarnished Truth:
The Debate on the Law of the Sea Convention

William L. Schachte Jr.*

GoodMandsager, thank

afternoon. Distinguished guests, ladies and gentlemen, friends. Profes-

sor

you

for that kind introduction.

duced by someone you truly respect.
grateful for

your gracious

It is

It's

nice to be intro-

an honor to be your speaker today.

I

am

hospitality.

Background

The

Senate's consideration of

US

accession to the 1982 United Nations Conven-

on the Law of the Sea (1982 LOS Convention) this year, as it did when the
Senate last considered the Convention in 2004, has produced an amazing array of
opposition arguments. Well, this is America and protecting our rights, such as freedom of speech which of course includes the right to speak out on or participate in
1

tion

—

—

why many Americans have chosen to be members of
our armed forces. However, when examined, the opposition arguments are basically intellectually bankrupt. Reminds me of the fellow down South who used to ladebates on major issues

ment, "Broke?
In fact,

I

is

Man I'm so broke

I

can't even

pay attention."

couldn't resist the opportunity to express

my true feelings at a forum

sponsored by the Brookings Institution in September 2004. After Senator Lugar's
Rear Admiral, JAGC, United States Navy

(Ret.).
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opening remarks, we
the floor was

open

tunity to speak

five panelists

for questions.

first.

five to

seven minutes each and then

Frank Gaffney asked for and was given the oppor-

followed.

I

were given

I

took the

full five

minutes and these were

my

opening comments:
There has been a constant drumbeat of ill-founded criticism predicting nearapocalyptic

doom

for the

United States

The opponents constantly argue

if it

that the

accedes to the

Law of the

Sea Convention.

Law of the Sea (LOS) Convention will

cripple

the U.S. Navy's ability to perform maritime missions necessary for national security,

including collecting intelligence, conducting submerged transits with submarines, and

preventing actions by

and incorrect

terrorists.

I

am

compelled to speak out against these misguided

beliefs to set the record straight.

scrutiny of this

nation.

certainly respect honest, deliberate

complex Convention. But, given the repeated misstatements of fact,

hard not to conclude that there are some
effort to

I

who

mislead the public and our government leaders on this important issue for our
It is

bad enough

when people

to be

wrong, but there

is

something more serious going on

ignore facts and are consciously and purposefully wrong. Bottom

nothing in the

LOS Convention hampers,

with traditional naval

activities

we

will recall that the

floor vote during the

line:

impedes, trumps or otherwise interferes

currently conduct or will conduct in the future.

sincerely want to thank the Brookings Institute [sic] for providing
communicate the truth about the LOS Convention. 2

You

it is

are engaged in a deliberate, concerted

this

I

opportunity to

Convention's opponents were successful in preventing a

second session of the

One Hundred

Eighth Congress.

It

was

almost unprecedented to have a treaty unanimously reported out of committee,
yet

fail

to go to the full Senate for a vote.

As the One Hundred Tenth Senate considers the 1982 LOS Convention,

a

ber of items have appeared in the press and online asserting the Convention
trary to

num-

is

con-

US interests. The opponents' arguments have been aggressively countered
3

by the Convention's supporters. 4

On October 31, 2007, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted seventeen
to four in favor of acceding to the treaty. 5 Its report has

been sent to the

full

Senate

for consideration.

The strongest supporters of the 1982 LOS Convention are those directly affected
by it. 6 The arguments made by Convention opponents and the Bush administration's rebuttals from the One Hundred Eighth Senate's consideration of the Convention appear in the written statements of Department of State Legal Adviser
William H. Taft before the Senate Committee on Armed Services on April 8, 2004, 7
before the House Committee on International Relations on May 2, 2004, 8 and before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence on June 8, 2004; 9 and in testimony by Assistant Secretary of State John Turner before the Senate Committee of
1
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Foreign Relations on October 21, 2003, 10 and before the Senate Committee on En-

vironment and Public Works on March 23, 2004. u This year, testimony in support
of the Convention was provided to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee by

Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon
England and Admiral Patrick Walsh, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, on September 27, 2007. 12 The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
stated unequivocally that the

Staff,

Admiral Mike Mullen,

US interests during his confirCommittee on Armed Services on July 31,

Convention advances

mation hearings before the Senate
2007. 13

Opposition Myths

The following is a sampling of the myths regarding the Convention that opponents
continue to trumpet.

President Reagan thought the treaty was irremediably defective. 14
This

is

absolutely

false.

President Reagan expressed concerns only about Part XI's

deep seabed mining regime. 15 In
specifically identified the

cerns, the regime has

fact,

he believed that Part XI could be fixed and

elements in need of revision. 16 In response to those con-

been fixed in a legally binding manner that addresses each of

US objections to the earlier regime. 17 The rest of the treaty was considered so favorable to US interests that, in his 1983 Ocean Policy Statement, President Reagan
the

ordered the government to abide by and exercise the rights accorded by the non-

deep-seabed provisions of the Convention. 18

US adherence to the Convention is not necessary because navigational
freedoms are not threatened (and the only guarantee of free passage on the
seas

is

the

power of the US Navy). 19

Wrong! It is not true that our navigational freedoms are not threatened. There are
more than one hundred illegal, excessive claims affecting vital navigational and
overflight rights and freedoms. The United States has utilized diplomatic and operational challenges to resist the excessive maritime claims of other nations that interfere

with

US

navigational rights as reflected in the Convention. But these

amount of risk, e.g., the Black Sea bumping incident
former Soviet Union in 1988. Being a party to the Convention would sig-

operations entail a certain

with the

nificantly

enhance our

efforts to roll

back these claims by, among other things,

putting the United States in a far stronger position to assert our rights and affording us additional

methods of resolving

conflict.
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—

—

The Convention was drafted before and without regard to the war on
terror and what the United States must do to wage it successfully. 20

An

irrelevant canard.

terror;

that

Convention was drafted before the war on

true that the

however, the Convention enhances, rather than undermines, our

successfully
ity-

It is

is

wage the war on

terror.

The maximum maritime naval and

assured by the Convention

is

essential for

ability to

air

mobil-

our military forces to operate

The Convention provides the necessary stability and framework for our
weapons and materiel to get to the fight without hindrance and ensures

effectively.

forces,

that

—

our forces

not be hindered in the future. Accordingly, the Convention

will

supports our war on terrorism by providing important stability for navigational

freedoms and overflight.

It

oceans to meet national

security-

lanes remain

open

as

preserves the right of the

requirements.

an international

proval from nations along the routes.
will

essential that

It is

legal right

A

US military to

use the world's

key sea and

air

and not be contingent upon ap-

stable legal

regime for the world's oceans

support global mobility for our armed forces.

Obligatory technology transfers will equip actual or potential adversaries

with sensitive and militarily useful equipment and know-how such as anti7

submarine warfare technology. 21
Total bunk.

Xo

technology transfers are required by the Convention. Mandatory

technology transfers were eliminated by Section 5 of the Annex to the Agreement

amending
plicitly

Part XI of the Convention. Further, Article 302 of the Convention ex-

provides that nothing in the Convention requires a party to disclose infor-

mation the disclosure of which

As

is

contrary to the essential interests of its security.

a non-party, the United States

is

allowed to search any ship that enters our

economic zone (EEZ) to determine whether it could harm the United
States or pollute the marine environment. Under the Convention, the US
Coast Guard or others would not be able to search any ship until the United

exclusive

Nations

is

notified

and approves the

right to search the ship. 22

Absurdly false. Under applicable treaty law
as well as

its

the

1

958 law of the sea conventions

customary international law, no nation has the right to

any ship that enters
lute

—

its

EEZ to determine whether it could harm

that nation or pol-

marine environment. Xor would we want countries to have such

"right," because

it

more than any other

in

our existing

is

incorrect.

The Convention

ability or authority to search ships entering

with regard to security or protection of the environment.
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that

nation. Thus, the description of

both the status quo and the Convention's provisions

makes no change

a blanket

would fundamentally undermine the freedom of navigation

benefits the United States

EEZ

arbitrarily search

One

final

our

and very

William

L.

Schachte Jr.

important point: under the Convention, the
tary operations, such as in deciding when

UN has absolutely no role in US mili-

and where a foreign ship maybe boarded.

Other parties will reject the US "military actMties" declaration

A

ridiculously false assertion.

tion

and is not

a reservation. It

The US declaration
is

is

as a reservation.-"

consistent with the

Conven-

an option explicitly provided by Article 298 of the

Convention. Other parties to the Convention that have already made such declarations exercising this option include the United

Kingdom,

Russia, France, Canada,

Mexico, Argentina, Portugal, Denmark, Ukraine, Norway and China.

The 1994 Agreement doesn't even pretend to amend the Convention;
establishes controlling interpretive provisions.

1

it

merely

-

Nonsense. The Convention could only have been formally "amended"

if it

had already

entered into force. The 1994 Agreement 15 was negotiated as a separate agreement
in order to ensure that the

flawed

state.

Convention did not enter into force with Part XI in

The 1994 Agreement made

Convention and has the same
vention

itself.

1

explicit, legally

le^al effect as if

it

its

binding changes to the

were an amendment to the Con-

-

A letter signed by all living former Legal Advisers to the US Department of State,
representing both Republican and

Democrat administrations,

confirrns the legallv

binding nature of the changes to the Convention effected by the 1994 Agreement.
Their

letter states,

"[T]he Reagan Administration's objection to the

tion, as expressed in

LOS Conven-

1982 and 1983, was limited to the deep seabed mining regime.

The 1994 Implementing Agreement that revised this regime, in our opinion, satisfactorily resolved that objection and has binding legal effect in its modification of
'

the

LOS

Convention." 1

The problems identified by President Reagan in 1983 were not remedied by
the 1994 Agreement relating to deep seabed mining. 1
Wrong. Each objection has been addressed. .Among other things, the 1994
Agreement
-

•

Provides for access by

US

industry to deep seabed minerals on the basis of

non-discriminatory and reasonable terms and conditions;25
•

Overhauls the decision-making rules to accord the L'nited States

influence, including veto

would

power over the most important future

critical

decisions that

affect L^S interests and, in other cases, requires two-thirds majorities that will

enable us to protect our interests by putting together small blocking minorit:

and
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•

Restructures the regime to comport with free-market principles, including

the elimination of the earlier

production controls.

The Convention

A

mandatory technology

gives the United Nations

ludicrously false assertion.

fees for

its first

on the continental

It

34

The

and none of the revenues go

United Nations. These minimal costs are worth

(US companies applying
fee directly to the

would be

US

tion

necessary.)

for

and administrative

costs are less than the royalties paid

to foreign countries for drilling off their coasts

pay the application

for or authorize

does include revenue sharing provisions

shelf beyond 200 miles 33

deep seabed mining operations.

representatives.

all

opportunity to levy taxes. 32

The Convention does not provide

taxation of individuals or corporations.
for oil/gas activities

and

transfer provisions

31

it

to the

according to reliable industry

deep seabed mining licenses would

Seabed Authority; no implementing

legisla-

consent would be required for any expenditure of

such revenues. With respect to deep seabed mining, because the United States

is

a

LOS Convention, US companies currently lack the ability to
engage in such mining under US authority. Becoming a party will give our firms
such ability and will open up new revenue opportunities for them when deep seanon-party to the 1982

bed mining becomes economically
ing for

viable.

The

alternative

is

no deep seabed min-

US firms, except through other nations that are parties to the Convention.

The Convention mandates another tribunal to adjudicate disputes. 35
The asserted authority of the tribunal is wildly inaccurate. The Convention established the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea. However, parties are free
to choose other methods of dispute settlement. The United States would choose
two forms of arbitration rather than the Tribunal.

The United States would be subject to the Seabed Disputes Chamber if deep seabed mining ever takes place. The proposed Resolution of Advice and Consent
makes clear that the Seabed Disputes Chamber's decisions "shall be enforceable in
the territory of the United States only in accordance with procedures established by

implementing

and

legislation

factual review as

is

and

that such procedures shall be subject to such legal

constitutionally required
36

and without precedential

effect in

The Chamber's authority extends only to disputes involving the mining of minerals from the deep seabed; no other activities,
including operations in the water column or on the surface of the oceans, are sub-

any court of the United

ject to

States."

it.
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US adherence will entail history's biggest voluntary transfer of wealth and
surrender of sovereignty. 37

To

the contrary, the Convention enhances not only sovereignty of military ships

and

aircraft,

but also bolsters our resource jurisdiction over a vast area off the

coasts of the United States. Furthermore,

the 1994 Agreement, there
sovereignty. In fact, the

absolutely

is

under the Convention,

no

transfer of wealth

as

superseded by

and no surrender of

Convention supports the sovereignty and sovereign

rights

of the United States over extensive maritime territory and natural resources off its
coast, including a

broad continental shelf that

in

many areas

extends well beyond

the 200 nautical mile limit, and

claims against others.

would give us additional capacity to defend those
The mandatory technology transfer provisions of the origi-

nal Convention, an element of the

Convention that the United

States objected to,

were eliminated in the 1994 Agreement.

The International Seabed Authority (ISA) has the power to regulate seventenths of the earth's surface, impose international taxes, etc. 38
Nothing could be further from the truth. The Convention addresses seven-tenths
of the earth's surface; however, the ISA does not. The authority of the ISA is strictly
limited to administering mining of minerals in areas of the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction, generally

present,

and

unfeasible.

more than 200

miles from the shore of any nation. At

in the foreseeable future, such deep seabed

The ISA has no other

role

is

economically

and has no general regulatory authority over

the uses of the oceans, including freedom of navigation

no authority or

mining

and overflight. The ISA has

ability to levy taxes.

The United States might end up without a vote in the ISA. 39
Not possible. The Council is the main decision-making body of the ISA. The
United States would have a permanent seat on the Council, by virtue of its being
the State with the largest economy in terms of gross domestic product on the date
of entry into force of the Convention, November 16, 1994. 40 This would give us a
uniquely influential role on the Council, the body that matters most.
The People's Republic of China asserts that the Convention entitles it to
exclusive economic control of the waters within a 200 nautical mile radius of
its artificial islands
including waters transited by the vast majority of
Japanese and American oil tankers en route to and from the Persian Gulf. 41
Wrong again on both facts and law. The US government is not aware of any claims
by China to a 200 mile economic zone around its artificial islands. Any claim that
artificial islands generate a territorial sea or EEZ would be illegal under the

—
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Convention. The Convention specifically provides that
have the status of islands and have no

Participation in the

territorial sea or

artificial islands

EEZ

of their own.

do not

42

Law of the Sea Convention would render the Proliferation

Security Initiative (PSI) invalid. 43

Wrong and an insult to our military leadership, all of whom strongly support the
Convention. US accession to the Convention would in no way hinder our efforts
under the PSI to

interdict vessels suspected of engaging in the proliferation of

weapons of mass destruction. The PSI Statement of Interdiction

Principles re-

quires participating countries to act consistently with national legal authorities
"relevant international law

the 1982

LOS

and frameworks," which includes the law

and

reflected in

Convention.

Concluding Remarks

Those are the basic arguments. Before going
stress

one point; whether

Program must be an
only effective

if it is

to

my

predictions,

a party or non-party, a robust

I

would

Freedom of Navigation

essential part of US oceans policy. This treaty, or

implemented by

like to

any treaty,

is

action.

Predictions: I'm going to be an optimist here. Considering the favorable vote of

the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the direct support "in writing" from the
President, the support of the Democratic side of the aisle, as well as support

Senators Lugar, Stevens,
the floor

and

Warner and

gration
still

I

predict the Convention will get to

receive the necessary votes for advice

will finally join the current

Having

others,

said that,

Bill that is

and

from

and consent. The United

States

155 parties to the Convention.

after

observing the Senate maneuvering over the Immi-

now pending, something "unforeseen" from the far right might

be possible. But I'm relying on the wisdom of Winston Churchill and his

state-

ment: "You can always count on the Americans to do the right thing. Yes, you can
always count on the Americans to do the right thing

—

after they've

exhausted every

other possibility."

Thank you very much

again.

Notes

1.

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec.

inafter 1982
2.
3.

2007,

10, 1982,

1833 U.N.T.S. 3 [here-

LOS Convention).

Author's notes.
See, e.g.,
at

Frank

J.

Gaffney

Jr.,

The U.N.'s

big

power grab, WASHINGTON TIMES, Oct.

2,

A14, available at http://washingtontimes.com/article/20071002/COMMENTARY03/

136

William

Schachtejr.

L.

110020010/1012/COMMENTARY%22; Frank

Gaffney

J.

Jr.,

LOST Runs

Silent,

Runs Deep,

Townhall.com, Oct. 30, 2007, http://www.townhall.com/columnists/frankjgaffneyjr/archive
.shtml; JeremyRabkin, Defeat the Law of the Sea Treaty, WASHINGTON TIMES, Nov. 13, 2007, at
A22, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/article/20071 1 13/EDITORIAL/l 1 1 130001/
1013/editorial;

U.N. Law of Sea Treaty on Senate fast- track, WorldNetDaily, Sept.

30, 2007, http://

www.worldnetdaily.com/news/article.asp?article_ID=57903; Phyllis Schlafly, Sink The

Law Of

The Sea Again, EagleForum.org, Sept. 26, 2007, http://eagleforum.org/column/2007/sept07/07
-09-26.html; Doug Bandow, Bad Treaties Never Die, Rejectlost.blogspot.com, Nov. 15, 2007,
http://rejectlost.blogspot.com.
4. Patrick Neher, In Support of LOST, WASHINGTON TIMES, Dec. 14, 2007, at A18; Ken
Adelman, Sea Law Turbulence, WASHINGTON TIMES, Dec. 12, 2007, at A 16, available at http://
www.washingtontimes.com/article/2007 1 2 1 2/COMMENTARY/ 1 1 2 1 200 1 1 / 1 1 2; Letter from
Michael Chertoff, Secretary, US Department of Homeland Security, to Senator Joseph Biden,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations (Sept. 26, 2007), available at http://
www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/HomeSec_Letter-27Sep07.pdf; Letter from Joint Chiefs of Staff
to Senator Joseph Biden, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations (June 26, 2007), available at http://www.jag.navy.mil/documents/test24%20star%20ltr.pdf; Letter from George
Shultz to Senator Richard Lugar (June 28, 2007), available at http://www.jag.navy.mil/documents/Shultz.pdf [hereinafter Shultz letter]; Patrick Neher, LOST Will Enhance Security,
WASHINGTON TIMES, Nov. 14, 2007, at A20, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/
apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20071 1 14/EDITORIAL/l 1 1 140015&template=nextpage;
Letter
from Stephen Hadley, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, to Senator Joseph
Biden, Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations (Feb. 8, 2007), available at http://

www.jag.navy.mil/documents/HadleyLetter.pdf.
5.

S.

EXEC. REP. NO.

1

10-9, at 9 (2007), available at www.virginia.edu/colp/pdf/UNCLOS

-Sen-Exec-Rpt-1 10-9.pdf.
6.

While

I

have

testified as a private citizen

the critics of the Convention (truth

is

presenting the same or very similar responses to

universal),

I

have chosen to draw basically from the

mony of Bush administration witnesses to "correct the record." See Advice and Consent to
Comm. on

of the Sea Convention: Hearing Before the

S.

2003) (statement of William L. Schachte

Jr.),

testi-

the

Law

Foreign Relations, 108th Cong. (Oct. 14,

available at http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/

2003/SchachteTestimony03 10 14.pdf; Military Implications of the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Armed Services, 108th Cong. (Apr. 8, 2004)
(statement of William L. Schachte Jr.), available at http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/
2004/April/Schachte.pdf; Closed Hearing Before the

S. Select Committee on Intelligence, 108th
Cong. (June 8, 2004) (statement of William L. Schachte Jr.) [unclassified statement available
from author] See also The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
.

1 10th Cong. (Sept. 27, 2007) (testimony of Gordon England, Deputy Secretary
of Defense; John D. Negroponte, Deputy Secretary, US Department of State; and Admiral Patrick M.

Foreign Relations,

Walsh,

US

Navy, Vice Chief of Naval Operations), available at http://www.senate.gov/~foreign/

hearings/2007/hrg070927p.html [hereinafter Hearing on the Law of the Sea Convention]. See testimony of Admiral Michael Mullen, US Navy (the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff nominee) before the Senate

Committee on Armed

Services (July 31, 2007), available at http://

oceanlaw.org/index.php?name=News&file=article&sid=3 1
7.

Available at http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2004/April/Taft.pdf.

8.

Available

at

http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa93660.000/hfa93660

_0.HTM.
9.

S.

EXEC. REP. NO.

1

10-9, supra note 5, at 34-41.

137

The Unvarnished Truth: The Debate on the Law of the Sea Convention
10.
1

1.

Available at http://foreign.senate.gov/testimony/2003/TurnerTestimony031021.pdf.
Available at http://epw.senate.gov/hearing_statements. cfm?id=2 19509.

12.

Statements of all three available at Hearing on the Law of the Sea Convention, supra note

13.

Available

at

6.

http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2007/July/Mullen%2007-31-07

.pdf.
14.

Steven Groves,

Why Reagan Would

Still

Reject the

Law of the

Sea Treaty, Heritage.org,

Oct. 24, 2007, http://www.heritage.org/Research/InternationalOrganizations/wml676.cfm.
1

5.

Statement on United States Participation in the Third United Nations Conference on the

Law of the
1

the

6.

Sea,

Law of the
17.

1

PUBLIC PAPERS 92

(Jan. 29, 1982). See also Shultz letter, supra note 4.

See Statement on United States Participation in the Third United Nations Conference on
Sea, supra note 15.

Professor

Oxman

cataloged President Reagan's objections and the ways they were ad-

Oxman, The 1994 Agreement and
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 687 (1994).

dressed in the 1994 Agreement in Bernard H.

88

18.

Statement on United States Oceans Policy, Mar.

10, 1983, in

1

the Convention,

PUBLIC PAPERS 379

(1983).
1

9.

Doug Bandow,

Sink the

Law of the Sea

17 ("the only sure guarantee of free passage
20.

Treaty,

on the

Michael D. Huckabee, America's Priorities

WEEKLY STANDARD, Mar.

seas

in the

is

1

5,

2004, at

1

6-

power of the U.S. Navy").
Terror, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Jan-

the

War on

Feb. 2008, at 155, 155, available at http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080101faessay87112/
michael-d-huckabee/america-s-priorities-in-the-war-on-terror.html; Tell Congress to
the

Law of the

REJECT

Sea Treaty, RightMarch.com, Dec. 10, 2007, http://capwiz.com/sicminc/issues/

alert/?alertid=10393631.
21.

LOST Mandates Technology

Transfer, RejectLost.blogspot.com, Sept.

1,

2007, http://

rejectlost.blogspot.com/2007/09/lost-mandates-technology-transfer.html; Cliff Kincaid, Conservatives Mobilize Against

Law of the

Sea Treaty, HumanEvents.com, Sept. 10, 2007, http://

www.humanevents.com/article.php?print=yes&id=22292.

—

The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Oversight Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Environment and Public Works, 108th Cong. (Mar. 24, 2004) (statement of Peter
Leitner) ("Ratification of the Treaty would effectively gut our ability to intercept the vessels of
terrorists or hostile foreign governments even if they were carrying nuclear weapons"), available
at http://epw.senate. go v/hearing_statements.cfm?id=2 19545; Frank J. Gaffney Jr., statement Before id. ("LOST would prohibit U.S. Navy or Coast Guard vessels from intercepting, searching or
seizing them"), available at http://epw.senate.gov/hearing_statements. cfm?id=2 19549; Paul M.
Weyrich, Law of the Sea Treaty Threatens Sovereignty, RenewAmerica.us, Nov. 23, 2004, http://
www.renewamerica.us/columns/weyrich/041123 ("ISA [International Seabed Authority]
[has] the right to determine in what situations our Navy can stop a vessel").
23. Oliver North, Law of the Sea Treaty on Fast Track to Ratification, FOXNews.com, Oct.
22.

.

.

1

.

1

2007, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,30 1 279,00.html.
24.

The Convention on

100th Cong. (Oct.

4,

the

Law of the Sea: Hearing Before

2007) (statement of Frank

J.

Gaffney

Jr.)

the

S.

Comm. on

Foreign Relations,

("The 1994 Agreement Did Not

Amend

LOST"), available at http://www.senate.gov/~foreign/testimony/2007/GafnieyTestimony071004
.pdf;

Statement of Fred

problems of

LOST

L.

Smith

Jr.,

have not been

President, Competitive Enterprise Institute, Before

fixed.

And, indeed, proponents do not

id.

("The

really believe that they

have been"), available at http://www.senate.gov/~foreign/testimony/2007/SmithTestimony071004
.pdf.

25. Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention
on Law of the Sea, -.A. Res. 263, U.N. GAOR,48th Sess., 101st plen. mtg. U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/263
(

138

William

L.

Schachte Jr.

(Aug. 17, 1994), available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N94/332/98/PDF/

N9433298.pdf?OpenElement

[hereinafter 1994 Agreement].

Oxman, supra note 17; Louis B. Sohn, International Law Implications of the 1994 Agreement, 88 American Journal of International Law 696 (1994); Jonathan I. Charney, U.S.
26.

Deep Seabed Agreement, id. at 705.
on Accession to the Law of the Sea Convention (Apr.
98 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 307 (2004).

Provisional Application of the 1994
27.

Former Legal Advisers'

2004), reprinted in
28.

fore the

Letter

17,

Law of the Sea: Hearing Be2004) (statement of Jeane J.

Military Implications of the United Nations Convention on the
S.

Comm. on Armed

Services,

108th Cong. (Apr.

Kirkpatrick) ("the [1994] modifications have not been major.

8,

The Treaty

is

fundamentally the

same"), available at http://armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2004/April/Kirkpatrick.pdf.
29.

at

Id.,

Annex,
Annex,
Annex,

sec. 1, para. 6(a)(iii).

30.

Id.,

31.

Id.,

32.

Thomas A. Bowden, Deep Six the Law of the Sea, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Nov.

sec. 3.

sees. 5, 6.

20, 2007,

A18, available at http://www.aynrand.org/site/News2?page=NewsArticle&id=16115&news

_iv_ctrl=1021; Smith, supra note 24 ("Under the

Law of the

ized countries will pay for the privilege of being regulated

Doug Bandow, The Law

Sea Treaty, taxpayers in industrial-

by a Third World-dominated body");

of the Sea Treaty: Turning the World's Resources Over to a Second

United Nations, IPI IDEAS, Sept.

1,

2007, http://www.ipi.org/ipi%5CIPIPublications.nsf/

PublicationLookupFullTextPDF/F9BlA41B3FF334158625736400652B15/$File/LawandSea.pdf
?OpenElement.
33.

1982

LOS Convention,

supra note

1, art.

82.

34.

1994 Agreement, supra note 25, Annex,

35.

Gaffney, supra note 24, at 8 ("LOST's compulsory dispute settlement");

Compulsory Dispute Settlement,

sec. 1, para. 6(a)(ii).

Rejectlost.blogspot.org, Sept.

1,

LOST Mandates

2007, http://rejectlost.blogspot

.com/2007/09/lost-mandates-compulsory-dispute.html.
36.

Understanding 22

in the

Instrument of Ratification, contained in the Commentary ac-

companying the Secretary of State's Letter of Submittal in S. TREATY DOC. NO. 103-39 (2007).
The Commentary may also be found in Law of the Sea Convention: Letters of Transmittal and
Submittal and Commentary, DISPATCH MAGAZINE, Feb. 1995, at 5-52, available at http://
dosfan.lib.uic.edu/ERC/briefing/dispatch/ 1 995/html/Dispatchv6Sup 1 .html;

7

GEORGETOWN

INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW 87-194 (1994); 34 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
MATERIALS 1400-1447 (1995); J. ASHLEY ROACH & ROBERT W. SMITH, UNITED STATES RESPONSES TO EXCESSIVE MARITIME CLAIMS 537-653 (2d ed. 1996).
37. Gaffney, supra note 24; Smith, supra note 24; Gaffney, The U.N.'s big power grab, supra
note 3; Gaffney, LOST Runs Silent, Runs Deep, supra note 3; Rabkin, supra note 3; U.N. Law of
Sea Treaty on Senate fast-track, supra note 3; Schlafly, supra note 3; Bandow, supra note 3.
38. Bandow, supra note 32, at 1 ("This may be the first global tax imposed on Americans
without congressional approval"); Bowden, supra note 32; Gaffney, The U.Ws big power grab,
supra note 3 ("So why on earth would the United States Senate possibly consider putting the
U.N. on steroids by assenting to its control of seven-tenths of the world's surface?").
39. Gaffney, supra note 22, at 1 ("Conceivably, due to membership rotation, there could be
times

when

sions taken

[the

by

United

[the

States]

might not even have a vote

1994 Agreement, supra note 25, Annex,

41.

Frank

J.

to say nothing of a veto

—over

deci-

Seabed Authority]").

40.

ONLINE, Feb.

—

Gaffney

Jr.,

sec. 3.15(a).

John Kerry's Treaty: Outsourcing Sovereignty, NATIONAL REVIEW

26, 2004, http://www.nationalreview.com/gaffney/gaffney200402261356.asp.

139

The Unvarnished Truth: The Debate on the Law of the Sea Convention

42.

1982

LOS Convention,

43. Gaffney, supra note 24,

supra note
at 14

1, art.

60(8).

("LOST Can be Used

Initiative").

140

to Limit the Proliferation Security

PART III
MARITIME ENFORCEMENT OF
UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS

VII
Conflicts between United Nations Security

Council Resolutions and
the 1982 United Nations Convention

on the

Law of the Sea,
and Their Possible Resolution

Robin R. Churchill*
Introduction

Since 1990 the UN Security Council has adopted a number of resolutions calling on UN members to take various kinds of action that have the potential,
depending on how those resolutions are interpreted, to
tional rights

LOS

under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982

Convention). These resolutions, virtually
1

under Chapter VII of the

A

first

interfere with States' naviga-

category

is

all

of which were explicitly adopted

UN Charter, fall into a number of different categories.

resolutions providing for the enforcement of sanctions im-

posed under Article 41 of the Charter. They include Resolution 221 (1966) 2 (paragraph 5 of which

calls

on the

British

government "to prevent, by the use of force

if

necessary, the arrival at Beira of vessels reasonably believed to be carrying oil des-

tined for Southern Rhodesia"); Resolution 665 (1990) 3 (paragraph

on those

1

of which

calls

UN Member States deploying maritime forces in the Persian Gulf to "use

* Professor

of International Law, University of Dundee, United Kingdom.

UN Security Council Resolutions and the 1982 LOS Convention
such measures commensurate to the specific circumstances as

under the authority of the Security Council to

halt

may

be necessary

inward and outward mari-

all

time shipping, in order to inspect and verify their cargoes and destinations and to
ensure

strict

implementation" of the economic sanctions imposed on

lutions 787 (1992)
to the

Iraq); Reso-

(paragraph 12 of which contains similar provisions in respect

former Yugoslavia) and 820 (1993) 5 (paragraphs 28 and 29 of which "pro-

commercial maritime

hibit all
eral

4

Republic

from entering the

traffic

and authorize

of Yugoslavia

States

territorial sea"

to

"use

of the Fed-

such measures

commensurate to the specific circumstances as maybe necessary under the authority
of the Security Council to enforce" this prohibition); Resolutions 875 (1993) 6 and

917 (1994) 7 (of which paragraphs

1

and

to Haiti similar to those in Resolutions

10, respectively,

contain provisions in respect

665 and 787); and Resolution 1132 (1997) 8

(paragraph 8 of which contains similar provisions as regards Sierra Leone). 9

A second category of Security Council resolutions that have the potential to

in-

with States' navigational rights relates to the prevention of trafficking in

terfere

weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Such resolutions include Resolution 1540
(2004) 10 (paragraphs 3(c) and 10 of which

call

der controls to prevent

WMD and to take cooperative action to

illicit

trafficking in

on all States to develop

effective bor-

prevent such trafficking "consistent with international law") and Resolution 1718
(2006)

]

]

(in

paragraph

prevent trafficking in

8(f)

of which the Security Council "decides" that in order to

WMD with North Korea,

all

UN Member States should take,

"consistent with international law, cooperative action including through inspection of cargo to

and from" North Korea).

A third, and related, category concerns resolutions to prevent the transfer of cerExamples include Resolution 1695 (2006) 12

tain materials to particular States.

(paragraph 3 of which "requires

law to

.

.

.

all

Member States

.

.

.

consistent with international

prevent missile and missile-related items, materials, goods and technol-

ogy from being transferred" to North Korea) and Resolution 1696 (2006) 13 (paragraph 5 of which contains similar provisions in respect to Iran). Unlike the
resolutions in the

do not
their

first

explicitly refer to action

being taken against shipping

wording seems broad enough

of Resolution 1540

A

category, the resolutions in the second

its

to

encompass such

and third categories
at sea.

Nevertheless

action, although in the case

drafting history suggests otherwise. 14

fourth category of Security Council resolutions that have the potential to in-

terfere with 1982

terrorism.

LOS Convention

navigational rights relates to the prevention of

The main example of such

graph 2(b) of which "decides" that

resolutions

all

is

Resolution 1373 (2001

13
),

para-

States shall "take the necessary steps to pre-

vent the commission of terrorist acts." There seems to be no reason

could not include action against ships while
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at sea.

why such steps
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Last

and

certainly very far

from

well-known

least is the

resolutions authorizing States to "use

all

set

of Security Council

necessary means" (in other words, force)

to achieve a particular goal, including Resolutions 678 (1990) 16 (relating to Iraq),

794 (1992) 17 (Somalia), 940 (1994) 18 (Haiti) and 1264 (1999) 19 (East Timor).

There seems no reason why "necessary means" could not cover the use of force
rected at ships at sea in addition to the use of force

di-

on land and in the air, which are

both clearly covered.
This article will attempt to answer three questions arising from the above resolutions

and from possible future Security Council resolutions

with navigational rights enshrined in the 1982

1.

Is

there in fact, or

is it

likely that there

LOS

that could interfere

Convention:

could be, a conflict between such

UN Security Council resolutions, however interpreted, and provisions of
the 1982
2.

LOS Convention concerned with

navigational rights?

such conflicts resolved by either the

If so, are

UN

Charter or the

Convention?
3.

Would

dispute

a

settlement

body

under Part

acting

XV

of the

Convention have the competence to consider and rule on the above two
questions, as well as the

competence to interpret relevant

UN

Security

Council resolutions? Given the breadth and generality of some of the
provisions of the resolutions quoted above,

it

maybe essential for a

1982

LOS Convention dispute settlement body to interpret these provisions if
it is

going to be able to answer questions

Before answering these three questions,
ture of

UN

it is

1

and

2.

20

necessary to establish the legal na-

Security Council resolutions, in particular whether they are legally

binding. Article 25 of the

UN Charter provides that UN members "agree to accept

and carry out the decisions of the Security Council."
cisions" of the Security Council are binding

adopted by the Security Council that
raises the question as to

is

on

It is clear,

therefore, that "de-

UN members. A contrario, any act

not a "decision"

is

not legally binding. This

what acts adopted by the Security Council constitute "deci-

meaning of Article 25. The answer to this question depends primarily on the Charter provision under which an act is adopted and on its
wording. 21 Measures adopted under Chapter VI, other than decisions to carry out
sions" within the

an investigation under Article 34, are not "decisions" within the meaning of Article
25. 22

On the other hand, measures adopted by the Security Council under Chapter

VII are "decisions"
gally binding.

23

if it is clear

If the

to be done, that

is

from

their

wording that they are intended to be

language used by the Council

clearly intended to

be

legally
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is

to "decide" that

binding and

is

le-

something

is

thus a "decision"

UN Security Council Resolutions and the 1982 LOS Convention
within the meaning of Article 25.

mands"

that States

The same

do something.

On

true

is

if the

the other hand,

Council "requires" or "de-

if

the Council "encourages"

or "invites" States to do something, that appears intended not to be legally binding

but more in the nature of a recommendation and thus not a "decision" within the

meaning of
"calls

upon" or "requests"

wording whether

its

Some terminology

Article 25.

that "calls

However,

upon"

is

this

States to
is

was used

had imposed on

it

and was

tively,

If

the Security Council

not always clear simply from

least

one writer has suggested

of the nature of a recommendation. 24

is

in the operative parts

upon

called

Iraq, the Federal

clearly regarded

it is

At

a "decision" or not.

and 875, where the Security Council
that

ambiguous.

do something,

not a decision but

this expression

is

of Resolutions 665, 787

States to enforce the sanctions

Republic of Yugoslavia and Haiti, respec-

both by States and by writers as being intended to

be legally binding.

Question
a

It is

I.

Is It Likely

or Possible That There

or Could Be a Conflict between

UN Security Council Resolution and the 1982 LOS Convention?

clear at the outset that there

norms

Is

—where there

is

cannot be a conflict in the true sense

a conflict of

incompatibility between a legally binding act (such as a

and a non-legally binding

treaty provision)

—

act.

Thus, there

is

no

conflict

where

UN Security Council that not a
"decision" within the meaning of Article 25 of the UN Charter and the 1982 LOS

there

is

incompatibility between any act of the

is

Convention. Only where the Security Council resolution
be, at least potentially, a conflict with the
tial

is

a "decision"

can there

Convention. However, some such poten-

conflicts are avoided because of provisions either in the resolution or in the

Convention.
In the case of a Security Council resolution,

members

it

may

authorize or

call

on

UN

to take action "consistent with international law" (for example, Resolu-

tion 1540 (2004), 25 paragraphs 3

and 10 (on the prevention of trafficking

in

WMD),

26

and Resolution 1695 (2006), paragraph 3 (concerning the transfer of missiles and
related items to North Korea)). Clearly "international law" in this context includes
the 1982

LOS Convention.

This means that action taken by

UN

members under

must be consistent with the Convention and so no question of

these resolutions
conflict will arise.

Turning now

to the 1982

LOS Convention,

several of

that navigational rights are subject to other provisions

Article 92 provides that while ships

on the high

clusive jurisdiction of the flag State, this

is

provisions stipulate

of international law. Thus,

seas are in principle

under the ex-

subject to exceptions "expressly pro-

vided for in international treaties." Likewise, Article

146

its

1

10, in setting

out the limited

Robin R. Churchill

circumstances in which a warship

may stop and board

a foreign ship

on the high

with the words "except where acts of interference derive from

seas, prefaces this

powers conferred by treaty." "International

Thus interference by

92 and "treaties"

in

UN

Charter, as well as legally binding acts

as a Security

Council resolution under Chapter VII. 27

Article 110 appear to include the

adopted thereunder, such

treaties" in Article

a warship of

one State with a ship of another State on the

high seas (or in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) 28 ) pursuant to a Security

Council decision under Chapter VII of the UN Charter will not be in conflict with
the Convention. 29

In other situations of interference with navigational rights set forth in the 1982

LOS Convention,

the position

may not

be so

Suppose, for example, that a

clear.

warship of State A, purportedly acting pursuant to a Security Council resolution

adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter, intercepts a ship registered
that

is

exercising

its

right of innocent passage

through State C's

would violate both

the face of it, the warship's action

of State B's ship and State C's sovereignty over

its

this

On

its

Under Article 2(3)

territorial sea "subject to

convention and to other rules of international law." Under Article 19(1) a

ship's right of innocent passage

and other

is

to "take place in conformity with this convention

rules of international law." In each case, the "rules of international law"

presumably include the Charter and

legally

binding acts adopted thereunder. 30 In

the scenario just outlined, the warship of State A,
tion

territorial sea.

B

the right of innocent passage

territorial sea.

of the Convention, a State exercises sovereignty over

in State

under which

it is

acting,

would not appear

and the Security Council

to breach the

Convention

resolu-

as far as

territorial sea

is

concerned, since

such sovereignty is "subject to" other rules of international law.

31

The

the interference with State C's sovereignty over

may be

with State B's ship

right of innocent passage

nocent passage
law.

Both

its

is

different,

is

its

interference

however. Article 19(1) does not say that the

"subject to" the rules of international law, but that in-

to take place "in conformity with" other rules of international

wording and

way in which a ship

its

exercises

context suggest that this provision
its

right of innocent passage,

is

directed to the

and could not therefore

cover the acts of the warship of State A. Unless one can argue that passage in con-

formity with the rules of international law includes the notion that a ship in innocent passage

is

required to allow

other than the coastal State

Council resolution
conflict

—and

itself to

when

this

be interfered with by a warship of a State

that warship

may be

is

acting under a binding Security

argument

a sustainable

between the Convention and the resolution

would seem to be even more likelihood of a conflict

— there would be

in the scenario above.

a

There

in the case of interference

by

a

foreign warship with a ship exercising a right of transit passage through an international strait because the provisions of the

Convention dealing with
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transit passage

UN Security Council Resolutions and the 1982 LOS Convention
do not contain any reference to such passage having to be

in

conformity with inter-

national law.

In practice so far there has actually been relatively

tween Security Council resolutions and the 1982

little

potential for conflict be-

LOS Convention,

particular resolutions are not legally binding or because the

Convention

tion or the provision of the

at issue

Depending on how one

ject to the other.

between navigational

tions that

wording of the resolu-

avoids conflict by making one sub-

interprets the reference to the "rules of

LOS Convention, any

international law" in Article 19(1) of the 1982
flicts

either because

actual con-

Convention and Security Council resolu-

rights in the

may exist have largely been in the context of Security Council Resolution

820, which prohibited

commercial shipping from entering the

all

territorial sea

of

the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Are Conflicts between a Security Council Resolution and the 1982
LOS Convention Resolved by Either the UN Charter or the Convention?

Question

2.

Where a conflict between a Security Council resolution and the 1982 LOS Convention does arise,

how is it to be resolved? Does either the UN Charter or the Conven-

tion provide for

its

resolution? In the case of the Charter, Article 103 provides that

"in the event of a conflict

the present Charter
their obligations
vails

between the obligations of the members of the

and their obligations under any other international agreement,

under the present Charter

over any treaty that

is

in conflict with

came

fore or after the Charter

it,

shall prevail."

Thus, the Charter pre-

whether that treaty was concluded be-

into force. 32

The phrase

"obligations under the

present Charter" in Article 103 includes binding decisions adopted by

under the Charter, such
ter VII.

33

Thus, the

as decisions

binding

latter will prevail

will prevail

UN bodies

adopted by the Security Council under Chapover any conflicting treaty provisions. 34 The

consequence of Article 103, therefore,
legally

UN under

is

that Security Council resolutions that are

over any conflicting provisions of the 1982

LOS

Convention.

Although that appears to resolve the matter, for the sake of completeness one
should also consider what
the issue. Article 31

Convention and
Charter.

Two

1

(if anything)

the 1982

LOS Convention

has to say about

of the Convention addresses possible conflicts between the

a range of other treaties.

The

latter

do not

explicitly include the

provisions of Article 311 are potentially relevant to the relationship

of the Charter (and Security Council resolutions) to the Convention.

graph 2 provides that the Convention "shall not
States Parties

which

and which do not

arise

alter the rights

enjoyment by other

148

para-

and obligations of

from other agreements compatible with

affect the

First,

this

Convention

States Parties of their rights or the
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performance of their obligations under
as

such

rity

is

compatible with the 1982

Convention." Obviously, the Charter

LOS Convention, but it is

Council resolutions adopted under

actually do, affect the

this

enjoyment of

it

have the potential

States' rights

also clear that Secu-

to,

and on occasions

under the Convention. This

might suggest that in such a situation the Convention would prevail over the resolution in question. However, this
clearly

must have priority in

is

negated by Article 103 of the Charter, which

this situation since there

LOS Convention to try to

of the drafters of the 1982

was no intention on the part

override or negate Article 103

of the Charter. 35 In any case, any apparent conflict between Article 311(2) of the

Convention and Article 103 of the Charter

will in practice

on many occasions be

avoided as a result of paragraph 5 of Article 311, which provides that Article 311
(including paragraph 2) "does not affect international agreements expressly per-

mitted or preserved by other

articles

of this Convention."

that the various references to "treaties"

Convention

visions of the

articles in

was suggested

earlier

and "international law" found in such pro-

as Articles 2(3), 19(1),

92 and 110 include the Charter

and Security Council resolutions adopted thereunder.
that the Charter

It

It

can therefore be argued

and Security Council resolutions are permitted or preserved by the

question and therefore that they are not affected by the 1982

LOS

Convention.

Would a Dispute Settlement Body Acting under Part XV of the
1982 LOS Convention Have the Competence to Consider and Rule on
Questions 1 and 2 Above?

Question

3.

Rather than try to answer

what might happen

question in the abstract, an easier

this

in a hypothetical dispute.

Suppose

way is to consider

a warship of State A, pur-

portedly acting pursuant to a Security Council resolution, stops a merchant vessel
registered in State
torial sea

that

is

exercising a right of innocent passage through the terri-

of State C, boards

against State
that State

B

A

and searches

it

before a 1982

is

that

for

LOS Convention

A has breached its vessel's right

tion. State A's defense

it

its

WMD. State B then brings a case

body arguing
of innocent passage under the Convendispute settlement

actions are justified because the reference to "rules

of international law" in Article 19(1) of the Convention requires State B's vessel to

be subject to searches under the Security Council resolution (compare the discussion

on this point above); but if this is not the case, the actions of its warship pursu-

ant to the resolution

trump the

right of innocent passage of State B's ship

of Article 103 of the Charter. Suppose that the 1982
tlement body rejects State A's
or

is

this

beyond

its

first

jurisdiction?

argument. Can

At

first sight,
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it

LOS Convention

consider

its

by virtue

dispute set-

alternative defense

the latter might indeed appear to be

UN Security Council Resolutions and the 1982 LOS Convention
the case since Article 288(1) of the Convention limits the jurisdiction of a dispute

body

settlement

"any dispute concerning the interpretation and application of

to

A

Convention."

this

dispute settlement body under the Convention does not,

therefore, have jurisdiction to hear disputes involving other treaties, such as the

UN

Charter and acts done pursuant to

ments

to suggest that this

the 1982

is

However, there are

it.

number of argu-

a

an oversimplified approach to Article 288(1) and that

LOS Convention dispute settlement body could indeed consider State A's

alternative defense.

Even though the question before the dispute settlement body is whether the
of State A that have interfered with State B's rights under the 1 982
are overridden

one related
its

acts

LOS Convention

by the Security Council resolution, the dispute arguably remains

to the "application" of the Convention, namely, the alleged breach of

provisions on innocent passage. Article 293 of the Convention, dealing with ap-

body having jurisdiction under Ar-

plicable law, provides that a dispute settlement
ticle

288(1) "shall apply this Convention and other rules of international law not

incompatible with the Convention." This provision would allow the dispute

ment body

settle-

to consider the Security Council resolution since the phrase "other

rules of international

law not incompatible with the Convention" must include the

UN Charter and legally binding acts adopted thereunder. Support for this position
can be found in the judgment of the International Tribunal for the
in the

M/V Saiga

(No. 2) case, where,

on the

voked the customary international law
force that

force.

rules governing the degree of permissible

in illegally arresting the Saiga

The Tribunal

Sea

basis of Article 293, the Tribunal in-

may be used to arrest ships, to find that Guinea's breach of the

Convention
36

Law of the

also suggested that

1982

LOS

was compounded by its excessive use of

had the necessary conditions

for

its

appli-

cation been fulfilled (which they were not), Guinea might have been able to rely
the general international law of necessity to justify

A

LOS Convention,

may at any time make

forcement

The

a declaration excepting

tlement any dispute to which

it is

a party

a dispute settlement

latter

provides that a State

from compulsory dispute

concerning military

activities relating to its rights in the

EEZ or disputes

UN Security Council "is exercising the functions assigned to

the United Nations, unless the Security Council decides to
its

agenda or

calls

upon

Convention." Since

this

the parties to settle
is

body,

to consider State A's alternative de-

fense relates to Article 298(1) of the Convention.

the

breach of the Convention.

second argument to support the competence of

acting pursuant to the 1982

party

its

it

activities,

in respect to
it

it

set-

law en-

which

by the Charter of

remove the matter from

by the means provided for

in this

an optional exception to the jurisdiction of a 1982

Convention dispute settlement body,

on

37

LOS

presupposes that some disputes involving
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action taken

ment body.

by the Security Council may come before a Convention dispute

settle-

38

A third argument is a policy one.

If in the hypothetical dispute outlined above,

the dispute settlement body could not consider State A's

argument based on the

periority of the Security Council resolution over provisions of the 1982

su-

LOS Con-

would lead to the fragmentation of the dispute, with this point having
to be dealt with (if at all) under some other dispute settlement mechanism. It is de-

vention, this

on grounds of judicial economy not to fragment disputes if this can reasonably be avoided. Furthermore, if the argument about the superiority of a Security
sirable

Council resolution over a Convention provision were not dealt with by another
body, considerable injustice might be caused, because State

have violated the Convention without

in

Law of the

to

on the

Some support for the policy
remarks made by the President of the

superiority of the resolution being considered at

International Tribunal for the

found

perfectly plausible defense based

its

argument put forward here can be found

A might be

all.

Sea, Judge

Wolfrum,

in addresses to the

UN General Assembly and before an Informal Meeting of Legal Advisers in 2006. 39
Judge Wolfrum argued, based on the deliberations of the Tribunal judges

2006 sessions on administrative and legal matters not connected with
a maritime

at their

cases, that in

boundary delimitation case the Tribunal had competence not only

in

respect to such delimitation but also in respect to associated disputed issues of delimitation over land

and sovereignty over

tion with the maritime delimitation.

territory because of their close connec-

Although Judge Wolfrum did not use the

expression "fragmentation of the dispute" explicitly, this position taken by the Tri-

bunal judges seems to be based on a similar idea since President Wolfrum justified

on the basis of the "principle of effectiveness" which "enables the
adjudicative body in question to truly fulfill its function." 40
A final argument to support the competence of a 1982 LOS Convention dispute settlement body to consider State A's defense based on the superiority of the
it

in part

Security Council resolution
particular the
ited

by

is

the practice of

European Court of Human

Article 32 of the

some other

international courts, in

Rights. That court's jurisdiction

European Convention on

Human

Rights to

"all

is

lim-

matters

concerning the interpretation and application of the Convention." Nevertheless,
in a recent case the court held that

tions taken

it

was competent to consider whether certain

under the aegis of the NATO-led Kosovo Force and the

Kosovo amounted to breaches of the Convention.

41

ac-

UN Mission in

Although the Convention con-

no provisions on applicable law, the court held that it could not interpret and
apply the Convention "in a vacuum" but "must also take into account relevant

tains

rules of international

law when examining questions concerning
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its

jurisdiction."

UN Security Council Resolutions and the 1982 LOS Convention
Such

rules include the

der Chapter VII.
If the

meaning of the Security Council resolution

dispute

ical

ample,

UN Charter and Security Council resolutions adopted un-

42

clear, the

is

there

if

matter

doubt

is

as to

is

at issue in the

But

relatively straightforward.

whether the resolution

meaning of Article 25 of the Charter or whether
foreign vessels in innocent passage),

is

above hypothet-

if it is

not (for ex-

a decision within the

terms authorize the search of

its

would the 1982 LOS Convention dispute

tlement body have the competence to interpret the resolution? This

is

an impor-

tant question because Security Council resolutions are often quite vague as to

action

may be

resolutions.

logical if a

body does not have the competence to

1982

LOS Convention

Counwould be il-

interpret Security

However, there are arguments to the contrary.

First,

it

body could apply a Security
but was precluded from doing so if

dispute settlement

Council resolution whose meaning was clear
the

what

taken and where. Article 288(1) might suggest that a Convention

dispute settlement
cil

set-

meaning of the resolution was not wholly

certain. In

any

case, the distinction

between applying an apparently clear legal provision and interpreting a legal provision

is

not always clear-cut. Secondly, there

is

support for the proposition that the

Convention dispute settlement body would have the competence
resolution at issue

Law of the

to interpret the

from analogous practice by the International Tribunal

Sea. In the Saiga

for the

No. 2 case the Tribunal had to discover and articulate

the customary international law relating to the use of force in arresting ships, a not

markedly different exercise from interpreting a written

legal text. 43

Furthermore,

other international courts whose jurisdictions do not cover the interpretation and
application of the
selves

UN Charter and acts adopted thereunder have considered them-

competent to interpret Security Council resolutions that are relevant

termining the outcome of the case before them,

Human

Rights in Behrami

that a 1982

v.

LOS Convention

France and Saramati
dispute settlement

e.g.,

v.

to de-

the European Court of

France

et al.

body may not

44

Thirdly, to say

interpret a Security

Council resolution would again lead to fragmentation of the dispute.
If there are

should be

left

concerns that the interpretation of Security Council resolutions

to the International

Court of Justice,

the United Nations, these concerns

as the principal judicial

may be allayed by pointing out

organ of

that the conse-

quences of any interpretation of a Security Council resolution by a 1982

LOS Con-

Any interpretation would be binding
on other UN members or on the UN Security

vention dispute settlement body are limited.

only on the parties to the case, not

Council

itself.

However,
settlement

would

45

it

would be going too

body could

clearly exceed

rule
its

on the

far to say that a

legality

jurisdiction

1982

LOS Convention

of a Security Council resolution

under Article 288(1). That
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is

this

so
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supported by the practice of other courts. Thus, the European Union's Court of
First Instance

has taken the position, based on Articles 25, 48 and 103 of the

Charter, as well as European

Union

law, that

it

UN

cannot review the lawfulness of Se-

curity Council resolutions, although, curiously perhaps,

it

has

made

a limited ex-

ception in the case of possible incompatibility of Security Council resolutions with

The European Court of Human Rights has implied that it lacks the jurisdiction to question the validity of Security Council resolutions as to do so would
ius cogens.

46

Council under Chapter VII of the

interfere with the effective functioning of the

Charter.

47

Thus,

interference
gally

by

it

would seem

that

if

the dispute settlement

State A's warship with State B's vessel

fell

body found

UN

that the

within the terms of a

binding Security Council resolution adopted under Chapter VII,

it

le-

would

have to accept that the acts of the warship overrode State B's rights under the 1982

LOS
ties

Convention. To do otherwise would not only risk interfering with the

activi-

of the Security Council under Chapter VII but also challenge Article 103 of the

UN Charter. It needs to be asked, however, whether this would be the position if
the Convention dispute settlement

body were the

International Court of Justice.

Whether the Court may review the legality of Security Council resolutions is a
hotly debated topic, 48 but one on which it is not necessary to take a view here. Even
if the Court does have such competence in general terms, it would not appear to
have it where its jurisdiction in a particular case was derived from the 1982 LOS
Convention, as
tion

like

every other Convention dispute settlement body,

its

jurisdic-

confined by Article 288(1) of the Convention to disputes "concerning the

is

interpretation
Finally,

it

and application" of the Convention.

may be noted

that a 1982

LOS Convention

dispute settlement

body

would not be able to hear the dispute if either State A or State B had made a declaration under Article 298 excepting

concerning military

activities"

Council was exercising

its

from compulsory dispute settlement "disputes

and/or disputes in respect to which the Security

functions under the

covered the dispute between States
this are slight, as

larations.

than

it

A and B.

UN Charter, and such a declaration

However,

statistically the

only 19 of the 155 parties to the Convention have

Furthermore, the exception in Article 298( l)(c)

at first sight appears.

Excepted under

Security Council of the United Nations

is

it

chances of

made such dec-

maybe less far-reaching

are "disputes in respect of which the

exercising the functions assigned to

it

by

the Charter of the United Nations" (emphasis added). In the scenario being dis-

cussed here, the exception will not apply unless there
States

is

actually a dispute

between

A and B with which the Security Council is dealing. If State A is merely pur-

portedly acting under a Security Council resolution (as
here), the exception will not apply

is

posited in the scenario

(though of course the military

tion may).
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excep-
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Conclusions

The aim of this

article

was

to consider three questions.

As

far as the first

question

concerned, whether there are in fact or are likely to be conflicts between
rity

Council resolutions and the 1982

LOS Convention

provisions dealing with navigational rights), the answer
flict is

is

UN Secu-

(in particular, the latter's
is

that in

most

cases a con-

or would be avoided either because of the language of the Security Council

resolution

(if it states

that action to be taken

ternational law) or because the situation

is

under

it

should be consistent with in-

one where the Convention provides

for

the possibility of interference with shipping pursuant to Security Council resolu-

The latter is particularly the case in respect to interferences with foreign merchant shipping by warships on the high seas or in the EEZ. The most likely situation
where a conflict would arise would be where there was interference with a ship
tions.

while in the territorial sea by a State, other than the flag or coastal State, purportedly acting under a Security Council resolution.

(turning to the second question),
the conflict
ity

it

follows

would be resolved by the

a conflict did arise

from Article 103 of the UN Charter that

UN Security Council resolution taking prior-

over the Convention. The third question was whether a 1982

dispute settlement

body would have

was argued

LOS Convention

the competence to decide a dispute involving

an alleged conflict between the Convention and a
It

Where such

UN Security Council resolution.

that notwithstanding Article 288(1) of the Convention,

which

limits

body to disputes "concerning
the interpretation and application" of the Convention, such a body would have the
competence to rule on an alleged conflict between the Convention and a UN Security Council resolution. This follows from the provisions of the Convention on applicable law, from the fact that exceptions to the jurisdiction of Convention dispute

the jurisdiction of a Convention dispute settlement

settlement bodies for disputes involving military matters or the Security Council
are optional,
sons, a 1982

and

in order to avoid fragmentation of the dispute.

LOS Convention

dispute settlement

interpret a Security Council resolution but

port for the position put forward here

is

it

body would

For similar rea-

also be

could not question

its

competent to
validity.

Sup-

provided by the practice of other interna-

tional courts.
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39. Riidiger Wolfrum, President, International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Statement to
the General Assembly of the United Nations paras. 5-8 (Dec. 8, 2006), http://www.hios .org/
start2_en.html (then follow "News" hyperlink; then follow "Statements of the President"
hyperlink). See also Riidiger Wolfrum, Statement to the Informal Meeting of Legal Advisers of
Ministries of Foreign Affairs 3-7 (Oct. 23, 2006), available at id.
this

298(

40.

Statement by President Wolfrum to the General Assembly, supra note 39, para.

7.

Decision on admissibilty of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of
luman Rights in Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France et al. para. 122 (May 31,
2007), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp 197/viewhbkm.asp?action=open&table=
l-69A27I-i)8FB86142BF01C1166DEA398649&key=62605&sessionId=10475686&skin =
41.

I

hudoc-en&attachment=true.
42.

Id.

43.

Supra note 36, para. 156.
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Supra note 41, paras. 123-43. However, the Court did say that it was "not its role to seek
to define authoritatively the meaning of provisions of the UN Charter and other international instruments" (para. 122, emphasis added).
44.

LOS

1, art. 296(2). Concerns should also be allayed by
European Court of Human Rights outlined in the previous note, where the
Court stressed that it was not giving an authoritative interpretation.
46. See Case no. T-306/1, Yusuf v. Council and Commission, [2005] II-E.C.R. 3533, paras.

45.

See 1982

Convention, supra note

the approach of the

272-77. The Court has maintained this position in later cases:

see, e.g.,

Case T-3 15/01, Kadi

Council, [2005] II-E.C.R. 33649, paras. 217-31 and Case T-253/02, Ayadi

v.

Council, [2006]

v.
II-

E.C.R. 2139, para. 116. Kadi has been appealed from the Court of First Instance to the Court of

Case C-402/05). As of September 20, 2007 the Court had not given its judgment. In
none of the cases did the Court of First Instance find any breach of the rules of ius cogens.
47. Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France et al., supra note 41, para. 149.
48. See, e.g., Dapo Akande, The International Court of Justice and the Security Council: Is
Justice (as

Room for Judicial Control of Decisions of the Political Organs of the United Nations?, 46 INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW QUARTERLY 309 (1997); Vera Gowlland-Debbas, The
There

and the Security Council in the Light of the
INTERNATIONAL
LAW 643 (1994); Geoffrey R. WatLockerbie Case, 88 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
son, Constitutionalism, Judicial Review and the World Court, 34 HARVARD INTERNATIONAL LAW
JOURNAL 1 (1993).
Relationship between the International Court ofJustice
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Ashley S. Deeks*
I.

Professor

Introduction

by Professor Adam Roberts

piece

petence in the 'War on Terror.'" As the
1

US

actions over the past six years,

launch pad for
look

tive

at

US

me

to address a

entitled "Detainees, Torture,

and Incom-

Garraway and the organizers of

its

arguments. In

title

and uses

this

panel asked

indicates, the piece

is

highly critical of

a review of three different

brief, Professor

detention and interrogation policies since September 11, 2001, ar-

recognizes that

fighting

as a

Roberts takes a largely retrospec-

guing that a number of US decisions along the way led to the abuses

He

books

it is

at

Abu Ghraib.

complicated to apply the law of war to certain individuals

US forces in different conflicts, but he concludes that the President's deci-

them "humanely" in 2002 did not provide a clear legal framework and
charges the Bush Administration with both bad intentions and incompetence.
Professor Roberts discusses the legal and policy confusion that currently exists in
Afghanistan among the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the
sion to treat

government of Afghanistan

related to detainee treatment,

and proposes

that

NATO establish rules for treatment of detainees who are not entitled to prisoner of
war

US

*

status. Finally,

he

reflects the

often-heard concern about a perceived threat to

separation of powers principles and concludes that the resort by the United

Attorney- Adviser,

US Department

of State, Office of the Legal Adviser. The views expressed

herein are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of either the United
States

government or the Department of State.
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"war on terror" paradigm leaves quite a

States to a

bit to

be desired, even in the

wake of all of the changes the US government has put in place since September 1 1
By way of response, I will spend my time discussing three issues: where US law
and policy currently stand

in the three conflicts the

United States

is

fighting, the

how we might address
some of the ongoing legal and operational confusion in Afghanistan among NATO
allies. In focusing on the current state of US law and policy,
do not mean to sugprocesses by which

we arrived at our

current positions, and

I

about the applicability of the Geneva Con-

gest that several still-unresolved debates

ventions

—and of

the

are irrelevant. But to

war paradigm to our struggle with al Qaeda more generally

move this

multiyear dialogue forward,

to use the current state of play as the

the decisions that the United States

I

think

it is

jumping-off point, whatever one

important

may think of

made in the immediate aftermath of September

11,2001.
Before

dive in,

I

I

would

scribed in the books that

something about the abuses of detainees de-

like to say

Adam Roberts has reviewed. Like many in the US govern-

ment, including the military

itself, I will

not and cannot defend that abuse. Events

Abu Ghraib have been devastating to the reputation of the United States, espe-

like

number of arguments about the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and with al Qaeda with which I
do not agree, and which I look forward to addressing. But I wanted to make clear
cially in

European and Arab

up front

that detainee abuse warrants

II.

The

State

Where

US

no

Roberts raises a

defense.

We Are Now—A Snapshot

Department's Legal Adviser, John Bellinger, spent a week

serving as a guest blogger

and

States. Professor

politics.

conflict

Juris, a

January

website devoted to international law

He posted pieces on Common Article 3, unlawful belligerency and the
with al Qaeda, among other topics. 2 Professor Garraway served as a

guest respondent
a foreigner

on Opinio

in

who

and opened his post with an old

asks an Irishman for directions

Irish saying.

from

The saying

involves

his current location to the

The Irishman tells him, "Well, I wouldn't start from here!" 3 But
"here" is precisely where I would like to start. As I noted, Professor Roberts concludes his review with an assertion that the United States continues to rely on
flawed structures and rules to deal with its conflict with al Qaeda, and bemoans
nearest town.

where the United

States has

take a snapshot of where

ments

we

ended up

are right

in 2007.

To

evaluate this conclusion,

now, putting aside the various

legal

let's

develop-

that have gotten us to this point.

Because different

and with

al

Qaeda,

I

legal

paradigms apply to

will treat

US conflicts

each of them separately.
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A. Afghanistan

ISAF

is

operating in Afghanistan under (most recently)

member States participating

lution 1707, a Chapter VII resolution that authorizes

ISAF

in

to "take

all

necessary measures to

ISAF and

takes part in

Freedom (OEF), the

UN Security Council Reso-

mandate." 4 The United States

fulfil its

also continues to lead a coalition called

force that intervened in Afghanistan in

Operation Enduring

November 2001

the United States decided to respond in self-defense following the September

The United

tacks.

ghanistan

States has not formally revisited

an international armed

is

international

armed

conflict

is

based on the

coalition forces that are part of

that

conflict.

ISAF and

its

at-

1 1

view that the conflict in Af-

The argument

fact that the

OEF

after

that

it

remains an

US government and

the

continue to fight the same entities

OEF began to fight in 2001, at which time it clearly was an international armed

conflict

between the United States and the Taliban.

In this ongoing conflict, the United States applies the rules

as well as

acknowledged

targeting appro-

—

armed conflict most notably, distinction and proportionlimitations on the use of certain weapons. Professor Roberts

priate to international
ality,

on

US

targeting rules in a talk he gave at the Brookings Institution in

2002, where he stated, "In the conduct of the air war [in Afghanistan] as in Iraq in
,

'91

and as

also in Serbia in '99, the

United States

clearly accepted the relevance

and

indeed value of the rules restricting targeting to militarily significant targets and

US Department of Deon the Law of War Program,

think that needs to be frankly and honestly recognized."
fense
is

(DoD)

policy, as reflected in the

DoD directive

I

5

that

the DoD Components comply with the law of war during all armed
however such conflicts are characterized, and in all other military operations,
and that the law of war obligations of the United States are observed and enforced by
the DoD Components and DoD contractors assigned to or accompanying deployed

members of
conflicts,

Armed

Forces. 6

The Directive

defines "the law of war" as encompassing "all international law for

the conduct of hostilities binding

on the United

States or

its

individual citizens, in-

cluding treaties and international agreements to which the United States

and applicable customary international law." This
itary that, as a general matter, applying the rules
all

conflicts

however characterized

(1)

is

reflects a decision

is

a party,

by the US mil-

of international armed conflict to

the right thing to

do

as a

moral and hu-

manitarian matter and (2) gives the military a single standard to which to train.
The US processing and treatment of detainees in Afghanistan is governed by
several laws

and

policies.

To ensure

that

we
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are detaining only those people

who
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pose a security threat, we have established status review processes
in Iraq

and

determine

at

if

Guantanamo). The

review takes place

first

the person being detained

is

at the

(just as

we have

time of capture to

an enemy combatant. The second review

occurs usually within seventy-five days and in no event

more than

hundred days

a

DoD custody. The review is based on all reasonably
available and relevant information. A detainee's status determination maybe subof the individual's coming into

The combatant
commander may interview witnesses and/or convene a panel of commissioned officers to make a recommendation to him. That commander must review the detainee's status on an annual basis, although he has tended to do so every six
months. The Review Board also nominates certain Afghan detainees for entry into
Afghanistan's reconciliation program. The government of Afghanistan then vets

ject to further

review

if

additional information

the nominees and selects

We

also

some

comes

to return to their village elders to be reintegrated. 7

have established clear treatment

rules. First, the

Act of 2005 (DTA) makes clear that no detainee in
less

of where he

is

held or by which

US

US

further states that

all

custody or control, regard-

may be subjected to cruel, inhuman
understood in the US reservations to

the Convention Against Torture (CAT). 9 Second, the

sued in September 2006 provides that

Detainee Treatment

entity,

or degrading treatment, 8 as those terms are

in accordance with U.S. law, the

to light.

"all

DoD

detainee directive

humanely and
policy." 10 The latter

detainees shall be treated

law of war, and applicable U.S.

persons subject to the Directive shall apply at a

standards articulated in

is-

Common Article 3 of the

minimum the

1949 Geneva Conventions with-

out regard to a detainee's legal status. The Directive also requires that detainees not

be subjected to public curiosity,
sory deprivation.

reprisals,

medical or scientific experiments, or sen-

And it states that all persons in DoD control will be provided with

prisoner of war protections until a competent authority determines

some other le-

Some have expressed concern that the rules in the Detainee Directive are
protections, not legal protections. But soldiers who mistreat detainees can

gal status.

policy

be prosecuted under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).
Finally, interrogations

erned by the

which

is

Army

publicly

DoD custody, wherever held, are govHuman Intelligence Collector Operations,

of individuals in

Manual on
available, and which
Field

expressly prohibits a

tion techniques, including using military

number of interroga-

working dogs, inducing hypothermia or

heat injury, applying physical pain, and placing hoods or sacks over the eyes of
detainees. 11

Does

all

this

mean

that the conflict in Afghanistan

policy or tactical questions?
tions contribute to ISAF,

It

does not. These are the

no longer poses hard

US rules, but thirty-seven na-

and each contingent operates within

framework. The contributing

member States have
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legal,

a different legal

different views about

what type
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will address lingering
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some question whether an armed conflict exists at

complications about the situation in Afghanistan later

in this article.

B. Iraq

The activities of the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) currently are governed by
a

UN Security Council resolution issued pursuant to Chapter VII. Under Resolu-

which the Security Council adopted unanimously on June 8, 2004, the
mandate of MNF-I is "to take all necessary measures to contribute to the maintenance of security and stability in Iraq in accordance with the letters [from Secretary
tion 1546,

of State Powell and then-Iraqi Prime Minister Ayad Allawi] annexed to this resolution." 12

The annexed letters describe a broad range of tasks that MNF-I may under-

take to counter "ongoing security threats," including "internment where this

is

13

The letter from Secretary Powell
states that the "forces that make up the MNF are and will remain committed at all
times to act consistently with their obligations under the law of armed conflict, including the Geneva Conventions." 14
necessary for imperative reasons of security."

Security Council Resolution 1546 required review of the

MNF-I mandate

within twelve months. Subsequent resolutions have extended this authority tem-

—most recently Resolution 1723, which extends the Resolution 1546 man-

porally

December 2007. Resolution 1723 affirms the importance for all forces
promoting security and stability in Iraq to act in accordance with the law of armed
conflict, and the annexed letter from Secretary Rice states that the forces that make
up MNF-I remain committed to acting consistently with their obligations and
rights under international law, including the law of armed conflict. 15
The detention standard contained in Resolution 1546 ("imperative reasons of
security") is drawn directly from Article 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, 16
and was included in the annexed letters to indicate that the same basis for
detentions that coalition forces applied before June 28, 2004 would continue to apdate until

ply after governing authority was transferred to the sovereign government of Iraq.

Domestic

Iraqi

law

(in the

form of CPA Memorandum No.

3 17 ) provides detailed

requirements for the conditions and procedures for security internment, including
review of detention within seven days, as well as further periodic reviews. These periodic reviews occur in the

form of the Combined Review and Release Board

(CRRB), a majority-Iraqi board that

Memorandum No.
ternment

assesses the threat

posed by each detainee. 18

3 states that the operation, condition

facility established

Geneva Convention, Part

III,

by MNF-I
Section IV.

internees with food, water, clothing

shall
19

in-

be in accordance with the Fourth

(This includes requirements to provide

and medical
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and standards of any

attention,

and

give them- the
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ability to

hold religious services, engage in physical exercise, and send and receive

Memorandum

letters.)

No.

3 requires

MNF-I

to release individuals

internment or transfer them to the Iraqi criminal justice system no
teen

months from the date of detention, unless
also provides for

later
is

than eigh-

approved by

The CPA
guaranteed International Committee of the Red

the Joint Detention Committee, which

Memorandum

further detention

from security

staffed

is

by senior

20

officials.

Cross (ICRC) access to internees. 21

To break my own

rule

and dive backward into

history,

I

want

to correct

misimpressions about whether the United States as a government ever asserted
that the

Geneva Conventions did not apply

Iraq in 2003

to

its

conflict with the

government of

and the subsequent occupation of Iraq. Professor Roberts

refers in his

review of Mark Danner's book Torture and Truth to an excerpt of an e-mail written
in

mid-August 2003 from

a captain in military intelligence in Iraq. 22

That e-mail

suggests that the captain believed that he could apply different rules of engage-

ment and interrogation techniques to "unlawful enemy combatants" detained in
Iraq. Danner also cites an effort by Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, thenCommander MNF-I, to change the legal status of some of those detained to "unlaw23
ful enemy combatants";
however, General Sanchez did not have the authority to
make that determination. Indeed, this was not and did not become US policy. In
mid-2004, then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated, "Iraq's a nation.
The United States is a nation. The Geneva Conventions applied. They have applied
every single day from the outset." 24

commentary The Torture Memos, 25 Josh Dratel fails to distinguish between the different rules that apply to Afghanistan, Guantanamo and Iraq;
he is not correct when he asserts that the United States desired to abrogate the
Similarly, in his

Geneva Conventions with respect
of armed
flict

up

to the treatment of persons seized in the context

The Geneva Conventions applied directly to that conend of occupation on June 28, 2004, and continued to apply as the

hostilities in Iraq.

to the

Conventions require

—

—

to

any individual

who remained

detained as a prisoner of

war or protected person. The Security Council resolutions, the annexed
ferring to

now

MNF-I compliance

with the laws of war and

provide the governing rules for MNF-I, and

Treatment Act
tingent of

26

and the War Crimes Act

27

US

letters re-

CPA Memorandum

No.

3

laws such as the Detainee

provide additional rules for the

US con-

MNF-I.

C. Conflict with al

The United

States

Qaeda

is

aware that many States and scholars continue to be skeptical

that a State can be in an
that State's territory.

armed

conflict with a non-State actor primarily outside

However, the United

States, for reasons the State
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some detail, continues to believe that such a
conflict can and does exist. The US Supreme Court has supported that view, most recently in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld. 28 In the wake of that opinion, the protections of Common Article 3 apply to all members of al Qaeda detained in that conflict. Those al
Qaeda members we detain in Afghanistan and Iraq are subject to the detention and
review provisions I have already described. The treatment of al Qaeda members detained at Guantanamo is governed by the DTA and the Army intelligence collecLegal Adviser has set forth publicly in

tion manual. 29 (All of the detainees there are in

Supreme Court has held

DoD custody.) Further, because the

that our conflict with al

Qaeda

is

a non-international

30

armed conflict, the Military Commissions Act (MCA) provisions that criminalize
violations of most provisions of Common Article 3, including torture, cruel treatment, intentionally causing serious bodily injury, rape and mutilation, would apply to those who mistreat al Qaeda detainees. The ICRC has access to everyone held
at Guantanamo.
The detention review process for individuals held at Guantanamo, many of
whom are associated with al Qaeda, is somewhat different from review processes in
Iraq and Afghanistan. I assume that the readers are familiar with the Combatant
Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs), by which the United States determines whether
these individuals are in fact enemy combatants. As recently updated in the MCA,
detainees

may appeal their CSRT determination to a federal civilian court, the DC

Circuit Court of Appeals. That Court, in the Bismullah

v.

Gates and Parhat v. Gates

cases, currently is considering the evidentiary standards

by which

it

will

review

CSRT decisions. There is another process by which the United States reviews ongoing detention in Guantanamo: when the CSRT upholds a detainee's status as an
31

enemy combatant and the United

States does not intend to prosecute the detainee

in a military commission, the detainee receives
tive

an annual review by an Administra-

Review Board (ARB), which assesses whether he continues

to pose a serious se-

Hundreds of individuals have been released from
Guantanamo since it opened, under the CSRT and ARB processes.
These processes are more detailed and more regularized than the Article 5 tribunals that the Third Geneva Convention delineates for cases of doubt regarding
on the one
prisoner-of-war status. This is so because we are trying to balance
hand the fact that the law of war recognizes that a State can detain enemy comon the other hand
batants fighting against it until the end of the conflict with
an acknowledgment that the end of this conflict may be a long way off. The United
States is aware of concerns about indefinite detention that flow from the fact that
curity threat to the United States.

—

—

this conflict is

—

of indefinite length and has taken these steps so that we are not hold-

ing anyone longer than necessary.
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D. Hard Questions
This
it

is

where the law,

rules

for others to discuss

in

any case

some

trial

it

and procedures have ended up

whether or

in

mid-2007.

how Abu Ghraib might have been

should be clear that these issues are hard, and getting

and

error.

it

will leave

1

avoided. But

right has taken

We are not the first government to have grappled with diffi-

cult questions at the

beginning of a period of violence and terrorist attacks, and we

not be the

Professor Roberts has described elsewhere the fact that the

will

last.

United Kingdom

initially

ern Ireland, which "led

ignored international standards of treatment in North-

them

in the initial, militarized

into terrible trouble." 32 In fact, the United

Kingdom

phase of the "Troubles" occasionally used "war

talk," al-

though, unlike the United States, the government generally did not characterize
the fighting as an

armed

conflict in the legal sense. 33

to detention without charge

of

Human

Rights later

The

UK government resorted

and interrogation techniques that the European Court

deemed

to violate the

Rights (ECHR). Professor Roberts makes a

fair

European Convention on

Human

point about the lessons of history in

book review: any State fighting a non-State actor, including the United States,
would be well served to pay attention to the examples of the United Kingdom in
Ireland and the French in Algeria. I was not working on these issues at the time, but
his

I

expect that there was a strong belief that an attack by nineteen terrorists that killed

over three thousand people in one day lacked historical precedent in key ways.

Even Professor Roberts recognizes that

it

was not obvious how

to apply existing

laws and rules to this type of non-State actor.
If

application of law of

war

rules to the conflict with al

Qaeda were

easy,

we

—

would not see so many people in foreign governments, non-governmental organizations and the academy
hold so many different views on how to treat this conflict. Some say it is not an armed conflict, so the United States should have used law

—

enforcement measures to quash
there

is

al

Qaeda

Others say that

an armed conflict in Afghanistan, but that a State cannot be in an armed

conflict with a non-State actor outside
conflict with the State in

knowledge that
actor

after the 9/11 attacks.

when

a State

hostilities

its

territory without also being in

which the non-State actor

is

an armed

operating. Yet others ac-

can be in an extraterritorial armed conflict with a non-State

between those groups meet the threshold

level

of violence

The US government has explained elsewhere
why exclusive reliance on a law enforcement paradigm was not possible, and described how the UN Security Council and NATO have recognized that non-State
actors can engage in armed attacks against States at a level to trigger that State's
right of self-defense. But we recognize that others do not agree.
Even the more traditional conflicts are complicated. The Geneva Conventions
that constitutes

an armed

conflict.

provide rules for a three-stage process: armed conflict between States, occupation
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by one State of the other State and peace. But what happens when,

as in Iraq,

armed

What is the status of the many different
conflicts in Iraq? Or in Afghanistan, where a new government took power less than
conflict continues after

occupation ends?

a year after the fighting began, but the conflict between the United States

and the

Taliban continues? If the Afghan conflict has switched from international to noninternational,

the conflict?

what does that mean

for those detained in the international phase of

Does it matter for allies in a coalition with a host government how that

host characterizes the violence?

Can Chapter VII

questions moot? These are not easy questions, and
allies

to find

we continue

to

good answers.
III.

With regard

some of these
work with our

resolutions render

to the

How We Got Here— The US System

United States and the three armed

conflicts

I

have discussed,

many look at the glass as still half-empty. This seems to be due at least in part to the
suspicion about the United States that the last five years has engendered among legal scholars, European allies and human rights advocates. These views are colored
by abuses in Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib, by objections to the CIA interrogation
program and undisclosed detention
of renditions. But one
glass half- full,

move

to

rules. In

bit

may

also

where the United

to a clear, robust

facilities overseas,

look

and concern about the use

at the current state

States has built

framework

of law and practice as a

on the decisions made

for treatment,

in

2001-02

where everyone knows the

addition to assessing the substance of the current rules,

I

also

want to talk a

about the process by which we arrived "here," because that process

is

another

reason to be optimistic about the United States.

We arrived "here"

in

2007

as the result of vigorous debate

and

activity within

each of our three branches of government. The executive branch established a

number of detainee

Qaeda and the Taliban
in Afghanistan and set up military commissions to try those suspected of war
crimes and related offenses. In 2001, Congress passed the Authorization to Use
Military Force, 34 and later enacted the Detainee Treatment Act and the Military
Commissions Act. The federal courts have opined on several of these executive decisions about detainee policies and military commissions, and on the MCA. This,
in

policies related to the conflict with al

my view, speaks to the strength of the US constitutional system. Professor Rob-

erts expresses a sense that

our bedrock separation of powers principles are threat-

ened and suggests that the executive branch has dominated the decision making.

comments by Professor
Supreme Court on behalf of the

Consider, however, recent

Neil Katyal,

Hamdan case in the
that the Hamdan decision

detainee.

—which

who

argued the

He states,

"I believe

invalidated the President's system of military
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commissions

—

represents a historic victory for our constitutional process, and, in

United States Congress and federal judiciary

particular, the role of the
partite system of

government."

[A]s a student of history,
conflict to

I

35

know

He
it's

armed

tri-

also stated:

hard for the Supreme Court

in a

time of armed

And here the Administration has managed to

rebuke the President

a case during

our

in

conflict] several times ....

[lose

[The Department of Justice] said

[detainees] won't have habeas corpus rights. Well, the

Supreme Court

said

no

.

.

in the

Rasul case. The Administration said that U.S. citizens can be held indefinitely

incommunicado. The Supreme Court said no in Hamdi. The Administration said, you
can have military commission [sic] and try these people. The Supreme Court said no in

Hamdan? 6
The justices themselves seem confident that our separation of powers is healthy.
In Justice Breyer's concurring opinion in

clusion "ultimately rests
tive a 'blank check.'" 37

in those

upon

Hamdan, he writes

a single ground:

that the Court's con-

Congress has not issued the Execu-

He further describes the majority opinion

as

keeping "faith

democratic means" necessarily implicit in the Constitution's

structure.

These statements

he

"For reasons of inescapable

stated,

recall Justice Souter's

asked to counter a serious threat

is

human

concurrence in Hamdi, in which

nature, the branch of

not the branch on which to

between the

liance in striking the balance

will to

tripartite

win and the

rest the

government
Nation's re-

cost in liberty

on the

," 38

way to victory
Many, including Professor Roberts, might have wished for us to get to
.

.

.

in the first instance

—

to get

right

it

immediately

after

September 2001, with cool

heads and a clear understanding of the lessons of history.

faster

It

would have saved years

permitted the United States to try detainees accused of war crimes

in litigation,

much

this place

and avoided

significant tension with

develop on September 12

all

European

of the processes and laws

allies

we have

—but we did not
now.

in place

It is

important to recognize, however, that the Supreme Court has confirmed several of
the Administration's basic legal positions with respect to

has confirmed that the United States

is

More

fine-tuning

is

pending or on appeal
the

DC

termination.

A

Common

Qaeda.

It
It

Article 3 of the

to that conflict.

likely to follow

because there are several important cases

our courts.

already mentioned the Parhat case, where

in

Circuit will decide whether

tained in a detainee's

detention policies.

in a state of armed conflict with al

has confirmed that the law of war, and in particular

Geneva Conventions, applies

its

CSRT

I

it

can look to documents beyond those con-

record to determine whether to uphold the

CSRT de-

panel of the Fourth Circuit recently decided the Al Marri case. 39 In

2003, the United States detained

al

Marri as an enemy combatant;
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5.

Marri's detention he resided in the United States. (He has been held in a brig in

South Carolina since that time.) The United States agreed that the detainee had
constitutional rights, including a right to habeas corpus, but argued that the Military

Commissions Act applied

to him,

and

that Congress in the

MCA had created

by which al Marri could contest his detention.
The Fourth Circuit panel held that the Military Commissions Act did not apply to
al Marri; that the Court therefore had jurisdiction over his habeas corpus claim;
an adequate and

that al Marri

effective substitute

had constitutional due process

dent's determination in 2003 that al Marri

rights;

and

that, despite the Presi-

was an enemy combatant

closely asso-

ciated with al Qaeda, the United States could not detain al Marri as an

combatant because

it

had not properly determined

that he

member of an armed force at war with the United States,
a battlefield
(3)

on which an armed

in hostilities against the

beas

relief,

criminal offenses. 41

The United

citizen or

was seized on or near

conflict there, or (4) directly participated
40

The Court granted al Marri haUS government was free to prosecute him for

United States or its

while noting that the

was a

United States was taking place,

conflict with the

was in Afghanistan during the armed

(2)

( 1 )

enemy

allies.

States has appealed this decision, seeking rehear-

ing en banc.

Another court will consider whether Majid Khan, one of the fourteen detainees
brought to Guantanamo Bay in September 2006 and someone to

government previously had granted asylum, has
corpus.

And

peals of final

as military

commission decisions

to the

the

US

a constitutional right to habeas

commissions get under way, we should expect

the standards of review contained in the
clear,

whom

to see ap-

DC Circuit, which will need to interpret

DTA,

as

amended by the MCA. And

it is

even now, that the military judges are acting independently. In the Khadr and

Hamdan

cases, the

two military judges dismissed the prosecution

cases without

The basis for their decisions was that the CSRTs had not determined that
the accused were "unlawful" enemy combatants (a prerequisite status for trial by
military commission), but rather that they simply were enemy combatants. It
prejudice.

seems

we have not seen the last of any of the three branches as we at-

safe to say that

tempt to

a

strik[e] the

balance between the will to win and the cost in liberty on the

way to victory."
IV. Lingering Confusion

Just because the

does not

mean

—Afghanistan

US government has a clear set of rules for detention in Afghanistan

that

we

are

working seamlessly with

Professor Roberts flags the "precious
sion" in Afghanistan. This

is

little

allies that

have different

rules.

uniformity" and "ongoing policy confu-

particularly true
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issues:

some

States are
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reluctant to detain combatants at

all,

other States hand detainees over quickly to

the government of Afghanistan and yet other States choose not to transfer

Why

their detainees to the Afghans.

greater

is

this the case,

all

of

and can we move toward

harmony?

A. Different Views of the Conflict

One reason that contributing States approach detainee treatment differently in Afghanistan

is

that they take different views of the legal nature of the situation there.

There are four possible positions: that
a non-international
that

ISAF

on the

is

level

armed

engaged
of

conflict; that

in security or

hostilities,

it is

at

it is

an international armed

it is

conflict; that

not an armed conflict

peacekeeping operations; and

at all,

that,

it is

and thus

depending

times an armed conflict and at times a security

operation.

As
flows

I

mentioned

earlier,

from the idea

November 2001

the argument that

that the conflict

it is

an international armed

very similar to the conflict that began in

is

Operation Enduring Freedom and that the

in

conflict

initial conflict

Under

has

continued without interruption between the same

parties.

right to self-defense continues, the consent of the

government of Afghanistan

troop presence
ternational

the

is

to

important but not necessary, and individuals detained in the in-

armed

Hamdan

this theory, the

conflict

decision,

may

continue to be detained. 42

which deemed

non-international, affects the

at least the al

US view of the

It is

Qaeda

not clear whether

part of the conflict

status of the conflict in Afghanistan.

armed conflict flows from a belief
that, as of June 2002, when the Karzai government took power, the conflict in Afghanistan evolved away from a conflict between two States (the classical conflict
identified in Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions) and became a conflict
between the new Afghan government and countries supporting it on the one hand,
and Taliban and al Qaeda forces on the other. Thus, the conflict resembles an internationalized non-international armed conflict of the type that Hans-Peter Gasser
described in 1983. 43 The ICRC takes this view, and asserts that Common Article 3,
customary international law applicable in non-international armed conflicts and
Afghan human rights laws apply to the conflict. 44 Canada presumably also takes
The argument

this view:

that

although

it is

it is

a non-international

treating

its

Third Geneva Convention,

it

However, the

relying

fact that

ance suggests that
Third, the
all.

it

it is

appears to be doing so as a matter of policy, not law.

on

a core law of

war

treaty for detention guid-

views the situation as an armed conflict. 45

German government may

German documents

operations

detainees in Afghanistan consistent with the

describing

its

not believe that

it is

an armed conflict

at

role in Afghanistan refer only to stability

— the documents make no reference
172

to

armed

conflict. 46

This seems

Ashley

surprising, given the level of violence,
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numbers of troops

and widespread

killed

use of military responses around the country to suppress the Taliban. Finally, at
least

one

State

seems to take the view that the situation fluctuates between being

an armed conflict and

falling

below the threshold of conflict that

triggers applica-

tion of the law of war.

What is the view of the Afghan government on this question?
the government has formally stated

its

view that

this is or is

not clear that

It is

not an armed conflict,

but its use of its military to fight the Taliban and detain individuals without charge,
as well as

its

consent to the presence of thousands of foreign troops

who

continue to

engage in combat operations, suggests that the Afghan government would conclude
that

der

it is

its

in an

armed

conflict. It

constitution. If it

has not, however, invoked a state of emergency un-

a non-international

is

customary international law applicable in
stan's

armed

conflict,

Common Article

Common Article 3 conflicts and Afghani-

domestic human rights obligations would govern Afghanistan's treatment of

detainees held in the conflict. (This explains

why the ISAF/Interim Administration

document that Professor Roberts cites refers to the Interim Administration's
gation to conform with "internationally recognized human rights.")
It

obli-

should also be recognized that Security Council Resolution 1707 provides a

legal basis

under Chapter VII of the UN Charter for ISAF operations, including de-

tention, regardless of the nature of the fighting in Afghanistan. In
this

3,

makes the need

some

respects,

to resolve the precise nature of the conflict less important, as

ISAF's authorities under the resolution do not depend on the nature of the conflict
(or even

on the continued

existence of a conflict).

differing views of the conflict

tion operations

also suggests that potentially

by ISAF members need not prevent

States

were to agree that they would,

Article 3 to detainees;

and

it

would apply Common

sions in the International

Article 3

Covenant on

at a

minimum, apply

that States could at their discretion apply

higher standards of treatment as a matter of policy; and

agreed that

effective deten-

on the ground. One could imagine some kind of future arrange-

ment whereby ISAF

Common

It

Civil

if

the Afghan government

and applicable human

and

Political Rights

47

rights provi-

and the govern-

ment of Afghanistan's constitution and laws, then it may not be necessary formally
to reconcile the competing descriptions of what is happening on the ground in
Afghanistan.

B. Different Legal Obligations

Another reason that ISAF

States

and Domestic

Politics

have taken diverse approaches to detention

they have different legal obligations and face different political pressures.
tably,

European member

some circumstances,

State contributors to
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on

Human

that

Most no-

ISAF may be concerned

the European Convention

is

that, in

Rights 48 extends to
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their activities outside their

Skeini

and

others

own

territories,

even during armed

conflict. In Al-

Secretary of State for Defence, for instance, the United

v.

Kingdom

ECHR applied to its detention of one individual who died in its
custody in Iraq. The UK Court of Appeal upheld a High Court finding that the
United Kingdom's Human Rights Act 50 and the ECHR applied to that individual's
conceded that the
49

case because he

was within the authority and control of UK forces

House of Lords has just upheld that
son held by

UK forces abroad

in Iraq. 51

decision, with the apparent result that

The

any per-

(and therefore in the United Kingdom's "effective

would be covered by the Human Rights Act and the ECHR. 52 Similarly,
the European Court of Human Rights, in the Saramati case, just considered
whether troops from France, Germany and Norway, acting as officers of the NATO
control")

UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), vio-

Peacekeeping Force in Kosovo (KFOR) and

ECHR in detaining a particular individual. 53 And
in the Behrami case, the European Court of Human Rights just considered whether

lated Articles

1, 5,

6 and 13 of the

France violated an individual's right to

life

when

the individual died from unex-

ploded ordnance in the area of Kosovo in which France was participating in the

KFOR mission. 54 The European Court of Human Rights concluded that these cases
were inadmissible because each respondent

State's acts

were "attributable" to the

KFOR

United Nations, pursuant to Chapter VII authority that authorized

UNMIK, and

that the

scrutinize these acts.

European Court of

The Court,

have decided the questions

if the

Human

States

Rights was not in a position to

was not forced

therefore,

and

to address

how

had been acting in their sovereign

Even though France, Germany and Norway won

their cases,

it

would

capacities.

one imagines that

the possibility of such cases, and the lingering ambiguity about whether the Court

would have reached
auspices,

a different conclusion if the States

must create different, and potentially very cautious,

proaches to conflict and peacekeeping for
In addition to the

Protocols
In the

any

I

and

Afghan

significant

II

ECHR, most

to the

conflict,

Covenant on

it is

and

UN

and legal ap-

ECHR States parties.

NATO member States are parties to Additional
States

is

not.

not clear whether this fact would have (or has had)

impact on the ground. Further, most

Civil

political

Geneva Conventions, 55 whereas the United

lieve that their legal obligations

Political Rights 56

agreements between

NATO member

States be-

flowing from treaties such as the International

and the Convention Against Torture 57

apply to their activities extraterritorially. This
bilateral

were not acting under

NATO

States

may account

for the fact that the

and the Afghan Ministry of Defense

regarding individuals detained by ISAF contain provisions that appear to reflect
the non-refoulement obligations contained in Article 3 of the

CAT. The United

CAT

obligations apply

States historically has not taken the position that
extraterritorially,

its

although as a matter of policy the United States
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will

not transfer
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an individual outside of its territory to a country where

it is

more

likely

than not

that he will be tortured.

Human Rights Watch has described these bilateral arrangements with the government of Afghanistan
[T]hey share

as follows:

many common

release detainees or transfer

and Afghan

features,

them

to

such as an agreement that

NATO

forces will

Afghan custody within 96 hours, and that

NATO

authorities will treat detainees in accordance with international law.

agreements further stipulate that Afghan authorities

will

not

try, release,

detainees to a third country without the explicit agreement of

(presumably to avoid transfer of detainees to

.

.

.

jurisdictions

The

or transfer

NATO

forces

where detainees may be

Under the agreements seen by Human Rights Watch, NATO
International Committee of the Red Cross, will have access to

subject to mistreatment).
forces, as well as the

detainees even after they have been transferred to Afghan custody. 58

When Canada
over to

US

operated as part of OEF, the Canadian forces turned detainees

forces in Afghanistan, but

came under public pressure not

to

do

so.

59

Under the original 2005 Canada- Afghanistan Detainee Transfer Arrangement, the
Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission had guaranteed that it
would report any abuses to the Canadian government. As a result of public concern about the mistreatment in Afghan custody of detainees turned over by Cana-

dian forces, the Canadian government recently
to bring

it

amended

the 2005

Arrangement

into line with pre-existing Denmark-Afghanistan, United

Afghanistan and Netherlands-Afghanistan arrangements.
allows Canadians to enter Afghan detention

facilities at

60

Kingdom-

The new Arrangement

"any time." 61

The United States in its OEF capacity has been cautious about turning over detainees to the government of Afghanistan, due in part to our desire to confirm with
greater clarity the legal basis on which the government of Afghanistan would hold
them. Contrast the Canadian position: General Gauthier, the lieutenant general

who commands
all

the Canadian Expeditionary Forces

Canadian forces deployed abroad, was quoted

transfer.

concerns about turning detainees over to the

allies'

United States or to the Afghans, some
renders the mission

less effective.

"Our default setting is
few hours and we would prefer

as saying,

We haven't held anybody for more than a

not to." 62 As a result of certain

Command and thus oversees

allies

are choosing not to detain at

all,

which

63

Consider the following by David Bosco:
About 7,000 troops from Canada, Britain and the Netherlands are fending off a Taliban
resurgence. The demanding mission
has also confronted alliance members with the
uncomfortable reality that fighting often means taking prisoners. America, of course,
.

.

.
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has been taking prisoners in Afghanistan for some time. And that's part of the problem.
The European and Canadian publics have been disgusted by reports of prisoner abuse,
and they want nothing to do with what they see as American excess .... So NATO
countries have essentially opted out of the detainee business. Before committing their

troops to combat areas, the Canadian, Dutch and British governments signed

agreements with the Afghan government stating that any captured fighters would be

American forces. In practice, these
agreements mean that NATO troops have no system in place for regularly
interrogating Taliban fighters for intelligence purposes. Whenever possible, they let the
Afghan troops they operate with take custody. When that's not possible, they house

handed over

to

Afghan authorities rather than

to

their prisoners briefly in makeshift facilities while they arrange a transfer to the

Afghans.

NATO guidelines call for the handover of prisoners within 96 hours, far too

brief a time for soldiers to even

know whom they're holding. And once prisoners are in

Afghan hands, international forces
only

is

NATO

interrogation,

easily lose track

of them.

forfeiting the intelligence benefits that

it's

handle them and

It's

can

not good policy. Not

come with

real-time

sending detainees into an Afghan prison system poorly equipped to
rife

with abuse. 64

A Human Rights Watch report confirms the reluctance to detain that Bosco describes.

That report, from November 2006,

states,

Oruzgan announced their first five detainees two weeks ago,
while British and Canadian forces operating in Helmand and Kandahar, respectively,
have publicly acknowledged fewer than 100 detainees. Given the ferocity of the fighting
in these areas, the absence of more detainees raises two alarming alternatives: either

Dutch

that

forces operating in

NATO

forces are not taking detainees, or,

more

likely, that

NATO

forces are

circumventing their bilateral agreements by immediately turning over detainees to

Afghan authorities and thus abrogating

their responsibility to

monitor the detainees'

treatment. 65

Even the

New

political

approaches to the fighting in Afghanistan are

York Times described the Dutch and

US

approaches

different.

The

as follows:

[Hjere in Uruzgan Province, where the Taliban operate openly, a Dutch-led task force
has mostly shunned combat.

tactics emphasize efforts to
and self-governance, rather than hunting the
Taliban's fighters. Bloodshed is out. Reconstruction, mentoring and diplomacy are in.
American military officials have expressed unease about the Dutch method, warning

improve Afghan

that

if

Its

counterinsurgency

living conditions

the Taliban are not kept under military pressure in Uruzgan, they will use the

province as a haven and project their insurgency into neighboring provinces. 66
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5.

Toward Greater Harmonization
Presumably greater harmony in our approach to the situation in Afghanistan
would be useful, as it would permit us more easily to transfer detainees among the
various contingents, increase the intelligence we can gather from detainees, apC.

proach the Afghan government with a united

Can we

and increase

interoperability.

achieve greater harmonization? Professor Roberts suggests that the gov-

ernment of Afghanistan
not clear

if

he

is

establish a country- wide detention regime, although

suggesting that the regime

picked up and held by ISAF forces as well.

binding

front,

set

of rules on

all

would or should apply

He

to individuals

NATO

also suggests that

it is

develop a

aspects of treatment of security detainees not entitled to

prisoner-of-war protections. This seems sensible, although

NATO

already tried

once to achieve such a framework for Afghanistan and was able only to come to

agreement on broad parameters. 67 Other ideas might include a new

UN Security

Council resolution containing language parallel to Resolution 1546, and a more
detailed

framework modeled on

CPA Memorandum No. 3

(such that standards of

any internment facility shall be in accordance with the Fourth Geneva Convention,
Part

III,

Section IV). Finally, ISAF States could agree as a policy matter to treat

detainees in their custody as prisoners of war.

changes as well, such as a
ities,

"left-seat, right-seat"

One might

also explore practical

approach to Afghan detention

whereby the government of Afghanistan runs the detention

tance and oversight by

all

facility

with

facil-

assis-

NATO forces from different countries. Any such solutions

would require certain legal and political concessions from both the US government
and other NATO contributors.
V.

I

would

like to circle

efforts dealing

many

other

Conclusion

back to Professor Roberts's ongoing discomfort with the

with the "war on terror" since September

critics

of

US

11.

policy over the last six years,

Professor Roberts, like

is

concerned about the

phrase "war on terror." But the phrase "global war on terror"

ment, not a
tions

legal assertion.

68

The United

must strongly oppose terrorism

States uses this

in all of

not think we are in an armed conflict with

we

ever, believe that

armed

cludes an

armed conflict

are difficult,

and the laws

—were not

US

forms, around the world.

—not

in place

1

1

—

difficult

failed

—

for

na-

We do

We do, how-

said, the questions raised

on September

all

Qaeda, which

al

by

inthis

internationally

crafted to deal with the factual scenario

working through these

system has worked

a political state-

terrorists everywhere.

That

conflict in Afghanistan.

is

term to mean that

are in a legal state of armed conflict with

and domestically
faced. In

all

its

US

we suddenly

problems, the balance of powers in the

many of the

177

critical

elements of the three
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conflicts discussed.

look objectively
a

at

I

would challenge

this

audience and our friends and

where the law now stands, and determine on that

detention framework

now exists that strikes
I

would

this

and future

also suggest that detention in Afghanistan pres-

ents hard questions not just for the United States but for

ISAF, and that

whether

an appropriate and durable balance

between humanitarian concerns and military requirements in
non-traditional conflicts.

basis

critics to

all

States contributing to

we should continue to put our heads together on these difficult and

pressing questions.
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IX
Distinction

and Loss of Civilian Protection

in International Armed Conflicts

Yoram Dinstein*
A. The Principle of Distinction

There are several cardinal principles lying at the root of the law of international

armed

conflict.

Upon

examination, none

is

more

critical

than the

"principle of distinction." Undeniably, this overarching precept constitutes an in1

tegral part

of modern customary international law. 2

It is

also reflected in Article 48

of the 1977 Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, entitled "Basic rule,"

which provides that "the

Parties to the conflict shall at

all

times distin-

guish between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian
objects

and military

objectives

and accordingly

shall direct their operations

only

against military objectives." 3

As is clear from the text, the pivotal bifurcation

is

between

ants (and, as a corollary, between military objectives

wrong to present the dichotomy,
(ICRC) sometimes does,
forces.

5

Apart from the

4

in the

fact that

and

civilians

and combat-

civilian objects). It

is

Committee of the Red Cross
versus members of the armed

as the International

form of

civilians

not every member of the armed forces

ant (medical and religious personnel are excluded), 6 civilians

who

is

a

combat-

directly partici-

pate in hostilities lose their civilian status for such time as they are acting in this

fashion although they are not

* Professor Emeritus, Tel

members of any armed

Aviv University,

Israel.

forces (see infra Section B).

and Loss of Civilian

Distinction

It is

—

at all

done whether they
are,

article,

(ii) it is

whether they are targeted

not allowed

weapons may be used,

to, (v)

—

however, a number of caveats:

neutral territory,
ited

times

rule, all

are advancing, retreating or remaining stationary, and, as dis-

cussed later in this

There

enemy combatants can be lawfully atduring an international armed conflict. This can be

almost axiomatic that, as a

tacked directly

Protection in International Armed Conflicts

(i)

the attack

when

a ceasefire

groups or individually. 7

in

must be
is

carried out outside

in effect,

no prohib-

(iii)

no perfidious methods of warfare may be resorted
combatants are not to be attacked once they become hors de combat (by choice
(iv)

(surrendered personnel) or because they are wounded, sick or shipwrecked), 8 and
(vi)

the attack

must not be expected

The hallmark of civilian
vilians

—

status in

as well as civilian objects

to cause excessive injury to civilians.

wartime

is

that, in contrast to

—enjoy protection from

combatants,

ci-

attack by the enemy. In-

tentionally directing attacks against civilians (not taking direct part in hostilities)

or civilian objects

is

a

war crime under

Article 8(2)(b)(i)-(ii) of the 1998

Statute of the International Criminal Court.

The term

"attack" in this context

Rome

9

means any act of violence, 10 understood

widest possible sense (including a non-kinetic attack), as long as

it

in the

entails loss of

damage to property. Attacks do not include
non-forcible acts, such as non-injurious psychological warfare. The line of division
between what is permissible and what is not is accentuated by computer network
attacks (CNA). These would qualify as attacks within the accepted definition only
if they engender
through reverberating effects human casualties or damage to
property (it being understood that a completely disabled computer is also damaged
life,

physical or psychological injury, or

—

—

property). 11
It is illegal

among the

to launch

an attack the primary purpose of which

civilian population.

has every reason to believe that

is

The prohibition is applicable even
such a terror campaign will shatter

so that

if

the attacker

the morale of

to

is

on both sides).

13

Yet, an important rider

not the actual effect of the attack but

not forbidden unless terrorizing civilians

mounting an otherwise lawful

(saving,

to a

will

as a result, countless lives

counts here

to spread terror

the enemy's determination
pursue the armed
—
rapid conclusion
be eroded — and the war
be brought

the civilian population
conflict will

is

12

is its

its

purpose or

primary aim.

attack against combatants

14

is

in order.

intent:

What

an attack

Nothing precludes

and military

objectives,

outcome (due to resonating "shock and awe") is the collapse of civilian morale and the laying down of arms by the enemy.
The principle of distinction excludes not only deliberate attacks against civil-

even

if the

ians,

but also indiscriminate attacks,

target

any

net

specific military objective

ensuing casualties

will

i.e.,

instances in which the attacker does not

(due either to indifference as to whether the

be civilians or combatants
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or, alternatively, to inability to
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control the effects of the attack). 15

A leading

example

is

the launching

by Iraq of

Scud missiles against military objectives located in or near residential areas in
in 1991, notwithstanding the built-in imprecision of the Scuds

which made accu-

racy in acquiring military objectives virtually impossible (and, in the event,
itary objective

was

—where asymmetrical warfare

—the prohibition of indiscriminate

greater practical import than that of the

reason
likely

is

that, generally speaking, the

nowadays

ban of direct

attacks

on calculation

—

is

is

civilized

to target civilians with premeditation.

—

is

not part of the

perhaps of even

attacks against civilians.

armed forces of a

the incidence of indiscriminate attacks
rather than

no mil-

struck).

In regular inter- State warfare
military equation

Israel

The

country are rarely

However, the prospect of

predicated, as

it is,

on

lack of concern

much higher. A commonplace illustration would be

a high-altitude air raid, carried out notwithstanding conditions of zero visibility

and malfunctioning instruments
Certainly, military training

tacks

if

must tenaciously address the issue of indiscriminate at-

they are to be eliminated.

The flip
jectives

for identifying preselected military objectives.

side of civilian objects (which are protected

from

attack)

is

military ob-

(which are not). The authoritative definition of military objectives appears

in Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol

I:

Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are concerned,

which by their nature, location, purpose
contribution to military action and whose total or partial

military objectives are limited to those objects

or use

make an

effective

destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a
definite military advantage.

This definition

is

16

very open ended,

cluding even a hospital or a church

if

—

only because every civilian object

is

susceptible to use

—not

ex-

by the enemy for military

purposes. Such use (or abuse) will turn even a hospital or a place of worship into a
military objective, exposing

it

attenuating consideration

that,

is

to a lawful attack

under Article 52(3) of Protocol I,

the presumption should be that such a place

poses to which
It

it is

dedicated.

under certain conditions. The only

is

in case of doubt

actually used for the

normal pur-

17

follows that the key to robust civilian protection

lies,

perhaps, less in the fun-

damental requirement of concentrating attacks on identifiable military objectives

and more

in the

complementary

legal

condition of observing proportionality in

the effects of the attack. This means, as prescribed in Article 51(5)(b) of Protocol
that

—when an

attack against a military objective

civilians or civilian objects

is

planned

(usually called "collateral

185

—

I,

incidental losses to

damage") must not be

Distinction

and Loss of Civilian

Protection in International Armed Conflicts

expected to be "excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated." 18 Intentionally launching an attack in the

incidental loss of

would be

a

war crime under Article 8(2)(b)(iv) of the Rome

the International Criminal Court.

The expectation of excessive

do not count

isolation

from the

services. Indeed, food, cloth-

may actually be rationed; buses and trains may not
and blackouts may impinge on the quality of life; etc. These

anticipated from an attack
is

and

essentials

Moreover, the military advantage

in the calculus of proportionality.

large-scale attack

damage to civilian
Yet it must be borne in mind

ought to be considered relevant. In war-

time, there are inevitable scarcities of foodstuffs

run on time; curfews

Statute of

incidental losses to civilians or

that not every inconvenience to civilians

and other

cause

19

objects taints an attack as indiscriminate in character.

ing, petrol

will

damage to civilian objects which
to the concrete and direct overall military ad-

clearly excessive in relation
is

it

or injury to civilians or

life

vantage anticipated

knowledge that

must be viewed

in progress,

it is

overall picture.

in a rather holistic fashion:

when

a

not required to assess every discrete segment in

20

deemed excessive is often a matter of subjective appraisal,
which takes place in the mind of the beholder (always remembering that the appraisal must be done in a reasonable fashion). The difficulty is that military advanUndeniably, what

tage

and

is

civilian casualties are like the

comparison between them

is

an

metaphorical apples and oranges: a

not a science. Civilian losses can be counted,

art,

damage can be surveyed and estimated, but how can you quantify a military advantage on a measurable scale? Additionally, since the entire process is a
matter of pre-attack evaluation and expectation, it must be acknowledged that it is
embedded in probabilities. What is to be done if "the probability of gaining the
civilian

military advantage

and of affecting the

civilian

population

is

not 100 percent but

lower and different"? 21
All the

circumstances must be factored

or a church used by the

enemy may be

patients or worshippers

on

proportionate, the attack

between the cases

of, say,

may

borne

in

mind

command and

command and

that "excessive"

it is

is

is

a difference

used by a single enemy

control center of an armored divi-

control center

is

number of

entail a substantial civilian price tag, but the
is

a different matter.

It

has to be

not interchangeable with "extensive."

based on a misreading of the

and military value of a military objective

lateral civilian losses resulting

the actual

whereas, should the numbers be dis-

one mosque where the minaret

scholars take that position, 22 but
tegic

if

have to be aborted. However, there

Taking out the sniper must not

elimination of a key

Thus, the bombardment of a hospital

given a green light

site is negligible,

sniper and another serving as a
sion.

in.

is

text.

23

If the stra-

exceedingly high, significant col-

from an attack may well be countenanced.
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—and any commensurate estimate of the number of
or near
—must be based on up-to-date

Any planned
ians present in

attack

military objectives

The "fog of war"

gence.

military operation.

civil-

intelli-

such that mistakes are unavoidable in every sizable

is

When a legal analysis is made after the event, there is a built-in

temptation to scrutinize the situation with the benefit of hindsight. But this temp-

must be strongly

tation

damage to

civilians

resisted.

The proper question

proved to be excessive in

actuality:

is

it is

not whether collateral

whether collateral dam-

age could or should have been reasonably expected to be excessive at the time of
planning, ordering or carrying out the attack.

A reasonable

expectation has to be

linked to the data collated and interpreted at the time of action. Evidently, a valid

evaluation of the state of affairs

not obsolete.

If crucial

must be based on information

information

cinity of a military objective)

(say,

a

attack

must take

profound change.

all

may mean

if not

that the facts

on the

24

those who plan or decide

I,

feasible precautions (taking into

stances prevailing at the time),

current and

derived from a reconnaissance mission, the attack

is

Pursuant to Article 57(2) (a) (ii) of Additional Protocol

on an

is

about the absence of civilians from the vi-

should follow soon thereafter since a long interval

ground have undergone

that

account

to avoid altogether, at least to

dental losses to civilians or civilian objects.

25

circum-

all

minimize

inci-

Yet the aspiration to minimize

collateral

damage cannot trump all other military inputs. Minimize the costs to civil-

ians, yes,

but not

at all costs to the attacking force.

There

is

no obligation incum-

bent on the attacker to sustain military losses only in order to minimize incidental
losses to

enemy civilians or civilian

equipment

is

objects. "Survival of the military personnel

and

an appropriate consideration when assessing the military advantage

of an attack in the proportionality context." 26

Minimizing incidental losses or injury to
the

civilians

can be accomplished through

employment of precision-guided munitions (PGM)

—where

available

—

to tar-

get a military objective located in the midst of a densely populated residential area.

The use of PGM enables the

strike to

be surgical, with

pected to the surrounding civilians or civilian objects.
Schmitt, this

is

so not only because

collateral

PGM are more accurate, but also because "the

explosive charge needed to achieve the desired result
their

damage exAs pointed out by Michael
little

is

typically smaller than in

unguided counterparts." 27

In order to achieve the

same goal of sparing

the effects of attacks, Article 57(3) of Protocol

among

and

civilian objects

sets forth that, if a

choice

is

from

possible

several military objectives for obtaining a similar military advantage, the

one expected to cause the
lected.

I

civilians

28

least incidental civilian losses

But, again, the unfortunate truth

is
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that

it is

and damage should be

se-

often impossible to determine
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with any degree of credibility whether the elimination of diverse military objectives

would afford
Other
effective

a similar military advantage.

feasible precautions include

advance warnings to

—

civilians

circumstances permit

if

—

the issuance of

of an impending attack (in conformity with

Article 57(2)(c) of Additional Protocol

I

29
).

All the same, circumstances

do not

al-

ways permit the issuance of such warnings. Otherwise, surprise attacks would have

had

to be struck out of the military vocabulary.

"The law of armed

conflict singles out for special protection certain specified

categories of civilians, either because they are regarded as especially vulnerable or

on account of the functions they perform." 30 The first category is illustrated by
women and children, 31 and the second by civilian medical and religious person32
In the same vein, certain civilian objects
for instance, cultural property33 or
nel.
places of worship

34

—

—

also enjoy special protection.

be looked upon as merely the icing on the cake:
really affect the core.

Some

additional elements

tection

—

yet the

most vital safeguards

it

But the special protection must

adds some flavor but

it

does not

—enhancing the range of the pro-

are brought into play, for the benefit of the selected persons or objects,
are granted to

all

civilians

and civilian objects without

may be lost as a re-

fail.

There

sult

of a failure to meet prescribed conditions, as stipulated by the law of interna-

tional

is

also a proviso: protection (even special protection)

armed

conflict.

B. Direct Participation in Hostilities

Direct participation of a civilian in hostilities leads to loss of protection from attack

of the person concerned (within the temporal limits of the activity in question). As

promulgated

in Article 51(3) of Protocol

against dangers arising

I,

civilians

enjoy a general protection

from military operations "unless and

take a direct part in hostilities."

of "direct") participation in

35

Occasionally, the reference

hostilities,

36

and

at

for such time as they
is

to "active" (instead

times either adjective

is

deleted. 37

The bottom line is essentially the same: 38 a person who takes part in hostilities loses
his protection. There is no doubt that, as held by the Supreme Court of Israel (per
President Barak) in the Targeted Killings case of 2006, this
international law.

There

is

a

reflects

a consensus that a civilian can be targeted at such time as he

direct part in hostilities.

For

norm

my part,

combatant

I

customary

39

40

believe that

— indeed,

There

is

taking a

nevertheless a serious debate about taxonomy.

by directly participating

more

is

in hostilities a

person turns into

often than not, an unlawful combatant. 41

On

the

other hand, the ICRC, while conceding that "[l]oss of protection against attack
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clear

and uncontested," 42 adheres to the view that the status of that person remains

one of a

The

civilian.

difference of opinion about status has a practical consequence only

the person concerned

is

captured.

I

am inclined to think that, as an unlawful com-

batant, the person loses the general protection of the
in occupied territories)

when

Geneva Conventions (except

and only enjoys some minimal safeguards,

in conformity

The ICRC maintains that the general protection of
civilian detainees under Geneva Convention (IV) applies also to civilians directly
participating in hostilities. My own position is predicated on Article 5 of that Conthose engaged in hostilities
vention, whereby other than in occupied territories
do not benefit from the privileges of the Convention, although they still have to be
treated with humanity and are entitled to a fair trial. 43
The words "for such time" appearing in Article 51(3) of Protocol I raise serious questions about their scope. 44 The government of Israel has traditionally contended that these words do not reflect customary international law, but the
Supreme Court has utterly rejected that submission. 45 The Court made it clear
with

human

rights standards.

—

—

that a civilian

who

only sporadically takes a direct part in

protection from attack

on

a

permanent

basis:

The

ber that

who

reservist

are called
is

up

dur-

).

who

directly participates in

It is

worthwhile to remem-

forces in the world incorporate large

components of reserv-

space of time makes a lot of sense.

many armed

may have committed

47

desire to confine the exposure of the civilian

hostilities to a finite

ists

from attack46 (although he may

be detained and prosecuted for any crime that he

ing his direct participation in hostilities

does not lose

once he disconnects himself from

these activities, he regains his civilian protection
still

hostilities

for a prescribed period

basically a civilian

who

and

are then released

from

service.

A

wears the uniform of a combatant for a while

and is then cloaked again with the mantle of a civilian.
a combatant, a reservist can be attacked. Yet, before

Surely, for such time as he

is

and after, qua civilian, he is ex-

empt from attack. The same consideration should apply grosso modo to other types
of civilians turned combatants and vice versa.
There are two salient riders added to the general proposition by the judgment in
the Targeted Killings case. The first is that the cycle of direct participation in hostilities commences at an early stage of preparation and deployment, continuing
throughout the engagement itself, to cover also the disengagement and return
phase. 48 Although there are those who maintain that the expression "for such time"

should be construed
is

generally rejected.

strictly as

49

1

encompassing only the engagement itself,

(and others) take the position

that, in

vant time span in the course of which the person concerned
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this

claim

demarcating the
is

rele-

actually taking part
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in hostilities,

it is
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permissible to go as far as reasonably possible both "upstream"

and "downstream" from the actual engagement.

The second

rider

that while a person directly participating in hostilities

is

more

may still revert to a civilian status during an interval, this cannot be
brought off when the hostile activities take place on a steadily recurrent basis with
than once

brief pauses (the so-called "revolving door"

phenomenon). 50 Those attempting

to

be "farmers by day and fighters by night" lose protection from attack even in the
intermediate periods punctuating military operations. The same rationale applies
if

member

an individual becomes a

of an organized armed group (which collec-

he would lose

tively takes a direct part in the hostilities):

long as that membership

lasts.

In the locution of the Court, an organized

group becomes the "home" of the
tween
tical

acts of hostilities

terrorist for

may be

when not personally linked to any specific
There

is

no doubt

open ended, and
effort."

52

—

Still,

a

it

whom

—merely means preparation

terms, the individual in question

ship in such a group

civilian protection for as

as long as that

a respite

armed

—interposing

for the next round.

51

be-

In prac-

targeted (see infra Section C), even

hostile act

—simply due

to his

member-

membership continues.

that the construct of direct participation in hostilities

is

not

narrower than that of making a contribution to the war

"is far

whole range of activities can be

direct participation in hostilities.

identified as concrete

examples of

As the Supreme Court of Israel expounded, these

include not only using firearms or gathering intelligence, but also acting as a guide
to combatants, and,

most pointedly, masterminding such

activities

through

re-

money contributions or selling supplies to combatants: the latter activities do not come within
cruitment or planning (in contradistinction

to, e.g.,

merely donating

the ambit of direct participation in hostilities). 53

Under Article 50( 1 of Protocol
)

ian, that

germane

person

shall

I,

"

[i]

n case of doubt whether a person

be considered to be a

civilian."

54

The provision

to the issue of direct participation in hostilities.

It is

is

tions later."
ities

55

not treat

all

civilians as targetable,

"shooting

a civil-

particularly

imperative to ensure

that military units tasked with the mission of winnowing out civilians
in hostilities will

is

first

who engage

and asking ques-

Additionally, the presence of civilians directly participating in hostil-

among the

civilian

population does not deprive the population

at large

of the

participation in hostilities has been under study for a

num-

protection from attack that

The theme of direct

it is

entitled to.

56

ber of years by a group of experts under the aegis of the ICRC. While the study has

not yet been consummated,

But there

is

has exposed a

number of challenging

questions and

One

hotly contested point will be discussed infra in de-

a host of thorny

problems. By way of illustration, there are disputes

has led to lengthy debates.
tail.

it

regarding the different degrees of civilian contribution to electronic warfare,
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ranging from the mere maintenance of military computers to playing the role of

—

—

"man in the loop" guiding perhaps from a great distance a military unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) or a CNA, with a view to causing death, destruction
the

or damage. There are also arguments concerning the roles of civilian contractors

who may offer purely logistical services (e.g., refueling military aircraft en route to
a far-away armed conflict) but may also be carrying out paramilitary missions
(such as guarding supply convoys) near the contact zone with the enemy.

C. Targeted Killings

Hague Regulation 23(b)
and

of Civilians Directly Participating in Hostilities

Article 37(1) of Additional Protocol

international

is

entitled to

armed

individuals, 57

prohibits killing an adversary

I

by

resort

an act inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to

to perfidy (defined as

believe that he

enemy

forbids the treacherous killing of

—or

conflict,

is

obliged to accord

—protection under

the law of

with an intent to betray that confidence). 58

How-

when perfidy is not in play, even the ICRC Model Manual concedes that an
enemy individual combatant maybe targeted (including a head of state who is the
ever,

commander-in-chief)

There

is

59
.

a nexus between the question of whether a civilian

is

directly participat-

ing in hostilities and the issue of targeted killing. Logic dictates that, since a

com-

may be individually targeted for attack, the same rule should apply to a
civilian who takes a direct part in hostilities (at such time as he is indulging in that

batant

activity).

But scholars like to debate the deceptively simple hypothetical scenario of

a civilian driving an

ammunition truck

(maintained by General A.P.V. Rogers)
civilian protection,

truck

—

is

to supply the

armed

forces.

One view

that this will not result in the forfeiture of

although the presence of the civilian driver in the ammunition

a palpable military objective

tacked on his watch. 60

To

—

will

fully perceive

put him

what

is

at risk

at issue,

should the truck be

it is

at-

necessary to flesh out

the postulated sequence of events. Let us assume that the

ammunition truck

reaches a gas station and the driver parks the truck, going into a mini-mart to pur-

some refreshments. An enemy commando unit, lying in wait, is mounting an
attack during that exact time frame. The question is: can the commandos attack
only the ammunition truck (at its parking spot, which may be heavily guarded) or
can they also kill or neutralize the driver when he is by himself inside the minimart? General Rogers's position is clear cut: only the ammunition truck can be atchase

tacked.

As soon

benefits

from

as the driver detaches himself from the truck,

civilian protection.

depends on whether the
far

away from

it.

I

(among

others) disagree.

script unfolds in geographic

If the location is at a great distance
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he sheds the risk and

We believe that

it all

proximity to the front line or

from the front

line (say, in the

Distinction

continental United States while the front line
a civilian

and runs

ever, if the
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venue

a risk solely

shifts

when he

is

is

in or near the

from attack even when he steps out of the

Supreme Court of Israel has

In occupied territories, there

hostilities:

truck.

61

endorsed the

clearly

in

remains

truck.

How-

immediate

at the front line, the driver

considered a civilian directly participating in

lo-

must be

he then loses protection

In the Targeted Killings case, the
latter view. 62

a preliminary issue related to targeted killings of

is

civilians directly participating in hostilities,
is

ammunition

and the ammunition truck is being driven

support of the military units deployed

gistical

in Afghanistan), the driver

namely, whether the occupying power

capable of taking effective law enforcement measures vis-a-vis such persons in

lieu

of slaying them. As President Barak stressed, detention of a person directly par-

occupying power

ticipating in hostilities against the

that his arrest

is

feasible.

63

If detention is

is

the preferred step, provided

not a viable option,

that a civilian taking a direct part in hostilities risks his

and
son

is

exposed to a

—and

killing

lethal attack.

him

—

available or ineffective.

is

64

permissible

when

Israel

must be

and they are

applied.

66

residential area.

bomb

There

is

a

not feasible)

is

lawful, the

civilians are present in the vicinity

likely to

come to

against a

of

be injured, the principle of propor-

the fore in Israel, because of a highly publi-

well-known Palestinian

terrorist hiding in a

growing public sentiment that such a massive

should not have been used, since

damage

is

that a targeted killing of a

The relevance of the principle of proportionality in the

setting of targeted killings has

cized use of a one-ton

any combatant

non-lethal measures are either un-

pronounced

Court was adamant that whenever innocent

tionality

like

65

an occupied territory (when detention

the targeted individual

—

must be recognized

Differently put, a strike targeting such a per-

Although the Supreme Court of
terrorist in

life

it

it

was almost bound

bomb

to cause excessive collateral

to civilian bystanders.

D.

Human Shields

This raises the cognate issue of the use of civilian

"human shields" intended to lend

protection to combatants or military objectives. Article 28 of Geneva Convention
(IV) states that "[t]he presence of a protected person
certain points or areas

51(7) of Protocol

I

immune from

may

not be used to render

military operations." 67 For

reads, in part, that "[t]he presence or

its

part, Article

movements of the civilian

population or individual civilians shall not be used to render certain points or areas

immune from
jectives

military operations, in particular in attempts to shield military ob-

from attacks or

to shield, favour or

impede military operations." 68

ably, the prohibition of the use of civilians as
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human

shields mirrors

Irrefut-

customary
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international law. 69 Utilizing the presence of civilians or other protected persons to

immune from military operations
8(2)(b)(xxiii) of the Rome Statute. 70

render certain points, areas or military forces
recognized as a war crime by Article
It is

incontrovertible that

when combatants

is

(including civilians directly partici-

pating in hostilities) surround themselves by civilians, this

is

a breach of the law of

armed conflict. All the same, it is necessary to distinguish between
voluntary and involuntary human shields. As the Supreme Court of Israel (per
international

human
shields are victims, voluntary human shields are to be deemed civilians who take a
direct part in hostilities. 71 That being the case, voluntary human shields are
President Barak) held in the Targeted Killings case, whereas involuntary

targetable and, of course, they "are excluded in the estimation of incidental injury

when assessing proportionality." 72
What if, contrary to the law of international armed conflict,

involuntary human

shields are actually compelled to screen a military objective? Article 51(8) of Proto-

col

I

sets forth that a violation

of the prohibition of shielding military objectives

with civilians does not release a belligerent party from
the civilians.

mains in

73

its

legal obligations vis-a-vis

What this means is that the principle of proportionality in attack re-

effect. I

do not deny that the principle of proportionality must still govern

the planning of an attack against a military objective screened
ian

by involuntary civil-

human shields. However, in my opinion, the test of excessive injury to civilians

must be relaxed in such exceptional circumstances. That

is

to say, to

my mind, the

appraisal of whether civilian casualties are excessive in relation to the military ad-

vantage anticipated must

make allowances for the fact that, by dint of the large

(al-

beit involuntary) presence of civilians at the site of the military objective, the

number of civilian

casualties can

Louise Doswald-Beck, "[t]he

be expected to be higher than usual. To quote

Israeli

bombardment of Beirut

in June

and July of

1982 resulted in high civilian casualties, but not necessarily excessively so given the
fact that the military targets

approach

is

were placed amongst the

confirmed by the 2004

civilian population." 74 This

UK Manual on the Law of Armed Conflict

Any violation by the enemy of this rule

[the prohibition of human shields]

would not

relieve the attacker of his responsibility to take precautions to protect the civilians
affected,

but the enemy's unlawful activity

whether the incidental

loss or

may be

taken into account in considering

damage was proportionate

to the military advantage

expected. 75

Customary international law
point.

an

It

illegal

is

certainly

more rigorous than Protocol I on

this

has traditionally been grasped that, should civilian casualties ensue from

attempt to shield a military objective, their blood will be on the hands of
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the belligerent party that abused
that a belligerent party

them

as

human

shields. 76

not vested by the

The long and the short
law of international armed con-

of it

is

flict

with the power to block an otherwise lawful attack against military objectives

by deliberately placing

is

harm's way. 77

civilians in

The prohibition of placing

civilians as

human

shields

around

a military objec-

become a modus operandi
typical of terrorists, there are multiple ways in which regular armed forces may be
tempted to employ analogous tactics to facilitate military operations. The issue
arose before the Supreme Court of Israel (per President Barak), in 2006, in the
Early Warning case. 78 The Court had to determine the legality of an "Early Warning
Procedure" (adopted by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF)) whereby, when a terrorist
has been cornered and besieged, a local resident would be encouraged to volunteer
(provided that no harm to the messenger was anticipated) in order to relay a warning and a call to surrender so as to avoid unnecessary bloodshed. 79 The "Early
Warning Procedure" drew criticism from outside observers 80 and it was nullified
by the Court. President Barak relying on Article 28 of Geneva Convention (IV)
and on Article 51(7) of Protocol I (although Israel is not a contracting party to Protocol I)
stressed that the IDF was not allowed to use protected persons as human
tive applies to all belligerent parties.

Even though

this

has

—

—

shields

and

that, therefore, the assistance

of a local resident could certainly not be

required coercively. 81 But what about assistance offered voluntarily in circumstances where this

is

not expected to place the person concerned in jeopardy? Presi-

dent Barak ruled against the "Early Warning Procedure" on four grounds:

(i)

protected persons must not be used as part of the military effort of the occupying

power,

(ii)

bat operations,
(iv)

puts

it is

(iii)

voluntary consent in these circumstances

not possible to

him

in danger.

tell

in

advance whether the

activity

why such

mother or a

father

assistance cannot be offered

— of

is

who begs to be given

son to surrender and save his
life

persuasive. Yet, he did not

a terrorist besieged in a building that

by, for example, the parent

danger to the

of the protected person

by a close

(with the likelihood of death in action of the terrorist),

if any

is

82

Generally speaking, President Barak's reasoning
explain

comoften suspect, and

everything must be done to separate the civilian population from

life.

83

a

relative
is

when

—

especially, a

about to be stormed

the initiative

is

taken

chance to persuade the besieged

In such exceptional circumstances, there

is little

of the parent, and humanitarian considerations actually tip

the balance in favor of allowing the requested intercession to take place.
In conclusion, this article
is

should show

a basic tenet of the international

protection for granted. There are

render practical

assistance,

and

that,

although the protection of civilians

law of armed conflict,

many ways
a

civilian
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which

a civilian

cannot take that

civilian protection will

would become

a

not

victim of war
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inadvertently (due to collateral damage). But, above

all,

civilian protection

can be

who purports to benefit from it crosses a red line by directly participating in hostilities. He may then be targeted, and this need not be done in an
anonymous fashion. Absent perfidy, the bullet that kills him may lawfully have his
name engraved on it.

lost if the

person
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The Treatment of Detainees and the "Global

War on Terror": Selected Legal Issues

David Turns*
Introduction

This

article will

detainees

which

to

1

address selected legal issues relating to the treatment of

in the context of the "Global

War on

Terror" as a "hook" on

hang some ideas of more general application and significance about the

international legal

framework of the "war." Some general

(i.e., jus

ad bellum)

inter-

national law aspects of the parameters of that framework have already been de-

bated in the literature, 2 but the perspective adopted herein
focus inasmuch as

mind of all

it

is

of

more

specialist

concentrates on the practical issue that should resonate in the

coalition military

and associated personnel since the disclosure of ill-

treatment of detainees in the custody of US and British forces in Iraq at Abu Ghraib

and elsewhere: 3 namely, once suspects
cordance with what rules and

in the

"War on Terror"

legal standards are

fundamental, more theoretical (but no
question of detailed substance

is

less

they to be treated? The broader,

important) issue lurking behind

one of the utmost

War on

Terror": does the

* Senior Lecturer in International

Kingdom. The views expressed herein
not necessarily represent the

United Kingdom.

"War on Terror"

Laws of Armed

official

this

practical significance for per-

sonnel deployed to military counterterrorist operations in the
the "Global

are captured, in ac-

Conflict, Defence

field in the setting

constitute an

Academy of

of

armed

the United

are those of the author in his personal capacity.

They do

views of the government or Ministiy of Defence of the
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conflict in the sense of international law?
it:

sionmakers

if so,

something

international, non-international or

The premise contained

And

herein, in a nutshell,

is

what kind of armed

is

else?

that military

and

political deci-

purposes of this

in the coalition countries (principally, for the

the United States

conflict

article,

and the United Kingdom) have mentally placed the proverbial

"chicken before the egg," in that they have completely failed to consider the very
real implications that these

of view.
context

considerations have

on armed

forces

from

a legal point

When soldiers are deployed on military operations, they need to know the
of and legal framework governing their actions. When in action against

"terrorists" in Afghanistan, are coalition troops subject to

the 1949

4

Geneva Conventions, or Additional Protocols

they apply

all

their provisions, or only

particularly acute

when armed

(and expected to apply)

I

some of them? The

or

II

legal

thereto? 5 If so,

do

problem has been

been given instructions which, while

forces have

have tended to undermine respect for the law of armed conflict in

vague on

details,

general. 6

As one noted former member of the US armed forces has succinctly put it:

I

can understand

why some

administration lawyers might have wanted ambiguity so

that every hypothetical option

is

theoretically open, even those the President has said

he does not want to exercise. But war doesn't occur in theory and our troops are not
served by ambiguity.

The

They

are crying out for clarity.

structure of this article will be,

first,

rent legal proceedings in both the United

7

to consider

some

Kingdom and

ing treatment of detainees in custody, before

moving

specific issues in cur-

the United States regard-

to the broader picture of the

War on Terror." The latter discussion will involve a brief review of recent relevant decisions by the US and
general legal framework and classification of the "Global

Israeli

Supreme Courts

British security forces in

as well as a

comparison with the situation confronted by

Northern Ireland during the "Troubles" 8

decessor for such a "war." At the end,

about

legal

we

will return to the specific starting point

standards for the treatment of detainees in military custody in light of

and

the foregoing discussion about the nature

draw some conclusions with suggestions

come

a veritable legal

The Al-Skeini
June

court

in

1

3,

way forward

in

and

what has be-

and moral minefield.
in the

United Kingdom

Litigation

2007 the House of Lords

the

classification of the conflict,

for a possible

Recent Legal Developments

On

as a limited pre-

(sitting in

United Kingdom) gave

its

200

its

judicial capacity as the highest

judgment

in

a

long-running saga

David Turns
concerning the treatment of detainees in Iraq, namely, the Al-Skeini case. 9 Claims
for

compensation are

Defence

British Ministry of

Lords,

10

although

now being brought by the family of Baha Mousa against the

it

as a direct result of this

judgment by the House of

represents the final stage in the instant litigation.

In the Al-Skeini affair there have been two separate limbs: the

which culminated
court-martial.

House of Lords

in the

The

situation

which gave

decision,

rise to

both

civil

proceedings

and military proceedings

of proceedings involved

sets

the deaths of six Iraqi civilians at the hands of British troops in Basra between
gust and November 2003

—

in other words, during the period in

Kingdom, along with the United
belligerent occupation of Iraq.

below. The applicants in the
Iraqi civilians.

for

11

States,

civil litigation

12

case will be

were close

Au-

which the United

was internationally recognized

The court-martial

at

as being in

mentioned further

relatives

of the six dead

They sought an order of judicial review against the Secretary of State

Defence by way of challenge to his refusal to order an independent public

in-

quiry into the circumstances in which their relatives died and his rejection of liability to

pay compensation for

troops while exchanging
searches,

13

their deaths. Five of the deceased

were shot by British

with Iraqi insurgents, during patrols or house

fire

but the most famous one

what different. Baha Mousa was

is

the sixth,

whose circumstances were some-

a young hotel receptionist

who was taken into cus-

tody by British troops during a search of his hotel. Within thirty-six hours he was
dead, apparently having been beaten to death by British troops while in their cus-

tody

at the military

base of Darul Dhyafa in Basra. 14

The legal issue in the case turned on the extraterritorial application of the Human
Rights Act 1998 (HRA), 15 which is the domestic British incorporation of the
United Kingdom's international obligations under the European Convention of

Human Rights (ECHR). 16 The claimants'
vilian detainees in British military

the

arguments were

essentially that Iraqi ci-

custody in Iraq were entitled to the protection of

HRA and therefore (indirectly) of the ECHR; the core question was thus one of

jurisdiction.

Throughout the
17

earlier

proceedings in the Divisional Court and the

House of Lords, a clear distinction was drawn between the five Iraqis who were shot on the street or in house searches by British
troops and the one, Baha Mousa, who died in the actual custody of British troops.
Court of Appeal,

and also

in the

This distinction was necessitated by the Convention's

High Contracting Parties
and freedoms defined

in

own

insistence that "the

shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights
.

.

.

this

Convention." 18 In a confusing

series

of cases

decided by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the Court introduced and
elaborated

upon

a notion of "effective control" over territory for the purposes of

ECHR jurisdiction

"

outside the

espace juridique" 19 of the Convention,

mental tension developed between two alternative conceptions of the

201

and

a funda-

extraterritorial
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application of the

ECHR

during military operations by armed forces of

were not party to the Conven-

State parties in States or other territorial entities that
tion.

20

This was clearly the case in Iraq, as that State

ECHR, whereas

Kingdom

ECHR

is

not and never has been a

The fundamental question,
therefore, was whether the actions of British troops, deployed on military operations outside the United Kingdom, could be subject to provisions of the Convention (by way of the HRA, which applies to all "public authorities" of the United
Kingdom and makes it unlawful for such authorities to act in a way that is incompatible with a right under the ECHR). 21
party to the

Essentially

the United

what was conceded by the Ministry of Defence, and

of the House of Lords hearings

was

is.

22

in the final stage

was no longer contentious, was that the

in principle applicable to these cases.

The

first five

ECHR

deceased, however, because

they were shot on the street or during patrols or house searches but were not in the
physical custody of British troops, were held not to

the

UK

courts for the purposes of the

human

fall

within the jurisdiction of

rights legislation. In the

House of

Lords, the government was appealing against the findings (in both the Divisional

Court and the Court of Appeal,
liable in respect to

albeit

with slightly different reasoning) that

Baha Mousa's death and

that

it

it

was

could or should be ordered to

hold the requested independent public inquiry into the circumstances thereof.

Throughout the proceedings

in Al-Skeini, at all three court levels,

it

was com-

mon ground that there were two possible legal reasons as to why the Iraqi claimants
should be brought within the jurisdiction of British

though they were not

citizens of the

curred outside the United

Kingdom

United Kingdom and the

of the

(1) the effective control

as a result

rights laws,

even

acts in question oc-

while British troops were engaged in military

operations. These reasons were that, under the
traterritorial jurisdiction

human

ECtHR decision

in Bankovic, 25 ex-

ECHR could be based on either

of a State over a territory and

its

inhabitants, either

of military occupation (whether lawful or unlawful in general

international law), or with the consent, acquiescence or invitation of the

government of

that territory, such that the State in effective control

actually exercises

exercised

all

or

some of

the public powers normally to be

by the government of that

extraterritorial jurisdiction

is

territory.

This approach to

referred to for convenience as the "effective

control of an area" (ECA) argument and was based on the

jurisprudence in the line of cases following Loizidou;
(2) the exercise
activities

24

ECtHR

or

of authority or control over a State's individuals by the

of another State's

official
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agents in

its

embassies, consulates,
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military bases or prisons, or
flying the flag of that State,

on board

aircraft or vessels registered in or

wherein agents of the State are exercising the

authority of the State extraterritorially in a foreign country. This

approach to

extraterritorial jurisdiction

is

referred to for convenience as

the "State agent authority" (SAA) argument,
alternative jurisprudence of the

Janousek

France and Spain.

v.

ECtHR

and was based on an
Drozd and

as expressed in

25

The Divisional Court had limited the applicability of the ECA argument to territory within the espace juridique of the Convention and applied a narrow construction of the

SAA

argument, holding that

consulates, vessels

and aircraft and ...

ters,

the case of Baha

was

also the preferred

Mousa

it

applied only in relation to "embassies,

a prison." 26 Within those restrictive

alone was considered justiciable. The

view of the Court of Appeal, although

a broader interpretation of the

ECA

it

parame-

SAA argument

additionally applied

argument than the Divisional Court,

sense that the majority opined that the

ECA

in the

theory could apply anywhere in the

world, even outside the espace juridique of the Convention, so long as the territory

was under effective control. The appeals court was also more generous in its view of

SAA argument. It relied heavily on the decision in Issa and Others v. Turkey, 27 a
case in which the ECtHR gave "an unequivocal statement of SAA responsibility in a

the

military context" 28 (Issa concerned the deaths of a

number of Iraqi

shepherds,

al-

legedly at the hands of Turkish soldiers operating against Kurdish guerrillas in

northern Iraq). The Court of Appeal effectively held, largely on public policy
grounds, that "Article

1

[of the Convention] could not be interpreted so as to allow

ECHR on the territory of another State

a State party to perpetrate violations of the

which
plied

it

could not perpetrate on

whenever the individual

its

own

territory" 29

in question

and

that the

SAA

theory ap-

was under the control and authority of

the relevant State agents anywhere in the world.

However,

in the

House of Lords judgment

in Al-Skeini, a majority of the

Law

Lords was uncomfortable with the extremely broad approach of the Court of Appeal,

and chose

to retrench the position considerably. In the leading

Lord Brown dismissed the expansive

extraterritorial application of the

gime proposed by the Court of Appeal

in reliance

on

judgment,

ECHR

re-

Issa as

much. It would make a nonsense of much that was said in Bankovic [as
the Convention being an essentially regional instrument that was not designed to

altogether too
to

operate throughout the world]
effective control

It

would, indeed, make redundant the principle of

of an area: what need for that

general principle of "authority

and control"

effectively controlled or (b) within the

if jurisdiction

Council of Europe?
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arises in

irrespective of
30

any event under a

whether the area

is

(a)

War on
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In connection with military forces

and the law of armed

Terror"

conflict,

Lord Brown

noted that the requirements of effective occupation required that the occupying

power respect the laws
mechanisms; indeed,

would be

The

ECHR

that

cases of the

in force, rather
in

most

rights

first five

than introducing

parts of the world outside

would be incompatible with

Europe the probability
local

law in any event. 31

claimants were therefore conclusively dismissed as falling

outside the United Kingdom's jurisdiction for
spect to the sixth claimant, Lord
fall

new laws and enforcement

human

Brown agreed

that

rights purposes, while in re-

Baha Mousa's case did indeed

within the scope of the United Kingdom's obligations under the

ECHR, but

"only on the narrow basis found established by the Divisional Court, essentially by

made for embassies." 32
Although it is perhaps still too early to make a full evaluation of the impact of the

analogy with the extra-territorial exception

final decision in Al-Skeini,

and a claim against the Ministry of Defence pursuant

the judgment in the litigation has only recently been
cision of

enormous

significance because

Kingdom on

ployed outside the United
effectively will

it

means

made public,

33

it is

to

surely a de-

when

that British forces,

de-

certain kinds of military operations,

be carrying the obligations of the

ECHR and the HRA with them. In

Kingdom (and all other States that are party to the
of human rights will become increasingly important in situa-

other words, for the United

ECHR)
tions

questions

where

British troops are either in belligerent occupation of foreign territory

or stationed in any foreign territory in a situation other than full-scale international

armed

conflict.

This

years; as the International

is

a trend that has

been gathering strength for some

Court of Justice has put

it:

human rights conventions does not cease in time of armed
conflict .... As regards the relationship between international human rights law and
international humanitarian law, there are
three possible situations: some rights may
be exclusively matters of international humanitarian law; others may be exclusively
matters of human rights law; yet others may be matters of both these branches of
[T]he protection offered by

.

.

.

international law. 34

It is

the

a fact that a

demand

there

is

major part of contemporary culture, especially

for redress after injury. In the context of

a specialized

mechanism

for calling

from the victims' perspective.

criminal conduct are either acquitted (which
sons,

some more

trial.

This

is

is

a lengthy

is

although

and generally un-

All too often soldiers

may of course be

readily understandable to the

others) or not even brought to

conflict,

West,

wrongdoers to account by criminal

prosecution on charges of war crimes or similar, that
satisfying process

armed

in the

accused of

for a variety of rea-

world outside the courtroom than

an allegation that might be made in the

current context of securing accountability for misconduct by British troops in
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Iraq, 35

but

it is

nothing new: there were notoriously few prosecutions of German

military officers

and

soldiers in the Reichsgericht at Leipzig for offenses allegedly

committed in World War

I,

and most of those that took place resulted either in ac-

quittals or in derisorily lenient prison sentences. 36

human rights law in
ment

is

relation to situations of occupation or other military deploy-

inevitable, given that civil litigation for

ants to secure than criminal

doubtless be seeing

The growth in the importance of

more of

trials.

these

compensation

In the United

human

is

Kingdom,

rights cases for

easier for claimat least,

we

will

compensation being

brought against the Ministry of Defence the longer our forces stay in theater.
All of which

is

not to say that British forces will no longer be applying the law of

armed conflict when they are deployed on operations abroad or

will

be looking

every military situation through the distorting lens of human rights obligations;

at
it

simply means that in certain limited situations, where for example they may be oc-

cupying territory or they
State, as is the case

apply the

may be based

in a foreign State with the consent of that

with both Iraq and Afghanistan, they are under an obligation to

ECHR and HRA in

relation to persons

who

are in their custody. But

it

would be inconceivable for them to be required to apply human rights law to field
operations on the battlefield, where the law of armed conflict is and will remain the
applicable lex specialis.

Court-Martial Proceedings
Since the period of belligerent occupation in Iraq by the Coalition Provisional

Authority in 2003-04, there have been two principal British courts-martial which
resulted in the convictions of soldiers accused of transgressions in relation to the

treatment of detainees in Iraq, as well as two other high-profile court-martial cases

The same facts that led to the civil proceedings in the
relation to the death of Baha Mousa in British military cus-

that failed for lack of evidence.

Al-Skeini litigation, in

tody, resulted in the court-martial of seven servicemen in the United

Kingdom

in

The trial, although not entirely a success, made legal history on two counts: it
involved the first instance of a British soldier pleading guilty to a war crimes charge
under the International Criminal Court Act 200 37 and it saw the first modern in2006.

stance of criminal charges being brought against senior British
dereliction of duty

—

in international

been the doctrine of

command

Army

officers for

law the basis for such a charge would have

responsibility.

Four

soldiers of

The Queen's

Lancashire Regiment were charged with inhumane treatment of the Iraqi civilians
in

September 2006. Of

charged under the

these,

Army Act

one (Corporal Donald Payne) was additionally

1955 38 with manslaughter and perverting the course

of justice, and another (Sergeant Kelvin Stacey) was charged with actual bodily
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harm or assault. Two
forming

a duty, as

Intelligence

Corps

officers

were charged with negligently per-

was Colonel Jorge Mendonca, the regimental commander. 39

Corporal Payne pleaded not guilty to manslaughter and perverting the course of

inhumane treatment of civilians and was senfrom the Army and one year's imprisonment in consequence. 40

justice but guilty to the charge of

tenced to dismissal

The other

accused were

six

acquitted due to lack of evidence. 41 Although the

all

Mendonca was eventually thrown out, 42 he was notable for
highest-ranking British military officer in modern history to be charged

charge against Colonel

being the

with a war crime, and particularly on

command responsibility principles. When he

subsequently decided to resign from the Army, despite his acquittal, rather than
face possible further internal disciplinary action, there

Attorney General and the
ing

him

there

as a scapegoat.

There

right that

criticism of the

Army Prosecuting Authority, who were accused of treatclearly a fine line to tread here.

is

was not enough evidence

was obviously

was much

to convict Colonel

Mendonca

On the one hand, if

of any crime, then

it

he was acquitted. But the criticism of putting him on

Army wanted to put an officer on trial" 43 is beside the point: the system of hierarchy and command responsibility, whereby every
court-martial simply "because the

commander is legally responsible for the troops under his command, is a lynchpin
of the modern law of armed conflict. The case of Payne and Others teaches us that
we should not shy away from calling senior officers to account when troops under
their command commit criminal offenses. If the officer either ordered the crimes
or knew or should have known that they were occurring and "failed to take all necessary

and reasonable measures"

to "prevent or repress their

commission or

to

submit the matter to the competent authorities for investigation and prosecution" 44 then he

do

must

face investigation and,

on

to concentrate

the ordinary soldiers

if

appropriate, prosecution.

and non-commissioned

commit the actual abuse; they are easy targets for a prosecution.
The Al-Skeini litigation and its associated courts-martial, although
profile matter

we have had

in the

United Kingdom.

Two

to courts-martial within the last three years, although

sult in a full trial as Fusilier

In

will

officers

The Queen

v.

not

who

the highest-

concerning treatment of detainees by British forces abroad,

the only case that

gone

It

is

specific cases

not

have

one of them did not

re-

Gary Bartlam, the soldier concerned, pleaded guilty. 45

Mark Paul Cooley, Darren Paul Larkin and Daniel Kenyon> 4b the

The Royal Regiment of Fusiliers)
faced a total of nine charges under the Army Act. 47 These included the same
charges as in Bartlam in relation to the same facts and others, namely, forcing two
three accused

(all

non-commissioned

officers in

detainees "to undress in front of others" and forcing two naked males "to simulate
a sexual act." In addition, offenses

of conduct to the prejudice of good order and

military discipline (contrary to Section 69 of the
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offense (contrary to Section 70 of the

Army Act) were also charged. The Section 69

charges related to simulating the punching and kicking of an
(in the case

unknown male and

of Corporal Kenyon, the most senior of the defendants) failing to re-

the assault and beating

command. The Section 70 charge involved
of an unknown male who was being detained by British

forces. All the incidents,

both in Bartlam and in Cooley, Larkin and Kenyon, arose

port unlawful acts by soldiers under his

out of an operation in
in

May 2003,

proceeded to

"Camp

Breadbasket" in the British Zone of Iraq near Basra

number of Iraqi civilians and
"work them hard" (as the British commanding officer apparently inin

which

British troops

rounded up

a

structed his men). This vague order, coupled with apparent failures in reporting

and supervision of conduct, led to

several situations in

and mentally abused by

physically

One

soldier stood

Iraqi detainees

were

The specific acts alleged instripping them and forcing them to simu-

British soldiers.

cluded punching and kicking detainees,
late sexual acts.

which

on

a detainee; a

group of others tied another

him off the ground. Astonishingly, some of
these misdeeds were photographed by some of the soldiers, and it was when one of
detainee to a forklift truck and raised

the latter took his film to be developed back in Britain that the matter was reported

A particularly disturbing aspect of the case was the

to the police for investigation.

failure to bring charges against the officer

who

quently failed to supervise his men. However,
large area

and the

was

Camp

Breadbasket covered quite a

particular abuses that were the subject of the court-martial oc-

curred in a discrete area of the
officer

gave the original order and subse-

located, such that

it

camp some

distance

would have been

from where the commanding

infeasible for

him

to have

known

what was going on. Consequently, the Army Prosecuting Authority did not
that there

of

was

command

sufficient evidence to charge

responsibility.

guilty to assault

and was

Of the

him with an

feel

offense under the doctrine

actual defendants in the case, Larkin pleaded

jailed for 140 days, while

Kenyon and Cooley were both

convicted and sentenced to eighteen months' and two years' imprisonment, respectively. 48 Cooley's sentence

was subsequently reduced

onment by the Army Reviewing
There has been
vilians (in

some

Authority.

to four

months' impris-

49

much generalized concern as to allegations of ill-treatment of ci-

cases allegedly

amounting to

torture)

by British troops

the subsequent investigations into such conduct by those troops.

mains one of the
rently ongoing.

51

will tell

in Iraq

The

and

issue re-

number of investigations are curhow many more cases arise and can be

greatest topical interest

Only time

50

and

prosecuted.
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Recent Legal Developments in the United States

The long

saga of detainee matters in the

US

there have been interesting developments in
v.

Hamdan and

United States

v.

courts has continued unabated and

two

cases in particular: United States

Khadr. 52 In June 2007, two different

US

military

judges in two different sets of proceedings in military commissions threw out

all

charges in the two cases, on the grounds that the accused had not been properly de-

termined to be "unlawful enemy combatants"
sions Act of 2006; therefore

all

in

terms of the Military Commis-

the charges were thrown out for lack of jurisdiction.

Hamdan, the judge held that the Combatant Status Review Tribunal's
(CSRT) determination that he was an "enemy combatant" was made for the pur-

In respect to

pose of determining whether or not he was properly detained, rather than whether
or not he was subject to
standard.

He

trial

by military commission, and using

a different legal

concluded:

either entitled to the protections accorded to a Prisoner of War, or

he is an
Commission,
alien unlawful enemy combatant
or he may have some other status. The Government [has] failed to determine, by
means of a competent tribunal, that he is an "unlawful enemy combatant" using the
53
definition established by Congress

[Hamdan]

is

subject to the jurisdiction of a Military

.

.

.

.

In respect to Khadr, the judge declared that "the military commission

not the

is

proper authority, under the provisions of the [Military Commissions Act], to determine that Mr. Khadr
tial

jurisdiction for this

is

an unlawful enemy combatant

commission

to try

Mr. Khadr."

Commissions Review (CMCR), however, has

in order to establish ini-

54

The Court of

Military

since reversed that ruling

on the

grounds that the distinction between "enemy combatant" and "unlawful enemy

combatant" status was purely semantic and that the judge had erred
sion that a

CSRT determination

requisite to trial

enemy combatant"

status

was a pre-

by military commission, because the military commission

had jurisdiction so
against Khadr,

of "unlawful

in his conclu-

to determine.

55

The

CMCR accordingly reinstated the charges

and the Department of Defense has now indicated

press ahead "expeditiously" with the

itself

full

that

it

intends to

prosecutions of Khadr and other detain-

same position. 56 Although some might have thought that the twin rulings
in June would provide a substantive obstacle to the entire system for the prosecution of detainees in the "War on Terror," throwing it into disarray and causing a
ees in the

general rethink
tion's plans

on the part of the Pentagon,

was only

clearly the setback to the Administra-

a temporary, procedural one.
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The "Global War on Terror": Comments on the General Legal Framework
In the last part of this article

will consider the

I

broader issues mentioned

at the

be-

ginning, namely, the broader international legal framework that might govern the

"Global

War on Terror."

what kind of armed

In short,

conflict

is it?

is it

This

an armed
is

case:

was

Al-Marri

v.

Wright,

legally resident in the

in

tary authorities without charge
brief, the

It is

which the applicant

United

States.

And if it is,

prompted by another detainee

has been heard recently in the United States.
57

conflict or not?

case that

not a military case but a
is

civilian

a civilian citizen of Qatar

Al-Marri had been detained by

and had been so detained

for

then

some four

US

who
mili-

years. In

Court of Appeals ruled that he could not be detained indefinitely by the

military authorities

and was

entitled to habeas corpus.

However,

I

do not intend

dwell on that aspect of the case, but rather on something else that the Court said,

most as an aside.

It is

in a couple of sentences in

middle of the Court's opinion;

to
al-

one of the paragraphs buried in the

has apparently escaped the attention of most

it

observers.

The Court in Al-Marri said that because the US Supreme Court had determined
in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 58 that the armed conflict with Al-Qaeda is a conflict "not of
an international character" and because there are no categories of combatants in
non-international conflicts, neither lawful combatants nor unlawful combatants,
the Military

Commissions Act did not apply

possible classification of him

and

legally resident in the

to Al-Marri

was that he was a

United

States,

civilian. 59

and the only remaining

Because he was a

he was entitled to certain constitutional

protections; as a civilian, he could not be transformed "into an

subject to indefinite military detention,

cause

it

represents, in

tainees in the

my opinion,

"War on Terror"

enemy combatant

any more than allegations of murder in

sociation with others while in military service permit the
a civilian into a soldier subject to trial

civilian

by court

as-

Government to transform

martial." 60 This

one of the two best options

is

interesting be-

for classifying de-

for the purposes of ensuring that they receive the

benefit of the best possible treatment in captivity.

This leads to a comparison of the

Hamdan

decision with the Israeli

Supreme

on targeted killings 61 and with certain aspects of the situation that
the United Kingdom had in relation to Northern Ireland. The view of the plurality
in Hamdan was that "there is at least one provision of the Geneva Conventions
Court's decision

that applies here, even

if

the relevant conflict

This the plurality identified as

which applies
conflicts,

as a

minimum

Common

is

not one between signatories." 62

Article 3 of the

Geneva Conventions,

standard for humanitarian protection in

although on the face of it the provision

conflicts not of an international character, in
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persons taking no active part in

hostilities,

including those placed hors de combat

by wounds or sickness and those who have surrendered or have otherwise been
detained.

The key

conflict not of

to this part of the decision in

Hamdan was

the phrase

"armed

an international character," a phrase which the plurality held to

have a meaning "in contradistinction to a conflict between nations": effectively a
negative definition, such that

armed

it

could be interpreted as bringing within

all

conflict

paradigm. The plurality asserted that

do not

ambit

within the traditional inter-State armed

any and

conflicts that

its

fit

this

was the

"literal

meaning" of the

phrase "armed conflicts not of an international character," and that in any event
the intention behind the provision, while ostensibly restricted specifically to non-

armed

international

conflicts in the classic sense of international law,

was

for the

purposes of its scope of application and protection to be as wide as possible. 63
the dissenting opinions in

Hamdan, only Justice Thomas dealt directly with

sue of the nature of the conflict between the United States and Al-Qaeda.
that "the conflict with

Al-Qaeda

is

one of the High Contracting

it is

Parties."

is-

He held

international in character, in the sense that

occurring in various nations around the globe. Thus,
ritory of more than

the

Of

it is

also occurring in the ter64

Although he described

"armed conflicts not of an international

the plurality's interpretation of the phrase

character" as "admittedly plausible" he nevertheless

felt

constrained by a judicial

duty of deference to the Executive's determination of matters of war and peace. 65

So the plurality of the

War on

Terror"

from what was

is

US Supreme Court

held that the totality of the "Global

an armed conflict not of an international character, proceeding

essentially a functionalist perspective: the necessity to

determine

the legality of the military commissions established by President Bush,

and apply-

ing a

literalist

the decision of the Israeli

nario

now to a comparison with
to a much more limited sce-

reading of the letter of the law. Turning

— namely,

Supreme Court

in respect

Defense Forces (IDF) actions against Palestinian militants in

Israel

the Occupied Palestinian Territories and in areas under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority

—

a

much more

holistic

approach was applied by the Court

in

seeking to explain the whole legal framework underpinning IDF operations in this

The Israeli Supreme Court reached a diametrically opposite conclusion to
that of its American counterpart, namely, that the conflict between Israel and the
Palestinians is an international armed conflict.
Most international lawyers outside the Middle East would have thought that
theater.

that

is

tional

a counterintuitive position to take,

armed

conflict, there

have to be two or more

not a State in international law. So

it

are

still

under

Israeli

States,

it

to be an interna-

and the Palestinians are

looks a bit unlikely from that perspective,

though there are other grounds on which
that

because normally for

it

could be plausible. For example, areas

occupation could be said to be
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still

in a state

of
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armed conflict by virtue of being under belligerent occupation. Conversely, the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians could not intuitively have
been considered a non-international armed conflict either, because some parts of
the Occupied Territories remain under the occupation of Israel and other parts are
under the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority and in neither case are they legally part of the State of Israel. So it cannot be a non-international armed conflict,
because it is not occurring on the territory of only one State. The classification of
the armed conflict was a point of agreement between the petitioners and the State.
The latter made a very interesting point in its submissions:
international

The question of the classification of the conflict between

Israel

and the

Palestinians

a

is

complicated question, with characteristics that point in different directions. In any
case, there is

no need

because according

to decide that question in order to decide the petition.

to all of the classifications

conflict will apply to the acts of the State.

party to the

of armed

conflict, the

That

is

laws of armed

These laws allow striking at persons who are a

armed conflict and take an active part in it, whether it is an international or
armed conflict, and even if it belongs to a new category of armed

a non-international
conflict

which has been developing over the last decade

in international law: a category

of armed conflicts between States and terrorist organisations. According to each of
these categories, a person who
it is

I

a combatant,

think this

that

it

is

amounts

cally the

and

it is

is

a party to the

armed conflict and takes an active part in

number of reasons, one of which in this context is
many of the rules in armed conflicts are now basi-

interesting for a
to saying that

same, irrespective of the classification of the conflict in question, so

necessary to worry too

This

is

permissible to strike at him. 66

much about whether

certainly a tendency that has

the conflict

been gathering

is

it is

not

international or not.

force, albeit in the slightly dif-

ferent context of application of penal sanctions for violations of the law of armed
conflict, since the

jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the

former Yugoslavia began to develop some twelve years ago. To the extent that the
State of Israel,

through

variant thereof,

it

its

counsel in this litigation, expressed the same view or a

could be viewed as an example of the accumulation of opinio

on this point.
The Supreme Court of Israel, nevertheless, did not choose to go down the particular path opened to it by the State's submissions on the character of the armed
conflict between Israel and the Palestinians. Instead, it ruled simply that the applicable law was that governing international armed conflicts and it did so for two

juris

particular reasons:
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of the armed conflict crossing the frontiers of the State,

(1) the fact

pre- 1967 frontiers,
67

and

reference

to

occupation;

(2)

by

and taking place within

the

military

organizations. This point
specific situation that the

The

is, I

the

a context of belligerent

of

capabilities

modern

terrorist

think, of more general application than the

Court was dealing with.

The Court expressed

latter point, in particular, is quite innovative.

The

i.e.,

fact that the terrorist organisations

thus:

it

and their members do not act in the name of a
them into a purely internal State conflict.

State does not turn the struggle against

Indeed, in today's

reality, a terrorist

organisation

is

likely to

have considerable military

At times, they have military capabilities that exceed those of

capabilities.

Confrontation with those dangers cannot be restricted within the State and
law.

States.

its

penal

Confronting the dangers of terrorism constitutes a part of the international law

dealing with

armed

conflicts of an international character.

The decisions of the US and

68

Supreme Courts in these two cases represent two alternative classifications of the "War on Terror," or at least certain aspects thereof, as an armed conflict. While I think that there is much to commend
the contextual analysis that was adopted by the Israeli Court, the American approach seems somewhat literal by comparison. Nevertheless, at the very least the
US Supreme Court decision might signal a resurgence of an emphasis on the usefulness of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. 69 That can be broadIsraeli

ened for those States that are parties to Additional Protocol
guarantees" contained in Article 75 thereof.

What

is

I

to the

"fundamental

innovative about the deci-

Common

sion in

Hamdan

what

not really a non-international armed conflict as traditionally understood

is

in international
flict.

That

is

in this particular respect

law

at all,

is

that

it

applies

Article 3 to

but might rather be called a transnational armed con-

to say, the conflict

is

neither specifically international nor specifically

non-international in nature within the traditional framework of the law of armed
conflict,

but

it

is

transnational because

it

occurs in

world simultaneously within the same context of

any event,

common

denominator

more than one

hostilities.

State in the

Common

Article 3,

humanitarian protection:

it

should have the widest scope of application possible, which essentially means

it

in

is

the lowest

should be applied

The

in all

Israeli decision,

analysis.

However,

it

is

for

armed conflicts, no matter how they are classified.
on the other hand, is seductive in the clarity and logic of its
quite clear that the Court there was only seeking to deal

with the situation as between Israel and Palestinian militants. Nevertheless, the
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more
sweeping statement of the law might have been intended, however peripherally, by

passages quoted above might be interpreted as suggesting that a broader,

the Court.

me very briefly consider the Northern Ireland example, which is often mentioned as a predecessor in some ways for dealing with the "Global War on Terror."
Let

In terms of the latter phrase, the experience of Northern Ireland clearly shows that
there

is

nothing new,

at least rhetorically, in the

—

power of internment
duced in the province

use of such language.

indefinite detention without charge or trial

in 1972,

its

When

—was

the

intro-

Prime Minister, Brian Faulkner, said that North-

ern Ireland was "quite simply at war with the terrorist." 70 The Irish Republican

Army (IRA)

tried to claim prisoner of war

been detained by British security
British authorities.

situation in

71

(POW)

forces, a status

status for

operatives

who had

which was not accepted by the

Indeed, the perspective of the British government was that the

Northern Ireland did not amount to an armed

the sense of international law; the legal

forces were deployed in

conflict of

framework within which

United Kingdom being that of Military Aid to the

Civil

it

any kind in

operated in the

Power, wherein the armed

Northern Ireland pursuant to a request from the Northern

Ireland government, which
escalating situation

its

felt

that the

normal police

and needed military

forces could not contain the

assistance to restore law

and

order.

It

could not in any event have been an international armed conflict because Northern
Ireland
tocol

I

is

a part of the

situation, as a

United Kingdom.

war of national

It

could not have been an Additional Pro-

liberation,

even though that

is

what the IRA

Kingdom was not at the time a party to
Additional Protocol I, and second, because the IRA failed to make the declaration
that is required of a national liberation movement under Article 96(3). Finally, it
sought to claim,

first,

because the United

could not have been a situation under Additional Protocol

United Kingdom was not

at the

II,

again because the

time a party to that instrument. In any event, the

would not have been met by the IRA in terms of control of
and the violence was for the most part too sporadic and isolated to meet

threshold of application
territory,

the Protocol's requirements.

The contemporary British position in terms of the "Global War on Terror" as an
armed conflict is that the United Kingdom does not accept the notion that such a
"war" exists as an armed conflict of any classification in international law. Any determination as to the type of an armed conflict in which British forces are engaged
will be made on a case-by-case basis, depending on the facts on the ground in each
given situation. 72 The legal basis of the decision in any event is the international law
definition of an international or non-international armed conflict, in conjunction
with the facts on the ground. If British forces are in action against the government
or other official forces of any other State, the situation will be dealt with as one of
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international

armed

conflict. In

any other situation

in

which

British troops are de-

armed

ployed, the situation will be regarded as one of de facto non-international
conflict.

Thus, from the

ing place in Afghanistan
the United

The

Kingdom

is

UK point of view, hostilities that are currently tak-

official

and Iraq are

States:

it is

a conflict

between the

invited British troops to assist

it

entirely devoid of sense

US Supreme

from

is

not a conflict between the British and Iraqi

Iraqi State

and

Iraqi insurgents,

in certain parts of Iraq in

gency. Although this might, again,

and the former

combating the insur-

seem a counterintuitive position to take,

a strictly legal perspective, in the

Court's decision in

which

on the side of the governments of those States.

participating

conflict in Iraq, for example,

in effect treated as internal conflicts in

Hamdan

has a certain logic to

same way

it is

not

that the

it.

Concluding Remarks

I

think that there are six possibilities that

legal

we could

framework of the "Global War on Terror"

consider in terms of the broad

law of armed

in the sense of the

conflict.

(1)

—

The "war" is an armed conflict and it is international in nature that
would essentially be an extension of what the Israeli Supreme Court held
in the targeted killings case;

(2)

The "war"
that

(3)

is

is

an armed conflict and

what the US Supreme Court

The "war"

is

going to be that

is

what actual

some

the actual situation

because

(4)

it

does not

The "war"

is

Hamdan;

has a

it

if

we call

it

respects because

on the ground,

tell

us

new kind

as a "transnational

armed

a "transnational

do we apply? While

rules

classification in

non-international in nature

said in

an armed conflict and

which might be described
issue here

it is

it is
it

is

this

of hybrid status
conflict" 73

armed

—

conflict"

looks attractive as a

factually realistic in terms of

not ultimately that helpful

much about the details of the law to be applied;

an armed conflict and

its

precise classification in terms of

the law of armed conflict does not really matter because in any event
will

in

apply the

question

is

the

minimum yardstick of Common Article 3 and
a party to Additional Protocol

I

—we

if the

State

are also going to apply

the fundamental guarantees contained in Article 75;
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(5)

The "war" does not

constitute an overarching

purposes of international law

—the various

armed

conflict for the

counterterrorist military

operations which have been taking place since September 2001 should be

viewed

as falling primarily within the

law enforcement,
military forces;

(6)

albeit

framework of large-scale criminal

they are undertaken either largely or entirely by

and

The "war" does not

constitute an overarching

armed

but each

conflict,

individual counterterrorist military operation in the context thereof

should be

designated

separately

as

international in nature, depending

on

and the facts on the ground

—

this

is

either

international

or

non-

the international law definition

the position currently maintained by

the British government.

Ultimately, the

most important

issue here

is

the practical one of the standards

according to which detainees captured in counterterrorist military operations are
treated.

The fundamental point

is

that the purpose of the law of armed conflict in

the context of detainee treatment has to be to provide the

maximum amount

of

means applying Common Article 3 at the very least,
then perhaps that is the best thing that we can do. But in some respects I would say
protection possible, and

if that

much if we treat detainees as POWs. This is not
the same thing as saying that they are POWs, just that we treat them as if they were
POWs. It does not stop the State from prosecuting them after capture, and by doing so we would be applying the maximum possible humanitarian protection and
that

it

should not even matter too

would be complying with the spirit and letter of Geneva Convention III. 74
There is no logical reason, other than State pride, for this to be taken as a commentary on the legitimacy or otherwise of the terrorist organizations such attitudes are in any event outmoded by the contemporary paradigm of asymmetrical
warfare and the inevitable diminution in the importance of reciprocity as a primary basis of obligation in the international law of armed conflict. I concede that

—

the view expressed herein

seems to

is

unlikely to be widely adopted at the present time, but

it

me to be a rational and practical one. At the end of the day, the law in war

has to protect detainees, and what
basic parameters of applying

we need

is

not more law but agreement on the

Common Article 3, what that means in practice, and

firm and consistent application of Article 75 of Additional Protocol
States that are parties thereto.

75
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trigger application of the basic princi-

is

Article 3

much
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this analysis. In its application

of

armed conflict on which
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Article 3, at least,
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the conduct of hostilities
74.

is

it

it

remains vague as to what specific rules on

would be applicable.
Convention III, supra note 4,

Article 5 of Geneva

specifies that "[sjhould

any doubt

arise

belong to [the category of POW], such persons shall enjoy the protecConvention until such time as their status has been determined by a competent tribunal." In my opinion, it is abundantly clear from the continuing controversy over the
status and treatment of detainees that doubt has indeed arisen.
75. It is regrettable to conclude on a negative note, but for a contrary view to the one espoused herein, see the comments of John B. Bellinger, Legal Advisor to the US Department of
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tion of the present

State:

Critics

have suggested that the United States

is

backing away from the Geneva

Conventions or ignoring them, and want to be crystal clear, the United States remains
absolutely committed to the Geneva Conventions. We support them, we apply them.
I

But one does have to read what they
fact

apply to conflicts between

states.

They do not apply to every situation. They in
So therefore the Geneva Conventions do not give

say.
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you the answers about who can be held in a conflict with a non-state actor. They do not
tell you how long you can hold someone in a conflict with a non-state actor. They do
not tell you what countries to return people to ...
The United States is firmly
committed to the law that applies. We're also committed to working with other
countries around the world to develop new legal norms in cases where existing law does
not give one the answers. But what we do think is problematic is to simply suggest that
the Geneva Conventions provide all the answers in fighting international terrorism,
and that countries simply need to follow the Geneva Conventions and that is the end of
.

the matter.

US Mission to the United Nations in Geneva, Press Conference by the US Delegation to the 30th
International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (Nov. 27, 2007), http://
geneva.usmission.gov/Press2007/1127RedCross.html.
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COALITION OPERATIONS

XI
Issues Arising

from Coalition Operations:

An Operational Lawyer's Perspective

Neil

The aim

of this

article is to illustrate the types

during coalition operations and

drawn from
the period

my experience

of practical legal issues that arise

how they maybe managed. These issues are

in relation to operations involving

from October 2002

combat operations

Brown*

to February

that followed the invasion of Iraq in

points where

limited, but
I

I

will

during

2005 and, in particular, to the period of

they relate in part to operations that are continuing today,
tail is strictly

UK forces

March

2003. Given that

my ability to disclose de-

endeavor to provide practical examples to

illustrate

can.

The Role of the Operational Lawyer

Among the

essential functions of every coalition

in the planning

and execution of a mission,

military capabilities across his force.

It

commander

to identify

is

the requirement,

and manage the

differing

follows, therefore, that insofar as they

might

impact on the scope of the military missions, the role of his operational lawyer in
the planning

* Captain,

and conduct of the mission

Royal Navy. The views expressed in

represent those of the Royal Navy, the United

Government.

is

to identify,

minimize and manage the

this article are those

of the author and do not

Kingdom Ministry of Defence

or

Her Majesty's

Issues Arising from Coalition Operations:

An

Operational Lawyer's Perspective

commander is fully sighted
on them. This requires a deep knowledge not only of "his own" national legal posidifferent national legal positions

tion,

and

to ensure that his

but also of those of each coalition partner, drawing on whether each has ratified

treaties

and conventions (and,

as well as

if so,

with what reservations and understandings),

an understanding of each

State's practice, opinio juris

and academic

writings.

With

the increasingly frequent deployment of forces to multinational peace-

keeping and peace-enforcement missions throughout the 1990s,

between even the

closest coalition partners,

radar during decades dominated by Cold

which had remained

War planning, became

legal differences

largely

below the

increasingly visi-

ble.

By the end of that decade, many lessons had been

ject

of the closest examination from the general, such as our respective positions on

identified

and were the sub-

the use of lethal force in the defense of property, to the specific, such as

"What could

we have done under our own laws if faced with a 'Srebrenica'?"
The invasion and occupation of Iraq by coalition forces in 2003 threw up
1

many "coalition

issues" but

I

will focus

on

three:

first,

a great

those arising from targeting;

second, those in relation to rules of engagement (ROE); and third, those arising

from the capture of internees, detainees and prisoners of war.

main

subjects shortly, but, using a

well-known example,

the sort of complex coalition issues that

let

I

will return to the

me start by illustrating

may arise.

Anti-personnel Landmines

An

oft-cited

mines.

2

example of coalition differences

Put simply, signatories to

landmines

in the "victim-initiated

this

the Ottawa Convention

is

on land-

Convention may not use anti-personnel

mode,"

that

the presence, proximity or contact of a person.

is,

It

when

may be exploded by

they

does not, however, prevent either

the use of other types of landmines, or indeed the use of anti-personnel landmines

other than in the "victim-initiated mode."

While

this presents the land

prised of both "Ottawa"
legal issues

component commander of a

and "non-Ottawa"

extend beyond the "mere"

coalition force

com-

States with a tactical complication, the

tactical. If a

commander,

as a result of treaty

upon him by "Ottawa," cannot authorize the use of air-dropped
anti-personnel landmines to deny an enemy access to a particular facility, he may
be laced with the expectation of a higher number of civilian casualties as a result of
obligations placed

a kinetic strike. If expected civilian casualties are excessive in relation to the direct

and concrete military advantage anticipated, no attack may be
excessive, they

possible.

may, of course, be greater than those expected

if

Even

if not

landmines were

used instead. There may, therefore, be a tension between treaty obligations. Indeed,
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given that prohibitions under "Ottawa" extend to those

who would "use,

develop,

produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to anyone, directly or indirectly" 3 or

who would

ited activity"

4

"assist,

encourage, induce anyone else to engage in prohib-

differing national positions within a coalition

might have wider

repercussions and complicate the provision of basing and the

complex

management of

air-tasking order cycles during high-intensity warfighting.

March

Legal Framework for the Conduct of Operations in Iraq from

Whatever the precise
operations,

legal bases

at the operational

coalition positions, the

and tactical levels was of the legal

framework to regulate the conduct of the operation. What was
was that any invasion would precipitate an armed
law would be the law of armed

May 2003

adopted by coalition partners for the conduct of

and there were subtle differences among the

most important legal question

to

conflict in

clear

by early 2003

which the operative

conflict.

Targeting

The Gulf War of 1991 generated much legal debate over the extent to which Additional Protocol I (AP I) 5 was said to codify the customary international law on the
use of force in armed conflict. This may have been in part because at the time, while
most of the members of the coalition against Iraq had ratified AP I, the United
Kingdom and Australia had signed but not ratified, and the United States had
signed but in 1987 announced that it did not intend to become a party. This, and
the fact that Iraq had not even signed it, meant that AP I was therefore not applicable to those hostilities. Between 1991 and 2003 there had been only modest change
to the overall position in that the United Kingdom (like Australia) had ratified AP I,
whereas the United States and Iraq had not. Nevertheless, in 2003 as a matter of
practice

it is

distinction
set

out in

whether
2003,

1

arguable that the definition of a military objective and the principles of

and proportionality, even the use of precautions

AP

as a

I,

6

were generally applied by

matter of practice AP

would have

Among

to say that

I

all

coalition forces. Put simply,

if

number

not.

are simply practical.

The

relatively

straightforward application of customary international law as reflected in

during the high-intensity warfighting operations in the
part to the scale

from Kuwait

first

and character of the operation. Despite

power, the 2003 invasion force was about half the
Iraq

asked

differences were significant in the early part of

on the whole they were

the reasons for this, a

in attack, as they are

size

in 1991. This relatively small force
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its
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of that which had evicted

embarked upon

a high-speed
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land offensive on a single axis aimed at Baghdad. This had three consequences that,

taken together, had a significant legal
warfighting mission was

—

effect. First,

by the time of the invasion the

—an agreed one. Second,

effectively

and char-

the scale

maneuver had required the governments of coalition forces to delegate the authority to conduct attacks to their commanders in theater. And third,
in those first six weeks or so of operations, coalition forces conducted what was, legally speaking, a most conventional international armed conflict.
acter of the land

—

The proportionality test as it applies in targeting, and in particular to the center of gravity, which is a determination of the military advantage
is ideally suited
to use

—

by military commanders

tional land

campaign. That

in support of their forces

not to say that there

is

my experience,

differences are, in

who have an understanding

of,

will

for,

conven-

in a

not be differences, but most

successfully resolved

and respect

engaged

by

staff officers in theater

each others' national positions.

This was greatly assisted in 2003 by the presence in deployed headquarters of UK

and US

who were able to draw upon shared experience and mutual confi-

officers

dence that had grown out of operations conducted together since 9/11 in relation
to Afghanistan. Finally,

sued,

it

and perhaps

must be accepted

successful that

that the initial

commanders were

which have en-

ironically in light of events

combat operations were

successful; so

able to apply a cautious approach without any

obvious military penalty, and could have decided not to authorize attacks which,
while capable of being conducted lawfully, might have had an adverse information

operations impact.
I

have until

now focused on the issues as they relate to what might be called "de-

liberate targeting." This

is

where the most senior military commanders

supported by technologically sophisticated targeting systems and
including

(among

specialist staffs,

others) targeteers, intelligence officers, image analysts, opera-

tional analysts and, of course, legal advisers,
gality

in theater,

make command

of airstrikes as part of a huge and sophisticated

decisions

command

on the

process.

le-

Such

processes are quite capable of delivering kinetic attacks by hundreds of aircraft

throughout a campaign. While that process

and complexity

—

agile,

not

all air

is

incredibly accurate

and

—

on

to take the greatest steps to avoid or

civilians to the extent that

obligations

same

upon

all

who

law. Therefore,

it is

it is

its

size

attacks can be subject to the deliberate targeting

process however expedited. While the law places the heaviest burden

commanders

for

feasible for

plan, authorize

minimize the

them

to

and conduct

do

effects

on senior

of an attack

so, the reality

is

attacks are derived

that the

from the

perhaps a dangerous oversimplification to suggest

that,

except where attacks are approved as a part of a deliberate targeting process, the use

of force

is

solely a matter for

ROE.
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In order to provide support to land forces engaging the

enemy in a city or built-

up area, the availability of immediate kinetic support to be applied with the highest
possible accuracy

is

necessary. In 2003, in response to an "urgent operational re-

quirement," coalition partners acting independently produced strikingly similar
direction

and guidance that

identified the

same legal

obligations, identified the re-

spective legal responsibilities of those requiring close air support

involved in providing
targeting process
legal obligations

all

it,

and sought to ensure

that within

involved were quite clear as to

and those directly

what was

a tactical-level

"who owned the bomb"

were discharged. Coalition forces were

so that

effectively interoperable in

this respect.

Rules of Engagement

Having

set

out some of the successful features of recent coalition operations and

demonstrated their interoperability,
the coalition partners at
tives

all

I

now

have to make an admission

times operated on their

and their own separate rules of engagement.

been asked to consider the problems that

Having trained

as

own

—

in

2003

separate targeting direc-

mind that I have
flow from not having coalition ROE.
It is

with

this in

an operational lawyer in the years that followed Kosovo,

I

was

keenly aware of the perception that coalition operations are necessarily fraught

with

difficulties or, in the

view of some, that they

may be more

trouble than they

The difficulties of Kosovo and other coalition operations in the 1990s
have clearly had a lasting impact in military legal circles on both sides of the Atlantic and may even be behind the specific question which I have been asked to
are worth.

address.

There is no doubt that in each of our respective nations

ROE can mean different

They can be placed in different parts of mission directives or operational orders. They can be presented in the form of guidance or orders. They can use different language and style. However, as I have sought to suggest here, if the legal basis
for the mission and the legal framework for the use of force used by coalition partthings.

ners are sufficiently coherent, then the use of different
style

and process

is

ROE doctrine,

The key question about national
"
do they mean 7

entirely manageable.

the coalition context

is

"What

exactly

formatting,

ROE in

Too often, operators, and even occasionally military lawyers, have been tempted
to label differences in national

law or policy as

"ROE problems." Such debate does

not begin to identify the problem, only the symptom.

guidance (that distinction

is

ROE are rules or
common legal au-

If different

not important here) that

reflect a

thority to conduct a mission then their effects will be largely the same.
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For more than a decade after the passing of the
to enforce the sanctions

imposed

after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait

manders enjoyed the use of a mandate

inward and outward maritime shipping"

—

to stopping vessels

in order to

ensure

7

maritime com-

was perhaps unprecedented

that

and robustness, and became accustomed

plicity

UN Security Council resolution

strict

in its

sim-

— indeed

"all

implementa-

embargo imposed by Security Council Resolution 66 1. 8 Once estabthat a vessel was proceeding to or from Iraq (not too arduous a task given the

tion of the
lished

geography of the northern Arabian Gulf) there was no requirement to have either
the "suspicion" or "reasonable grounds" as to
that are

armed

common

its

precise activity before boarding

requirements in peace and (in relation to neutral vessels) in

conflict.

Post-9/11 maritime operations were not legally so straightforward. Indeed, in
the context of maritime security operations, the vexing issue of masters' consensual boardings illustrates the altogether different legal picture that exists.

coalition partners,

some (including

Kingdom) do not

the United

Among

believe that the

master has the authority to permit boardings by foreign authorities under either
the 1982 United Nations Convention

of the

sea.

Others disagree and take the position that with the voluntary permission

of the master not only

may be

on the Law of the Sea 9 or the customary law

inspected. 10

by operators
what certain

may the

While

this

vessel be boarded,

but the ship's papers and cargo

and other national

legal positions

to a matrix of coalition
States can

and cannot do,

ROE
this

and

is

may be reduced

a "traffic light" encapsulation of

not a

ROE issue. Instead, it is the seri-

ous business of sovereign States having different views on the status of international law; views to

which they are entitled and views which will not be remedied by

simple request to the chain of command to modify the ROE.

The conundrum

for military lawyers

particular the relationship
difficult

between

tions are lawful" to "the

There has been a crucial

on the

ever,

when ROE permit

met or

is

may be

used

but within a coalition
"if the

Does

in

it is

quite pos-

ROE permit me to act my ac-

—

if

we

are unable to identify the link between

them the cohesion of the coalition is at risk.
debate in academic and military legal circles

issue of "direct participation in hostilities."

tackers "hostile"?

ROE, and

ROE permit me to act within the law." The implications of

legal authority for

years

forces,

could range from

such different approaches are plain

ROE and

to ensure that the status of

ROE and the law, is absolutely clear. This task is

enough within national armed

sible that national positions

is

a relatively junior
it

mean

commander

it

mean, how-

to declare unidentified at-

that a test for the "direct participation" has

he simply determining that they are
in self-defense? If it

What does

in recent

is

ulated by the law of armed conflict

a threat against

which

been

lethal force

the former, the conduct of any attack will be reg-

and the operative proportionality rule will
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be

much more

permissive than that available under any national laws.

If

the

it is

armed conflict, those captured will have the right to be treated as prisoners of war. These are the legal implications which can flow from the application
former, in an

of ROE at the individual unit

level.

A coalition commander must be vested (by his operational lawyer) with a compete understanding of what coalition forces can and cannot do, and why.

He must

know whether he can expect disparities to be remedied by a ROE request for additional authority to act, or

whether a

national legal positions. Coalition

States' forces are already at the limits

of their

commanders must appreciate whether those na-

tional positions are policy positions (which

may change)

or legal positions (which

common ROE remedy these perceived problems? My short answer to this is no, but I can quite see how the use of common lanmay be less likely to

change). Will a

guage and form might greatly

managing

assist

the process of identifying, minimizing

and

different national positions.

Prisoners of War, Detainees

and Internees

Given the almost immediate and widespread legal controversy that surrounded the
establishment of the detention

facility at

the

US

Guantanamo Bay,
in March 2003 of a

naval base at

Cuba, the conclusion by the three main coalition partners

memorandum of understanding (MOU) for the handling and transfer of prisoners
of war, internees and detainees in Iraq was a clear indication of the anticipated
"conventional" international armed conflict which was to

commence with the

in-

The power to capture enemy combatants in Iraq was derived from belligerent powers under the law of armed conflict and the conditions for their treatment
were, the partners agreed, set out in the Third Geneva Convention. 11 The resultant
MOU was, in great part, similar to that agreed by their predecessors in 1991 and
vasion.

provided, in particular, for the transfer of prisoners between coalition partners.

And so

if

asked whether there were, during combat operations in 2003,

signifi-

cant coalition problems in relation to the handling of prisoners of war, internees

and detainees

in Iraq as a result of any different interpretation of the

law of armed

would have to say no. Even when the actions of a large proportion of the
Iraqi military who abandoned their units and uniforms at an early stage in the war
threw up unexpected challenges, the handling of issues was generally successful.
conflict

I

This included, for example, the instigation of a novel
volving joint teams of

screening system in-

UK and US military legal and operational officers to process

numbers of prisoners where the delay to conduct Article
was unnecessary.

large

case

initial
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issues relating to prisoner of war

camps were

relatively straightfor-

ward, ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have presented complex coalition

legal

Under

challenges.

occupying powers

78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention

Article

may intern inhabitants of the occupied territory "for imperative

reasons of security." 13 This power has been broadly preserved in the

UN Security

Council resolutions that have authorized the ongoing presence of multinational
forces in Iraq since 2004. 14 Indeed, using this

an average of around 120 internees

in the

power the United Kingdom has held

Multi-National Division South East area

of responsibility, including one (Mr. Al Jeddah, a
since 2004.

The United Kingdom's

UK

citizen captured in Iraq)

ability to intern has

been the subject of legal

challenge in our domestic courts.

Many will be familiar with the position of the United Kingdom in relation to the

UK domestic courts arising out of incidents in Iraq
have now established that those captured and held by UK forces on operations outdeath penalty, but cases in the

armed conflict have rights under the European Convention of Human Rights
(ECHR). 15 These include not only the right not to be tortured but also a right to liberty. On this basis, the right to intern was challenged and successfully defended. A
side

feature of

UK operations since 2003 therefore has been the legal examination of the
and international human

relationship between international humanitarian law

when detainees and internees may be handed
whom. The United Kingdom cannot transfer internees to States who

rights law, particularly in relation to

over and to

cannot guarantee that their essential

mands upon

coalition

human

rights will

be upheld. This places de-

commanders to understand, through their operational legal

advisers, the respective legal responsibilities

command. Can we guarantee
partner they will be released when

which apply

operational

that

alition

their

if

to

all

those under their

internees are transferred to a co-

internment

is

no longer necessary

for imperative reasons of security in Iraq or

may they still be held while they are of

actual or even potential intelligence value?

Concerns about torture and mistreat-

ment may get

the headlines, but given the right to liberty present in the

other similar regimes, the first-order issue for coalition
identify exactly

what

legal authority coalition partners

they have to detain and

when

ECHR and

commanders may be

to

and host nations believe

they consider they are obliged to release.

Private Military Contractors

Although much progress has been made
cussed above, there
ful

is

an elephant

in the

in recent years in addressing the issues dis-

room

that will,

I

believe, require

attention, even in the maritime environment. If they have not

coalition planners

may

in the future

our care-

done so

already,

have to consider not only international
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military forces

and interagency

and international interagency

forces

also the private military contractors

Brown

who seem determined

to

which may previously have been considered the preserve of the

forces,

expand into

but

roles

military.

Concluding Comments

I

believe that coalition operations can work,

instigated coalition

and can work well.

I

witnessed a US-

ROE response to a successful suicide vessel-borne improvised

explosive device attack

on

a boarding party in the northern Arabian Gulf that took

hours, not days or weeks, to plan and implement. This was possible because the op-

commanders in the region as a matter of
minimized and managed their respective coali-

erational legal advisers to the maritime

course had continually identified,

tion positions. There will continue to be difficulties, but perhaps militaries

military lawyers have

have,

all

begun

to understand better

how

to deal with them. If they

commanders may begin to view the law as
constraint and more as an enabler.

military

tions less as a

and

it

applies across coali-
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XII
Coalition Operations:

A Compromise or an

Accommodation

Vicki McConachie*
[TJhere

is

no quandary in the mind ofAustralia's military leaders when we ex-

amine where we might need

to

be technologically;

United States as a benchmark. However,

we use interoperability with

we must strike a

remain interoperable with both technically advanced
nically advanced, but no less important, regional

successfully led the

allies

and

we

those not as tech-

and coalition partners. Australia

UN effort in East Timor because

command and control systems,

balance that ensures

the

it

had

the ability to flex

its

and procedures

in

technology, tactics, techniques

both directions to accommodate coalition partners across a range of technological capabilities.

We must continue to achieve this balance within a

tight budget.
1

This will challenge our ingenuity and, I suspect at times, our patience!

Legal

interoperability

interoperability;

However,

While

it

it is

ways,

similar

to

technological

required for nations to operate effectively in coalitions.

legal interoperability

may be

many

in

is,

is

relatively easy to

for technological interoperability,

also in

many ways more

difficult to achieve.

persuade those outside the military of the need
it is

perhaps more

difficult to

persuade those en-

gaged in international negotiations that military interoperability should take precedence over other goals a nation might wish to achieve in becoming a signatory to

*

Commodore, Royal Australian Navy. The views expressed in

this article are those

of the author

alone and do not necessarily represent the views of the Australian government, the Australian

Defence Force or the Royal Australian Navy.
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proposed international agreement. This means that military planners, with the

assistance of their lawyers,

must

find a practical

way

accommodate

to

the various

needs of their coalition partners while ensuring that operations are not

legal

compromised.
In this article
tions.

I

will

I

am

going to deal with the issues surrounding coalition opera-

begin with a brief overview followed by a discussion of some of the

main constraints, how they are dealt with (both formally and on a practical level)
and what opportunities we gain from accommodating the differences of our coalition partners.

—or

at least

the fact that coalition

mem-

Many of the issues surrounding coalition operations are well settled
well-furrowed ground. At the heart of these issues

is

who come together for a common purpose may not be signatories to the same
conventions and, even if they are, they may not have a common interpretation of
the applicable international law. They may view the nature of the operation as being different in character, one member characterizing the operation as a police ac-

bers

another as a non-international armed conflict and a third as an international

tion,

armed conflict. The coalition partners will certainly have varying obligations under
their domestic laws and may have quite different domestic political imperatives
leading to differing policy guidance. All of this must be accommodated to achieve a
successful mission outcome.

It is

important to note that

for operations then political resolve

if you lose

public support

may be undermined, leading to

disintegration

of a coalition.

On

occasion a coalition partner

simple resolution.
tions.

A coalition

is

may wish

that these differences

What must be remembered, however,

is

would have

a

that these are coali-

not a group of client States acting subject to a patron's desires.

come together, usually pursuant to a UN Security Council resolution, and it is composed of sovereign States who have chosen for various reasons
to act together to pursue interests that may be different, but which will be served by
their presence in the coalition and the actions that they take while members of that
The

coalition has

coalition.

As noted by Rear Admiral Raydon Gates, Royal Australian Navy:

In coalitions, compatible national interests are

compatible interests are not necessarily
the coalition force

common

and

certainly

interests.

we immediately have the potential

for a

terms of

.

.

[I]t

present, but

follows that within

number of different

objectives, reflecting differing national political objectives.

Nonetheless a coalition partner

.

must be

military

2

may feel that, because of its greater commitment in

manpower and economic

contribution and

for the success or otherwise of the mission,
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it

its

ostensible responsibility

should prevail where there are

Vicki

differences of opinion.
ality is that all States

ligations

and

However,

McConachie

this is

not the international

reality.

Rather the re-

must reach an accommodation that satisfies their national ob-

interests.

accommodation lead to a compromise of mission or values for the
State actors? While you could characterize this accommodation as representing the
lowest common denominator, 3 that would be quite wrong. In fact, the accommoSo does

this

dations should rather be taken as encouraging the partners to look critically at their
rules of engagement

hesion.

It is

the

accommodation of difference that is the essence of equality4 in a co-

of sovereign

alition

and to carefully consider the impact they have on coalition coStates.

Key Constraints
There are several areas of difference that have affected coalition operations or given
rise to

concern between coalition partners over the last decade. These areas include

Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and

•

Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I); 5

Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and

•

of Anti-Personnel

Transfer

Convention);

Convention

•

and

Mines

on

Their

Destruction

(Ottawa

6

for

the

Human Rights
on Human Rights);

Protection

Freedoms (European Convention

of

and Fundamental

7

•

National law, including the criminalization of behavior on the battlefield;

•

Rome

•

National policy.

Protocol

Statute of the International Criminal Court; 8

and

I

A key area of concern in relation to coalition operations has been identified as Protocol

I.

While many nations who have engaged

United States are parties to Protocol
col.

I,

in coalition activities with the

the United States has not ratified the Proto-

This difference in international obligations of itself creates an issue that must

be reconciled when planning coalition operations.
In planning operations regard
that

it

given to statements by the United States

follows the principles underlying Protocol

sibly this
itself.

may be

adds

clarity to the obligations that the

However, the matter

in relation to

is

I

as part

of customary law. 9 Osten-

United States considers binding on

complicated by lack of certainty as to the

which underlying principles of Protocol
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US position

form part of customary
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international law. In particular, before September

gree of certainty as to those parts of Protocol

1 1

,

200 1 there seemed to be a de-

the United States viewed as not

I

forming part of customary law. This included such matters

as

applicability to "wars of national liberation";

•

Its

•

The prohibition on use of enemy emblems and uniforms during

military

operations;
•

The prohibition on causing widespread, long-term and severe damage to the

environment;
•

The

•

The prohibition on

the use of mercenaries;

•

The prohibition on

reprisals;

•

The

•

The protection of dams and

definition of combatant;

definition of military objective;

Since September

1 1,

dykes. 10

2001, however, there

is less

certainty as to

which provisions

embodying customary international law.
"'England Does Not Love Coalitions' - Does Anything Change?,"

the United States views as binding
In his article

and

on

it

as

Charles Garraway says:

It is

interesting in reading the so-called "Torture

Memos,"

to find the almost complete

I. It is as if it has been wiped out of the memory
no longer even clear whether the United States accepts such key provisions as
Article 75 on Fundamental Guarantees.
This lack of legal clarity causes acute
problems for Allies seeking to work alongside the United States.

lack of reference to Additional Protocol

bank.

It is

.

.

.

1

Both the difference

formal

in

legal obligations

partners' being signatory to Protocol
to

what parts of Protocol

I

I

*

occasioned by some coalition

while others are not and the uncertainty as

the United States considers as forming part of custom-

ary international law are factors that must be considered in planning for coalition
operations.

Ottawa Convention

The Ottawa Convention on anti-personnel mines is another point of difference between the United States and
is

many of its coalition

partners.

While the United

States

not a party to the Ottawa Convention, nations such as Australia, the United

Kingdom, Denmark, japan and the Netherlands, among many others, are parties.
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Clearly obligations under the Convention

the contribution a coalition partner

must be considered when examining

may make.

In particular, State parties to the

Convention undertake
never under any circumstances:
(a)

To

(b)

To

use anti-personnel mines;
develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile, retain or transfer to

anyone, directly or indirectly, anti-personnel mines;

To

(c)

assist,

encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity

prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.

Each State Party undertakes to destroy or ensure the destruction of
personnel mines in accordance with the provisions of this Convention. 12
2.

all

anti-

In practical terms for coalition operations, the greatest constraint of the Ottawa

Convention
is

is

the prohibition

on

assisting,

prohibited under the Convention. This

ing personnel

encouraging and inducing activity that

may include such conduct as transport-

who have anti-personnel mines in their possession,

or refueling air-

craft or ships carrying anti-personnel mines.

The European Convention on Human Rights
Likewise the European Convention on Human
ber's ability to undertake certain operations.

Rights can impact

upon

a

mem-

For example, the European Conven-

tion influenced British reluctance to use lethal force to defend property in Iraq
also

underpinned

its

and

lack of support for the use of the death penalty by Iraqi courts

during the occupation period. 13

Domestic Law

Beyond a
nation

is

nation's international obligations

is its

domestic law. The actions that a

prepared to take in a particular conflict or peacekeeping situation are not

merely an expression of a nation's international obligations. They also

reflect

do-

mestic law and policy considerations. These matters concerning domestic law are

not always apparent to coalition partners and unless discussed can be a source of
uncertainty.

The uncertainty can be heightened by complicating factors such as how the particular coalition partner views the character of the operation. The impact of domestic law may vary depending on whether the operation is characterized as
international armed conflict, non-international armed conflict or policing.
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of the impact of domestic law on operations

M.H. McDougall,

in her article "Coalition

is

given by Captain

Operations and the Law." 14 In examin-

ing the issues surrounding the transfer of detainees between coalition partners, she

notes that issues of domestic law require consideration
the Canadian Charter of Rights

—

in particular, Section 7 of

and Freedoms, which may prohibit the

detainees to coalition partners where they

may be

transfer of

potentially subject to the death

penalty. 15

Criminal Offenses

Another influence on interoperability is the criminalization of behavior on the battlefield.

For example, Australia, as a party to the

domestic law a number of offenses to

Rome Statute, has introduced into

reflect its obligations.

16

These, of course, have

extraterritorial application.

Beyond the offenses introduced as a result of the Rome Statute,

make

uing trend in Australia to

territorial in their jurisdiction.

an offense

resident overseas.

is

may be

it

of an Australian citizen or

While the defense of lawful authority 19

killed

a contin-

For example, the Criminal Code Act 1995 makes

remains a risk that Australian personnel
zen or resident

is

criminal offenses and regulatory regimes 17 extra-

in certain circumstances to cause the death
18

there

charged

is

likely to apply, there

when an

Australian

citi-

during operations.

This increase in offenses with extraterritorial jurisdiction means that com-

manders must increasingly consider whether operations
offense being

potentially give rise to an

committed by themselves or their personnel. These offenses could be

criminal in nature or aimed at such matters as environmental protection and occupational health

and

safety.

Damages
Apart from the criminal law, commanders are increasingly concerned about their
possible responsibility for civil law claims arising

March 2008, an
Supreme Court
family,

Iraqi family

in Australia as a result

who was brought

treatment, alleges that
the family

personal

is

commenced an

it

fired

action for damages in the Queensland

by the Australian government

upon without warning. While

suing the Australian government,

liability

of soldiers

in

of an incident in Baghdad in early 2005. The

to Australia

was

from operations. Indeed

who harm

20

civilians

for medical

in this instance

the case raises questions about the

during operations. 21

National Policy

Beyond the
it is

law, however,

is

national policy. This should not be discounted because

essentially the expression of the

democratic
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that

—while lawful—

are unpalatable

and government direction to the military will

be given to express the will of the people. National policy may or may not be visible
to coalition partners

and therefore may add further ambiguity

to the coalition

relationship.

How Do We Deal with the Constraints?
All of these matters

Protocol

I,

—uncertainty over the US view of

the Ottawa Convention, the characterization of an operation, domestic

—may contribute

law and policy
ner

the principles underlying

may take. While this

to uncertainty as to

lack of legal clarity

is

what action a

a matter that

the planning of and participation in coalition operations,

The evidence of

coalition partnerships.

this

is

differences

is

made

is

must be addressed

it is

not

in

fatal to effective

the fact that coalition operations

have taken place in a number of theaters since September
differences, effective legal interoperability

coalition part-

very

11, 2001. In spite

of the

common. 22 Accommodation

of

to facilitate operations.

The question then

is

what

are the

mechanisms

that allow this to be achieved?

Captain Dale Stephens, Royal Australian Navy, notes that legal interoperability has

been achieved through a number of means, namely, by reservations or declarations
to treaties

and extensive consultation and sharing of military law manuals,

as a psychological will to coalition

as well

mission accomplishment and the development

of multilateral rules of engagement for operations. 23

Declarations

At the formal level, one mechanism used by nations to manage
obligations

is

their varying treaty

that of declarations.

Protocol I

In relation to Protocol

I,

declarations have been used to clarify coalition partners'

obligations. For example, Australia has

made

a declaration that includes clarifica-

tion as to the Australian understanding regarding the definition of "military ad-

vantage." 24

The effect of this declaration is that, while Australia is a party to
Protocol I and the United States is not, it is still possible that the approaches of the
two countries to issues such as targeting can be harmonized. However, while declarations have made it easier to manage conflicting approaches between the United
States and Australia, it is clear that there are still differences
albeit the precise nature of these differences has been made more difficult to discern in relation to Pro-

—

tocol

I

in the

post-September

11,

2001 environment.
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Co n ven tio

In relation to the

derstanding.

Ottawa Convention, Australia has again used

Among

other matters, this declaration

a declaration of un-

clarifies that

operating with

armed forces of States which are not party to the Convention and

the

activity prohibited

vention.

25

The

under the Convention
of the declaration

effect

is

is

not,

by

itself,

that engage in

a violation of the

Con-

that Australia can act with States that are

not party to the Convention in a coalition, provided that Australia does not

assist,

encourage or induce those parties to act contrary to the Convention. Thus, to ensure compliance, a party to the Ottawa Convention

planning of what support
the Convention

is

must be mindful in operational

requested by the forces of a State that

is

not a party to

and which possesses anti-personnel mines.

Domestic Law and Policy
Rules of engagement for

members of a

coalition can be different as a result of each

own domestic laws and policy. 26 In the area of domestic law and policy we

partner's

must be mindful of our coalition partners' obligations to comply with their domestic

To ask them to do

laws.

otherwise would be to undermine the rule of law and to

demand allies act outside the law that binds them "would make a mockery of the rule of law." 27 What we
fail

to respect their sovereignty.

can do

is

ference

to use

As Charles Garraway said,

to

open dialogue to better understand and accommodate issues of dif-

and respect our

coalition partners

when

they decline a mission because of

domestic considerations.

General
All of these differences

maybe encapsulated in coalition partners' rules of engagement.

As Captain Dale Stephens

said in his article "Coalition Warfare: Challenges

portunities," however, effective interoperability "[i]n the
tions of the willing'

To

.

.

is

modern context of 'coali-

means achieving a harmonization of rules of engagement

" 28

achieve interoperability at the working officer level requires critical exami-

nation of where the
it

.

and Op-

difficult to

common approach may lie

frame rules of engagement

policy as to the existing law

changes. So

how are

these

is

—although

it

should be noted that

in circumstances

either unarticulated or has

accommodations made

where government
been the subject of

at a practical level?

Practical Examples of Accommodation of Difference

Timor

Leste

There are

moting

a

number of practical examples of the accommodation of difference pro-

effective coalition operations.

An example
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of such a challenge, which has
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Mike Kelly in his article "Legal Factors
Coalition Warfare and Military Interoperability," 29 is opin 1999. As leader of the International Force East Timor

received previous examination by Colonel
in Military Planning for

erations in

Timor

Leste

mission, Australia was in the position of needing to forge a coalition to conduct
stabilization

and pacification operations

in

Timor

Leste following militia violence

that broke out after the vote for independence. Australian planners confronted the
issue of aligning mission rules of engagement to

accommodate all of the participat-

ing coalition States.
In this operation the mission rules of engagement formed the basis for operations.

These rules of engagement were more expansive than some participating na-

tion's

own rules of engagement. The more expansive aspects of the mission rules of

engagement included provision

for the use of

up

to

and including

lethal force to

protect specifically designated property considered essential to the success of the

mission. 30

more contentious
aspects of the rules of engagement. A key issue was that the United Kingdom, New
Zealand and Canada viewed this as only being acceptable where a direct association
with the protection of life could be established. 31 Some Australian uniformed lawThis protection of mission-essential property was one of the

yers took an expansive view of the use of lethal force to protect property. 32
ever, in a

non-armed

conflict,

it is

life is

would
Arguably property on

unlikely that Australian domestic law

permit the use of lethal force to protect property alone.

which human

How-

dependent could be protected by the use of lethal

mately mission assignment had to accommodate

this difference in

force. Ulti-

views on the

protection of property.

Likewise in the subsequent

UN rules of engagedifferences between UN rules of engage-

UN mission

in

Timor

Leste,

ment were issued. This highlighted the
ment and national rules of engagement. These differences presented a challenge
that required a strategy to accommodate them. Coalition partners were canvassed
as to their rules of engagement compliance. As expected, some coalition partners'
national rules of engagement were more restrictive than the UN rules of engagement and they were restricted by their rules of engagement from undertaking certain tasks. 33 In planning particular operations account

was taken of

this

and

ultimately the mission was not detrimentally affected by this approach. In the end,
differences

must be accommodated

for a coalition to function effectively, thus en-

suring appropriate recognition of the equality of States participating in a coalition.

Targeting

While not the only area of difference, a
operations

is

targeting. This

is

also

clear area

where

legal differences arise

on

an area where accommodation has been made
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a

number of occasions. The first time that the

issue of legal planning factors

im-

pacting on interoperability was significant was in Operation Allied Force in 1999 in

Kosovo. 34 According to Colonel Kelly:

The United

conducted some 80 per cent of the

States

air strikes against the

Serbs and

members
The situation was compounded by the fact that

the Americans increasingly chafed at the legal restrictions that other

considered applicable under Protocol

I.

NATO had no mechanism designed to enforce common legal standards.
As

a result,

NATO

policy permitted

member

states to refuse

.

.

if

most of
were subsequently attacked by the
In practice, however,

they regarded a particular target as being illegitimate
the Serbian targets that were rejected

bombing assignments

.

Americans. 35

This policy by the United States led to friction in the coalition and ultimately to an

understanding that when you are trying to maintain cohesion in a coalition

stood.

To

fail

and ultimately

to understand

lenges

to respect

upon themselves

restrictions that other nations place
risk the coalition.

es-

and limitations of each member nation are well under-

sential that the obligations
36

it is

As Dale Stephens stated

and accommodate the

in coalition operations

is

to

in his article "Coalition Warfare: Chal-

and Opportunities":

Just because the

United States retains the full legal capacity to attack the types of objects

prohibited by the Protocol to others does not

mean

that

it

will necessarily

undertake

such attacks. Policy imperatives regarding coalition cohesion plainly inform decisions
concerning attack

profiles.

37

Iraq 2003

An example of restraint arose in

Iraq in 2003.

By the time of the operations

there was a greater understanding of the need to
ties.

This operation represented the

liver

ordnance under the changed

Protocol
tions,

first

I.

38

accommodate

coalition sensitivi-

time for Australia that aircraft would de-

legal

Again referring to Colonel

environment generated by the 1977

Kelly's

examination of coalition opera-

"The American targeting system was shaped by precautions

the lawfulness of striking individual targets
sualties

and damage

in Iraq,

and by

a general

that related to

need to minimise ca-

to vital installations." 39

Targeting in this operation involved a tiered system based on levels of authority
required for approvals related,
civilian casualties

and

among

collateral

other factors, to the anticipated

damage.

40

While Australia used

considerations for Australia took account of differences between
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coalition partners not party to Protocol

I.

In targeting decision-making Australia

operated according to national rules of engagement.

To

assist

Australian

commanders planning operations

obligations of other coalition partners,

to understand the legal

two matrices were developed

—one

for

law

of armed conflict and one for rules of engagement, noting that the rules of engage-

ment were more prone

The law of armed conflict matrix, for example,
listed issues such as anti-personnel mines and definition of combatant against each
coalition partner and the known international obligations of each. The rules of engagement matrix followed a similar form and greatly assisted in reducing the areas
of apparent difference highlighted by the law of armed conflict matrix. 41
Where there were differences, they were accommodated by the "Red Card" system which allowed a mission to be declined. 42 Even in circumstances where a mission was allocated and agreed, Australian pilots undertaking that mission were
given the ultimate discretion not to strike a target which they assessed as not being
a lawful target. This ultimate "Red Card" discretion was used and supported by seto change.

nior Australian personnel.

Ottawa
As previously mentioned, in practical terms for coalition operations the greatest
constraint of the Ottawa Convention has been the prohibition on assisting, encouraging and inducing activity that is prohibited under the Convention. This prohibition meant that air-refueling aircraft in Iraq in 2003 were ordered not to refuel
any

US

airframe that was fitted with air-delivered anti-personnel mines, such as

the scatterable, mixed-munitions
a prohibition

would need to be

circumstances.
aircraft

An

GATORS system. 43 Clearly the operation of such

carefully considered

exception to the rule

needing to be refueled

is

and may not be absolute

may be where

in

all

the safety of the coalition

at risk.

Another practical example of an accommodation to ensure compliance with the

Ottawa Convention while supporting coalition operations with a non-party was
the transport

by

coalition partners of US personnel.

To ensure compliance, com-

manding officers of ships transporting US personnel took measures to satisfy themselves that those personnel
this

were not carrying anti-personnel land mines. Provided

condition was met, personnel could be transported.

Opportunities

may seem to be constraining operations, they indicate an accommodation of the restrictions that coalition partners may have dur-

While these

practical

ing operations. This

examples

accommodation of
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to

a greater
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contemplation of the value of any target or objective as against

its

cost to the overall

coalition operation.

would be wrong, however,

It

As Rear Admiral Gates

limiting.

I

would not want

to leave

problems, in

offers

to think that coalition operations are necessarily

commander to

fact

it

said:

you with the impression

often offers opportunities.

Red Sea

in 1992/93

action, in certain areas,

coalition partners. This

employed

It

may be

possible for a coalition

more freedom

use the forces of another nation to undertake a task with

of maneuver than would be available to their
this in the

that political divergence always

own

where Australian

forces.

I

experienced

ROE give our units greater freedom of

when conducting maritime

was an advantage

For example,

to the

interception operations with

US commander, who

subsequently

RAN units closest to the Straits of Tiran at the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba to

intercept "inspection runners"

when

required. 44

In employing these innovative solutions,

mindful of their individual

commanders

have, of course, to be

legal responsibility for actions that

they have been directed

to take.

This accommodation of the differing obligations of coalition
like technical interoperability, forces

member

States,

an assessment of how best a State can contrib-

ute to coalition operations. Rather than asking what a State cannot do, the question
is

what

does

upon

can do; where can

it

it

make the best contribution to the coalition and what

need to achieve mission accomplishment within the restrictions placed

it

Ultimately,

it?

strictive

making these accommodations, whether they seem

to be re-

or empowering, reinforces the equality of sovereign States necessary in an

effective coalition partnership.

Conclusion

Legal

interoperability

interoperability,

is

ners that

mean

coalition

essential

interoperability, while
terests will

in

for

we can aim

planning and operations,
mission

technical

with

technical

for the perfect solution, diverging national in-

that there will continue to be differences

must be accommodated

As

achievement.

like

among

coalition part-

to ensure effective operations.

This accommodation should not be viewed as being detrimental; rather
positive effect

on the conduct of operations. The process of dealing with

coalition views

awareness and

and

on the applicable law and policy generates
critical

who are

has a

differing

a greater level of self-

examination that improves the way we conduct operations

aids adherence to the

to people

it

norms of international

in the military

law.

By and

large

it is

important

of a democratic State that they act honorably.
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important for the maintenance of public support of the operation

To fail to understand and ultimately respect the
place upon themselves in coalition operations is to

that they be seen to act honorably.

constraints that other nations

them

to treat

fail

as equal coalition partners

and

to risk

profoundly the efficacy of

the very coalition.
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XIII
Coalition Operations:

A Canadian

Perspective

Kenneth W.Watkin*

order to put my thoughts
context, begin by outlining recent Canadian
Inparticipation
the international sphere.
want to highlight that Canadian
in

I

in

I

often misunderstood, not

Forces operations are not limited to "peacekeeping" as

is

only on the international scene, but also sometimes

home. While Canada chose

not to be involved in the 2003 Iraq operation,
in terms

both of the

lives

States,

has been a fully committed member

of its soldiers, sailors and airmen, including

well as of "national treasure"

what the United

it

at

—

in the coalition

and international

women,

as

efforts related to

our close neighbor to the south, has termed the "Global

War on Terror" or the "GWOT," and what we call the "Campaign Against Terrorism" or the "CAT."
the reason this

1

I

suppose

this subtle use of different

terminology

is

part of

volume contains two other articles 2 authored by representatives of

nations that have participated in coalition operations with the United States. Together they illustrate the differing national approaches and understandings relating to participation in a

Regardless of
multidisciplinary

how

common

enterprise.

the conflict

is

termed, countering Al Qaeda requires a

and multifaceted approach involving

ligence agencies, policing, diplomacy

civilian

and military

and international engagement,

intel-

as well as the

Canadian Forces. The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of
the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the government of Canada.
* Brigadier General,
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The use of military

use of military forces.

international operations. In this regard

have the equivalent of the
land and air
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US

forces

encompasses both domestic and

should be noted that Canada does not

it

Posse Comitatus Act. 3 Canadian military forces

—can be deployed

to provide a

—

naval,

wide variety of assistance to law en-

forcement operations, both within Canada and off our shores. 4

how to

There has been significant debate about

characterize the conflicts against

non-State actors, such as Al Qaeda, other terrorist groups and insurgent forces. This
includes categorizing such conflicts as being "not of an international character," 5
"international

From time
demic

conflicts" 6

armed

to time the

and "internationalized

term "transnational" armed

conflict has

literature. 7

The Canadian approach has been
1949 Geneva Conventions 8 applies

Article 3 of the

internal

that at a

armed

conflicts."

even crept into aca-

minimum Common

to operations in Afghanistan.

Canada, however, has avoided categorizing the transnational operations of Al
Qaeda, preferring to simply acknowledge that an "armed conflict"

is

in existence to

which humanitarian law applies regardless of whether operations occur on land,
air

or on the high seas. 9

in the

Remember, however, that the famous Caroline case outlining

the basis for self-defense for States under international law involved the transborder
activities

of a non- State actor against Canada. 10

Of course "war" is such an emotive term, particularly for international lawyers
who may have viewed the creation of the United Nations Charter as an end of
"war" in any legal sense. In factual terms, "war" very much continues to exist and
the conduct of "warfare"

humanitarian law

treaties

one Canadian academic
nal" to States. 11

what engages professional military forces, international

is

and customary international

institute,

law.

As has been noted by

95 percent of contemporary conflicts are "inter-

As warfare changes from the

industrial age to the information age

and perhaps fourth-generation warfare, contemporary military operations have, as
the British General Sir Rupert Smith has noted,

amongst the people."
"international

12

armed

become

the conduct of "war

This trend away from the traditional idea of warfare being
conflict"

between nation-States

is

presenting significant

challenges not only for us as military law practitioners, but also for our academic
colleagues and for essential stakeholders such as the International
the

Red Cross (ICRC) and committed human

tions.

It

may be fair to say that the effort in

recourse to war by States (jus ad bellum)

customary law

rights

non-governmental organiza-

the post-World

means the

Committee of

rich

War II era to restrict the

body of conventional and

(jus in hello) technically applies to its fullest extent to a significantly

decreasing type of conflict.

I

know

the ICRC's 2005 Customary International

Hu-

Law study 13 has garnered criticism from a variety of sources regarding
14
its methodology and some of its conclusions.
Indeed, there are parts of the study
15
with which
disagree;
however, it remains a significant and, in many ways, a
manitarian

I
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courageous undertaking at an essential time as operations appear to
cus

on

shift

from a fo-

armed conflict to counterinsurgency. I keep a copy of the
my desk and it is used regularly by Canadian Forces legal officers as

international

study close to

an important resource

tool.

Since October 24, 2001

when Canada acted "in the exercise of the inherent right

of individual and collective

self

defence in accordance with Article 51" of the

United Nations Charter in response to the armed attacks on the United

Canada has been

States,

a steadfast participant in conducting military operations against

by Al Qaeda and the Taliban. 16 With our joint enterprise in the
North American Aerospace Defense Command, Canada and the United States
have worked in an integrated fashion to protect the skies over North America.
the threats posed

Canadian participation has seen the deployment of a significant portion of our

US Central Command's maritime area of responsibility,

navy to the
part of US

Navy carrier

the Persian Gulf.

and other units

We

strike

groups and maritime patrol

have also provided

to coalition

including as

aircraft operations in

tactical airlift, infantry, special forces

and International Security Assistance Force opera-

tions since the beginning of operations in Afghanistan, including the participa-

tion of an infantry battle group in Operation

Anaconda

in 2002.

presently has approximately 2,300 personnel operating in Regional

Canada

Command

(South) centered on Kandahar. These include an infantry battle group, combat
engineers, artillery, Leopard tanks,

armored reconnaissance, an unmanned aerial

and operational mentor liaison teams working with the Afghanistan
Canadian legal officer was deployed to work with our American col-

vehicle unit

army.

A

leagues in the

program
will

Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan mentoring

in respect to the

Afghan

justice system. Further, another legal officer

deploy shortly to the Canadian Operational Mentoring Liaison

Team

mentoring the Afghan 205 Corps.

The

cost of the mission has

personnel, including our

first

been high from a Canadian perspective. Fifty-seven
female combat casualty (an

artillery officer),

have

been killed mostly in the last eighteen months. In addition, a Canadian Foreign Affairs officer

was

killed

by an improvised explosive

device.

Over two hundred per-

sonnel have been wounded. As can be expected, the involvement of Canadian
Forces personnel in Afghanistan has caused considerable political and national debate.

For example, the vote in Parliament in

May 2006 to extend the mission in Af-

ghanistan until February 2009 was 149 to 145 in favor of the extension. 17

The operations

in Afghanistan reflect a larger challenge facing

that being the changing nature of warfare.

all

our nations,

The challenges presented by "counterin-

surgency" warfare include, inter alia, the treatment of detainees, the application of

human rights norms, and targeting and resulting limitations on collateral damage.
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Historically, there are
ity"

impacting on the
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themselves as "centers of grav-

legal issues that present

ability

of democracies to wage military campaigns against in-

surgent forces. They are the issue of the treatment of detainees
specifically, the

(collateral

As an

question of torture

—and

excessive injury

damage). The present campaign

officer serving for a

you might expect

that

I

is

—and,

and death

to civilians

no exception.

country that has signed Additional Protocol

would

more

indicate that treaty

I (

AP I), 18

a reason for differing ap-

is

proaches to the conduct of coalition operations with non-party countries such as
the United States; however,

it is

hard to make that

world's States have signed and ratified
as either

customary international law or

The AP

85 percent of the

AP I and many of its provisions are accepted
as a doctrinal basis for the

erations. In other words, a general acceptance of
"fact."

Some

case.

AP

conduct of op-

provisions

I

is

a matter of

provisions are integrated into the training and doctrine of Cana-

I

dian Forces personnel and their involvement in

non-AP

fundamentally change the way wars are fought. That

NATO countries who are AP

I

widespread acceptance of the

countries.

AP

I,

I

conflicts

is

not likely to
of other

likely the case

is

The most obvious example of this

Article 57 precautionary

is

the

measures and the

principle of "proportionality" in respect to targeting.

There are different

legal obligations

personnel than for American forces.

on anti-personnel mines.

19

and interpretations of the law

An example

That Convention

is

for

Canadian

the 1997 Ottawa Convention

clearly prohibits the use, develop-

ment, production, stockpiling, retention or transfer of anti-personnel mines, as
well as assisting, encouraging or inducing such activities.

Canadian Forces per-

sonnel have specific direction setting out their obligations

when they operate with

nations

who are not parties to the Convention. We may not use anti-personnel mines

and cannot request,

directly or indirectly, the protection of those mines.

Canadian Forces personnel can participate
Convention

States.

However,

combined operations with non-

in

There appear to have been no stumbling blocks,

likely

because

of a general lack of use of such mines in contemporary operations; the relatively

NATO, who have ratified the Conven-

large

number of countries,

tion;

and the general awareness by our personnel of their

It is

simply a

fact

including within

of coalition operations that nations

more directly impacted by the human

decisions of the European Court of

Human

will often take different ap-

my experience has been that European

proaches to interpreting the law. For example,
nations are

obligations. 20

rights

framework associated with

Rights than non-European countries,

we must

deal

law lawyers look

at a

such as Canada and the United States. Further, from time to time
with the different

problem. Again,

proach

a

problem

way

my

that civil-law-trained

and

experience has been that

first

from the context of the
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common

civil

law lawyers

will usually

treaty law provisions, while

ap-

common
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law lawyers read "black
tional law.

letter"

law in the context of case law and customary interna-

Although the approach can be different, we often end up at the same place.

There can also be differences with countries with similar legal systems, although not
as

many differences as may be the perceived wisdom. For example, the US interpreta-

tion of "military objective," to the extent that
capability,"

also

is

broader than that of most

it

States,

includes an enemy's "war sustaining

including Canada. However,

be noted that Canada entered a reservation to Additional Protocol

I

it

should

that states,

" [T]he military

advantage anticipated from an attack is intended to refer to the advan-

tage anticipated

from the attack considered as a whole and not from isolated or partic-

From a Canadian perspective, targets would not be limited to

ular parts of the attack."

military forces

and could include

grids, oil refineries, lines

such as

strategic targets

rail

yards, electric

of communication, bridges and supply routes.

power

To the extent,

however, that the US wording would include attacks on exports that may be the source
of financial resources for a belligerent,

it

could very well present, as Professor Dinstein

has noted, "a slippery slope" in which every economic activity might be considered as
indirectly sustaining the

armed

ternational

war

effort.

conflict that

21

It is likely

in this context during a traditional in-

Canadian and American approaches would

differ.

22

A greater challenge in contemporary operations is determining the role and desired
effect

of the strategic use of airpower. Comparing the 1991 Gulf conflict and the 2003

Iraq invasion,

it

would appear that a purely "strategic" approach had curried less favor

in the overall planning of the latter campaign. 23

more significant issue when one
considers how strategic strikes would realistically impact on a non-State-actor enemy.
It is

a

A problem with the application of strategic airpower is that in practice
have lived up to the hopes of its most ardent proponents.
significant

As
in

is

It is

appears not to

less likely to

have a

impact during "small wars."

noted by James

Corum and Wray Johnson, the most effective use of airpower

opposing insurgents and terrorists conducting a low-level

"indirect"

even

it

means such as reconnaissance and transport.

even with a

tactical focus

much of the world,

—can

raise

24

more profound and

guerrilla

war

Issues related to

is

the use of

bombing

challenging questions:

weapon of the poor and fanatic;
airpower is seen as the symbolic weapon of the West the means by which the wealthy
and advanced countries can bully the poor and weak countries. Thus, bombing is
automatically viewed in the Third World as cruel and heavy-handed. This creates a
paradox that policymakers today do not seem willing to address. While airpower is
often the most effective means to strike at insurgents and terrorists, its use will
immediately provoke outcry and protest in many quarters of Western society and
In

terrorism

is

seen as the unique

—

throughout most of the Third World. In short, there
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is

a political price to pay. 25
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As Corum and Johnson
ists in

state,

"Bombing

urban areas with resulting

advantage of the rebels."

The

A Canadian Perspective
civilians,

or targeting insurgents and terror-

civilian casualties, generally

works to the propaganda

26

damage"

issue of "collateral

is

as

in Iraq.

The

civilian deaths

and

important in Afghanistan as

Afghan government has increasingly expressed concern over both

it is

manner in which searches are conducted. NATO itself has recognized the issue of
collateral damage as one of the most important ones it faces 28 and Jane's has recently
27

the

concluded that continued

civilian casualties will increasingly

port for international forces.

measure

collateral

29

impact on Afghan sup-

The question remains as to how members of a coalition

damage and

ultimately the emphasis that

"right to life" of uninvolved civilians. This, in turn, raises

is

to

be placed on the

fundamental questions

re-

garding the applicability of human rights norms in the interpretation of international

humanitarian law.

From
conflict

a legal perspective, resolving the interface

between the law governing armed

and human rights law may be the most significant challenge facing operational

lawyers of all our nations.

We are trained and schooled in State-on-State conflict and

struggle over issues such as

how collateral damage is to be assessed when it results from

the reverberating or "knock on" effects of attacks against electrical grids. In the three-

block wars, 30 occupations and other complex security situations of the twenty-first
century, military forces are confronted with fighting dangerous, perfidious

ceedingly violent
ulation

and

ex-

armed groups, while at the same time interfacing with a civilian pop-

who may oppose

or support the insurgent forces. This raises questions of

whether assessments of collateral damage under these circumstances are impacted by
the

human

strict

rights/law enforcement notions of "capture rather than kill"

and a more

assessment of proportionality that demands operations be "planned and con-

ducted

in

such a way as to avoid or minimise, to the greatest extent possible, any risk to

the lives of the [civilians]." 31

While there has been no

definitive articulation of the degree to

law impacts on Canadian Forces international operations,
tional

Court of Justice

human

in the

Nuclear Weapons

32

33

and Wall

law continues to operate during armed

rights

tion of humanitarian law as a lex specialis. Further,

it is

it is

which human

rights

clear that the Interna-

cases have determined that

conflict, subject to the applica-

unlikely that the

Canadian posi-

Human Rights Committee,
which, while not binding as a matter of law, would be persuasive. 34 That Comment in-

tion

would ignore Comment No.

dicates that the International

would apply
'

applicable.

in situations

3 1 of the United Nations

Covenant on

where "the

Civil

and

Political Rights

rules of international

(ICCPR) 35

humanitarian law are

Mfl

While the Canadian approach
apply to international operations

to accepting

may be

whether

human

rights

different than that of the
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norms can

United

States,
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the practical effect

is

likely the

governing armed conflict

is

same, particularly when the

applied.

lex specialis

Canada has accepted the application of human

rights-based norms regarding the treatment of detainees reflected in
ticle 3

of the laws

Common Ar-

of the Geneva Conventions and Article 75 of Additional Protocol I (which it-

ICCPR norms). This approach would appear to resonate with that
taken by the US Supreme Court in Hamdan. 37
More difficult and pressing questions for many of our military forces regarding
the application of human rights norms relate to the extraterritorial reach of domestic courts and what, if any, impact those norms may have on the use of force. Many
self reflects the

Western nations are confronted with litigation regarding the extraterritorial application of human rights (or civil rights) to matters relating to

occur for a

number of reasons,

against terrorism
ity

and non-State

armed conflict. This can

including the complex nature of the campaigns
entities,

and the

relative

weakness of accountabil-

in a

previous boundaries. This

may simply

impact of "globalization" cannot be discounted; we
terconnected world that

is

breaking

down

human

The
far more in-

frameworks under humanitarian law in comparison to
live

and fight

rights law.

be one more casualty of the information age.

Domestic courts

in the

United Kingdom and the European Court of

Rights have struggled with this issue.
igation in our Federal

Canada is no exception.

Human

Presently, there

is lit-

Court commenced by Amnesty International Canada and a

provincial civil liberties association challenging the transfer of detainees taken in

Afghanistan to Afghan authorities on the basis of a claim that they are subjected to
torture.

The

but also

states that "[t]here are also substantial

application

States of America
ees,

is

is

not only focused on the Afghan treatment of detainees

engaged in

including torture, which

degrading and inhuman treatment of detain-

cruel,

is

grounds to believe that the United

contrary to assurances the

US

has given to other

38

The applicants are relying not only on international law, but also claim that Canada's domestic Charter of Rights and Freedoms
applies to the transfer of detainees outside of Canada in other countries. I will not
governments, including Canada."

say anything further as the matter
cation of

how human

is

before the courts, but this

rights claims, including

is

yet another indi-

domestic law, has the potential to

impact on contemporary operations.

As

I

have already indicated, the reach and

effect

limited to the issue of the handling of detainees. This

Supreme Court,

sitting as the

of human rights norms are not
is

High Court of Justice,

39

evidenced in the recent
decision,

termed

Israeli

as the Tar-

The Court applied the human rights law principle of preferring
arrest over killing as "the means that should be employed" even when the "target"
40
is someone taking a direct part in hostilities.
The position that a civilian cannot be
attacked at such time as he or she is taking part in hostilities "if less harmful means

geted Killing case.
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can be employed"

is

not an absolute as

its

held to be based on "internal law" of the State. 41
application

is

military. Further, specific reference
rest

may

not exist
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at all

where

The

rule

is

linked to the degree of control exercised by the
is

made to

"at times

it

the possibility that the option of ar-

involves a risk so great to the lives of the

4:

soldiers.

The application of this

case

regarding occupation facing

may be somewhat

Israeli authorities.

limited by the specific situation

Further,

not clear

it is

how it would

be applied in a struggle against organized armed groups in a more traditional conflict setting.

Perhaps the most interesting aspect of this "blended" approach

notwithstanding the reliance on

human

in a built-up

it is

possible to contemplate a scenario

urban area controlled by the security forces where an attempt

tralize relatively low-level

that,

remains substantial reso-

rights law, there

nance with humanitarian law. For example,

is

to neu-

insurgents could lead to a determination that even under

the humanitarian law principle of proportionality
tions in the choice of means

(i.e.,

taking

and methods of attack with

any event to minimizing, incidental

loss

of civilian

life,

"all feasible

precau-

a view to avoiding,

injury to civilians

and

in

and dam-

age to civilian objects" 43 ) the result would be a decision to capture rather than

kill

an

opponent.
In the conduct of coalition operations there

misunderstanding

me

is

among the

"partners."

is

the potential for considerable

One such

issue that

immediately

strikes

the Canadian approach to the use of force in the defense of property. Put

simply, the use of deadly force to defend property generally

is

not permitted. This

arose out of the "Somalia Affair," where Canadian troops fired

ran away

when discovered attempting

once explained to one of our
stealing a

short of

watch even

armed

if it is

conflict,

soldiers,

right off

on Somalis who

to breach the wire to steal property.

we do not permit

As

I

the killing of people for

your arm. However, we have, for operations

provided greater authority to use force to protect desig-

nated mission-essential property. In respect to combat operations, the use of force
is

largely

governed by the laws governing armed

force to destroy

which permit the use of

conflict,

and defend property under appropriate circumstances. Indeed,

our rules of engagement have been quite robust throughout the conduct of operations since 2001.
Finally,
is

taking

I

want

to briefly address investigations in a coalition

up an increasing amount of commander and

ating environment that

demands

where additional training
a

Canadian perspective

ple

is

is

this has

legal officer

greater accountability.

provided for Canadian

environment. This

It

time in an oper-

has reached the point

legal officers in this area.

From

One examTarnak Farm where a US Air

included "blue-on-blue" engagements.

the friendly fire incident of April 17, 2002 at

Force F-16 mistakenly killed four and

wounded

258

eight

Canadian

soldiers.

In
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September 2006 there was a

tragic incident in

to provide close air support for a

one

soldier

ating Base
killed

and wounded

Robinson

called in

Canadian infantry company in Afghanistan killed

thirty.

There was a further incident

in Afghanistan

Forward Oper-

at

where both a US and a Canadian

soldier

were

during a firelight. That case is being investigated as a possible "blue-on-blue"

incident. In each case, the cooperation

from

which a US A- 10 Warthog

between

US and Canadian authorities has,

my perspective, been exceptional. The air incidents have involved both joint

US-Canada

investigations (Canadian- American copresidents)

tional inquiries.

While the most recent investigations are

clear that this cooperative effort has

had

still

a positive effect so far

and Canadian na-

being finalized,

on

it is

interoperability,

as well as public perception.

In

summary,

coalition operations present challenges, but

have been true "show stoppers." As a general comment,
the strengths of international law

and

treaties,

such as

none of them

to date

would appear that one of
the Geneva Conventions, is
it

common reference for all participants. As nations committed to
this common understanding, even when impacted by national in-

that they provide a

the rule of law,

terpretations, has held
will

all

our countries in good

stead. It

does not

mean

that there

be no differences, however; the threats we face are global, which in turn de-

mand international

cooperation.
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XIV
"Change Direction" 2006:
Israeli

Operations in Lebanon and the

International

Law of Self-Defense

Michael N.Schmitt*

On

July 12, 2006, Hezbollah launched Operation

True Promise, the ambush

of Israel Defence Force (IDF) soldiers patrolling the border with Lebanon. 1

Three

Israelis

were

sponding to the

killed

and two captured. Four more died

attack, while

an eighth perished

in

an IDF tank

re-

as Israeli forces

attempted to

re-

cover the bodies of the tank crew. Meanwhile, Hezbollah rocket attacks against

northern

Israeli

towns and IDF

facilities killed

Israel reacted quickly and forcefully with

itary action included a naval

and

air

two

civilians.

Operation Change Direction. The mil-

blockade of Lebanon,

air strikes

throughout

the country and, eventually, a major ground incursion into southern Lebanon. As
the

IDF

acted, Israel's

Ambassador to the United Nations transmitted

ters to the Secretary-General

and the Security Council

identical let-

setting forth the legal basis

for the operation.

Israel

thus reserves the right to act in accordance with Article 5 1 of the Charter of the

United Nations and exercise
against a

*

Member

its

right of self-defense

when an armed attack is launched

of the United Nations. The State of

Israel will take

Charles H. Stockton Professor of International Law, United States Naval

appropriate

War College.

Operations in Lebanon (2006) and the

Israeli

actions to secure the release of the kidnapped soldiers
that terrorizes

our

citizens.

Israeli justification for

Did the law of self-defense provide

fense against

and bring an end

whom — Hezbollah,

the State of

Operation Change

a basis for the operation? If so, de-

Lebanon or both? Were the

actions consistent with the criteria for a lawful defensive action

—

Israeli

necessity, pro-

and immediacy? Did Operation Change Direction unlawfully breach

portionality

Lebanese

to the shelling

2

This article explores and assesses the
Direction.

Law of Self-Defense

territorial integrity?

In order to frame the discussion,

it is

necessary to distinguish two distinct

com-

ponents of the international law governing the use of force. The jus ad helium

normative boundaries as to when a State
national policy.

3

Its

sets

may resort to force as an instrument of its

prescriptive architecture

is

modest,

at least in

terms of

lex

scripta.

UN Charter prohibits the threat or use of force in

Article 2(4) of the

tional relations. 4

tance.

The

first is

Only two exceptions

interna-

to the proscription enjoy universal accep-

enforcement action sanctioned by the Security Council pursuant

to Chapter VII of the Charter.

By this

linear

scheme, the Security Council

may de-

clare that a particular action or situation represents a "threat to the peace, breach of

the peace, or act of aggression." 3

been met,

may implement

it

may

the declarative condition precedent has

non-forceful remedial measures. 6 Should such mea-

sures prove "inadequate," or
fice, "it

Once

if

the Security Council believes they

take such action by

air, sea,

may

or land forces as

would not

suf-

be necessary to

7

maintain or restore international peace and security." The Security Council does so

by authorizing and employing UN-commanded and -controlled forces or by giving a

mandate

member

enforcement action to either

for

States organized as

a regional organization or individual

an "ad hoc" coalition (or a combination of the two).

Although the Security Council did employ its Chapter VII authority to enhance
the size and

mandate of the United Nations Interim Force

part of the August 2006 ceasefire,
either in July

2006 or

at

8

it

2(4) prohibition

Article 5

1

—

Lebanon (UNIFIL)

as

did not mandate Operation Change Direction,

any previous time. Instead, the

Change Direction submitted by Israel
ticle

in

lay in the

legal basis for

Operation

second express exception to the Ar-

self-defense.

codifies the right of States to use force defensively:

"Nothing in the pres-

ent Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence

an armed attack occurs against a

Member of the United Nations,

if

until the Security

Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."

9

A

State acting in self-defense

must immediately so notify the Security
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Council, a requirement epitomized during Operation Change Direction by Israeli
notification

The jus
field. It

geted,

on the very day defensive

in hello,

military operations began. 10

by contrast, governs how force may be employed on the

addresses such matters as the persons and objects that

how

targeting has to be accomplished,

civilians, civilian objects

may lawfully be tar-

and the protections

and those who are hors de combat are entitled.

an armed conflict must comply with the jus

in bello; status as

11

to

in bello.

which

All sides to

an aggressor or a vic-

tim in the jus ad bellum context has no bearing on the requirement. 12 This
does not address the jus

battle-

article

13

The Prelude

A basic grasp of the complex historical predicates to the 2006 conflict in Lebanon is
essential to

understanding Operation Change Direction and its normative context.

Southern Lebanon

is

a predominately Shiite area that has been largely ignored

by

The absence of a strong governmental presence rendered the area susceptible to exploitation by anti-Israeli groups.
Until its expulsion from Lebanon in 1982, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) used southern Lebanon as a base of operations against Israel. 14 In 1978,
a PLO attack on two Israeli busses left thirty-seven dead and scores wounded. The
IDF reacted with Operation Litani, an operation designed to force the PLO and
other Palestinian armed groups from Lebanese territory south of the Litani River.
In response, the Security Council, in Resolutions 425 and 426, called on Israel to
withdraw from Lebanon. It also created UNIFIL to monitor the withdrawal, help
restore international peace and security, and assist Lebanon in establishing effecthe Lebanese government.

tive authority in the area. 15

UNIFIL and

the Lebanese

government proved impotent

Palestinian attacks.

16

tion of the Israeli

Ambassador

Peace for Galilee.

17

in deterring further

Abu

Nidal Organization's attempted assassina-

to the

United Kingdom precipitated Operation

In 1982, the

During the controversial invasion of Lebanon, the IDF ousted

Syrian forces from Beirut and expelled the
Arafat. 18 Israel established a buffer

PLO, including

its

leader Yasser

zone in the southern part of the country, where

IDF remained for the next eighteen years.
The 1982 invasion radicalized many of southern Lebanon's Shiites. Inspired in
part by the 1979 Iranian Revolution, they created Hezbollah (Party of God).
Trained, armed, financed and logistically supported by Syria and Iran, Hezbollah's

the

manifesto includes the liberation of Jerusalem, the destruction of Israel and the establishment of an Islamic State in Lebanon. 19
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Israeli

Since
ism.

Operations in Lebanon (2006) and the

Law of Self-Defense

formation, Hezbollah has repeatedly engaged in international terror-

its

The catalogue of such

acts

is

long and bloody.

It

includes the seizure of eigh-

US Embassy and
Marine Barracks in Beirut, a 1984 attack in Spain which killed eighteen US service
members, the 1985 hijacking of TWA flight 847 (during which a US Navy sailor

teen

US

hostages in the 1980s and '90s, the 1983 bombings of the

was murdered), the 1994 bombing of the
lar attacks against targets in Israel

with bombs, rockets and surface-to-air missiles. 20

(1993) and Grapes of Wrath (1996)

rity

Embassy in Buenos Aires, and regu-

—Operations

twice launched major military operations

Israel

In

Israeli

—

in response.

Accountability

21

May 2000, Israel ended its occupation of southern Lebanon, a move the Secu-

Council recognized

as

compliant with Resolution 425. 22 Syria and Lebanon

protested, maintaining that the ongoing Israeli presence at Shab'a Farms, seized in

1967, violated the Resolution
territory.

23

and amounted

to

continued occupation of Lebanese

In any event, Hezbollah quickly filled the security

the wake of the withdrawal

vacuum

created in

and continued to mount attacks against Israeli targets. 24

A declaration by Hezbollah's leader, Sheik Hassan Nasrallah, that "if Jews gather in
Israel,

it

will save us the trouble

ganization's aims.

During

of going after them worldwide" confirmed the or-

25

this period, Israel repeatedly called

on Lebanon to

establish control over

the south. Likewise, the Security Council regularly stressed the importance of Leb-

anese action. 26 The

demands

forces in the country.

who assumed power

27

fell

on deaf ears,

in part

due

to the presence of Syrian

Lebanese President Emile Lahoud, a Maronite Christian

in 1998,

had seemingly decided

to tolerate Hezbollah's pres-

ence and

activities.

amended

the Constitution to allow extension of Lahoud's term in office for an ad-

In 2004, the National Assembly, acting under Syrian pressure,

ditional three years. 28
1

559.

29

Jointly

The

Security Council reacted in September with Resolution

sponsored by the United States and France, the resolution called for

a Syrian withdrawal

and the disarming of Hezbollah,

a

requirement previously

forth in the 1989 Ta'if Accords ending Lebanese civil war.

The

set

30

assassination of Rafiq al-Hariri in February 2005 caused the situation to

deteriorate dramatically. Al-Hariri, a Sunni,

had served

as

Prime Minister

having only resigned the previous October. His assassination, which
occurred

at the

litical crisis,

behest of Syria, sparked massive demonstrations.

twice,

many believed

The ensuing po-

labeled the "Cedar Revolution," led to the withdrawal of Syrian mili-

same time, the United Nations called on the Lebanese
double its efforts to ensure an immediate halt to serious viola-

tary forces. At the

government "to

tions" of the Blue Line, the "border" (line to

between Lebanon and

Israel.

31
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which the

Israelis

withdrew

in

2000)
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In May, an anti-Syrian coalition

sembly

seats necessary to unseat

won elections, but fell short of the National AsLahoud. 32 Hezbollah, together with the Amal

Movement and other partners, took over a quarter of the parliamentary seats; two
of its members were appointed to cabinet posts in Prime Minister Faud Siniora's
government. 33 But the postelection

political

arrangements proved

fragile.

In De-

cember 2005, the Hezbollah-Amal coalition walked out of the government when
the National Assembly agreed to a joint Lebanese-international tribunal to try
those accused in al-Hariri's death. 34 Siniora was forced to

make

concessions to se-

cure Hezbollah's return. In particular, he agreed never to refer to the organization
as a "militia"

and adopted an

resistance a natural

threats."

By

conceded the

mament

position that "the government considers the

and honest expression of the Lebanese people's national

to liberate their land
35

official

and defend

their

honour

rights

against Israeli aggression

and

characterizing Hezbollah as a resistance group, Siniora effectively
"legal fiction" that the Resolution

1559 requirement for militia disar-

did not apply to the organization.

Despite this victory, Hezbollah had been weakened by the "Cedar Revolution,"

departure of the Syrians, and Lebanese political in-fighting.
recapture

momentum.

It

Terrorist operations against Israel

needed

seemed

to

somehow

to present a

November 2005, Hezbollah fired mortars and
rockets across the Blue Line against IDF positions and facilities. Its forces also assaulted government offices and IDF positions in Ghajar, purportedly in an attempt

promising prospect for doing

to kidnap Israeli soldiers.

Hezbollah

moved

so.

In

Other actions against

quickly to strengthen

its

Israel followed.

forces

and

stockpile arms.

By mid-

summer of 2006, the organization fielded two to three thousand fighters and thousands of rockets, some of which could reach far into

Israel.

Moreover, Nasrallah

had proclaimed that he intended to kidnap Israeli soldiers and use them as bargaining chips in a prisoner exchange; 2006 was to be "the year of retrieving prisoners." 36

The threat was highly credible, for in October 2000, Hezbollah fighters had crossed
into Israel and kidnapped three soldiers. Hezbollah killed them, using their bodies
as bargaining chips in a

2004 prisoner exchange. 37

ominous situation, Kofi Annan and other UN representatives
repeatedly called on the Lebanese government to move south and exert control over
the border areas. 38 Their concerns proved well founded. When Hezbollah mounted
Operation True Promise on July 12, Israel responded with Operation Change Direction. The subsequent exchanges proved heavy. Hezbollah launched 125 rockets on
July 13, 103 on the following day, and 100 on the fifteenth. 39 On July 14, a Hezbollah
Sensitive to the

The incident was especially
not have been mounted but for radar data

rocket struck an Israeli warship, killing two sailors.

noteworthy, for the attack could likely

provided to Hezbollah from a Lebanese military radar
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site.

40

Israeli

For
tives

Operations in Lebanon (2006) and the

part, Israel offered a

its

Law of Self-Defense

seventy-two-hour ultimatum for release of the cap-

and cessation of the rocket

attacks. 41 In the

meantime,

it

declared an air and

naval blockade of Lebanon, conducted air strikes, and engaged in limited cross-

border operations designed to

foil

rocket launches.

and bridges throughout the country,

as Rafic Hariri International Airport in Beirut

were

of communication. 42 Israel hoped to prevent the removal of

lines

napped

by cutting them. By

soldiers

Lebanon; on August
border.

43

Many of the initial targets, such

Two

days

called for "the

9,

IDF was moving

kid-

into southern

launched ground operations extending well beyond the

it

later,

late July, the

its

the Security Council passed Resolution 1701, in which

it

immediate cessation by Hizbollah of all attacks and the immediate

cessation by Israel of

soon followed and

offensive military operations." 44

all

hostilities

ended on August

14. Israeli

A

ceasefire

agreement

troops had completely

withdrawn from Lebanon by October.

The Israeli Legal Justification
As noted,

Israel, in

announcing

the release of its soldiers
actions

readiness to take "appropriate" steps to secure

its

and force

a halt to the rocket attacks, justified

on the basis of self-defense pursuant to Article

what precipitously,
Syria, Iran

pointed the finger of blame

it

at

5 1 of the

its

military

UN Charter. Some-

not only at Hezbollah, but also

and Lebanon.

Responsibility for this belligerent act of

from whose

territory these acts have

war

lies

with the Government of Lebanon,

been launched into

Israel.

Responsibility also

lies

with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Syrian Arab Republic,

which support and embrace those who carried out

These acts pose

and the

a grave threat

entire world.

led to a situation in

many

The

not just to

Israel's

this attack.

northern border, but also to the region

ineptitude and inaction of the

which

it

Government of Lebanon has

has not exercised jurisdiction over

its

own

territory for

The Security Council has addressed this situation time and time again in
its debates and resolutions. Let me remind you also that Israel has repeatedly warned
the international community about this dangerous and potentially volatile situation.
In this vacuum festers the Axis of Terror: Hezbollah and the terrorist States of Iran and
Syria, which have today opened another chapter in their war of terror.
years.

Today's act

is

a clear declaration of war,

and

is

in blatant violation

Security Council Resolutions 425 (1978), 1559 (2004)

of the Blue Line,

and 1680 (2006) and all other
from southern

relevant

resolutions of the United Nations since Israel withdrew

Lebanon

in

May 2000. 45
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In great part, the Israelis attributed Hezbollah's actions to

of its failure to control the south.

Lebanon on the basis

A special Cabinet communique issued the day of

the Hezbollah attacks noted that "Israel views the sovereign Lebanese
as responsible for the action that originated

ducted soldiers to

Israel. Israel

—Hezbollah's

its soil

and for the return of the ab-

demands that the Lebanese Government implement

UN Security Council Resolution
ground

on

Government

1559." 46 Prime Minister Olmert added a second

participation in the Lebanese government:

This morning's events were not a terrorist attack, but the action of a sovereign state that

The Lebanese government, of which Hizbullah is a member, is
undermine regional stability. Lebanon is responsible and Lebanon will bear

attacked Israel ....
trying to

the consequences of its actions. 47

The extent

to

which

best illustrated

Israel initially

by IDF Chief of

focused responsibility on Lebanon was perhaps

Staff Lieutenant General

"turn back the clock in Lebanon by 20 years."

Dan

Halutz's threat to

48

A November 2006 UN Human Rights Council report also drew a close connection between Hezbollah

and Lebanon. In an

whether an "armed conflict" between

Israel

analysis of the separate issue of

and Lebanon

existed, 49 the report

noted that

in

Lebanon, Hezbollah

nationals

is

a legally recognized political party,

whose members

are both

and a constituent part of its population. It has duly elected representatives in
and is part of the Government. Therefore, it integrates and participates

the Parliament

in the constitutional organs of the State ....

[F]or the public in Lebanon, resistance

means

Israeli

occupation of Lebanese

territory.

The effective behavior of Hezbollah in South Lebanon suggests an inferred link
between the Government of Lebanon and Hezbollah in the latter's assumed role over
the years as a resistance movement against Israel's occupation of Lebanese territory
.... Seen from inside Lebanon and in the absence of the regular Lebanese
Forces in South Lebanon, Hezbollah constituted and

{'mukawamaH)
assumed de

is

an expression of the resistance

for the defence of the territory partly occupied

facto

State

Armed

authority and control in South

Hezbollah had also

Lebanon

in

non-full

implementation of Security Council Resolutions 1159 (2204) and 1680 (2006)

50
.

.

.

.

A Lebanese Cabinet policy statement of May 2005 had similarly characterized Hezbollah as a resistance force. Enhancing the purported relationship was Nasrallah's
leadership not only of Hezbollah's military wing, but also of the political wing that

was participating

in

government; neither faction advocated a peaceful solution to

the dispute with Israel.
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As

Israel saber-rattled,

UN

the
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Lebanon quickly denied
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culpability. In July 13 letters to

Secretary-General and Security Council President, Lebanon claimed that

Government was not aware of the events that occurred and are occurring on the international Lebanese border" and that "the Lebanese Government is not responsible for these events and does not endorse them." 51 Two days
"the Lebanese

later, in

an "Address to the People," Prime Minister Siniora again distanced him-

from the

self

Kofi

denying any prior knowledge thereof. 52 Secretary-General

attacks,

the Lebanese disclaimer. 53

Annan accepted

quickly backed away from assertions that the July 12 attacks were attrib-

Israel

utable to Lebanon, at least in the normative context of self-defense.
teenth, the Cabinet issued a

Lebanon but the

made Lebanon

have
der."

terrorist

54

communique

that declared, "Israel

On

the six-

not fighting

is

element there, led by Nasrallah and his cohorts,

a hostage

who

and created Syrian and Iranian enclaves of mur-

Similarly, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs briefing paper prepared shortly be-

fore the conflict

ended stated that although Lebanon bore responsibility "for the

present situation, and consequently

quences,

.

.

Israel

.

.

.

.

could not expect to escape the conse-

views Hamas, Hizbullah, Syria and Iran as primary elements in

the Jihad/Terror Axis threatening not only Israel but the entire Western world." 55
to Lebanon's responsibility, the paper deviated
set

from the

attitude

adopted

As

at the out-

of hostilities:

Israel

did not attack the government of Lebanon, but rather Hizbullah military assets

within Lebanon. Israel avoided striking at Lebanese military installations, unless these

were used to

assist

number of

the Hizbullah, as were a

destroyed after they helped the terrorists

fire a

radar

at least

cites a

number of

struck Lebanese military targets, the discussion
ples

—

the Israeli Air Force, the catalogue

wished

it

to engage

Thus, by war's end,

is

marked by

a barracks. 57

the

facilities

Human

and

Rights

IDF
paucity of exam-

Lebanese radar

facilitated

Given the wherewithal of

would undoubtedly have been

Lebanon

Israel

and

Israel

instances in which the

a military airfield, radar installations (recall that

the anti-ship missile attack of July 14)

Israel

government

absent an express link to Hezbollah. While the

Council report referenced earlier

which

shore-to-ship missile at an Israeli ship. 56

In fact, Israel assiduously avoided striking Lebanese

equipment,

facilities

far lengthier

had

militarily.

was steering clear of arguments that Hezbollah actions

amounted to a Lebanese "armed attack" within the meaning of Article 5 Whether
correct as a matter of law, tempering comments on the linkage represented sage
1

policy. First, Israel

void

its

needed the Lebanese

withdrawal would leave

if

it

Army

hoped
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southern Lebanon. Second,

little

was to be gained

in styling

Operation Change

Direction as a response to a Lebanese "armed attack" because Israeli military operations could

more convincingly be

legally justified as a direct response

Hezbollah. Third, conflict between States in the volatile Middle East
tentially contagious; therefore, for practical reasons,

trayal of hostilities as inter-State. Finally, as will also

community

it is

is

to

always po-

usually best to avoid por-

be discussed, the international

gingerly accepted Israel's need to defend itself against the increasingly

frequent Hezbollah attacks. Limiting the finger-pointing to Hezbollah

would

fit

better within the prevailing international frame of reference, an important consid-

eration in light of the fact that the international community's assistance

would

would also avoid a direct conflict with UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who early on adopted the position
that the Lebanese government had no advance notice of the July 12 attacks and
likely

prove helpful in securing the border

areas. It

that the Hezbollah actions ran counter to the interests of the Lebanese govern-

ment and

people. 58

Widespread,

albeit cautious,

acceptance of the legitimacy of the

response to Hezbollah emerged.
discussions of July 14.
"Israel's right to

59

It

was certainly apparent

Israeli defensive

in the Security Council

Similarly, Secretary-General Kofi

Annan acknowledged

defend itself under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter." 60 So

too did individual States and their leaders. 61 In the Arab world, Saudi Arabia
cized Hezbollah's "uncalculated adventures," a reproach echoed

and the United Arab Emirates.

made

62

criti-

by Jordan, Egypt

Indeed, Nasrallah complained that such censure

possible the harsh Israeli reaction. 63

Arab support only dissipated

in the af-

termath of Israel's July 30 bombing of Qana, during which twenty-eight

civilians

64

The Group of Eight, which was coincidentally meeting in July, condemned
Hezbollah actions and called on Lebanon to assert its "sovereign authority" over
the south, while the European Union made clear that it considered the right to selfdefense applicable. 65 In the United States, both the Senate and House of Representatives passed resolutions condemning the attacks against Israel. 66 Finally, the Sedied.

curity Council clearly indicated in Resolution 1701 that Hezbollah's attacks of July

12

had precipitated

events. 67

Such acceptance

is

cial

an important indicator of the operational code, the unoffi-

but actual normative system governing international actions. 68 In other words,

when seeking to identify the applicable law, it is essential to ascertain how the relevant international actors, especially States, interpret and apply the lex scripta. Only
then can norms be understood with sufficient granularity to assess an action's legality. It is

to those

norms

that this analysis turns.
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Legal Analysis

Self-defense under Article 5

1

of the

UN Charter was the claimed legal basis for Op-

Change Direction. In addition to Hezbollah, Israel initially pointed the finger of blame at Lebanon. This begs the question of whether the attacks and
kidnappings of July 12 can be attributed to Lebanon such that Israel was justified in
eration

characterizing

them

an attack by Lebanon

as

itself.

In that Israel's self-defense justification eventually centered

on Hezbollah, and

given the international community's seeming acceptance of that position, the issue

of an "armed attack" attributable to Lebanon

is

not determinative. Nevertheless, a

colorable argument can be fashioned to the effect that Hezbollah's actions were
equally Lebanon's, at least as a matter of law. In particular, Hezbollah's participation in the Lebanese

government and the government's apparent recognition of

the organization as a legitimate resistance group support such a depiction.
Article 8 of the International

Law Commission's Articles of State Responsibility

provides that an action carried out "on the instructions

or control

of,

the State"

amounts to an

Lebanese government, considered in
ganization's political

"act of State."

69

or under the direction

of,

Hezbollah's inclusion in the

light of Nasrallah's control

and military wings,

over both the or-

relevant in this regard. Yet, there

is

evidence that the Hezbollah parliamentarians or cabinet

is

no

members directed or were

otherwise involved in the attacks, or that the Lebanese government controlled the
organization, either directly or indirectly. Neither could Hezbollah be fairly characterized as "an organ
State

.

.

.

which has been placed

[that exercised]

of a State by another

elements of the governmental authority in the absence or

default of the official authorities
cise

at the disposal

and

such

in circumstances

of those elements of authority" pursuant to Article

9.

70

as to call for the exer-

Although Hezbollah

re-

ceived significant support from Syria and Iran, those States did not exercise
sufficient control over the organization to

Even when actions qualify as

meet the

Article 9 threshold.

acts of State for responsibility purposes, Article 50

bars the use of forceful countermeasures in response to a breach short of an
attack" under Article 51 (absent a Security Council mandate).

when

assessing the Israeli response, the question

is

when

71

"armed

In other words,

a non-State

armed

group's actions can be attributed to a State for self-defense purposes.
It

has long been recognized that support for non-State

amount

armed

to an

attack by the State supporter.

Justice (ICJ) has addressed the subject

gua judgment,
attack

if

it

found that

of

its

"scale

The

a non-State actor's actions

and

effects,"

In the 1986 Nicara-

could amount to an armed

on behalf of a

"would have been
274
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International Court of

on multiple occasions.

the group in question was "sent by or

tion, in light

72

State

and the opera-

classified as

an armed
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attack

.

.

.

had

it

been carried out by regular armed

forces." 73 In support of its posi-

Court cited Article 3(g) of the General Assembly's 1974 Definition of Aggression (3314 (XXIX)), which was characterized as reflective of customary
tion, the

international law. 74

The ICJ confirmed this

Congo and 2007 Genocide decisions.

"effective control" standard in

its

2005

75

The Nicaragua standard has proven

controversial. In 1999, the Appeals

Cham-

ber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia rejected
Tadic.

At issue was the existence of an international armed

it

in

conflict in Bosnia-

Herzegovina by virtue of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia's relationship with

Bosnian Serb

forces. In finding

such a conflict, the Chamber adopted a more

re-

laxed standard than that articulated by the ICJ. For the Chamber, the key was
"overall control going

beyond mere financing and equipping of such

forces

and in-

volving also participation in the planning and supervision of military operations." 76

and

would exclude
providing sanctuary or otherwise acquiescing to the presence of terrorists from the
Both the

effective control

overall control standards

ambit of "armed attack." Since no evidence

ernment

of a substantive Lebanese gov-

exists

link to the July 12 Hezbollah attacks, the relationship

and Hezbollah met neither the Nicaragua

between Lebanon

nor the Tadic "overall" con-

"effective"

trol tests.

In 2005, Judge Kooijmans, in his separate opinion in the Congo case, noted that
the Court had failed to take "a position with regard to the question whether the

threshold set out in the Nicaragua Judgment

is still

in conformity with

contempo-

rary international law in spite of the fact that that threshold has been subject to increasingly severe criticism ever since
perceptive.

it

was established

in

1986." 77

He was

The ICJ ignored the operational code evident in the international com-

munity's reaction to 2001 coalition attacks against the Taliban (the de facto gov-

ernment of Afghanistan). Taliban support
either Nicaragua or Tadic. Nevertheless,

during Freedom, with
zation or major State

for al

most

Qaeda

States

fell far

the operations.

On

set in

approved of Operation En-

many offering material support. 78 No
condemned

below the bar

international organi-

the contrary, a

month

after

launch of operations, the Security Council condemned the Taliban "for allowing
Afghanistan to be used as a base for the export of terrorism by the Al-Qaida net-

work and other terrorist groups and for providing safe haven to Usama Bin Laden,
Al-Qaida and others associated with them." Additionally, it expressed support for
"the efforts of the Afghan people to replace the Taliban regime." 79

Had

the operational code for attributing attacks

by non-State

actors to States

been relaxed? The precise parameters of any emergent standard remained unclear
because the community reaction to attacks on the Taliban

may merely

have

re-

flected a sense of relief over ouster of international pariahs, rather than a relaxation
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of the norms governing the use of force against States tied to terrorism. But

if

the

new standard could arguably apply to Lebanon. Like the
Lebanese government allowed Hezbollah sanctuary when it failed to

bar had been lowered, the
Taliban, the

move

south, as

Nations and
trol,

had agreed

it

Israel

to

do

1989 Ta'if Accords, and as the United

in the

had demanded. And with organized armed forces under its con-

Lebanon presumably had more capacity to deny sanctuary

did the Taliban vis-a-vis

al

to

Hezbollah than

Qaeda.

Ultimately, attributing the July 12 attacks to

Lebanon

is

problematic. True, the

President had expressed support for Hezbollah, the Cabinet had recognized

it

as

performing legitimate resistance functions, Hezbollah exercised government functions in the south

and the

failure

of Lebanese forces to take control of the area

On the other hand, the organization

could be characterized as providing sanctuary.

was not an organ of government empowered by Lebanese law, there

is

no evidence

that the Hezbollah cabinet ministers participated in the decision to strike Israel

kidnap

its

Lebanese

soldiers, the

officials

government did not

Israel correctly

itself

from the

grasped that there was a

much firmer normative

—

Prior to the terrorist strikes of September 11,
gest that Article 51 applied only to attacks
lay,

so the

offi-

attacks.

which to base Operation Change Direction

non-State actors

many

opposed Hezbollah, and the Lebanese government publicly,

and quickly distanced

cially

direct or control the operations,

and

self-defense against Hezbollah
it

by

argument went,

foundation on
itself.

might have been plausible to sug-

State actors. 80

in the

Those conducted by

realm of domestic and interna-

tional criminal law enforcement. 81

Article 51, however, contains

no reference

must be mounted by before qualifying
Similarly, Articles 39

to

whom the offending armed attack

for a defensive reaction as a matter of law.

and 42 (which together comprise the other exception

Article 2(4) prohibition

on the use of force) do not

limit the source of a threat to

the peace, breach of peace or act of aggression to States. 82
ysis,

to the

Beyond pure textual anal-

the Security Council has never restricted enforcement actions to those directed

against States; for instance,

it

has created international tribunals to prosecute indi-

viduals charged with crimes against humanity,

By

war crimes and genocide. 83

contrast, Article 2(4) specifically pertains to the use of force

States in their "international relations"
gests that the drafters

terpretive standpoint,

(i.e.,

relations with other States). This sug-

were sensitive to the textual scope of the
it

would

by member

resultantly be incongruous to

articles.

add

From an

in-

a State "attacker"

criterion to the law of self-defense.

A

construal of Article 51 which included non-State actor attacks had already

been advanced by some members of the academy prior to the attacks of September
1

1

.

For instance, Professor Oscar Schachter argued a decade earlier that
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clear that terrorist attacks against State officials, police or military units are

[i]t is

on a State wherever they occur. Attacks on private persons and private property
may also be regarded as attacks upon a state when they are intended to intimidate and
84
strike fear in order to compel that state to act, or refrain from political action.
attacks

Similarly, Professor

Yoram Dinstein has long maintained the right of a State to en-

gage in "extraterritorial law enforcement" against attacks by non-State actors. 85

Moreover,

it

must be remembered

that the locus classicus of the international

law of self-defense, the nineteenth-century Caroline incident, involved non-State
actors. 86

During the 1837 Mackenzie Rebellion

in Canada, rebel forces sought ref-

uge in New York state, where they also recruited from among a sympathetic popu-

On December

lation.

travel

20, British forces

between the United

States

and

boarded the Caroline, a steamer used for

rebel bases, while

it

was docked

in Schlosser,

New York. Of the thirty- three crewmembers and others on board, only twelve survived the onslaught. The attackers set the Caroline ablaze and sent

Niagara

An

it

adrift over

Falls.

exchange of diplomatic notes ensued, with the British claiming that

self-

defense necessitated the action, particularly in light of the American failure to police
its

own territory. In
arrested

ities

cated,

1841, the incident took a strange turn

one of the alleged British

had boasted of participating

McLeod's

release,

attackers, a

when New York author-

Mr. McLeod, who, while intoxi-

in the incident.

The

arguing that he was acting on behalf of the

British

Crown

demanded

in legitimate

The arrest resulted in a further exchange of diplomatic notes between
Secretary of State Daniel Webster and his British counterparts, in particular Lord
Ashburton. 87 The contents of those notes, discussed below, became immortalized
as the origin of the modern law of self-defense. 88 Thus, self-defense traces its normative lineage to an attack by a non- State actor.
self-defense.

In any event,

it

appeared as

if the

international community's reaction to the 9/11

The very day after the terrorists struck, when no one
was pointing the finger of blame at any State, the Security Council adopted Resoluattacks

had

tion 1368,

On

settled the issue.

which acknowledged the inherent right of self-defense

September

28, the

in the situation. 89

Council reaffirmed 1368 in Resolution 1373. 90

NATO

and

the Organization of American States activated the collective defense provisions of
their respective treaties

(which are expressly based on Article 51), 91 and Australia

initiated

planning to join the United States in military operations pursuant to the

ANZUS

Pact. 92 Forty-six nations issued declarations of support, while twenty-

seven granted overflight and landing rights. State practice seemed to be
strating

demon-

comfort with an operational code extending Article 51 to armed attacks by

non-State actors.
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Further evidence of this understanding of the scope of self-defense appeared as
the US-led coalition responded

Taliban

)

on October

7 with strikes against

targets. In its notification to the Security

ant to Article 51, the United States confirmed that
ble to the terrorist group.

93

Council that

Italy,

Japan, the Netherlands,

Turkey and the United Kingdom provided ground troops.

Pakistan, the Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan,

US

allowed

military aircraft to transit their airspace
95

port operations.

article applica-

Subsequent State practice proved supportive. Australia,

Canada, the Czech Republic, Germany,
land,

Qaeda (and

was acting pursu-

it

considered the

it

al

94

New

Georgia,

Zea-

Oman,

Turkey and Uzbekistan

and provided

sup-

facilities to

China, Russia and Arab States such as Egypt expressed accep-

tance of Operation Enduring Freedom. 96

The European Union depicted

the

military operations as "legitimate under the terms of the United Nations Charter

and of Resolution 1368 of the United Nations Security Council." 97 And the Security

Council adopted repeated resolutions reaffirming the right to self-defense in

the context of the conflict in Afghanistan. 98

It is

undeniable that post-9/1

demonstrated the applicability of Article 51 to attacks by non-State

Or
this

so

it

1

practice

actors.

seemed. In 2004, the International Court of Justice appeared to ignore

demonstrable history in

the Construction of a

Wall

its

polemical advisory opinion Legal Consequence of

in the

Occupied Palestinian Territories." Faced with

claims that self-defense justified construction of the Israeli security fence, the

Court found Article 51 irrelevant because
attacks the wall
gins,

was intended

to thwart

Kooijmans and Buergenthal

Israel

had not averred

were imputable to a

that the terrorist

State.

100

Judges Hig-

rejected the majority position, correctly pointing

out the absence in Article 51 of any reference to a State as the originator of an

"armed

attack," as well as the Security Council's self-evident characterization of

terrorist attacks as

armed

attacks in, inter alia, Resolutions 1368

and 1373. 101

Despite this telling criticism, in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo the

Court again

failed to address the issue

head on, inquiring only into whether a

State,

the Democratic Republic of the Congo, was responsible for the actions of a non-State
actor, the Allied

against

Congo.

102

Democratic Forces, such that Uganda could
In his separate opinion, Judge

the position that a non-State actor could

If the activities

Kooijmans cogently maintained

mount an armed

attack.

of armed bands present on a State's territory cannot be attributed to that

State, the victim State

irregulars

act in self-defense

is

not the object of an armed attack by

would, because of their scale and

attack had they been carried out

effects,

it.

But

have had to be

by regular armed

if

the attacks by the

classified as

forces, there

is

an armed

nothing

in the

language of Article 51 of the Charter that prevents the victim State from exercising
inherent right of self-defence.

103

278

its

Michael N. Schmitt

Judge

Simma criticized the Court on the same basis, chastising it for avoiding its re-

sponsibility for clarifying the law in a case directly

on

Such a restrictive reading of Article 51 might well have
prevailing interpretation, of the international law

However, in the

light

As

is

of September

self-defence for a long time.

it

in State practice

but also

ought urgently to be reconsidered, also by

known, these developments were triggered by the terrorist attacks
wake of which claims that Article 51 also covers defensive
terrorist groups have been received far more favourably by the

well

11, in the

measures against
international

reflected the state, or rather the

on

of more recent developments not only

with regard to accompanying opinio juris,
the Court.

point.

community than other

extensive re-readings of the relevant Charter

"Bush doctrine"

provisions, particularly the

justifying the pre-emptive use of force.

Security Council resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001) cannot but be read as

affirmations of the view that large-scale attacks

"armed

attacks" within the

meaning

of Article 51.

International reaction to Operation

Court was swimming against the

by non-State

actors can qualify as

104

Change Direction demonstrated

tide of the extant operational code.

might have been arguable that the supportive reaction to defensive

that the

Although

it

strikes against

Qaeda (as distinct from law enforcement endeavors) was an anomaly deriving
from the horror attendant to the 9/11 attacks, it would be incongruous to analoal

gously dismiss the international community's seeming acceptance of Israel's right
to act defensively against Hezbollah.

international law

is

dynamic, that

What the Court failed to acknowledge

if it is

to survive,

it

is

that

has to reflect the context in

community expectations as to its prescriptive content.
While the negotiating records of the United Nations Charter contain no explanation of the term "armed attack," it would seem logical that hostile actions by

which it is applied,

as well as

non-State actors must, like those conducted by States, reach a certain level before
qualifying as an

"armed

attack." 105

For instance, in Nicaragua, the International

Court of Justice excluded "mere frontier incidents" from the ambit of "armed
tacks."

106

Although the exclusion proved controversial,

107

that an incident occurs along a border does not disqualify

noted by

Sir

it

plainly the
as

an armed

mere

at-

fact

attack.

As

Gerald Fitzmaurice in 1952 in response to a Soviet request to include

"frontier incidents" in a

proposed Definition of Aggression, "What exactly does

mean? There are frontier incidents and frontier incidents. Some are trivial,
some may be extremely grave." 108 Although a frontier incident of sorts,
Hezbollah's actions on July 12 certainly rise to the level of armed attack. 109 They
this

were planned

in advance,

complex in the sense of including multiple components

(abduction and rocket attacks) and severe (kidnapping, death, destruction of
property). 110
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Actions in self-defense against armed attacks, whether from a non-State group

such as Hezbollah or a State, are subject to the same core

criteria,

which

trace their

roots to the Caroline case, discussed supra. In one of that incident's diplomatic ex-

changes, Secretary of State Webster argued that

[ujnder these circumstances, and under those immediately connected with the
transaction

and what rules of national law, the destruction of the "Caroline"

facts,

will

It

be for Her Majesty's Government to show, upon what

will

itself, it

it

moment for deliberation.

to show, also, that the local authorities of Canada

of the

to be defended.

be for that Government to show a necessity of self-defence, instant,

overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no
for

is

—even supposing

It

will

—did

nothing unreasonable or excessive; since the act justified by the necessity of

The

must be limited by that

necessity,

and kept

clearly within

it.

be

the necessity

moment authorized them to enter the territories of the United States at all

defence,

of

state

self-

111

three universally accepted criteria of self-defense appear in the extract: 1) neces-

sity ("necessity

of self-defence" and "no choice of means"), 2) proportionality

("nothing unreasonable or excessive"), and 3) immediacy ("instant, overwhelm-

and "leaving

ing"
into,

no moment

...

and remain, the normative catechism of

Court of Justice recognized the
gua;

for deliberation").

113,

a decade later

it

applied

first

two

as

These requirements matured

self-defense. 112

customary international law

them to Article

irrelevant

is

The Court has

recently

116

115

and Congo (2005).
Immediacy,
when assessing Operation Change Direction be-

criteria in Oil Platforms (2003)

the third criterion,

in Nicara-

5 1 self-defense in the advisory opin-

ion Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons. 114

confirmed the

The International

cause the Hezbollah attacks predated the Israeli response and continued through-

out the IDF operations.
Conceptually, necessity
quantitative.

Reduced

is

a qualitative criterion, whereas proportionality

to basics, necessity requires the absence of adequate

is

non-

armed attack in question. This does not
mean that non-forceful measures would not contribute to defense of the State.
Rather, necessity requires that "but for" the use of force, they would not suffice.

forceful options to deter or defeat the

Necessity analysis
is

is

always contextual, for the

situation specific. In the case of Operation

that Hezbollah

—an

utility

Change

of non-forceful measures

Direction, a key variable was

entity historically resistant to diplomatic,

economic and other

non-forceful actions and dedicated to the destruction of Israel

— had

carried out

the attacks and kidnappings. Additionally, precedent existed that was directly

on

point as to the futility of non-forceful measures in circumstances resembling those
precipitating Operation

Change

Direction. Recall the 2000 kidnapping of
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soldiers

and the use of their bodies in a prisoner exchange. History seemed to be re-

peating

itself.

The most likely alternative
action to

1)

immediate Lebanese

to Israeli action was, of course,

control those lines of communication Hezbollah might use to whisk

the captives out of the country, 2) recover the soldiers and 3) extend military con-

over the south such that the area could no longer be used as a base of opera-

trol

However, the necessity criterion does not

tions, especially for rocket attacks.

require naivete. As noted supra, extension of Lebanese government authority into
the south

had been

a cornerstone of the Ta'if Accords ending the civil

war

in 1989.

and 1680 (2006), the Security Council had
emphasized the urgency of exerting government control throughout the country
Further, in Resolutions 1559 (2004)

by disarming and disbanding Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias. 117 Yet, the Lebanese government had done nothing; on the contrary, it appeared that Hezbollah
was growing

militarily stronger.

By

summer

the

of 2006,

it

had two

to three

with up to ten thousand reserves. 118 Hezbollah's arsenal

thousand regular

fighters,

included not

than twelve thousand rockets. Most were short-range Katyushas,

less

but the organization also possessed Iranian-supplied Zelzal-2s, with a range of 210
kilometers, sufficient to strike deep into Israel. 119

Lebanese government, particularly given

its

was evident that action by the

It

political disarray

over the past year,

did not represent a viable alternative to Israeli use of force.

Another possible alternative was deferral to action by the international community,

much as Israel had done in

1991

when Saddam Hussein launched Scud missile

attacks against Israeli population centers during the "First Gulf

the situation in 2006 was dramatically different.
against Hezbollah, as the coalition
tently impotent.

The two

had been with

No

War." However,

friendly forces

Iraqi forces,

were engaged

and UNIFIL was pa-

States enjoying influence over Hezbollah, Iran

offered little promise; the leader of the

first

and

Syria,

had called for the Israel's destruction, 120

while the latter was technically at war with

Israel.

121

Finally, over the years the

United Nations had demonstrated a marked inability to resolve matters in the
Security Council politics generally precluded strong Chapter VII action,

ous

area,

and previ-

UN entreaties to Lebanon and Hezbollah had failed to achieve meaningful re-

sults.

In any event, the attacks were under

customary law of self-defense) required
fending

itself.

On the contrary, Article 51

in the face of an

armed

taken no such step, nor did

met the

Israel to yield to

in Article 51 (or the

any other entity in de-

expressly allows a State to act defensively

attack "until the Security Council has taken measures nec-

essary to maintain international peace

tion clearly

way and nothing

it

and

security." 122

purport to have done

so.

necessity criterion of self-defense.
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Security Council had

Operation Change Direc-

Israeli

Operations in Lebanon (2006) and the

The other

relevant self-defense criterion

is

Law of Self-Defense

proportionality. Proportionality

deals with the degree of force permissible in self-defense;

allows the application

it

of no more force than required, in the attendant circumstances, to deter an anticipated attack or defeat one that

is

under way. In other words, while necessity man-

dates a consideration of alternatives to the use of force, proportionality requires

its

calibration.

Proportionality
force

is

frequently misapplied in one of two ways.

employed by the defender

is

latter.

false

premise that the former

to that

may not exceed

But proportionality requires no such symmetry between the attacker's

and defender's response. 123 Operation Change Direction

actions

the degree of

sometimes assessed through comparison

used by the aggressor on the basis of a
the

First,

Although the IDF response exceeded the scope and

paradigmatic.

is

scale of the

Hezbollah

kidnappings and rocket attacks manyfold, the only way effectively to have prevented

movement of the hostages was to either destroy or control lines of commu-

nication. Further, the best tactic for preventing Hezbollah rocket attacks, especially

from mobile launchers, was through control of the

territory

from which they were

being launched.

The second common misapplication of the proportionality

principle confuses

the jus ad bellum criterion of proportionality, under consideration here, with the

by the same name. The

jus in hello principle

latter prohibits

be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian

injury to civilians,

combination thereof, which would be excessive

civilian objects, or a

the concrete

life,

direct military advantage anticipated." 124

and

"an attack which

may

damage

to

in relation to

considers the conse-

It

quences of individual or related operations, not the scope of a response to an

armed

attack. 125 Proportionality in the jus in hello context

that resident in the jus

ad helium

is

fully

divorced from

—the autonomy of the two bodies of law

is

inter-

national law holy gospel.

Most

critics

of Operation Change Direction in the jus ad bellum context focus

on the proportionality
Israeli

The Secretary-General,
ground that they had "torn

criterion.

operations on the

thereby producing results that ran counter to the
tary to exert

warned
But

its

Israel

Israeli

for example,

condemned

the country to shreds,"

need for the Lebanese mili-

authority over southern Lebanon. 126 Similarly, the European

about acting

recall that to

in violation

Union

of the principle. 127

breach the proportionality norm, the defender must do more

than reasonably required in the circumstances to deter a threatened attack or defeat

an ongoing one.

On

day, 103 were launched, with 100 impacting Israeli territory
II )I

entered Lebanon in force

Nevertheless, the

The next
fifteenth. The

July 13, Hezbollah fired 125 rockets into Israel.

number of

on

July 22

—

a

day

after

on the

97 rockets had been

fired.

rocket attacks actually grew following the Israeli
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movement

north. In

soldiers, while

Hezbollah rockets killed forty-three

all,

wounding nearly

that, at least vis-a-vis

fifteen

hundred. 128

More problematic from

a proportionality perspective

tional Airport, 109 Lebanese bridges

According to the

spiriting of the hostages

resupplied.

130

self-evident, therefore,

insufficient).

targeting lines of communication. In particular, the

blockades.

and twelve

operations designed to stop rocket attacks, Israeli actions

were proportionate (indeed, arguably

129

It is

civilians

and 137 roads,

Israelis,

were

Israeli

operations

IDF bombed Beirut Internaand established air and naval

these steps were designed to frustrate any

out of the country and to keep Hezbollah from being

As a general matter of operational

art,

131

attacking lines of commu-

nication also allows an attacker to isolate the battlefield, an especially useful strat-

egy in Lebanon given the concentration of Hezbollah in the south.

That a nexus existed between the stated objectives and the targets selected is ap-

The Israelis had intelligence that indicated there might be an attempt to remove the hostages from Lebanon and Hezbollah arms had been smuggled into
Lebanon from abroad, especially Syria and Iran. Interestingly, though, the lines-ofcommunication strikes provoked little discussion as to whether the IDF had gone
too far in the jus ad helium sense. Instead, debate focused on two jus in hello questions: 1) did the targets qualify as military objectives; 132 and 2) even if they did, was
the expected harm to civilians and civilian property excessive relative to the anticipated military advantage. 133 The international community also condemned the effect the approach had on humanitarian assistance for the Lebanese civilian
population and the movement of displaced persons. 134
It does not seem possible to portray objectively Operation Change Direction as
disproportionate from the jus ad helium point of view. Characterizing an action as
disproportionate can be justified on two grounds. First, the action maybe so excesparent.

sive relative to defensive

That was

needs that the situation speaks for

clearly not the case with

res ipsa loquitur.

itself

Operation Change Direction, for Hezbollah con-

tinues to conduct anti-Israeli attacks.

By

not be styled as overly broad,

absent an argument the

at least

definition, therefore, the operation canIsraeli actions

were

inept.

Moreover, the Hezbollah actions of July 12 must be assessed contextually. The
organization had been attacking Israel for a period measured in decades; no indica-

would

in the future. 135

As noted by Judge
Roslyn Higgins, the present President of the International Court of Justice, pro-

tion existed that

it

desist

from doing so

portionality "cannot be in relation to

any specific prior injury

—

it

has to be in rela-

tion to the overall legitimate objective of ending the aggression." 136

Viewed

in this

way, the only truly effective objective from the defensive perspective was, as noted
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Ambassador

United

to the

States,

Law of Self-Defense

"Hezbollah neutralization." 137 The

law of self-defense does not require half measures.
Second, an action

is

disproportionate

employing

military course of action
fully

when

a reasonably available alternative

significantly lesser force

would have

success-

met the defensive aims. Allegations of disproportionality are impossible

to

evaluate in the absence of an asserted viable alternative.

The Report of the

Human

Rights Council's

Commission of Inquiry exemplifies

misapplication of the principle. Although not tasked with conducting a jus ad

bellum investigation, the group nevertheless opined that

while Hezbollah's

action under international law of 12 July 2006 provoked an

illegal

immediate violent reaction by

Israel,

it is

clear that, albeit the legal justification for the

use of armed force (self-defence), Israel's military actions very quickly escalated from a
riposte to a border incident into a general attack against the entire Lebanese territory.
Israel's

response was considered by the Security Council in

its

resolution 1701(2006) as

"offensive military operation". These actions have the characteristics of an

aggression, as defined

armed

by General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX). 138

In a footnote, the Report noted that self-defense "is subject to the conditions of necessity

and proportionality,"

citing

Nicaragua and Nuclear Weapons as support. 139

The discussion of the escalation from riposte to general attack implies that the
Commission believed a violation of the latter criterion had occurred. Yet, the report failed to explain how a riposte, or even a border action, would have sufficed to
meet Israel's pressing defensive needs. In particular, the Commission did not consider escalation in the context of Hezbollah's ongoing rocket attacks. Without such
granularity,

its

appraisal

der such an evaluation,

was purely conclusory; indeed, absent

it

was

a

mandate

to ren-

irresponsible.

more mature review came from Israeli official corners.
2007 interim report of the Winograd Commission, which

Curiously, a normatively

According to the April

Prime Minister Olmert established (and which was approved by the Cabinet)

fol-

lowing widespread criticism of the conduct of the war,

The decision
a detailed,

the

to respond with an immediate, intensive military strike

comprehensive and authorized military plan, based on

complex

characteristics of the

characteristics

Lebanon arena.

would have revealed the

A

[sic]

study of

meticulous examination of these

following: the ability to achieve military gains

having significant political-international weight was limited; an

would

was not based on

carefull

Israeli military strike

inevitably lead to missiles fired at the Israeli civilian north; there

was not

[sic]

other effective military response to such missile attacks than an extensive and

prolonged ground operation to capture the areas from which the missiles were

which would have

a

fired

high "cost" and which did not enjoy broad support. These
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were not
was taken.

difficulties

strike

explicitly raised

with the

political leaders before the decision to

Consequently, in making the decision to go to war, the government did not consider
the whole range of options, including that of continuing the policy of 'containment', or

and diplomatic moves with military strikes below the 'escalation
so as to
or military preparations without immediage [sic] military action

combining
level',

maintain

political

—

for Israel the full

range of responses to the abduction. This failure

reflects

which derives [sic] the response to the event from a
more comprehensive and encompassing picture. 140

weakness in

strategic thinking,

Winograd Commission concluded

Ultimately, the

that the

Prime Minister

played "serious failure in exercising judgment, responsibility and prudence."

dis141

This criticism could be interpreted as reflecting elements of both necessity and
proportionality

—necessity

in the sense that diplomatic

and political moves should

have been employed, and proportionality in that military action below the
"escalation level"

and

legal violation

best option;

it

might have

But it

sufficed.

strategic failing.

necessary to distinguish between

The law does not mandate

by the actor

selection of the

made be reasonable in the circumstances

requires that the choice

as reasonably perceived

is

at the time.

Thus, although the Winograd

Interim Report articulated sensible alternatives, the mere existence of such

On

natives does not establish a breach of the proportionality criterion.
trary, recall that the

2000 incident involving the capture of

ended

Hezbollah missile arsenal had grown since the

tragically, the

drawal, the Lebanese

Army had

failed to

dictate escalation.

The

situation

portional,

and assuming

sit

self- evidently

Israeli defensive actions

right to cross into sovereign Lebanese territory to

rights

—

Israel's right

torial integrity.

on the border

optimal.

were both necessary and pro-

for the sake of analysis that the Hezbollah attacks

The conundrum

is

with-

had become so complex by the summer of

be classed as a Lebanese "armed attack," the question of whether

tions remains.

Israeli

had

deploy south, the Lebanese government

2006 that no particular course of action was

Assuming, arguendo, the

the con-

Israeli soldiers

was fractured and in disarray, and Hezbollah enjoyed the ability to

and

alter-

Israel

cannot

had the

conduct counterterrorist opera-

the existence of conflicting international law

of self-defense, discussed supra, and Lebanon's right of terri-

142

Territorial integrity lies at the core of the State-centric international legal architecture, and, thus, the general inviolability of borders

national law. Indeed, the

is

well entrenched in inter-

UN Charter's sine qua non principle, the prohibition on

the use of force found in Article 2(4), expressly bars cross-border uses of force
singling out territorial integrity.

143

On

the other hand, self-defense
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cornerstone of international law;

it

Law of Self-Defense

represents the sole use of force unambiguously

permitted without Security Council sanction.

Beyond possessing

rights, States also

shoulder obligations in international law.

Of particular relevance with regard to Operation Change Direction is the duty to
police one's own territory to preclude its use to the detriment of other States. As
John Basset Moore noted in the classic 1927 Permanent Court of Justice case, The
S.S. Lotus, "[IJt is well settled that a State is bound to use due diligence to prevent
the commission within

people."

144

first case,

its

dominions of criminal

Corfu Channel^

45

this obligation in its

in

its

very

In relevant part, the underlying incident involved

which struck mines

The Court concluded

another nation or

acts against

The International Court of Justice reaffirmed

British warships
Strait.

its

two

Albanian waters while transiting the Corfu

that since the

mines could not have been

laid

without

knowledge, Albania bore responsibility based on "certain general and well rec-

ognized principles," including "every State's obligation not to allow knowingly

its

territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of others." 146

The Court reiterated
the point in United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran, which involved
seizure by Iranian radicals of the US embassy in Tehran and consulates in Tabriz
and Shiraz, as well as the taking hostage of American diplomats and other citizens. 147 There, the

and subsequent

Court held that

Iran's failure to protect the diplomatic premises

refusal to act to free the hostages violated

general international law."

its

"obligations under

148

Soft-law instruments further support an obligation to police one's territory. For

Law Commission's 1954 Draft Code of Offences against
the Peace and Security of Mankind labels "the toleration of the organization of
[armed] bands in its own territory, or the toleration of the use by such armed bands

instance, the International

.

.

.

of its territory as a base of operations or as a point of departure for incursions into
the territory of another State" an offense against "the peace

and

security of

man-

kind." 149 Similarly, General Assembly 2625 (1970), Declaration on Principles of International

Law

Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States

in

accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, provides that

[e]very State has the duty to

refrain

from organizing,

instigating,

assisting or

participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in

organized activities within

when

In

its

territory directed

towards the commission of such

acts,

the acts referred to in the present paragraph involve a threat or use of force.

150

terms of State practice, the most useful contemporary reference point

Qaeda's use of Afghanistan as

a

is al

base of operations. In 1999, the Security Council

imposed sanctions on the Taliban government
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Osama

bin Laden and for permitting

al

Qaeda

"to operate a

network of terrorist

camps from Taliban- controlled territory and to use Afghanistan as a base
from which to sponsor international terrorist operations." 151 It insisted that the

training

Taliban

cease the provision of sanctuary

and training

organizations, take appropriate effective measures to

control

is

and their
ensure that the territory under its

for international terrorists

not used for terrorist installations and camps, or for the preparation or

organization of terrorist acts against other States or their citizens, and cooperate with

bring indicted terrorists to justice.

efforts to

Included was a specific

demand

Osama

that the Taliban turn over

bin Laden. 152

The following year, the Council levied additional sanctions after the Taliban failed
to expel al Qaeda; it established a sanctions-monitoring mechanism in 200 1. 153
Of even greater normative weight was the absence of international condemnation

when

the United States attacked Afghanistan after the Taliban failed to heed

post-9/11 warnings to turn over Bin Laden and rid the country of terrorists. 154

new

While, as discussed, the legitimacy of translating the non-reaction into a

norm
of a

regarding State support of terrorism

community conviction

is

that Afghanistan

questionable,

had not met

it is

its

certainly evidence

obligations to police

its territory.

Given the aforementioned hard law,

soft

law and State practice, any formula for

resolving a conflict between one State's right to self-defense
territorial integrity

must equally be factored

which the attacks have been mounted
155

so, the State

its

policing duties. But territorial

into the formula. Therefore, before a State

act defensively in another's territory,

territory.

right of

must include the fact that the need for conducting the defensive

operations arises only when the latter fails to meet
integrity

and another's

it

must

act to

first

demand

that the State

may

from

put an end to any future misuse of its

sanctuary State either proves unable to act or chooses not to do

If the

under attack may, following a reasonable period for compliance (mea-

sured by the threat posed to the defender), non-consensually cross into the

The vicforces and

former's territory for the sole purpose of conducting defensive operations.

tim State

may not conduct

must withdraw

as

soon

as

operations directly against sanctuary State

its

defensive requirements have been met. 156 Since the

victim State has a legal right to act defensively, the sanctuary State

may not interfere

with the defensive operations so long as they meet the aforementioned
does,

it

will

may use

have

itself

criteria. If it

committed an armed attack against which the victim

force in self-defense.
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case.

157

far

is

from novel;

rather,

it is,

Kingdom demanded

Recall that the United

the use of its territory by rebel forces.

It

reduced to basics, the Caroline
the United States put an end to

was only after US authorities

ply that British forces crossed the border in a

I

might

in his

safely

failed to

com-

form of self-help. Those forces with-

drew immediately on capture and destruction of the
Ashburton

Law of Self-Defense

Operations in Lebanon (2006) and the

Israeli

Caroline.

As noted by Lord

correspondence with Secretary of State Webster,

put

it

to

any candid man, acquainted with the existing

say whether the military commander

in

Canada had the remotest

day of December, to expect to be relieved from

this state

state

of things, to

reason,

on the 29th

of suffering by the protective

intervention of any American authority. How long could a Government, having the
paramount duty of protecting its own people, be reasonably expected to wait for what
they had then no reason to expect? 158

The facts underlying the British actions were even less compelling than those
instant case.
bels,

Although

in the

New York authorities were sympathetic to the Canadian re-

they were not in breach of international

demands

that control be established

over the territory in question. Further, the United States was actively enforcing the
laws of neutrality. 159
In their separate opinions in the Congo case, Judges Kooijmans and
a stance similar to that presented here.

Judge Kooijmans points to the

Simma took

As Simma perceptively noted,

fact that the

almost complete absence of governmental

authority in the whole or part of the territory of certain States has unfortunately

become

phenomenon

a

conclusions that,

if

as familiar as international terrorism.

I

fully agree

with his

armed attacks are carried out by irregular forces from such territory
still armed attacks even if they cannot

against a neighbouring State, these activities are

be attributed to the

territorial State,

"would be unreasonable to
self-defence merely because there is no attacker
and, further, that

deny the attacked State the right to
State and the Charter does not so require

How could

it

set forth

apply neatly to Operation Change Direction. Following

withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000,

move south

to secure the area

ternational

community did

end

misuse of

to the

160

be otherwise? 161

The standards
its

so."

it

its

from Hezbollah and other

so as well. However,

territory;

somewhat guardedly, Hezbollah.
not, but whatever the case,

Israel repeatedly

it

it

it

that

Lebanon

terrorist attacks.

Lebanon took no

on the contrary,

Either

demanded

seemed

to embrace, albeit

did not, thereby opening the door for
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in-

steps to put an

chose not to police the south or

sive action.

The

it

Israeli

could

defen-
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Moreover,

Israel

moved

in a very measured, stepped fashion. Its initial opera-

and the naval blockade. Ground force operations took place only in the border areas. It was not until September 9 that the IDF

tions were mostly limited to air attacks

launched large-scale ground operations into southern Lebanon, and even then
they were confined geographically to the area south of the Litani River. Operation

Change Direction was also confined temporally. The entire operation lasted a mere
thirty-four days, at which point a ceasefire was negotiated that provided for an Israeli

withdrawal and,

at least in theory,

safeguarded

Israel's security

along

northern border. Finally, although Israel did strike Lebanese military targets,
least

arguable that the

its

it is

at

struck supported Hezbollah operations, as in the

facilities

case of the radar stations used in support of the strike

on the

Israeli

warship.

Conclusion
Operation Change Direction remains a subject of continuing controversy,

though most criticism centers on the jus
there

is

relative

agreement that

Israel

in hello.

had the

tacks pursuant to the law of self-defense.

Its

With regard

right to

to the jus

al-

ad bellum

respond to the Hezbollah

y

at-

response comported with the various

body of law. Hezbollah's Operation True Promise
rose to the level of an "armed attack" as that term is understood normatively, and
the Israeli response met both the necessity and immediacy criteria. Although disagreement exists over compliance with the criterion of proportionality, when Operation Change Direction is considered in the context of not only the July 12 Hezbollah
attacks, but also those which had preceded them and those which likely would have
requirements

set forth in that

followed, the standard was met.

A colorable argument can be fashioned that Lebanon also bore legal responsibility for the attacks,

ducted them

perhaps even to the extent that
This

itself.

support of terrorism

is

is

could be treated as having con-

especially so in light of the heightened scrutiny State

subject to in the aftermath of the September

against the United States.

1 1

attacks

However, such an argument, which can be questioned as

a matter of law, need not be

foundation for the

it

made, for the law of self-defense provided an adequate

Israeli actions.

In terms of the continuing construction of the normative architecture governing the use of force, Operation
gards. First,

it

Change Direction

is

relevant in

two important

re-

serves as further evidence of an operational code extending the reach

of self-defense to armed attacks conducted by non-State actors. Despite the apparent unwillingness of the International Court of Justice to acknowledge that the law

of self-defense

now

reaches such actions, State practice demonstrates acceptance

by the international community. Second, Operation Change Direction serves
289

as

an

Israeli

excellent illustration of the

operations

when

duty to police

its

growing acceptability of cross-border counterterrorist

the State in which terrorists are located

own

September

fails

to

comply with the

territory.

These issues loomed large on the international
tacks of

Law of Self-Defense
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11.

legal

horizon following the

at-

Reaction to the coalition response, Operation Enduring

Freedom, suggested that the international community had come to interpret Article 51 as

allowing an Article 51 response against non-State actors, including a non-

consensual penetration of another State's territory to carry

it

out.

However, opera-

Qaeda and the Taliban made for weak precedent because both
groups were globally reviled. Operation Change Direction, therefore, serves as an
tions against

al

important milestone in crystallizing the operational code in such matters.
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property that was likely to have been caused during

1

Israeli strikes

1-20; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Responding to Hizbullah Attacks from Lebanon:

Issues of Proportionality (July 25, 2006), available at

http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/

Law/Legal + Issues+and+Rulings/Responding+to+Hizbullah+attacks+from-l-Lebanon--l-Issues
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Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 1429, 1430 (Oct. 6, 2001).
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157. Caroline, supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
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